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URBAN GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: 
ASSESSING THE ROLES OF PUBLIC-, PRIVATE-, AND THIRD SECTOR 
LEADERS IN GOVERNING THE MODERN CITY 
 
Benjamin C. Leamon 
 
May 13th, 2017 
 
As central cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment, 
“urban renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of their central urban 
neighborhoods, are cities still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized by 
urban regime theorists, or have new players emerged? Further, as cities continue to evolve 
within the post-Fordist landscape, do extant theories of urban governance, themselves built 
upon decades-old observations, continue to provide adequate models for urban governance 
as it actually exists in cities today? This dissertation is a quantitative and qualitative 
examination of contemporary urban governance in the United States, and the roles of CDCs 
and anchor institutions in urban decision-making structures. Chapter One begins with a 
description of Dallas, Texas, and two of its central urban neighborhoods – Downtown 
Dallas, the city’s CBD that is currently undergoing a conversion to mixed-use development; 
and North Oak Cliff, a former streetcar suburb that has suffered from a half-century of 
political and economic neglect, but has recently seen its fortunes dramatically improve. 
Chapter Two retells the interconnected histories of theories of urban governance, the 
socioeconomic impacts of Fordism, its crisis, and post-Fordism, and the evolution of Dallas 




reasons why current conceptualizations of urban governance may no longer fit with actual 
urban governance. Chapter Three details this study’s methods – first, the use of census data 
from 1980 to 2010, and second, a reputational analysis of 79 participants who showed 
themselves to be highly knowledgeable about Dallas’ contemporary decision-making 
structure. Chapters Four, Five, and Six detail this study’s key findings – first, that modern 
urban decision-making occurs within multiple interconnected levels (neighborhood and city); 
second, that the structure of urban decision-making is still critical in understanding the 
nature of which decisions get made (and which do not), as well as the range of responses for 
a given situation; third, that  Dallas’ third-sector organizations (e.g. CDCs and anchor 
institutions) have been largely unable to meaningfully involve themselves in the politics of 
decision-making; and finally, that under the right blend of economic- and political pressures, 
structures of urban governance can change from one type to another. In the Dallas case, the 
decline of its business coalition, and the court-ordered breakup of its at-large city council 
resulted in a new structure of governance, or better put, a non-structure, wherein multiple 
competing agendas and resource pools have taken over the larger political discourse, and 
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With respect to post-Fordist cities in the United States, who governs today? As 
central cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment, “urban 
renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of their central urban 
neighborhoods, are cities still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized by 
urban regime theorists, or have new players emerged?  
Questioning long-standing conceptualizations of urban governance is not a new idea. 
As the 20th century waned, urban scholars looked at the turbulence of the 1960s, the 
construction (and subsequent dismantling) of the Great Society, the end of the Fordist crisis, 
and the rise of (some) cities within a truly global marketplace, and charged that the pressure 
politics of the community power paradigm could no longer conceptualize urban governance as it 
had become1. At the end of the 20th century, urban theorists used observations of central 
U.S. cities to recast models of urban governance, first by painting cities as growth machines2, 
and later, by using a more generalized model of urban regimes and coalition governance3. 
Forty years after the start of this new, political economy paradigm, many cities look nothing 
like they did when growth machine theory and urban regime analysis were first 
conceptualized, so contemporary observations of central cities may, once again, yield new 
insight into their decision-making structures.  
                                                          
1 DeLeon, 1992a, pp. 559-560; Harding, 2009, p. 34; MacLeod, 2011, p. 2630; Mossberger, 2009, p. 41; Peterson, 1981, pp. 27-29; Savitch 
& Thomas, 1991. 238-239;  Schragger, 2009, pp. 502-504 
2 Molotch, 1976; Logan & Molotch, 2007 




In the chapter sections that follow, this study will introduce the problem that it seeks 
to address within current conceptualizations of urban governance, resulting from changes 
within the demographic- and economic contexts of central cities, as well as the growing role 
of third sector organizations – specifically community development corporations (CDCs) 
and anchor institutions (i.e. urban universities and hospitals) – in urban policymaking and 
economic development projects. Then, it will set down a series of research questions and 
hypotheses for testing. Following this, it will outline methods that were used to test those 
hypotheses, through a mixed-methods analysis of Dallas, Texas. Next, it will offer a brief, 
logical argument to justify the study itself, as well as the significance of studying Dallas as a 
crucial case. Finally, it will present a brief roadmap for the remainder of the study.  
The Problem 
As noted above, in the decades since scholars first examined cities using the urban 
political economy perspective, cities in the United States have undergone another series of 
changes. First, while white flight allowed (some) residents to abandon central cities, a 
smaller, counter-migration of wealthier, highly educated whites moved back into gentrifying 
urban neighborhoods, at the cost of displacing people of color and people with lower 
incomes. Additionally, corporate disinvestment over that same period left many central cities 
all-but abandoned, and a subset of these are transitioning into mixed-use hubs of capital 
accumulation, culture, and entertainment4. At the same time, CDCs and anchor institutions 
expanded into urban economic development projects and urban policymaking – roles 
previously assumed by actors in governing coalitions. This integration has recently received 
some limited attention and speculation by academics5, but an in-depth examination of 
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whether this is actually occurring in cities, and what that involvement may portend, is largely 
absent in current scholarship.  
This study proposes to, once again, revisit the nature of big city politics. In the 
following paragraphs, this study will first elaborate briefly on relevant post-Fordist 
contextual shifts in U.S. cities. Then, it will discuss the growing presence of CDCs and 
anchor institutions in roles once occupied by members of urban governing coalitions. 
Finally, it will argue that the confluence of these factors justifies further exploration, which 
the remainder of this study will attempt to undertake.  
Post-Fordism and Cities after Urban Political Economy  
 Post-Fordism marked an (uneven) transition of the U.S. economy from its regional 
blue collar roots to a globalized, integrated economy built largely on globalized white-collar 
firms in finance, investment, and real estate (FIRE) sectors, supported by localized producer 
services6. Although cities of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s focused on attracting and 
retaining corporate capital, urban cores today focus on providing a host of amenities inter alia 
pedestrian-friendly streets, access to cultural amenities and entertainment, and unique 
housing options that are unavailable in the suburbs7. As urban cores shift from centers of 
capital production to centers of cultural consumption, the new values and preferences 
expressed by the voters, small business owners, and prominent organizations are 
fragmenting- and reducing the overall dominance of old guard economic elites on the 
governing coalitions8. Additionally, the firms that remain are connected to global capital 
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streams, and often show little (if any) interest in the politics of governing any particular 
place9, leaving room for new actors to emerge. 
An additional effect of this revitalization of urban cores can be seen in the racial 
composition of central urban neighborhoods. A traditional understanding of race and the 
urban/suburban divide suggests that, following decades of white flight, contemporary 
central cities urban cores are predominantly populated by people who identify as nonwhite, 
and often of low- and moderate incomes. Meanwhile, the suburbs and exurbs encircling 
these cities are often white, and comparatively more affluent10. This chocolate cities, vanilla 
suburbs model fails to adequately conceptualize the gentrification of urban cores, in which 
affluent whites migrate back into majority-minority central urban neighborhoods11, 
displacing both minority residents, and the businesses that serve them. These individuals and 
businesses often move into the inner-ring communities that were once populated by the first 
waves of white flight, creating a nonwhite ring of communities sandwiched between white-
populated central urban neighborhoods and white-populated suburbs. The model that takes 
into account this new racial makeup of central cities is called the new donut12, and will be 
detailed in Chapter 2.  
CDCs and Anchor Institutions as Unlikely, Emerging Partners in Urban Governance 
 While some scholars suggest that these new actors represent specialized 
administrative units13, spatially-linked coalitions14, and regional governing bodies15, this study 
instead forwards that CDCs and anchor institutions, which are traditionally considered 
“ancillary” actors in governing coalitions, may have expanded to fill the power gap left 
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behind by hollowed-out public sector offices and fading business elites, potentially replacing 
value-neutral development with more equitable alternatives16. CDCs and anchor institutions 
have greatly expanded their roles within cities since the 1980s, attempting to fulfill their 
stated missions of service to their communities, and limited scholarly examination of these 
roles suggests that these organizations may be taking on greater roles in the politics of 
decision-making, and within governing coalitions17.  
Looking first at CDCs, these nonprofit organizations have been charged with 
directing federal support into urban neighborhoods since the Great Society18, and have 
traditionally focused on providing low-income housing and administration of social welfare 
programs in economically-marginalized neighborhoods19. Since the 1980s, many of these 
organizations have expanded into business enterprise development, commercial real estate, 
venture capitalism, community finance, and urban redevelopment20. Anchor institutions, for 
their part, have recently evolved into major economic engines in cities across the United 
States21. Because they are geographically locked “anchored” in place, these institutions are 
principally self-interested in the local economy, and some have begun leveraging their status 
as major employers and purchasers in order to engage in more equitable economic 
development and investment in economically-marginalized neighborhoods22.  
Study Purpose 
Although CDCs and anchor institutions hold the potential to advance beyond 
“ancillary” status in the urban governing coalition, there is debate as to whether this occurs 
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in actuality. While some CDCs have succeeded in creating social linkages with public- and 
private-sector actors, and can enmesh themselves within the decision-making process, 
research is somewhat inconclusive regarding whether they have actually done so in any 
meaningful way23. In addition, although urban hospitals and universities are significant 
drivers of urban economies, they are not often leveraged as policymaking assets because they 
are seen primarily as service providers, and some doubt the actual impact of their 
involvement in economic development projects24. If these organizations can be shown to 
play a significant role in policymaking, then it would suggest that current urban theory needs 
to be expanded, so that it can adequately describe this new, three-way (public-, private-, and 
third-sector) sharing of power.  
The purpose of this exploratory study, then, is twofold: first, to evaluate the evolving 
urban context surrounding a contemporary governing coalition; and second, to evaluate the 
structure- and nature of decision-making in contemporary governing coalitions, especially 
with respect to the role of anchor institutions and CDCs, and the effects of those roles on 
economic development and social- and economic equity. In service of this purpose, this 
study will analyze the city of Dallas, Texas, a large, economically-thriving city in North 
Texas, as well as two of Dallas’ central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and 
Downtown Dallas.  
Why Dallas, and Why These Two Neighborhoods? 
 Previous studies of Dallas have identified myriad reasons why this city is particularly 
desirable for research into decision-making structures. Among these are Dallas’ location – 
far enough from major coastlines to avoid the particular cultural influences of those 
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population groups, its (broadly) consistent pattern of growth and economic development, its 
diverse economy, and its self-contributing cultural life that creates (rather than imports) 
much of its art and music scene25. Further, the dynamics of the city’s leadership as an 
entrepreneurial governing coalition are particularly salient; therefore, a study of Dallas provides 
a relatively straightforward setting for the study of these connections26. Building on this, 
Dallas’ decision-making structure has, for decades, typified the developmental or entrepreneurial 
governing coalition, and so findings from this study may be generalized, at least in part, to 
other cities with similar decision-making structures – hardly a challenge, given that this type 
of governing coalition has long been considered the de facto arrangement of urban 
governance structures27. Further, as a large, economically-vibrant city in the United States, 
Dallas is an archetypical post-Fordist success story28, and so some subset of the results from 
this study may be generalizable to other, similar cities.   
As this study of Dallas builds on two previous explorations of the city’s leadership – 
the first by Carol Estes Thometz, and the second by Stephen Elkin – it is important to 
(briefly) discuss the settings and contexts of each. Looking first at the Dallas featured in the 
1963 Thometz study, the city could be characterized as being in a period of explosive growth 
and modernization. A tightly-knit business community largely commanded both long-term 
planning and day-to-day city operations, leading to significant public investment into private 
development, bolstered by cheap access to domestic- and international capital for real estate 
development projects29. Supported by both the public sector and the private, legendary 
developers demolished much of the city’s urban core, replacing fine examples of art deco 
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construction with the high-rise office buildings that define a large percentage of Dallas’ 
contemporary skyline30. Within this context, the Thometz study utilized participant 
interviews to uncover a three-tiered hierarchy among Dallas’ leaders, in which senior 
businessmen operated at the highest echelons of decision-making, while younger, less-
experienced protégés worked on smaller projects, proving their worth through service, and 
advancing their careers alongside their roles as decision-makers31.  
 Roughly two decades later, the Dallas studied by Elkin (1987) had reached the peak 
of its boom times, but this growth came at a cost. At the time of the study, Dallas’ business 
community was no longer as unified as it once was, owing first to fragmentation over how 
(or whether) to redevelop the city’s limited remaining land32, and second, to the decline of 
locally-anchored businesses in favor of national- and international corporations whose 
executives had little (if any) particular interest in Dallas itself33. In addition, a court-mandated 
overhaul of Dallas’ elections, in which its all-powerful city council went from at-large 
elections to a hybrid district-based / at-large system, had crippled the ability of the city’s 
business community to control elections. Within this context, Elkin found that, although 
Dallas’ business community continued to form alliances with political leaders, this political-
business regime was no longer the pure entrepreneurial governing coalition that it was during 
the Thometz study34. 
 Returning to the present study, Dallas’ history of development is a story of amnesia-
by-design, wherein the city’s powerful private-sector elites, ever-mindful of creating the 
image of the Dallas they wanted to see, paved over deep racial- and class divisions, and each 
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new project seems to further cement an enduring pattern of inequity35. Like in other post-
Fordist cities, Dallas’ pattern of development has not been even, and many of the city’s 
historically low-income and majority-minority neighborhoods are not faring as well as the 
wealthier, whiter areas, excepting in cases of gentrification.  
 On the most positive end of Dallas’ development spectrum is the neighborhood of 
Downtown Dallas; as the city’s CBD, Downtown Dallas is the traditional hub of citywide 
economic activity, and it is also the home of several of Dallas’ most identifiable landmarks, 
in addition to a dramatic transformation from being an abandoned corporate capital 
accumulator to becoming a vibrant, mixed-use urban hub. In contrast stands the 
neighborhood of North Oak Cliff, a neighborhood that, in the wake of white flight 
throughout the mid-20th century, has been occupied by people with low incomes and people 
of color. Like Downtown Dallas, North Oak Cliff has entered a period of revitalization, but 
unlike Downtown, much of this development has come at the cost of displacing long-time 
commercial- and residential occupants. So far, the displacement has been minimal, but 
residents (many of whom are renters or tenants, rather than owners) express concerns over 
ever-growing plans to redevelop ever-expanding tracts of land. By expanding its focus 
beyond the city level, and into these two neighborhoods, this study hopes to understand 
whether, or to what extent, neighborhood decision-making, and the actors who get involved, 
differ from decision-making and decision-makers at the citywide level. 
Research Questions 
Through its study of Dallas, this study aims to answer three primary research 
questions. First, how have the city’s demographics and economy evolved in the decades 
since the city was studied by previous urban scholars? Second, to what extent (if any) are 
                                                          




CDCs and anchor institutions active participants in Dallas’ governing coalition? Finally, if 
these organizations are active participants in Dallas’ governing coalition, what is the effect of 
that involvement on urban development and policymaking?  
Hypotheses 
To guide its attempts at addressing these questions, this study forwards six primary 
hypotheses. The first three of these hypotheses relate to the changing socioeconomic 
context of Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and 
Downtown Dallas, with regard to literature-based expectations of the demographic- and 
economic fortunes of central cities and their innermost urban neighborhoods. The second 
three of these hypotheses address the nature of governance in these same three geographies, 
and the effects of “who governs” on the decisions made in contemporary cities and 
neighborhoods. These hypotheses are as-follows:  
Hypothesis 1  
 Consistent with expectations of modern, economically-prosperous cities in the 
globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, in the decades 
since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic context has changed in 
four primary ways: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population 
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census 
immediately prior to the Elkin study).  
 
• A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 








Hypothesis 2  
 Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification of urban 
neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff, recent urban 
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary 
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980. 
 
• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 
in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 




 Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification of urban 
neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas, recent urban 
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary 
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980. 
 
• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 
in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 








 In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs are primary 
(rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this involvement 
portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral development seen 
in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Hypothesis 5 
In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs in are primary 
(rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and this 
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Hypothesis 6 
In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs in are primary 
(rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and this 
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Overview of Methodology 
In studying the context surrounding contemporary urban governance, the structure 
of contemporary governing coalitions, and the hypothesized roles of CDCs and anchor 
institutions within these structures, this study utilizes a case analysis of a single city, as 
opposed to a more comparative research design. Although the results of case studies are 
limited by a lack of generalizability, their shortcomings do not preclude their usefulness as a 
basis for functional analysis of a phenomenon36. Further, this study argues for the use of 
                                                          




Dallas, Texas as a crucial case, or in other words, a “least-likely” scenario for changes to be 
found. The benefit of focusing on a least-likely scenario is that, if this study finds a 
transformation in the role of third-sector organizations in such a city, its results would be a 
powerful indicator of changes occurring elsewhere.  
In considering this study’s specific methods, recall that this study contains two 
components: first, a “context” component, and second, a “coalition” component; to address 
these, this study combines quantitative and qualitative methods. Looking first at examining 
changes in the demographic- and economic profiles of Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, 
and Downtown Dallas, this study utilizes decennial census- and American Community 
Survey (ACS) records from 1980 to 2010, in order to understand how the city and a subset 
of its central neighborhoods have changed in the decades since Elkin’s (1987) analysis of city 
governance.  
Specifically, for each geography, this study will examine changes in racial makeup, 
labor force profiles using blue collar and creative class employment, and economic polarization 
using median household income and poverty rates. For Dallas as a whole, select data will be 
compared to its surrounding MSA, to compare actual demographic- and economic shifts to 
what would be expected from the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model of lower-income, 
majority-minority central cities surrounded by wealthier, whiter suburbs. For both North 
Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, data from these neighborhoods and Dallas as a whole will 
be compared to expectations from literature regarding the gentrification of central urban 
neighborhoods and the new donut model of affluent, gentrified, white enclaves within 
majority-minority, lower-income cities.  
In addressing its “coalition” component, this study employs a reputational analysis of 




neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. A previous reputational study of 
Dallas described the city’s decision-making structure as being stratified into three tiers, with 
each being comprised almost exclusively of business executives and civic elites37. To 
determine whether (or to what extent) the previous reputational analysis’ results remain 
valid, this study’s 79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the 
nature of decision-making in Dallas as a whole. To expand on previous studies of Dallas, 
participants were further divided into two groups, based on their self-reported area of 
expertise, and were asked to complete additional surveys and interview questions regarding 
either North Oak Cliff or Downtown Dallas.  
Participant free-response survey items and interview responses were coded, and 
analyzed to determine whether decision-makers could be categorized into a typology; from 
this analysis, five typologies emerged, although the specific makeup of each, and the relative 
proportions of each differed within each geography. Participant survey results were also 
analyzed for various correlations using a series of Spearman’s tests, comparing perceptions 
of power with participants’ willingness to include any given actor on a critical decision-
making team, as well as to uncover any effects of participant familiarity with particular 
actors. Additionally, for the city as a whole, and for each neighborhood, Duncan’s New 
Multiple Range Test was used to establish the extent to which power is stratified within 
citywide- and neighborhood-level decision-making.  
Study Rationale 
 Through its study of Dallas, this study aims to examine contemporary urban 
governance as it actually exists, in order to consider whether current conceptualizations of 
urban governance in theory remain valid, over a quarter-century after their inception. 
                                                          




Specifically, this study aims to evaluate whether the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions 
are becoming driving forces in skewing many urban agendas away from value-free 
development, and toward more equitable models38, and further, that this increased 
involvement may portend a change in these organizations’ respective positions within urban 
governing coalitions39.   
To assess whether third-sector organizations have taken an impactful role in urban 
economic development, and whether this role (if it exists) portends the need to expand the 
governing coalition to include third-sector actors as core members, this study focused on 
Dallas, Texas. Throughout the city’s history, Dallas’ leaders have strived to make city policies 
favorable to businesses and growth, but a legacy of racism has focused this growth into 
white neighborhoods and Downtown Dallas, at the expense of majority-minority North Oak 
Cliff and other southern neighborhoods that continue to lag behind, but recently, have 
begun to gentrify as affluent whites migrate from Dallas’ northern suburbs to its central 
neighborhoods40.  
While necessarily limited due to time and financial constraints, this study of Dallas 
offers at number of benefits to urban scholarship. First, the size of the city itself lends itself 
to offering a large participant pool, even when nonresponse is taken into account41. In 
addition, the city is currently engaged in a number of significant redevelopment projects42, 
the study of which may help uncover the presence- and nature of the city’s governing 
coalition. Further, while the city has a long, documented history of pro-development 
coalition governance, it also shows signs of a growing third-sector involvement in a subset of 
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economic development projects43. Finally, Dallas is a somewhat archetypical example of the 
pro-development governing coalition writ large; even if CDCs and anchor institutions are 
not found to be central members of its governing coalition, if successful examples of 
equitable economic development projects are found, either at the citywide level or in this 
project’s two focus neighborhoods, then these could serve as inspiration for similar projects 
in other development-focused cities around the country.  
Organization of this Dissertation 
 Over the summer of 2015, this study analyzed hundreds of census records to render 
an image of the changing demographic- and economic profiles of Dallas as a whole, as well 
as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Additionally, its principle 
investigator conducted 79 surveys and interviews to develop an understanding of the 
structure and nature of decision-making in these three geographies. In Chapter 2, this study 
will outline relevant literature to undergird the present study, including changes in the greater 
urban context that challenge the accuracy of current urban political theory with respect to 
how it conceptualizes urban politics in practice. In Chapter 3, this study will describe the 
methods that this study used to understand contemporary urban governance in Dallas 
citywide, as well as in this study’s two focus neighborhoods. In Chapter 4, this study will 
report data from its quantitative analysis of census and ACS data, as well as data from its 
qualitative analysis of participant surveys and interviews regarding the nature of 
contemporary urban governance. Chapters 5 and 6 will analyze these respective types of data 
with respect to this study’s research hypotheses. Finally, in Chapter 7, this study will first 
summarize its key take-aways, and then it will suggest directions for future research. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the present study, the 
background that led to its creation, its setting and methods, and its significance and rationale. 
In the preceding sections, this study introduced the problem of whether anchor institutions 
and CDCs are central actors in contemporary governing coalitions, and further, whether (or 
to what extent) that involvement portends more progressive urban policymaking and 
equitable alterative economic development programs. Next, it established a series of research 
questions and hypotheses for testing. Then, it outlined the quantitative and qualitative data 
sources and methods used to test those hypotheses. Following this, it provided a brief 
discussion of the rationale behind studying governing coalitions in Dallas and two of its 
central neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Finally, it presented a brief 
roadmap for the chapters that follow. In Chapter 2, this study will expand on a number of 
these sections, especially those related to contemporary urban theory, the context of 






REVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE 
 In writing about Dallas in the early 1960s, urban researcher Carol Estes Thometz 
noted that, “in every community there are persons who ‘run things,’ who make decisions and 
take action in the citizens’ behalf”76. The question, then, is not whether people govern, but 
“who governs?” Although bureaucrats are certainly a crucial component of governance, 
observation of urban governance in practice suggests that leaders of other organizations (e.g. 
churches, universities, labor unions, and chambers of commerce) have various roles to play 
in urban decision-making, and equally various motivations for playing those roles77. Urban 
political scientists often lack the luxury of truly experimental settings for their research into 
the “who” and “why” of participation in urban governance; as a result, they must look cities 
themselves to find answers to these questions.  
 Systematically observing active, complex urban environments is challenging in its 
own right, especially considering that cities are perpetually being reshaped by both internal- 
and external social- and economic trends78. Thus, answers to the related questions of “who 
governs” and “to what end” (i.e. theories of urban governance) are anchored within an 
interlocking series of global-, national-, state-, and local economic- and social context; 
further, the studies of urban governance guided by those theories are also embedded within 
these contexts. Therefore, this study contends that as the urban context shifts, new studies 
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must be conducted, in order to adapt urban governance from a theoretical perspective to 
urban governance in actuality.  
 This study aims to retest the tenets of the urban political economy, particularly urban 
regime analysis, in light of new developments in central cities in the United States, 
particularly the ongoing demographic- and economic changes resulting from post-Fordism 
and the globalization of capital flows, as well as the rise of CDCs and anchor institutions in 
urban policymaking. In retesting the tenets of contemporary urban theory, this study will 
also look to a city – Dallas, Texas – a city whose decision-making structure has been studied 
twice before, each under a different paradigm in urban political scholarship’s understanding 
of who governs cities, and during two different economic paradigms – Fordism and early 
post-Fordism. Before doing this, however, this study will establish the presence of a lacuna 
within extant literature regarding contemporary urban governance – one that a well-
designed, exploratory study could begin to address. 
 In the sections that follow, this study will first explore the effects of Fordism on 
central cities in the United States, and then it will introduce pluralism and elite theory, which 
are competing theories under the community power perspective. Following this, it will describe 
Dallas under Fordism, and the 1963 Thometz community power study of the city’s decision-
makers. Next, this study will describe the collapse of Fordism with respect to central cities in 
the United States, as well as the collapse of the community power debates, and the transition to 
the urban political economy perspective within relevant scholarship, including a discussion of 
both growth machine theory and urban regime analysis. Then, the present study will introduce the 
1987 Elkin study of Dallas’ governing coalition, and its findings. Subsequently, this study will 
introduce post-Fordism as an economic and social transformation, as well as the expansion 




a reconsideration of what Banfield (1965), and later Savitch and Thomas (1991) described as 
big city politics.  
Fordism, Community Power, and the Thometz Study of Dallas 
 By the mid-20th century, central cities in the United States were transforming under 
the social- and economic effects of Fordism, with prewar construction being demolished to 
make way for urban renewal projects, highways, stadiums, and skyscrapers. Within this urban 
context, dozens (if not hundreds) of observations of central cities were conducted, and these 
observations led to two competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite theory, 
which are collectively referred to under the umbrella term of community power. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will first examine the greater urban context of postwar 
central cities in the United States. Then, it will discuss the two theories developed as a result 
of urban studies conducted within that context, concluding with a brief discussion on their 
similarities and the key, irreconcilable differences that engendered the community power debates. 
Next, this study will introduce the Thometz studies decision-making in Dallas, the results of 
which will be compared against the results of this study in Chapter 5.   
Fordism and Central Cities in the United States 
 As a socioeconomic paradigm, Fordism can be described as a combined, co-evolving 
network of factors that, following World War II, defined over a decade of interactions 
between individuals, social modes of production, and the built environment79. At its most 
basic, Fordism is closely associated with the mass-production of commoditized consumer 
goods coupled with strong central state involvement in inducing demand for these goods 
through various national-level policies80. Critically for central cities in the United States, in 
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the years following World War II, these policies and consumption patterns convinced a 
significant number of firms in related industries to co-agglomerate into regional 
manufacturing hubs, in order to take advantage of economies of scale and a generally reliable 
workforce81. Responding to the centralization of well-paying, stable jobs in central cities, 
workers began a mass-migration from farms and small towns into the growing 
manufacturing hubs of cities like Cleveland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Detroit. As a result, 
central cities across the United States grew at rates never seen before (or, in many cases, 
since)82. 
Community Power: Urban Theory under Fordism.  
 Following World War II, a new wave of perspectives on urban political science 
began to emerge. Beginning with Floyd Hunter’s 1953 study of Atlanta (which also served as 
the starting point of the community power debates83), mid-century urban political scientists used 
empirical observations of postwar United States cities like New Haven and Atlanta, many of 
which were booming under the Fordist paradigm, to reject previous iterations of urban 
theory – notions which restricted (or, in some ways, ignored) the role of agency in 
communities. For these scholars, power was a property of people, rather than abstractions 
like the “hidden hand of the market;” thus, many focused instead on the study of power as a 
social phenomenon, and looked to individuals and groups as the unit of measure for 
understanding how community decisions are made84. In devising alternatives to the purely 
positivist urban theories of their predecessors, postwar urban scholars reformulated 18th 
century republican- and populist conceptualizations of governance, and reconciled these 
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with the political-economic reality of cities in the postwar United States85. What resulted 
from this process were two competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite 
theory. 
 Pluralism. Looking first at pluralism, this position was championed by scholars like 
Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby, who argued that the urban decision-making process is best 
characterized by competition and compromise among various interest groups. In this model, 
the wide distribution of power among competing interest groups precludes coercion or 
dominance by any particular interest, and this dispersion forces groups to compromise and 
negotiate86. As a result, urban policies and projects were designed to ensure that most groups 
would be reasonably satisfied, at least as long as these groups maintain enough power to 
pressure the decision-making process87. Further, the nature of capitalist development and the 
democratization of governance actively create new roles for individuals and groups, whose 
right to equal treatment by public-sector actors frequently demands that the relationships 
among interests groups change and evolve88.  
 The end result of the pluralist model is that resource inequality among various 
stakeholders in the governing coalition ensures that no particular group has all of the 
resources necessary to govern, and as a result, cannot hold dominance over the entire 
system89. However, as groups amass power and resources, some may seek to perpetuate 
injustices, increase their control over the decision-making process, or weaken the democratic 
process overall90. It is, therefore, the responsibility of a strong, elected government to 
balance and regulate all of these competing interests, while respecting some degree of 
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autonomy, and using their counsel to ensure that policies adequately address the wants and 
needs of the electorate91.  
 Elite Theory. In repudiating the pluralist utopia, elite theorists like Lloyd Warner, 
Floyd Hunter, C. Wright Mills, and G. William Domhoff argued that, while a vigorously 
competitive governance structure in which citizens express their preferences through 
elections and interest groups vie for support of their agendas offers the governed their best 
opportunity for representation in the decision-making process92, in reality, this doesn’t 
happen. Instead, the differential distribution of resources allowed some interests, especially 
those of business leaders and wealthy elites, to exert dominance over the decision-making 
process, subverting pluralist pressure politics entirely93. In other words, the privileged 
position of an upper-crust of economic elites ensures a stability in which some elements of 
that structure are “more equal” than others94. From this inequality rises a relatively stable 
coalition of non-competing policy monopolies that support particular political interests95, 
and an urban governance structure that reflect a particular bias towards the upper class.  
 The end result of elite theory is that a small, interdependent network of public- and 
private sector actors are heavily involved in the politics of decision-making. Private sector 
actors support public goods and services as concessions to the general electorate96, and in 
exchange, economic elites are appointed to various positions of power, such as policy-
advisory committees, issue-specific advocacy- and lobby groups, and are called upon to 
provide expert testimony to influence others in the decision-making process97. Further, 
urban policies and projects are deigned largely to support the agendas of these “power elite,” 
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and other concerns (e.g. public goods and services) are addressed primarily to ensure that 
voters keep “elite-friendly” political leaders in power98.  
 Community Power, in summary. By the mid-20th century, central cities in the 
United States were booming under the Fordist paradigm, and to describe the decision-
making processes that both responded to- and helped guide the individual expressions of 
Fordism in cities across the United States, then-contemporary urban scholars developed two 
competing theories of urban governance: pluralism and elite theory. Although each of these 
handles it differently, both theories center on how civic leaders mitigate the central tensions 
that result from the division of labor, and how they arrange land-use patterns within cities 
such that the effects of these patterns were the least likely to engender popular resistance to 
growth and development99. These conceptualizations were (and remain) wholly 
incompatible, and for decades, political scientists debated the relative merits of these 
different conceptualizations of urban governance structures, which led to a somewhat 
schizophrenic approach to the study of urban governance throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s (i.e. the community power debates)100.   
Fordism in Dallas 
 While other cities, with federal support, rebuilt their urban cores as modern, 
industrial powerhouses, Dallas chose a different route, eschewing federal funds in favor of 
issuing municipal bonds101. The modern Dallas was founded in 1963, immediately following 
the assassination of President Kennedy102. Although ten years prior, Dallas’ business leaders 
already felt that the commercial center of Dallas, with its architecture dating largely to the 
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1920s, had become obsolete and too expensive to maintain, the Kennedy assassination 
energized city leaders (and more importantly, voters) to rebrand the city under a banner of 
growth and vibrancy, even if doing so meant making decisions in closed-door meetings and 
informal, off-the-record dealmaking sessions103. As noted in Chapter 1, the resulting period 
of explosive growth was encouraged by the support of political leaders who were largely 
hand-picked by the city’s business elite104, and who invested millions of public dollars into 
private real estate investment. In addition, significant private investment – both domestic 
and international – flooded the real estate market, thanks to federal tax policies that allowed 
wealthy individuals to reduce their tax liabilities by investing in certain types of businesses, 
the most attractive of which was real estate development105. Supported by both the public 
sector and the private, legendary developers like Trammell Crow, Henry Miller, and Hank 
Dickerson spent the remainder of the 1960s and 1970s bulldozing the “old” Downtown 
Dallas, with its marble floors and brass fittings, and replacing it with the skyscrapers that 
comprise much of the city’s current skyline106.  
Dallas’ growth was not spread evenly throughout the city, however. Following World 
War II, Dallas’ leaders trumpeted the growth in the central city and northern 
neighborhoods107, while largely ignoring the minority-majority communities south of the 
Trinity River, even though the largest commercial corridor, located in what is today North 
Oak Cliff, was second only to Downtown Dallas in revenue generation throughout the 
1940s and 1950s108. However, public officials interested in re-election would largely ignore 
the actions of well-connected white supremacists who terrorized nonwhite neighborhoods in 
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southern Dallas. While privately, many within Dallas’ governing coalition disapproved of 
racial violence, and its consequences for Dallas’ image, the threat of political backlash 
ensured that there were no meaningful attempts to hold anyone accountable, as long as the 
problems stayed south of the Trinity River, and as long as the people responsible for those 
problems continued to support the development in northern Dallas. Thus, many of the same 
back-room deals that prepared Dallas to grow into a modern economic hub also resulted in 
the wholesale abandonment of Dallas’ southern neighborhoods, both economically and 
politically109.  
 The Thometz study: urban theory under Fordism in Dallas. In postwar Dallas’ 
dynamic, though deeply troubled urban context, the Thometz study took shape. This study 
of the city’s decision-making structure in the early 1960s, strongly aligned with the tenets of 
elite theory, and somewhat unsurprisingly, it found that Dallas’ political and business leaders 
were tightly connected, and that leadership was highly stratified among three different 
echelons of decision-makers. At the top of this structure were seven key leaders, who 
represented Dallas’ business elite, and who made the vast majority of decisions in the city – 
only working with political leaders when public funding or approval was required. These 
leaders were informed- and assisted by several top level business executives, as well as dozens 
of younger, less-influential, second echelon business leaders, such as mid-level managers and 
“up and coming” young men110. The study also found that Dallas’ men of power were 
interconnected through various civic organizations and trade associations, which acted as 
“stepping stones” for men looking to further their civic ambitions, and which allowed 
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talented leaders to build the skills needed to eventually become top level and key leaders 
themselves111.  
As Thometz notes in a section regarding study limitations, these findings are 
anchored in one particular point in time112, although they are corroborated by several other 
accounts of Dallas’ leadership at that time113. By relying on a tightly-knit political-business 
leadership committee as the basis for a reputational analysis, the study was inherently limited 
by what these participants were willing to say, even with guarantees of anonymity114. This 
created a “blind spot” in the study’s results; which neglected leadership in the southern 
(minority-majority) half of the city, which was already tipping into what would become 
decades of institutional neglect. As a result, people in southern Dallas who may have been 
involved in the city’s leadership structure (whether any existed) were either not well-
represented, or were not well-identified, and the study makes no mention of the leadership 
divisions over racism and racial violence perpetrated by some members of Dallas’ decision-
making structure. Further, the study was conducted during a time in which growth defined 
the city; as such, had it been performed during a less-dynamic period in Dallas’ history of 
urban redevelopment, it seems possible that actors outside of the business community would 
have been more heavily represented in Dallas’ decision-making structure.  
Fordism, Community Power, and the Thometz Study of Dallas, in Summary 
 In the years immediately following World War II, central cities in the United States 
were trading in their 19th and early 20th century mid-rise CBDs for skyscrapers and 
convention centers, fueled by the Fordist boom and a rush to fill factories and office 
buildings with workers emigrating from the small, rural communities that dominated the 
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landscape of the United States until that point. Studying these cities, postwar urban scholars 
began to conceive of power as a social phenomenon, and looked to individuals and groups 
as the unit of measure for understanding how community decisions are made115. Resulting 
from these studies, two competing conceptualizations of urban decision-making: pluralism 
and elite theory totalized the study of community power, leading to an intractable series of 
community power debates that defined the study of urban political science for over a decade.  
 Within the above context, the Thometz study of Dallas found that the city’s 
decision-making process was controlled by its business community, and more importantly, a 
stratified power-structure of business leaders whose wishes were made manifest by 
functionally subservient political leaders – only one of whom was even considered by the 
study to be a decision-maker at the citywide level, and who had previously been a leader in 
the city’s business community116. As a result, Dallas represented what later scholarship would 
characterize as a “pure” political economy, wherein the primary purpose of city politics was 
to further economic development, where the connections between business leaders and 
political leaders were well-developed, and where citizens who rose to political prominence 
were all-but exclusively business leaders first117. Public officials in Thometz’ Dallas were 
voted for by the population, but the ballots were filled by those who were selected by the 
Dallas’ leading business associations – the Citizens Charter Association and the Dallas 
Citizens Council118.  
The Fordist crisis, Urban Political Economy, and the Elkin Study of Dallas 
 The postwar economic- and population boom that allowed central cities to grow so 
rapidly would not last, however, and neither would the community power debates. Social 
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upheaval and abandonment of central cities throughout the 1960s was followed by 
retrenchment and the “hollowing of the state” – a reassignment of responsibility for social 
services from public-sector actors to private- and third-sector alternatives – during the 1970s 
and 1980s119. The effects of the Fordist crisis, the wholesale rollback of federal support for 
central cities, and the emergence of a new, knowledge-based economy led some scholars to 
suggest that many of the generalizations made by community power theorists regarding the 
nature of urban governance had become increasingly obsolete120. In addressing these 
concerns, urban scholars at the end of the 20th century attempted to recast models of urban 
governance within this new context of limited cities, Petersonian development agendas, and 
close relationships between powerful (but constrained) public- and private-sector leaders, 
first by painting cities as growth machines, and later, by using a more generalized model of 
urban regimes and coalition governance.  
In the paragraphs that follow, this study will describe the Fordist crisis, and its 
effects on the context of cities in the United States. Then, it will connect these changes to 
calls among urban political scientists for a new conceptualization of urban power and 
decision-making, and the resulting urban political economy perspective. Finally, it will introduce 
the Elkin study of Dallas, which helped to cement urban political economy as the dominant 
urban theory at the end of the 20th century.  
The Fordist Crisis and Central Cities in the United States 
By (at latest) the mid-1970s, the Fordist dream had become a nightmare for central 
cities, which found themselves in sharp decline121. Factors like high labor- and capital costs, 
slowing productivity, regulations seen as “hostile to business,” and increased competition 
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from Europe and Asia resulted in dramatic decreases in manufacturing profits122. In 
response, firms often slashed both employment- and wage levels in manufacturing firms123, 
and many manufacturers relocated to the comparatively lax regulatory environments in 
Sunbelt cities throughout the southern United States, while others took advantage of low 
shipping costs and international trade agreements to shift their production facilities to other 
nations entirely124.  
What resulted – a period called the Fordist Crisis – was a rapid, totalizing mid-
century exodus of industrial capital from older manufacturing cities in the United States, 
such as Cleveland, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and San Francisco, which starkly reduced both 
employment- and wage levels in their primary industries125. As a result, not only could these 
cities no longer support full employment at the prevailing blue-collar wages that once were 
common126, the rapidly-growing ranks of long-term unemployed workers increasing the 
demands placed on cities to provide social services127. When workers could find 
employment, many opted to abandon central cities in favor of modern, consumption-
centered suburbs, located far from the collapsing property values, and perceived blight and 
degradation of urban cores128. 
With unemployment high and no end to the deindustrialization of the United States 
in sight, many cities underwent several years of social unrest, including massive, highly 
damaging riots that left many CBDs in flames. While some cities (e.g. Dallas, Atlanta) 
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managed to avoid community conflict, by the mid-1960s, outbreaks of civil unrest in cities 
like Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, and Philadelphia suggest that the relative utopia of  the 
mid-20th century had largely unraveled , if it ever existed at all129  Under the Johnson 
administration, a number of federal attempts to alleviate extreme poverty and joblessness, as 
well as the riots that left parts of many central urban neighborhoods reduced to ash, were 
enacted130. Before many of these programs could take effect, most were cut short by 
conservative rollbacks during the latter part of Johnson’s administration, and were cut even 
deeper under both Nixon and Reagan; as a result, many cities were forced to divest 
themselves of many social service programs131, and mayors across the country opted instead 
to devote their dwindling tax dollars into programs designed to attract new businesses. These 
“beggar thy neighbor” practices of the 1970s and 1980s, seemed to confirm a belief that 
business elites had grown powerful to the point of being able to undercut political leaders in 
furtherance of their own agenda – a phenomenon that neither pluralism nor elite theory 
could readily explain132.  
 This Fordist crisis broadly refers to the apex of a demographic- and economic trend, 
primarily in mid-late 20th century, wherein corporations and factories that traditionally filled 
urban cores opted to abandon them for new facilities, both in nearby suburbs and abroad133. 
Across the United States, waves of disinvestment left once-thriving central cities nearly 
abandoned134, while many of the remaining corporations and financial institutions engaged in 
international mergers, acquisitions, and consolidation efforts. As tax revenues declined and 
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demands for social services increased, the threat of financial insolvency loomed over many 
cities of the 1970s and 1980s135. In response, city leaders across the United States, with the 
blessing- and support of austerity-focused state- and national lawmakers136, contracted out 
responsibility for public services, and redirected the savings into neoliberal economic growth 
and development strategies137. The resulting policies and projects were supported in part 
through dependence on the federal funding138, especially the Urban Development Action 
Grant (UDAG) program, which awarded almost $5 billion to thousands of economic 
development projects in hundreds of cities across the United States139. Although this funding 
stream would ultimately prove temporary, for a time, this funding, and the relationships 
between public officials and private-sector leaders that it engendered, resulted in a new 
model of urban governance: the development-focused, pro-business governing coalition140.  
Urban Political Economy: Urban Theory under the Fordist Crisis 
 Roughly 25 years after they began, the community power debates (of which 
Thometz’ Dallas study is a part) left urban political theory in disarray141. The radically 
different arguments, i.e. pluralism and elite theory, were well-established by the early 
1960s142, and what followed were hundreds of studies that found new examples of pluralistic 
tendencies and elite dominance, but that ultimately failed to result in definitive 
conclusions143. Further, as scholars looked around at central United States cities in the 1980s, 
it became apparent that those who governed clearly had the ability to downplay (or even 
ignore) many interest groups entirely. The city of the 1980s, scholars argued, was governed 
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by highly enmeshed groups of political- and economic elites, whose control over city politics 
was all-but complete, and who had the power to absorb oppositional groups into their 
structures, or to neutralize them entirely144. Responding to this, and to the changing urban 
context of cities since the start of the community power debates, a subset of scholars argued 
that, whether or not “community power” had ever actually existed, it had been replaced by 
highly enmeshed, informal coalitions of political- and economic elites, who merged their 
extensive, but limited resources in order to achieve their own particular goals, subordinate 
competing agendas and circumvent pressure politics145.  
 As a result of exhaustion from the community power debates, and new observations 
about urban governance under the crisis of Fordism, many urban scholars drifted away from 
the study of community power, as well as the methods employed in its study146. To illustrate 
this point, table 2.01 outlines the results of a brief archival search for scholarly work 
regarding community power, including published books and articles in peer-reviewed 
journalsi. 
Table 2.01: Community Power Keywordii Search Results 
 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Publications 390 2,419 4,679 3,971 3,532 2,309 
Though they are far-from comprehensive, these data suggest that scholarly interest in the 
community power debates peaked between 1970 and 1979.  
 As scholarly interest shifted, two new theories emerged: growth machine theory and 
the urban regime analysis. Both of these are parts of a new perspective on urban governance: 
urban political economy, which emerged as an attempt to reconcile the divergent truths of 
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elite theory and pluralism, while also overcoming the weaknesses inherent in each147. These 
both offered a fresh perspective on decision-making, using informal interviews and archival 
research of particular cities to suggest the interconnected nature of urban governance from a 
systemic, behavioral perspective, and as future sections will suggest, quickly grew to 
dominate the study of urban politics. Data in table 2.02 corroborate this, and suggest that 
research interest in contemporary urban theory – including growth machine theory and 
urban regime analysis, began to grow in the 1970s, and expanded most rapidly after 1980. 
Table 2.02: Urban Political Economy Keywordiii Search Results 
 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 
Publications 41 98 434 3,012 4,488 9,280 
As with data regarding the numbers of articles and books related to community power, these 
data are certainly not intended to be exhaustive. Nonetheless, these data suggest that starting 
in the 1970s, urban scholars reflected on the state of their field, and on the nature of cities at 
the close of the 21st century. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will unpack these new 
conceptualizations of urban decision-making, first for growth machine theory, and then for 
urban regime analysis. 
 Growth machine theory. First published about by Harvey Molotch in 1976, growth 
machine theory attempted to undercut all sides of the community power debates by focusing 
on the motives of economic actors within the governing coalition, as well as the actions they 
take in order to change the socially-constructed meanings and values of place within the 
city148. At the core of the growth machine are place-based elites, whose control over the 
political decision-makers is all-but absolute, and who direct the policymaking process in 
order to maximize rental incomes and property values within the city, with all other concerns 
being of secondary importance149. Growth machine theorists argue that all places carry with 
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them two socially-constructed values – their use-value and their exchange-value. For landowners, 
the value in a parcel of land is in what the land could be worth if sold or rented; this is the 
place’s exchange-value. For renters, who do not own the land, the value in a place is in how 
it is utilized or consumed – this is place’s use-value150. For any given place, these two values 
necessarily contradict, and the resulting tension is the fundamental conflict of growth 
machine theory151.  
Growth machine theorists also argue that landowners (or rentiers), by having their 
fortunes bound to local real estate values, universally support urban growth agendas152, and 
join with other influential actors153 to combine deep wells of financial resources, control over 
land-use regulations, tax abatement policies, and major media outlets to relentlessly pursue 
its growth agenda. These actors gain public support for their projects by establishing a 
discourse in which the city’s troubles, whatever they happen to be, can only be solved 
through new, publicly-financed development projects154, that the costs of such development 
will be unproblematic, and its benefits will be widely-spread155. Further, growth machine 
members manipulate voters’ fears of “losing out” to competing cities (domestically and 
abroad), proffering that alternatives to development will be highly detrimental to the city’s 
well-being156. Individuals and organizations critical of the growth agenda are often 
discredited, and in some cases, actively excluded from the discourse through media shut-
                                                          
150 Logan  & Molotch, 2007, p. 2 
151 Jonas & Wilson, 1999, pp. 5-6; Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997, p. 607 
152Harding, 2009, pp. 34-35; Logan & Molotch, 2007, pp. 50-51; p. 62; Jonas & Wilson, 1999, pp. 5-6 
153 e.g. political elites, local media outlets, construction companies, real estate developers, and regional banks 
154 Elkin, 1987aa, p. 55; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999, p. 701; Jonas & Wilson, 1999, pp. 5-9; Logan & Molotch, 2007, p. 115; Molotch, 
1993, pp. 34-37; Wilson & Wouters, 2003, pp. 123-125 
155 Bast, 1998; Coates & Humphreys, 2000, pp. 15-16; Cox & Mair, 1988, pp. 319-320; R. Keating, 1999, pp. 3-7; Okner, 1974, pp. 325-348; 
Troutman, 2004, p. 612; Zaretsky, 2001, p. 1 




outs157. As a result, growth machines are incredibly durable, regardless of opposition from 
anti-growth coalitions or changes in developmental regulations158. 
Critiques of growth machine theory. While there are a number of critiques of 
growth machine theory, it is beyond the scope of this study to examine them all in detail; 
instead, this study will focus on two. To the first of these, scholars level that growth machine 
theory is somewhat conflicted with respect to what the growth machine actually is, and as a 
result, what the growth machine actually does. Logan & Molotch, in their seminal work, 
define the growth machine – first with a narrow specification, and then with a broad one. To 
elaborate, the narrow definition of the growth machine refers only to the subset of elites 
who draw income from property rental159, while the authors’ broad definition includes a wide 
variety of place-dependent organizations, such as local banks and media outlets160, 161. By 
taking the narrow definition, growth machine theorists bind the growth machine and its 
members to a single-minded obsession with land-use and maximizing exchange value – a 
position that effectively wallpapers over conflicts among economic elites162. Meanwhile, the 
broadly-defined growth machine is engaged in perpetual conflict, both internally among its 
members, and externally with various renters over use-values for various places163. Building 
on this, a second critique suggests that growth machine theory too-narrowly defines 
exchange-value, limiting it to land values within cities themselves. Thus, growth machine 
theory ignores the exchange value of non-land assets164, and disregards the effects of greater 
socioeconomic forces165. Therefore, critics charge, the model cannot adequately account for 
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instances in which city leaders pursue agendas that may not directly induce development, 
such as education and service delivery166, nor can it account for why development slowed in 
many cities that took advantage of either private investment or federal funding to fuel urban 
development throughout the mid-20th century167. 
 Urban regime analysis. Although (largely) well-received by urban political 
scholarship, by the late 1980s, growth machine theory had been supplanted by a more 
generalized urban regime analysis168, which serves as the framework for contemporary urban 
theory169. Broadly speaking, urban regime analysis founds itself on the premise that the 
capacity to govern in the modern, complex urban environment emerges from informal 
relationships among partners within informal coalitions, and from their willingness- and 
ability to combine resources in order to govern the general electorate170. Critically, each 
partner possesses a resource that others lack, and as a result, urban regime advocates argue 
that the only path to successfully governing comes from partnerships with leaders who can 
marshal complementary resources171. Therefore, although political- and economic elites form 
the core of the governing coalition, they cannot effectively govern without additional 
support and legitimacy for their development-first agenda, support that comes from a wide 
range of ancillary coalition members172, 173. By combining a broad range of resources to 
further particular policies and programs, the governing coalition possesses a structural power 
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to overcome objections to its goals that is far greater than that of any individual coalition 
member174.  
 The versatility of the regime model allows a variety of governing coalitions to exist; 
Stone himself identified four175 while subsequent authors have added additional typologies176. 
After consolidating over a decade of literature on regime typologies, Jill Clark constructed a 
six-type categorization scheme for urban regimes177, which table 2.03 summarizes; this table 
also includes a seventh coalition typology, the antiregime, which Clark merged into the demand-
side urban governing coalition, based on DeLeon’s long-term studies of the evolving 
leadership structure of late-20th century San Francisco178. This study argues that it is still 
appropriate to include the antiregime, which is briefly summarized as one possible result of a 
collapsed (or otherwise failed) urban regime, and are composed of fragmented interest 
groups that fail to coalesce around a particular agenda, fail to establish ties with the business 
community, and fail to reconcile their various agendas with the political system179. Like the 
demand-side regime, the antiregime is successful at blocking unfavorable policies and 
development, but because it lacks the support of bureaucrats or organized institutions, it is 
unable to promote (or even to passively allow) beneficial urban policies or development 
projects180. 
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Table 2.03: Typology of Governing Coalitions 
Coalition Type Lead Actors 
Activist 
Minority-led electoral coalitions, engaged citizens, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, 
social justice or broker mayors, fiscal populists 
Caretaker Caretaker mayors, anti-growth bureaucrats, fiscal populists, post-materialists 
Demand-Side Neighborhood organizations, single-district councilmembers, minority mayors, post-materialists 
Entrepreneurial Business-led coalitions, strong mayor, pro-growth bureaucrats 
Progressive Minority-led electoral coalitions, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, social justice mayors 




 Notably, Table 2.03 should not be taken to suggest that coalition types are equally 
common; indeed, in practice, the pro-development, business-led entrepreneurial governing 
coalition (also represented by the growth machine model) is the de facto characterization of 
urban governance in the United States181, and the relatively privileged position of economic 
elites has resulted in a skewing of municipal agendas in favor of value-neutral economic 
development in many cities across the United States182. This coalition type is perpetuated in 
three primary ways. First, private-sector elites use their financial resources to underwrite re-
election campaigns, and to support projects that keep their political allies in power183. 
Because the tenures of these allies are limited by the constant need to be re-elected, political 
elites must continually appease their economic counterparts through business-friendly 
policy- and regulatory environments, tax incentives for economic development, and a 
general emphasis on economic development, often to the exclusion of social services, 
education, and infrastructure development184. Second, because the overall health and stability 
of the governing coalition is contingent upon cohesive internal cooperation, even in the case 
of conflicting interests185, members may selectively incentivized to “go along” with the 
development agenda in exchange for promises of coalition support for a future opportunity 
of their own, or in some cases, an immediate financial side-payment186. Finally, because 
governing coalitions must also mitigate external opposition, the aforementioned auxiliary 
members mobilize in order to create- and maintain a public discourse in support of the 
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coalition’s agenda, silence and discredit dissenters, and lend legitimacy to the coalition’s 
plans187. As a result, entrepreneurial coalitions remain incredibly durable, even during times 
of sharp public criticism and private disagreement188. 
 Critiques of urban regime analysis. As is the case for growth machine theory, 
while there are a number of critiques of urban regime analysis, it is beyond the scope of this 
study to examine them all in detail; instead, this study will focus on three that are particularly 
germane to the present study. First, urban regime analysis fails to adequately embed the 
regimes themselves within the wider institutional context189, arguing that regime actors have 
– at best – a limited awareness of extra-local forces190. Corrections for this have been 
attempted by linking urban regime theory to regulation theory, but even here, urban regime 
theory continues to fail at any sort of sustained interrogation of economic trends, which 
weakens its value as a proscriptive theory191 or comparative one192. Additionally, urban 
regime analysis fails to address the consequences of particular types of governing coalitions; 
i.e., no one type is “better” or “worse” than another, with respect to addressing the specific 
needs of a given city. Moreover, the model cannot predict whether any particular governing 
coalition will be successful at actually governing an individual city, or whether that regime is 
vulnerable to replacement or collapse193. Finally, urban regime analysis takes on faith a 
distinct division of labor between public- and private-sectors, assuming that the traditional, 
profit-driven private sector dominates economic development194; whether this assumption 
was ever completely accurate is debatable, but as cities transition away from a myopic focus 
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on business and capital generation, it may be that it is growing weaker. Taken together, these 
criticisms of urban regime analysis suggest that, as broader social- and economic forces 
change the urban context of cities, it is (at best) unclear whether urban regime analysis can 
adequately conceptualize the effects of these changes on real-world governing coalitions.  
 Urban Political Economy, in summary. In looking at United States cities in the 
mid-late 20th century, urban scholars found that the pressure politics of community power, 
whether it ever actually existed, had been replaced by informal, highly enmeshed groups of 
political- and economic elites, whose control over city politics was all-but complete, and who 
combined their extensive, but limited resources in order to achieve their own particular 
goals, absorb oppositional groups into their structures, or to neutralize them entirely195. This 
merger of politics and economics – urban political economy – is composed primarily of two 
approaches, the narrower growth machine theory, and the broader urban regime analysis. Indeed, 
scholars have found hundreds of examples of urban regimes in cities across the United 
States, and even internationally, and the preponderance of available evidence strongly 
suggests that both the urban political economy approach broadly, and at least some variation 
of urban regime analysis has played a role in framing the scholarly observations of urban life 
and urban governance in cities across the world196.  
The Fordist crisis in Dallas  
 During the formative, early years of urban regime analysis, Stephen Elkin used the 
city of Dallas, Texas to study the tight linkages between its political and business leaders. 
Like Thometz before him, Elkin cited the city’s business growth (even in spite of national 
recession), and the strong links between Dallas’ business community and its political leaders 
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as primary reasons for selecting it for study197. Indeed, while much of the United States 
stumbled economically during the Fordist crisis, Dallas’ growth from the end of World War 
II until the mid-1970s was uninterrupted198, built on the backbone of a massive oil boom, 
defense contracts, and electronics.  
 Looking first at oil, manufacturing equipment for oilfields and refineries had been a 
steady part of Dallas’ manufacturing base since the 1930s, but production orders ramped up 
alongside the automobile boom following the end of World War II199. In addition, 
throughout the war, and lasting until the end of the Cold War, over a quarter of the city’s 
manufacturing employee were employed in producing military aircraft200. Finally, Dallas is 
also the home of Texas Instruments, first founded in the 1930s as a seismic services provider 
for the oil industry, but (with the support of Dallas’ ruling elite) branched into transistor 
manufacturing in the 1950s, eventually leading to the 1958 creation of the integrated circuit, 
and new manufacturing contracts for electronics and guided missiles using this new 
technology201. This convergence of high-growth industries within the city turned Dallas into 
an industrial hub so vibrant that in the mid-late 1950s, it had become the manufacturing 
hinge of the entire Southwest202. From the 1950s until the 1970s, the city’s status as a 
regional manufacturing and trade hub was largely unchallenged, and helped attract a diverse 
combination of firms involved in wholesale and retail trade, banking and finance, and 
insurance203.  
 Of all of these industries, it was Dallas’ ties to oil that would largely inoculate the 
entire region from the earliest effects of Fordism’s collapse. The oil crisis brought on by the 
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1973 Arab embargo caused Texas oil companies – many of which were headquartered in 
Dallas – to experience unprecedented growth and expansion. Prices per barrel of oil 
skyrocketed by over 2000% between 1973 and 1980, and in that same period, land 
speculation drove real estate prices up over 900%204. This boom would add over $367 billion 
to Texas’ overall economy between 1970 and 1986, and much of that investment was 
occurring in Dallas, where a city eager to remove itself from the shame of a slain president 
eagerly constructed a new skyline205, funded by a mixture of public financing and private 
debt from both domestic- and international sources206. For Dallas, the economic plight 
throughout the rest of the United States may as well have been occurring in another country 
entirely.  
 Not all of Dallas saw the benefits of the city’s growth and prosperity, however. For 
decades, southern Dallas had been broadly ignored by both city leaders and the general 
public for decades, and garnered a reputation for commercial disinvestment, high crime, and 
poor school performance207. In reality, after many whites abandoned the neighborhood, 
people from African American and Hispanic communities moved in, creating a racially 
heterogenous region where wealth and poverty often lived within blocks of one another208. 
Minority-owned businesses replaced those formerly owned by whites, and while commercial 
corridors had changed by the late 1970s, limited commercial activity nonetheless remained, 
especially in- and near what would become known as North Oak Cliff209. 
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 The Elkin study: urban theory under the Fordist crisis in Dallas. Writing in the 
mid-1980s, Stephen Elkin used a study of Dallas (the “commercial republic”) to argue for 
the presence and dominance of business interests in a governance structure that 
characterized as an entrepreneurial governing coalition, in which a well-organized coalition of 
business leaders formed natural alliances with public officials, but were often at “arm’s 
length” from the day-to-day running of the city, as opposed to the deep, almost-daily 
involvement of the business community in running the “pure” entrepreneurial coalition 
found in Dallas during the Thometz study. Elkin’s study cites two primary reasons for this 
transition: first, the city’s business community was no longer as unified as it once had been; 
and second, the city’s political leadership was dramatically restructured, following a federal 
court order. 
 Looking first at the disunity among members of Dallas’ business community, the 
Elkin study identified two causes, both of which were consequences of the city’s success at 
inducing economic growth and development. First, by the late 1970s, Dallas had largely built 
itself out of undeveloped land210. In the past, Dallas’ leaders simply authorized massive bond 
packages to induce redevelopment of the city’s built environment, based on the needs of a 
unified business coalition. However, the city’s success in attracting outside investment 
brought an influx of new corporations into the CBD, corporations whose heads often had 
little interest in the politics of governance, preferring instead to focus their energies on 
regional-, national-, and global concerns211.  
 Additionally, as the size of the business community grew, influential corporate 
executives were increasingly less-able to reconcile different agendas through side-payments 
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or “go along to get along” dealmaking, leaving the business community fragmented and 
somewhat disorganized, and leading to tensions between developers who wanted to tear 
down the city and rebuild, and existing tenants who were largely happy with existing 
development212. Further dividing the city’s business community were the myriad 
redevelopment and infrastructure projects, such as the city’s proposed light rail network, 
which were implemented at great (and uneven) costs to various stakeholders213. This 
fragmentation was most evident in the collapse of Dallas’ Citizens Charter Association, 
which ceased operations following Dallas’ first attempt at modern electoral reformation, 
concluding that it was no longer possible for the city’s business community to act alone in 
guiding the city’s growth and development214. It could also be seen, to a smaller (though just 
as important) extent, in the weakening of the Dallas Citizens Council, which remains 
influential in city politics, but no is no longer able to command elections215. 
 Shifting focus, in considering the restructuring of Dallas’ elected leadership, in 1971, 
a lawsuit filed against the city contended that the at-large election system for city nearly-
omnipotent councilmembers was in violation of the Voting Rights Act, because it rewarded 
candidates who were popular in areas with the highest voter turnout – in this case, the 
affluent, white-majority neighborhoods in north of the Trinity River216. Because those areas 
had higher voter turnout, plaintiffs argued, the system had the effect of diluting votes among 
Dallas’ African-American and Hispanic populations217. The court case went on for four 
years, and in 1975, a federal judge ruled against Dallas, agreeing that the city’s at-large 
council election system violated the Voting Rights Act218. In response, the city council 
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quickly replaced its existing at-large system with an “8-3” plan, in which eight 
councilmembers were elected by districts in which they resided, while three more, including 
the mayor, would continue to be elected at-large. The council argued (and the federal judge 
agreed) that, while the eight district-based councilmembers would likely feel particular bias 
toward their own districts, the at-large councilmembers and mayor would be free to look 
after the needs of Dallas as a whole219.   
 Taking a broad approach to these changes, Elkin observed that their impacts were 
not as sweeping as one might have expected them to be. To begin, council members were 
only paid a small stipend for attending council meetings, so the position was still largely 
voluntary, and in addition, councilmembers rarely sought to build political coalitions, unless 
they intended to make politics a lifelong career. As a result, although the district-bound 
councilmembers paid some attention to local concerns, especially around election time, 
many continued to promote the pro-growth strategies of their predecessors220.  
 The study concluded that the ability of Dallas’ business interests to continue seeing 
their needs often, though not always, addressed over those of the electorate was emblematic 
of a greater, societal failure to separate the political need to promote a healthy economy 
from “... how to contrive a happy environment for businessmen” 221. Elkin argued that that 
public officials were induced to struggle and debate issues only when their audience demands 
struggle and debate; as long as business leaders and civic boosters composed that audience, 
then business inducement would remain at the core of public policy decisions222. 
Nonetheless, Elkin noted that even with a continued pro-business slant among Dallas’ 
political leaders, the way in which citizens approached Dallas’ bureaucracy had evolved since 
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the Thometz study. Specifically, Elkin found that citizens were increasingly drawn to interact 
with City Hall – not to further business interests or offer visions of the best way to bring 
vitality to Dallas – but instead to speak on behalf of their neighborhoods, or to demand 
public goods and services as bureaucratic clients223.  
 Improving upon the Thometz study, Elkin thoroughly wove racial tensions in Dallas 
into the narrative of the city’s political- and economic evolution. Nonetheless, like the 
Thometz study before it, this study and its conclusions – are ultimately a product of an 
urban study conducted within the context of limited United States cities in the mid-to-late 
20th century. As a result, Elkin’s “solutions” to the dominance of the entrepreneurial 
governing coalition are presented as national-level concerns, rather than local issues224. 
Additionally, because Elkin could only see Dallas through the constraining lens of a rigidly-
defined public-private division of labor, he could not see alternative paths to a new decision-
making structure – paths that utilize third-sector organizations and alternative economic 
development strategies, rather than national-level policy changes.  
 The Fordist crisis, urban political economy, and the Elkin study, in summary. 
While scholars abandoned the study of community power, both residents and firms were 
abandoning the communities themselves. Federal intervention strategies offered some hope 
of restoring cities, and the public-private partnerships that these strategies engendered 
portended a new kind of urban governance, the study of which would, in time, breathe new 
life into urban political theory225.  This new perspective, urban political economy, succeeded 
in sidestepping many of the problems with both sides of the community power debates, and 
has been used to describe cities across the United States, as well as internationally. Using this 
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perspective, the Elkin study of Dallas found the city’s simple, political-business coalition had 
been replaced by a more complex model of interlocking relationships, internal discord 
among the business community, and political leaders who were (slightly) more inclined to 
serve their electorate, yet who still served within a system that was designed to ensure that 
business interests were ultimately given priority over other concerns226. Nonetheless, while 
urban scholars used these methods to study cities, the cities themselves were changing, in 
ways that progenitors like Elkin, Logan, Molotch, and Stone – like their predecessors – could 
not have imagined, and for which they could not have accounted in their studies and 
conclusions.  
Post-Fordism, Urban Political Economy, and the Need to Revisit Dallas 
 In the decades since the Elkin study, the urban context has again shifted; first, the 
crisis of Fordism has given way to post-Fordism, a new socioeconomic paradigm that has 
reversed the economic- and population trajectories of many (though not all) cities in the 
United States; and second, third-sector organizations have expanded beyond their original 
missions and into public policy. As a result of these phenomena, the urban political economy 
approach, with its strict interpretation of the public/private division of labor, and its roots in 
the Fordist crisis, may need to be revisited. As the dominant theoretical model of urban 
governance, this study argues that it is imperative for urban political scholars to test the 
viability of what is now a (roughly) thirty year-old perspective. By re-examining Dallas, a city 
used previously to establish the validity of both the urban regime model broadly, and the city 
itself as an exemplar of the entrepreneurial governing coalition, the present study offers other 
urban scholars the opportunity to revisit urban regime analysis, and to consider (at the least) 
refining particular aspects of it. In the sections that follow, this study will first summarize 
                                                          




particularly salient post-Fordist changes to United States cities throughout late 20th and early 
21st centuries. Following this, it will focus on changes in Dallas following the Elkin study, 
especially those related to its business- and political leadership. Then, it will build a case for a 
fresh examination of the city’s governing coalition.  
Post-Fordism and Central Cities in the United States 
 As urban scholars of the late-20th and early 21st centuries scoured cities across the 
United States227 (and to some extent, abroad228) for evidence of urban regimes, cities 
themselves were undergoing significant economic and demographic reorganization, 
especially in- and immediately surrounding their respective CBDs. Against this backdrop, old 
ancillary members of governing coalitions – community development corporations (CDCs) 
and anchor institutions – began evolving their roles in economic development and policy 
decisions while, simultaneously, business leaders began exiting the politics of decision-
making. This study argues that, while urban scholars publishing near the turn of the 21st 
century identified several of these transitions, urban regime analysis – itself a product of 
research in the 1970s and early 1980s – failed to update itself with regard to these changes in 
the urban context. Importantly, this study does not fault earlier scholarship for failing to 
account for changes that had not yet happened, and instead argues that responsibility for 
advancing the collective understanding of contemporary urban governance falls to today’s 
scholars.  
 Under the new paradigm of Post-Fordism, both economic resources and 
demographic trends have departed from their previous trajectories, and these changes have 
reshaped the built environments in central cities across the United States, and even in other 
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nations. In considering these economic changes, regionally-based, blue-collar manufacturing 
work has been largely (though not entirely) replaced by globalized flows of knowledge- 
based employment in technology and finance throughout the developed world. In 
considering demographic changes, the affluent (often white) employees of these technology 
and finance firms, as well as the ancillary businesses that support them (e.g. law, real estate 
development, advertising) often find themselves disillusioned with the suburban lifestyle, and 
are migrating back to central cities and adjacent neighborhoods. In response, former 
commercial cores have become high-end, mixed-use developments combining office space, 
luxury retail and housing, and cultural amenities like museums and art installations.  
 As new, competing interests flow into central cities, it may be that the older, “pro-
business” decision-making bodies no longer hold as much influence over decisions being 
made in these areas, and further, there may be additional room for new actors with large 
resource pools, such as CDCs and anchor institutions, to find a role in policymaking, To 
better build this case, in the paragraphs that follow, this study will first discuss the economic 
and demographic transitions found in U.S. cities as a result of post-Fordism. Then, it will 
chronicle the expansion of third-sector organizations – particularly anchor institutions and 
CDCs – beyond their traditional roles and into urban policymaking.  
 Post-Fordist economic transitions. As an economic shift, post-Fordism can be 
summarized as a transition away from manufacturing as an economic engine, and into white-
collar firms in finance, investment, and real estate (FIRE) sectors, supported by localized 
producer services229. Breakthroughs in transportation, communication, and information 
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technology230, combined with a number of trans-national trade agreements231,232, have rapidly 
accelerated the decline of urban fortunes within the Rust Belt233. However, they have also 
have sparked unmatched growth and prosperity in communities referred to as global cities234. 
From their positions as hubs in the global financial- and economic network, global cities 
have experienced significant employment gains and wealth generation, benefitting from the 
agglomeration of knowledge-based industries and innovation235.  
 Because firms can (and often do) find specializations in the global marketplace, there 
is a wealth of opportunity for global cities to be located all over the world, without 
necessarily engaging in direct competition with one another236. Each of these global cities 
becomes a significant agglomeration of highly specialized firms, and participates in the 
geographic restructuring of economic flows throughout the world237. In the post-Fordist 
economy, firms choose to locate in specific cities in order to harness local market 
knowledge, to convert that knowledge into profit, and to integrate that knowledge into their 
global enterprise238. As a result of these advantages, global cities are attractive to foreign 
investment – that is, investment in domestic businesses or the creation of new businesses in 
a city by international investors239. In this way, global cities like San Francisco and Boston 
have become international centers of knowledge production and economic power240.  
 This prosperity comes at a cost, though, and is far-from uniform in its spatial 
distribution241. Although many cities have found prosperity in the new, global economy, 
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there is simply not enough investment to go around242, which has created (or exacerbated) 
uneven economic development243. Indeed, by comparison, far more cities have been 
excluded from the post-Fordist economic boom than have been able to find a place within 
it244.In this new economic geography, the upper echelons of prosperity rest within global 
cities like San Francisco, New York City, London, Tokyo, and Dallas, while many other 
cities find themselves locked in a pattern of disinvestment and decline, bound to the fate of a 
shrinking manufacturing sector245. Additionally, and of concern with respect to entrepreneurial 
governing coalitions, because many firms in FIRE sectors are branches of globalized firms, 
private-sector leaders often have few – if any – particular ties to any given place246, and often 
do not become lasting members in pro-development governing coalitions247. 
Post-Fordist demographic transitions. Contrary to the bleak predictions of 
“indifference and abandonment” regarding urban cores248, the paradigm shift that caused so 
much disinvestment and abandonment among central cities in the United States has also 
revived a subset of them, albeit no longer as centers of capital creation alone249. Beyond 
commercial investment, CBDs are also becoming home to a variety of cultural- and 
entertainment amenities such as, art galleries, university and hospital expansions, and upscale 
retail and dining, which in turn has attracted wealthier, residents to return to urban cores250. 
Finally, these younger, affluent professionals are also bringing with them a particular “left-
liberal” ideology and political activism that may have implications for local elections, 
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especially in cities like Dallas and Atlanta whose decision-making structures are closely 
associated with the entrepreneurial-type governing coalition251.  
Additionally, a subset of literature suggests that this changing demographic, 
unsurprisingly, carries with it a racial component. As Chapter 1 noted, a traditional reading 
of the racial composition of central cities across the United States252 describes the chocolate 
cities, vanilla suburbs model (shown in figure 2.01) of largely white suburbs surrounding 
predominantly African-American central cities, resulting from “white flight” throughout the 
mid-20th century, subsidized by federal policies, highway-building campaigns, and 
government-backed suburban mortgages253. While this model adequately describes cities in 
the wake of Fordist consumption patterns, it fails to account for the post-Fordist 
gentrification of many inner-city neighborhoods by white millennials and “urban pioneers.” 
This “back to the city” counter-transition has the effect of pushing minority groups (and the 
businesses that serve them) out of the central city, and into the inner-ring communities that 
were once populated by the first waves of white flight254. Addressing the new reality of post-
Fordist central cities, a new model – the new donut (shown in figure 2.02)255 – has emerged. In 
this model, white central neighborhoods are surrounded by majority-minority communities, 
which are themselves encircled by white outer-ring suburbs and exurbs. 
Figure 2.01: Chocolate Cities, Vanilla Suburbs Model Figure 2.02: New Donut Model 
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 Transitions in the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions. As cities’ economic- 
and demographic profiles evolved under post-Fordism, so too did their rosters of actors 
willing to engage in the politics of decision-making. Indeed, while private-sector elites 
withdraw from governing coalitions, a subset of urban scholarship suggests that CDCs and 
anchor institutions are advancing their roles as coalition members256. In the paragraphs that 
follow, this study will first introduce the growing role of CDCs beyond their traditional 
involvement in low-income housing projects, and then, it will describe the efforts of urban 
anchor institutions to revitalize economically-marginalized communities without the use of 
the “federal bulldozer.” 
CDCs: moving beyond low-income housing. Most (though not all) community 
development corporations were founded during the height of the Great Society, as 
community action agencies (CAAs) charged with directing federal support into urban 
neighborhoods257. Even as small-government conservatives dismantled the Great Society, 
many cities greatly increased their reliance on the now-rebranded CDCs in order to address 
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short-term, localist needs, such as low-income housing and social welfare provision in 
marginal neighborhoods258. Public-sector reliance on these organizations increased 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as federal policies cut cities off from federal development 
funds, while allowing CDCs to take advantage of the UDAG program, and later, the 
community development block grant (CDBG) that replaced it. Across the country, CDCs 
used these funds to accelerate expansion into projects like business enterprise development, 
commercial real estate, venture capitalism, community finance, and urban redevelopment259. 
Finally, since the 1990s, federal Empowerment Zone / Enterprise Community funds have 
been made available to CDCs, who are tasked with representing the needs of the 
communities being targeted by these federal programs260.  
At the local level, CDCs draw cross-sector support through their boards of directors, 
which often contain representatives from state- and federal organizations, political and 
business leaders, private philanthropists, clergy, and neighborhood members, who combine 
their various resource pools in service of organizational projects261. Because of these 
connections, there is some evidence that CDCs have become a driving force in skewing 
many urban agendas away from value-neutral development and back toward environmental- 
and social equity concerns262. However, even with this support, CDCs are frequently 
undercapitalized, and lack the capacity to fully address growing needs in economically 
marginalized communities; these challenges often prevent all but the largest CDCs from 
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being as effective as various scholars suggest they could be263. Further, CDCs are often 
considered challenging to evaluate; as CDCs venture away from traditional “charitable” 
activities like housing and social services, their activities look increasingly like those of 
private developers, but their redistributive objectives encourage these organizations to 
develop in locations that traditional, for-profit developers would find undesirable, so it may 
be inaccurate to compare them to private-sector peers264. As a final complication, a CDC 
that is successful as an organization may not necessarily be benefitting its resident 
community265.  
One thread of scholarship outlines a number of challenges surrounding CDCs, 
including evaluating their effectiveness, connecting measures of organizational success to 
community improvement, and problems with organizational capacity. Alternatively, an 
additional thread highlights an expansion of CDCs into long-range planning and urban 
economic development, a connectedness to urban decision-makers, and the successful 
efforts of some CDCs in affecting urban policies. As a result, it may be that, in spite of their 
challenges, some subset of CDCs have achieved central positions within urban governing 
coalitions. If a well-designed study could find evidence of this, then those organizations 
could be studied to understand how they were able to grow beyond “ancillary status” within 
these coalitions, and the effects of this on urban economic development policies and 
projects. 
 Anchor institutions: urban development without the federal bulldozer. As 
organizations that are geographically-linked (or “anchored”) to their surrounding cities, 
anchor institutions like universities and hospitals are uniquely situated to bring about positive 
                                                          
263 Clavel, Pitt, & Yin, 1997, pp. 437-438; Gittell & Wilder, 1999, p. 343; Rubin, 1993, p. 434; Stoecker, 1997, pp. 2-3, 6-10; Wallace, 1999. 
P. 169  
264 Schill, 1996, pp. 773-777 




improvements in their communities. The idea that anchor institutions can be catalysts for 
cities looking to solve complex urban problems reaches back to the late 1950s, though for 
much of the 20th century, these organizations did not apply significant effort to advance 
beyond research and teaching266. Instead, throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, 
urban hospitals and universities used hundreds of millions of dollars in grants from the Ford 
Foundation and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to engage in 
destructive expansion projects that replaced economically-marginalized neighborhoods with 
new- and expanded facilities as part of grand development plans267. By the early 1990s, 
decades of mounting losses in federal- and state funding, as well as significant public 
backlash regarding their untampered mid-century expansion projects268 forced anchor 
institutions to rethink their commitments to their missions, any many realized that that their 
missions could be better-served by improving the conditions in their surrounding 
communities269.  
 In 21st-century cities across the United States, anchor institutions have become key 
players in local economies. Taken as a whole, urban universities and hospitals across the 
United States collectively represent over $1 billion in payroll, and more than $1 trillion in 
overall economic activity, and in the largest 20 American cities, frequently among the largest 
non-governmental employers.270 Additionally, because they are geographically anchored in 
place, these institutions are principally self-interested in the local economy, and are once 
again showing an interest in the vitality of their surrounding neighborhoods271. Increasingly, 
urban universities and hospitals are actively working to address economic inequity in 
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economically-marginalized areas, leveraging their status as major employers and purchasers 
in order to engage in more equitable, value-driven economic development strategies in 
economically-marginalized neighborhoods that have historically been ill-served by value-
neutral development272. However, at the city-, state-, and federal level, officials have largely 
failed to develop policies to utilize anchor institutions as partners in urban economic 
development, and it appears that current policies are ill-suited for the needs and capabilities 
of these organizations – in effect, public-sector decision-makers simply do not know how to 
work with economic development organizations outside of the private sector, and research 
on this appears to be slow in forthcoming. As a result, although anchor institutions are 
(arguably) critical for improving community infrastructure, supporting their efforts is often 
not seen as a priority by urban decision-makers273.  
 Transitions in the roles of CDCs and anchor institutions, in summary. As cities 
have grown within the post-Fordist, knowledge-based economy, urban anchor institutions, 
as centers of research and technological advancement, have become their economic 
centerpieces, directly injecting millions of dollars into local economies through purchasing 
and payroll. In limited cases, these organizations are leveraging this economic power to inject 
new life into economically-marginalized neighborhoods, but even in such cases, local policies 
usually fail to adequately support anchors’ efforts, limiting their overall effectiveness in 
bringing about equitable economic development for cities’ most concerning neighborhoods. 
As large employers and economic engines, these institutions are well-positioned to become 
central members of urban governing coalitions, but considering that urban policies have not 
adequately adapted to support their economic development projects in the same way that 
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these policies continue to benefit private-sector economic development projects, it would 
appear that they have not advanced beyond their traditional, ancillary positions. Like with 
CDCs, if a well-designed study could find evidence of anchor institutions operating as core 
members of a governing coalition, those organizations could be further examined in order to 
accomplish this, as well as the effects of this increased involvement with respect to urban 
economic development projects. 
Post-Fordism in Dallas 
 Recall that the Elkin study found two key components that shifted Dallas’ governing 
coalition away from the “pure” political economy found in the Thometz study: first, disunity 
within the business community; and second, the transition from a purely at-large city council 
to a mixed council of district-based and at-large members. Since the Elkin study, these 
components have only amplified. First, as the study was published, Dallas’ economy was 
gutted by the Savings & Loan Crisis and collapse of oil markets, only to be reborn in uneven, 
disruptive ways. Second, the lawsuit that forced the city to change its at-large councilmember 
elections to an “8-3” plan was again challenged under the Voting Rights Act, resulting in 
another restructure in 1994. Certainly, Elkin could not have foreseen these changes, just at 
Thometz could not have seen the changes that Elkin noted when arguing that the Thometz 
characterization of Dallas’ decision-making structure was no longer accurate; nonetheless, 
this study argues that it is time for a new study to reevaluate Elkin’s vision of a complex, 
business-dominated entrepreneurial governing coalition. In the sections that follow, this 
study will first examine Dallas’ economic struggles and resurgence, then it will look at the 
city’s political reconfiguration, and finally, it will broadly discuss the city’s demographic 




 Economic transitions. Between 1981 and 1986, Dallas’ seemingly-invincible 
economy, which had grown steadily since the end of World War II274, was crippled by a 
catastrophic decline in the oil market, as well the nearly-simultaneous Savings and Loan 
Crisis275. The state as a whole, and Dallas in particular, had enriched itself over nearly a 
decade of oil speculation, funded on loans secured by extraction equipment, stock 
valuations, promises of future profit, and many loans were issued with little (if any) collateral, 
from recently-deregulated savings and loan institutions276. Eager to compete with these 
institutions, even traditional banks engaged in ever-riskier loan offerings, over-leveraging 
assets and over-investing in oil and land speculation277. The Saudi embargo on oil had 
brought incredible riches to the Texas economy, and to Dallas in particular, but the boom 
could not last. By the mid-1980s, utility companies diversified their fuel sources to include 
coal, natural gas, and nuclear power, while federal regulations forced fuel economy to rise in 
passenger vehicles; as a result of the reduced demand for oil, many resource extraction 
operations were forced into bankruptcy278.  
 As the owners of now-worthless oil drilling equipment and loans that would likely 
never be repaid (in full or in part), Dallas’ banks could not continue operating. By 1992, 80% 
of the region’s savings and loans were insolvent, 506 banks had failed, and of the state’s 10 
largest banks, 9 had failed. Further, all of Dallas’ locally-owned financial institutions and 
insurance firms – fully half of its economy – either abandoned the city or folded entirely279. 
For Dallas’ other large industries – textiles, electronics, and defense equipment, the picture 
was similarly bleak. By 1988, surging competition from Asian manufacturing firms drove 
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down the costs of computer chips, which in turn put many of Dallas’ electronics 
manufacturing firms out of business, the giant Texas Instruments nearly included280. 
International pressure also impacted Dallas’ textile manufacturers, as factory owners moved 
production to Mexico in the early-mid 1990s, lured by cheaper labor costs even before 
NAFTA further distorted the economics of U.S.-based manufacturing281. Indeed, for a brief 
moment in the late 1990s, the exodus of textile manufacturing to Mexico was so great that 
the country supplanted China as the largest clothing supplier to the U.S282.  
 Finally, as the Cold War came to an end, defense spending cutbacks began 
hammering Dallas’ beleaguered manufacturing sector. Between 1985 and 1989, defense 
spending in the United States was cut by roughly 20% in real terms283. For the Dallas area, 
which by 1988 was one of the largest recipients of DOD expenditures284, the effects were 
devastating, triggering thousands of layoffs throughout the industry, including layoffs of 
82% of Texas Instruments’ defense employees between 1990 and 1991, over 40% of whom 
remained unemployed 9 months later285. Without oil revenues, and now without defense 
contract revenues, the last of Dallas’ seemingly-endless capital streams dried up, and many 
firms throughout the city followed area banks into insolvency286. As a result of corporate 
bankruptcy and abandonment, by the early 1990s, 30% of Dallas’ CBD was vacant287, and 
many of its skyscrapers were so empty that they were referred to as “see-through” 
buildings288.  
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 Eager to return to economic “boom times,” civic first leaders looked to the business 
community for help; after all, when Dallas looked to rebrand itself after the Kennedy 
assassination, a group of civic-minded business elites stepped in to lead the charge. A 
quarter-century had passed since those leaders were in their prime; many were retiring (or 
dying), and had failed to groom their successors for positions in the governing coalition. The 
men and women who were rising to the highest echelons of business leadership often had 
little interest in the politics of development, and many remained divided over infrastructure 
projects and urban redevelopment plans289. Nonetheless, the remaining “old guard’ 
successfully exploited divisions among the city councilmembers, and strong-armed the 
council and city manager into finding a new way forward for the city290. The result was that 
Dallas hired firms to market the city around the mythology surrounding its football team, as 
well as the popular Dallas soap opera. In addition, the council engaged in several rounds of 
urban redevelopment projects throughout Dallas’ northern neighborhoods and central 
business district, although many of these projects fell far short of the grand ideas put 
forward by the “Dallas Plan,” a 30-year development agenda approved by the city council in 
1994291.  
 These efforts were highly successful, and since the mid-1990s, Dallas has seen 
economic growth, even as other parts of the nation decline292. In 2010, the city contained 
one of the highest agglomerations of Fortune 500 headquarters in the country293, and in 
addition, the once-abandoned skyscrapers that define Dallas’ skyline are being converted 
into mixed-use units, adding thousands of new residential units to the area294. However, this 
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development, which quite obviously favored the majority-white central- and northern 
sections of the city, engendered fierce political resistance from neighborhood groups in the 
city’s southern half295. To quell social unrest, city leaders created a trust fund to improve 
access to credit for businesses and community organizations in the city’s majority-nonwhite 
southern neighborhoods296, but it is unclear whether this fund has actually been used 
effectively, and the city has been accused of mishandling and misappropriating funds, while 
the area continues to suffer from decades of disinvestment and decline297.    
 Political transitions. While Dallas’ economic transition has been relatively well-
documented by academia, its political transition is less well-documented, as its effects are 
more recent than many of the works that chronicle the city. The “8-3” plan, identified by 
Elkin, was only a partial success for advocates of representative governance. As soon as it 
had been approved by the federal judge, the city had to determine how best to draw the 
eight council districts, but found it impossible to ensure adequate representation for the 
growing Hispanic and African-American populations, as well as changing demographics 
resulting from continued white flight298. Federal approval for Dallas’ 8-3 proposal relied 
upon demographic data from the 1970 census, but by 1980, these data – and the race-
conscious election districts derived from them – were already obsolete. In particular, 
between 1970 and 1980, the city’s Hispanic population grew by 62%, and its African 
American population by 25%, while the white population fell by 9% over that same period; 
these changes would require that some of the white-majority council districts would need to 
be redrawn, or merged to become primarily African American, and somehow the city would 
also have to create a district for people identifying as Hispanic, without increasing total the 
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number of districts – a feat that city staffers argued was impossible299. Further, political- and 
popular uproar over converting “white” districts into “black” districts under the 8-3 
proposal engendered a variety of alternative proposals, including the creation of “quadrant-
based” councilmembers to represent quarters of the city, and who would serve alongside 
district-based councilmembers, and the creation of at-large council seats elected by only half 
of the city300.  
 Ultimately, of the even reapportionment plans offered by the city manager’s office, 
the city council would approve the quadrant-based 8-4-1 option for federal approval301. This 
move engendered fierce resistance from the city’s African American community, with 
tensions reaching a breaking point during a council meeting when activists locked arms and 
sang We Shall Overcome at a 1989 council meeting concerning the plan302. By 1990, and before 
any elections could be held, the 8-3 system was ruled in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 
based on amendments made to the act after the 8-3 plan received initial approval303. In 1990, 
a federal judge ruled that the 8-4-1 system was also unacceptable, and the city’s attempt to 
appeal to the Justice Department also met with defeat. Meanwhile, an alternative, 14-1 plan, 
in which 14 councilmembers would be elected by districts in which they resided, with the 
mayor elected at large, was defeated by Dallas voters; however, courts ordered the city to 
conduct its upcoming elections under the 14-1 plan, a plan that remains in-effect today304.  
 In the years following this transition, Dallas’ city council is more racially diverse than 
ever before, with the city electing its first African-American mayor in 1995, and its first 
minority-majority city council in 1999305. In addition, under this new system, city 
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councilmembers hoping for re-election are forced to evaluate- and address the demands of 
their districts, rather than the desires of business elites306. A side-effect is that council 
districts are often operated more like fiefdoms than parts of a greater whole, and with this 
approach, the opportunities for corruption are increased dramatically; indeed, since the 
inducement of the 14-1 system, at least three major corruption scandals have erupted, 
including the 2009 bribery and extortion conviction of the city’s Mayor Pro Tem related to 
public housing contracts307. Absentee ballot fraud has also become a concern, peaking in 
2001 when a judge disqualified absentee ballots and changed the outcome of a council 
election in southern Dallas308.  
 Demographic transitions. Unquestionably, Dallas has historically been a 
segregated city. Since (at least) the 1930s, city policies have reflected a city deeply divided – 
both by the Trinity River (which splits the city into northern- and southern halves), and by 
race, with people identifying as White tending to cluster north of the river, and minorities, 
particularly people of Hispanic or Latino heritage and people identifying as Black or African 
American, confined to Oak Cliff, south of the Trinity309. Even as Dallas’ economy has largely 
rebounded from the collapse of the oil market and the Savings & Loan Crisis, not all of the 
city has found a way to thrive; indeed, much (though not all) of the city’s southern half 
continues to suffer from decades of disinvestment and decline, resulting from white flight 
that followed racial violence and civil rights legislation in the 1960s, and the forced 
integration of Dallas’ schools in 1971310. Although a comprehensive study of Dallas’ 
demographic transitions since the mid-1980s is beyond the scope of this study, a significant 
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portion of that story can be told through the rise, fall, and rebirth of these two central 
neighborhoods. The first of these, North Oak Cliff, is traditionally considered to be 
predominately-nonwhite, economically marginalized community, but in recent years has 
begun to rebound from decades of disinvestment, while the second, Downtown Dallas, is 
the traditional hub of the city’s economic activity, the home of several of Dallas’ most 
identifiable landmarks, and is currently undergoing a transformation from abandoned 
corporate capital accumulator to a vibrant, mixed-use urban hub.  
 North Oak Cliff. Recall that after whites abandoned the neighborhood, people 
from African American and Hispanic neighborhoods moved in to replace them, though 
often as renters rather than owners. Minority-owned businesses replaced those formerly 
owned by whites, and while commercial corridors had changed by the late 1970s, 
commercial activity nonetheless remained. Further, attracted by depressed home values, a 
subset of whites – the “urban pioneers” began to return to the area311, and beginning in the 
1980s and early 1990s, developers like Jim Lake Jr. and David Spence began to redevelop 
portions of North Oak Cliff, primarily surrounding an area now known as the Bishop Arts 
District312. In addition, the 2010 completion of a new bridge linking North Oak Cliff to 
Downtown Dallas has spurred additional development in the area; in-line with the new donut 
model, this has attracted wealthier, younger whites into the neighborhood313. While this 
revival of interest in North Oak Cliff is beginning to reverse decades of disinvestment, many 
fear the negative effects of gentrification – particularly the displacement of minority 
residents and businesses314.  
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 Downtown Dallas. While North Oak Cliff is experiencing a (somewhat 
controversial) revival, Downtown Dallas is experiencing a new birth – not as a center of pure 
capital accumulation, but as a center of both accumulation and consumption. Beginning at 
the dawn of the 21st century, hundreds of apartment units, condominiums, and townhouses 
have been added each year, built on an edgier, urban aesthetic, and with the support of a 
Public Improvement District that reinvests levied fees into what has become, since the early 
2000s, a white-majority neighborhood315. Since 2011, this transformation has dramatically 
accelerated under Downtown Dallas 360, a comprehensive area redevelopment plan. This plan 
was (and still is) billed as a way to bring together public officials, city staff, private 
developers, and a nonprofit development corporation in order to both encourage- and guide 
redevelopment projects throughout the neighborhood316. Initial stages of the plan focused 
on infrastructure improvements317, while more recent stages emphasize attracting retail and 
dining option into areas surrounding a series of newly-built museums, urban parks, and 
outdoor art installations318. Early indicators suggest that the plan has been successful so far; 
in 2014, over 1.5 million square feet of office space were leased, renewed, or expanded in 
Downtown Dallas, and the number of real estate transactions reached a level unseen since 
the boom times of the 1980s. In addition, since 2011, the neighborhood has added over 
4,600 new residences319.  
 Post-Fordism, urban political economy, and the need to revisit Dallas, in 
summary. Contrary to the bleak outlooks of mid-late 20th century urban scholars, the post-
Fordist transition that caused so much disruption across the United States also revived a 
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subset of these localities. This transition was much an economic shift as a social one, with 
locally-owned firms and manufacturing ceding ground to multinational organizations and a 
knowledge-based economy, while a subset of the affluent whites who abandoned cities 
during white flight return to reclaim urban neighborhoods for themselves. Within Dallas in 
particular, although the 1980s saw the collapse of its oil- and financial markets, which left the 
city’s urban core significantly vacant, and its economy in shambles, by 2010, the city had 
largely rebounded, and its CBD had begun a revitalization process that continues today. As 
in many (if not all) central cities growing under the knowledge-based, economic aspects of 
the post-Fordist paradigm, the economic prosperity in Dallas is not uniform, and people of 
color living in economically-marginalized neighborhoods (primarily in southern Dallas) face 
threats of gentrification and displacement.  
 As cities transition in the early 21st century, so too do the coalitions that lead them. 
While old guard leaders within governing coalitions remove themselves from the politics of 
decision-making, some cities are seeing a growth in the roles of anchor institutions and 
CDCs in governing coalitions. Although the involvement of CDCs and anchor institutions 
in Dallas’ decision-making structure is unclear, literature already suggests a weakening of the 
“old guard,” resulting in part from economic forces, but also from Dallas’ dramatic, court-
ordered restructuring of its system of electing city leaders. As a result of these changes, four 
decades after the growth machine heralded in a new perspective on urban governance – 
urban political economy – it may be time to revisit Dallas, and to once again reconsider big 
city politics.  
Chapter Summary 
Beginning in the late 1970s, but primarily in the 1980s and early 1990s, urban 




suggested that the “community power” theories of urban governance could no longer 
adequately conceptualize urban governance in practice. Two models emerged to fill this 
then-void in the literature – growth machine theory and urban regime analysis – which 
conceptualized urban governance from a systemic, behavioral perspective, and as a result, 
quickly grew to dominate the study of urban politics.  
Outside of the theoretical concerns regarding both of these theoretical perspectives, 
this study argues that, given the changes in the urban context beginning in the late 20th 
century, especially the economic- and demographic transitions in United States cities, as well 
as a growing role of CDCs and anchor institutions, theories of contemporary urban 
governance may no longer be accurate in modeling the actualities of contemporary urban 
governance. Indeed, this study proffers that, as a result of continued changes in the urban 
context, primarily the effects of post-Fordism on urban cores, and the expansion of CDCs 
and anchor institutions into economic development, big city politics are again in transition, 
and the structural components of urban governance need to be revisited. A well-designed 
study, therefore, may be able to fill this emerging gap in the literature. In Chapter 3, this 
study will outline the methods it will use in order to again revisit the nature of urban 
governance.  
 
i Author’s note: Keyword searches were performed on March 18, 2016 using the WorldCat database, available through the University of 
Louisville (OCLC, 2016). The search was limited to books and journal articles, and the search examined both titles and abstracts (where 
available). Journals were selected from the 2014 SJR database, and included the 50 highest impact factor journals in the following SJR-
defined categories: “political science and international relations,” “public administration,” “sociology and political science,” and “urban 
studies,” and were further limited to journals published in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe (Scimago Lab, 2016). From 
these 200 journals, 85 duplicate entries were removed; from these remaining 115 journals, the author deemed 16 unrelated (based on 
sample tables of contents from 2015), leaving 99 peer-reviewed journals to be searched.  
ii Author’s note: keywords included “biased pluralism,” “community power,” “decisional analysis,” “decisional method,” “elite theory,” 
“elites,” “influentials,” “Madisonian pluralism,” “pluralism,” “power elite,” “reputational analysis,” and “reputational method.” 
iii Author’s note: keywords included "growth machine," “growth coalition,” "urban regime," "governing coalition," "growth machine theory," 
"urban regime theory," and "urban regime analysis." 





SETTING AND METHODOLOGY 
In the previous chapter, this study discussed the state of extant urban scholarship 
with respect to its research questions, and established the presence of a lacuna in the 
literature with respect to contemporary urban governance structures. In this chapter, this 
study will outline the setting of its data collection, and the methods it used to assess whether 
cities are still governed by the political-business coalitions conceptualized in the 1970s and 
1980s, or whether some subset of the third sector has achieved legitimacy as a primary, 
rather than ancillary, component of urban governance320.  
In the sections that follow, this study will first revisit its research questions. Then, it 
will offer a series of hypotheses to be tested in order to answer those questions. Third, it will 
details the study design, arguing for its appropriateness in addressing the research questions. 
Fourth, it will describe the setting for this study, as well as the target population and research 
sample. Fifth, it will outline the data collection methods and instrumentation, including a 
note regarding the ethical considerations related to this study. Sixth, it will discuss how data 
are to be analyzed and processed – first for the descriptive data, and then for the surveys and 




                                                          




Research Questions and Hypotheses, Revisited 
The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study 
attempts to answer, or at least begin to address, and to present a series of hypotheses to be 
tested. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first list its overarching research 
questions, and following this, it will introduce the particular hypotheses to be tested. 
Research Questions Revisited 
This study aims to answer three primary research questions. First, how have Dallas’ 
demographics and economy evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous 
urban scholars? Second, to what extent (if any) are CDCs and anchor institutions active 
participants in Dallas’ governing coalition? Finally, if these organizations are active 
participants in Dallas’ governing coalition, what is the effect of that involvement on urban 
development and policymaking?  
Hypotheses Revisited 
As Chapter 1 noted, this study forwards six primary hypotheses. The first three of 
these relate the changing socioeconomic context of Dallas as a whole, as well as the 
neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, to expectations grounded in 
current literature regarding central cities and their urban neighborhoods. The second three of 
these hypotheses surround the nature of governance in these same three geographies, and 
the effects of “who governs” on the decisions made in contemporary cities and 
neighborhoods. These hypotheses are as-follows:  
Hypothesis 1. Consistent with expectations of modern, economically-prosperous 
cities in the globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, in 
the decades since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic context has 




• People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population 
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census 
immediately prior to the Elkin study).  
 
• A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 
• Dallas, as a whole, shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
  
 Hypothesis 2. Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification 
of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff, recent urban 
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary 
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980. 
 
• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 
in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Consistent with expectations of literature surrounding gentrification 
of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas, recent urban 
redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with four primary 
changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980. 
 
• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 





• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
Hypothesis 4. In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and 
CDCs are primary (rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this 
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Hypothesis 5. In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs 
in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and 
this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Hypothesis 6. In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and 
CDCs in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing 
coalition, and this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the 
value-neutral development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Research Design 
Previous studies of informal urban governance structures suggest that governance 
emerges from interactions among people, whether those people are influential elites321 or 
competing interest groups322, and these interactions complex causalities, resource constraints, 
and an element of path dependency based on the outcomes and contexts of previous 
interactions323. In looking to current urban scholarship for recommended methodologies, it 
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should be noted that seminal authors like Logan, Molotch, Elkin, and Stone all neglect to 
meaningfully endorse any particular methodology324, possibly to avoid having their work fall 
to the same fate as the community power studies to which their work owes a great deal.  
These deep connections, however, offer some validity to the idea of using previous 
methods – those found in the community power debates – in a contemporary setting. To 
test its hypotheses, this study reproduced- and refined methods anchored in that literature: a 
single-shot reputational analysis of a particular city, supported by descriptive quantitative 
data drawn from decennial census- and American Community Survey (ACS) tables. In the 
sections and paragraphs that follow, this study will first elaborate upon the case method, 
including a note on comparative urban research, and why a case study is employed instead. 
Then, it will offer a broad explanation of network analysis, as well as a detailed description of 
the reputational method. Finally, it will consider the use of secondary-source analysis, 
particularly when using census data. 
The Case Method 
In addressing the nature of contemporary urban governance, this study utilizes a case 
analysis of a single city, as opposed to a more comparative research design. First, this section 
will broadly describe the case method, making note of its advantages and disadvantages, and 
then outline the use of Dallas as a crucial case for analysis. Next, it will present a brief 
discussion of comparative urban research as an alternative, arguing for the inappropriateness 
of a comparative model. Finally, it will offer a defense of using a case study in answering the 
research questions.  
Case studies, broadly. As an alternative (or complement) to the comparative 
research methods, which takes a shallower look at a wide selection of cities, case studies 
                                                          




produce intensive examinations of particular locations325, and have been heavily used to 
investigate the variety of decision-making processes within cities, as well as the political and 
economic forces that make each one unique326. It is somewhat inaccurate to consider case 
studies as a unified block, and literature suggests that it is more appropriate to consider “case 
study” an umbrella term encompassing a wide typology of design methods327, 328. Whatever 
the particular design, though, a well-chosen case study allows researchers to engage 
holistically with rare events that may not recur often enough for statistical analysis, enables 
the study of interactions within cases too rare for statistical analysis or comparative 
research329, and can be used to suggest the plausibility of a new position, especially when 
there is a general lack of secondary source data330. Finally, it is important to note that case 
studies generally require fewer financial resources to complete than comparative- or 
statistical methods, while offering a degree of depth and complexity that are often infeasible 
through these other designs331.  
Certainly, case studies are not without their trade-offs. A primary concern with 
relying on the results of a single case is that doing so introduces the possibility that any 
conclusions drawn represent a deviant case, and as a result, are not representative of cases as 
a whole332. In addition, the looseness of the case study as a form of research can complicate 
attempts at generalization, as there are few widely-accepted guidelines for drawing inferences 
and assessing causation from the data. Further, because case studies highlight the 
particularities of any given case’s context, these contextual differences weaken attempts at 
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generalization to the population as a whole333. Finally, case studies are often viewed as 
lacking rigor, with sloppy research and lack of systematic procedures allowing researchers to 
influence the direction of their findings and conclusions334. As a result, it can be challenging 
for a single case to either constitute the basis for new generalizations, or to fully discount 
existing ones335, and for these reasons, case studies have fallen out of favor in many fields, 
concurrent with the rise of more powerful statistical methods336. 
Dallas as a crucial case. In studying the structure of contemporary governing 
coalitions, this study argues that Dallas is indeed a crucial case. While many Rust Belt 
municipalities have starved for new development, potentially rendering their governing 
coalitions more amenable to working with nontraditional organizations like CDCs and 
anchor institutions, Dallas has benefitted from its relative diversity of industries, as well as 
nearby resource extraction operations; indeed, the city’s economy has largely thrived since 
the mid-1990s, even as the Great Recession plagued the rest of the nation337. As such, Dallas 
is argued to be a “least-likely” scenario for changes to be found. If a well-designed case study 
finds that there is a transformation in the role of third-sector organizations in Dallas, with 
respect to current theories of urban governance, this would be a powerful indicator of 
changes occurring elsewhere. By comparison, results from a “most-likely” case like 
Cleveland or Detroit may simply be explained by that aforementioned hunger for 
development, and it could be argued that the change in “who governs” is merely temporary, 
lasting only until economic fortunes improve338.  
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A note on comparative urban research. Comparative urban research is a popular 
trend in contemporary scholarship, which makes the use of a case study seem somewhat 
dated. Before defending the use of the case study, it is important to briefly discuss the 
comparative method, which allows scholars to assess causality of defining characteristics and 
trends within cities, by comparing them against one another within a uniform theoretical 
framework. There are a nearly limitless number of ways in which a comparative study can be 
designed, but in practical terms, most comparative designs tend to fall within a relatively 
narrow band of study types339 that share the primary goal of testing whether (or to what 
extent) an independent variable is causally linked to the dependent variables in the 
researcher’s framework, and to develop empirically valid theories in the process340. Because 
comparative studies involve several cases that are intentionally selected based on researcher-
identified characteristics, it is somewhat unlikely that any conclusions drawn come from 
outliers, as is possible with single-case studies341. Because of these strengths, comparative 
research has been used to greatly expand the scope of urban theory, and in some ways, the 
use of comparative methods helped revitalize urban research in the closing decades of the 
20th century342.  
With respect to varying approaches to urban research, “no concept can be 
comprehensive, much less perfect, and each has its relative merits and liabilities.”343 While 
comparative research offers a number of strengths, it can be hampered by political- and 
cultural differences among various cases, as well as in differences among cities in terms of 
how similar problems manifest themselves344. In addition, even when the differences among 
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cities in a comparative study are minimized, the process of studying each city, and then 
comparing them comes at tremendous cost, both in terms of time and financial resources345 
Finally, when comparing variables found over multiple cities, the city-specific context in 
which those data actually exist may be lost346. This study intended to address the research 
questions by building a complex narrative for the evolution of the city of Dallas, and as such, 
a comparative design was considered to be inappropriate. 
On the appropriateness of the case method. Although the results of case studies 
are limited, and subjective opinions of the method vary, this does not suggest that they are 
without merit, as evidenced by their continuing popularity in urban research and theory-
building347. The shortcomings of case studies do not preclude their usefulness as a basis for 
functional analysis of a phenomenon, nor do they preclude the use of the method in 
exploring relevant attributes of the case itself348. These positions in mind, the use of a case 
study is appropriate for helping to foster a greater discussion about who governs cities today, 
and for suggesting the plausibility of the research findings which are detailed in later 
chapters.  
Network Analysis and the Reputational Method 
As part of its case study of Dallas, this study will employ a reputational analysis of 
the city’s potentially influential individuals. Reputational analysis is an established (though 
historically controversial) method under the larger umbrella of network analysis. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly discuss network analysis as a cluster of 
related methods. Then, it will examine reputational analysis, including its assumptions, 
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historical criticisms and conceptual shortcomings, before offering a rejoinder. Finally, it will 
offer a defense of a reputational analysis in answering the research questions. 
Network analysis. Network analysis is not a single technique, but rather, a group of 
related techniques including reputational-, decisional- and positional analysis (among 
others)349, which vary with respect to the particular aspects of social networks (actors350, 
activities351, or relations352) that they hold rigid, and which they allow to vary353. Generally 
speaking, each particular method operationalizes networks as interrelated sets of 
relationships among defined nodes or elements, which can represent range including (among 
others) individuals, organizations, and nations. Most commonly, network analysis methods 
attempt to explain and model the behavior of these people within their social networks, as 
well as to explain the network as a whole354, but many of these methods can also be used to 
examine individuals relative to their positions in organizations, or links between clusters of 
organizations355. Further, network methods emphasize the importance of the structure of 
networks in shaping actions of individual actors, or in other words, the effects of how 
people are connected through their social environments, and how differing environmental 
contexts describe and explain various decisions and outcomes356. In short, network analysis 
attempts to evaluate the extent to which people know one another, and the extent to which 
the people they know also know one another357.  
Reputational method. The reputational method (or reputational analysis) is a 
qualitative, narrative-driven method of network analysis, employed most commonly to 
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uncover the particular makeup of governing coalitions within given cities. This method 
focuses on the actors within a social network, using the reputation for influence in a 
community as a proxy for actual influence358.  
Reputational studies of cities are generally conducted in two phases. In the first, the 
researcher identifies a core group of volunteers, such as bankers, real estate developers, and 
community leaders; these volunteers are asked to rank lengthy lists of citizens who, based on 
their positions in society, could reasonably be assumed to be influential people (commonly 
referred to in the literature as influentials or decision-makers)359. Then, a new set of lists (often 
containing 50-100 of the highest-rated names) are then presented to that same group of 
judges, who are then asked to “vote” for the 10-25 most influential people, based on their 
understanding of the city. The people with the highest votes are then invited to participate in 
the second phase of the study.  
In the second phase of most reputational studies, the new group of participants are 
given similar lists of names to what the judges in the first phase were given, with similar 
instructions to rate the relative influence of individuals. In addition, participants are invited 
to add names that the list does not currently include. Researchers use these new names to 
expand the participant pool through snowball sampling. Eventually, the researchers cut off 
the snowball sampling, and use the results of the ranked lists to render an image the 
structure and actions within a social network360. This method, while not random, holds the 
advantage of being able to access hard-to-reach populations, as well as populations that are 
difficult to identify through traditional sampling methods361. 
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Assumptions, criticisms, and methodological challenges. Reputational analysis 
is built on three primary assumptions. First, the method assumes that power within a city is 
differentially distributed among members of a governing coalition, because the resources 
required to effectively govern a city are beyond the capacity of any particular actor or 
organization, regardless of their financial wealth or political clout362. Related to this, power 
rests within a relatively small group of actors willing and able to mobilize their resources in 
service of predetermined goals, with a reasonable likelihood of being able to attain them363. 
Finally, power cannot be measured directly, and instead, must be measured through a proxy 
variable; as such, a given actor’s reputation for having power is assumed to be a valid stand-
in364. 
The criticisms of reputational analysis generally fall into two broad categories: 
criticisms of its assumptions, and criticisms of its procedures and findings. To the first set of 
challenges critics assert that there is no reason to believe that power is either differentially 
distributed, or that it is an emergent property of interactions among various actors. Even if 
those assumptions can be supported, they do not necessarily suggest that influentials ever 
form into cohesive governing coalitions. Further, even if such a coalition exists, this does not 
presuppose dominance over the policymaking process. Finally, even if all of the previous 
assertions prove valid, they cannot be made a priori, which invalidates the reputational 
method365.  
Looking at the method’s procedures and findings, critics charge that the method 
offers little more than an ambiguous, static definition of power, and fails to recognize the 
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difference between generalized power and project- or agenda-specific power. As a result, the 
specific questions that reputational surveys use are generally imprecise, and results frequently 
confirm the positions of the authors. Finally, the roster of influential actors created by these 
surveys is merely a list of potential influentials, and cannot be assumed to contain all actual 
influentials366.  
A rejoinder. These pluralist arguments appear to reflect a deep misunderstanding of 
the technique’s ontological scholarship, as well as common-sense examinations of urban 
policymaking. To the suggestion that power is not differentially distributed, that there is 
indeed a distribution of power within cities has been supported by an overwhelming 
preponderance of evidence367, and dozens of studies are strongly suggestive of the presence 
of cohesive formal- and informal social-, legal, and business relationships among those who 
wield that power368. It is also inaccurate for critics to charge that reputational studies 
conceptualize power as a monolithic construct; instead, the majority of these studies suggest 
instead that, while some individual actors possess a degree of generalized influence, it is 
more common to see a broad range and typology of influential actors with dynamic, 
contextual scopes of influence that often reach beyond their particular fields or industries369. 
Finally, it is inaccurate for detractors to accuse reputational studies of presupposing the 
existence of governing coalitions. The reputational method itself does not assume the 
existence of a governing coalition of influentials; certainly doing this would indeed prejudge 
what has historically been a critical, fundamental question within urban political studies370. 
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Looking now to the criticisms of the method’s procedures and results, it appears that 
many of these arguments are actually responses to poor applications of the technique, or 
result from cherry-picked meta-analyses of reputational surveys. For example, when noting 
that some reputational studies fail to differentiate between generalized and issue-specific 
influence, detractors accurately highlight a critical shortcoming those applications of the 
technique, which have been addressed in more rigorous studies371. In addition, the 
suggestion that the reputational method always finds a governing coalition ignores several 
studies whose results fail to support the presence of one372. Further, to the criticism that the 
reputation for influence is not a valid proxy for actual influence, during the 1950s and 1960s, 
scholars validated the method against decisional- and positional surveys, and found 
significant evidence that the reputation for power is a valid indicator of the extent to which 
an individual is actually involved in the policymaking process373. Finally, that the results of 
reputational studies are based on individual biases and imperfect knowledge is undeniable, 
and as a result, it is assumed that there are an unknowable number of “blind spots” in the 
results. However, all methods produce results that contain error, so it is (arguably) 
unreasonable to invalidate reputational analysis for that reason.  
On the appropriateness of the reputational method. This study aimed to 
examine the structure of power in the city of Dallas, in order to consider fundamental 
questions about the nature of governing coalitions more broadly. In addition, it compared 
the Dallas of the early 21st century with the Dallas of the mid-20th, to understand how the 
city and its governing coalition have evolved over time and circumstances. In service of 
those goals, the reputational method held considerable appeal. First, the method is relatively 
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straightforward, and can replicated across a number of communities of varying sizes374. In 
addition, the method contains a tremendous amount of face validity; that is, it addresses the 
research questions in a way that would (arguably) be substantiated by common-sense 
appraisals from informed observers of a community’s affairs375. Finally, the previous study of 
Dallas utilized a reputational method, so in comparing the city’s governing coalition today to 
how it existed in the past, choosing an alternative method would likely jeopardize this study’s 
validity, as results would not easily compare to those of prior researchers. These positions in 
mind, the use of a reputational analysis was considered appropriate for analyzing the 
structure of urban governance in Dallas. 
Secondary-Source Data Analysis 
Finally, in addressing the nature of contemporary urban governance, decennial 
census- and ACS records from 1980 to 2010 are employed in order to trace the economic- 
and demographic transformations in Dallas since the Elkin (1987) study. First, this section 
broadly discusses the use of census data in social sciences, including specific data used for 
this study. Next, it describes some of the concerns with secondary-source data, as they apply 
to this case. Finally, it presents a defense of the appropriateness using these secondary-
source data in answering the research questions. 
 On the use and appropriateness of secondary-source data analysis. Broadly 
speaking, the use of census data has taken on an expanded role in investigating the social 
world analysis, and its use is now widely accepted across the social sciences376. By federal law, 
the U.S. government conducts a decennial census, and since 1940, this census has included a 
census of housing as well, providing researchers with a valuable source of economic- and 
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demographic information for a large section of the population377. These data are publicly 
available, are generally available at no additional cost to the researcher, are available at many 
geographic levels (e.g. tract-, city-, county-, and state-level), and are also available for 
multiple years. As a result, using census data allows inclusion of additional descriptive data 
than would have been feasible using direct surveys, in less time, for less money, and with 
data that are more readily comparable between different locations, such as among different 
areas within the same cities, or between one city and another378. This study utilizes decennial 
census data to examine demographic- and economic shifts between 1980 and 2010, as well 
as ACS data to supplement data from 2010 that have not yet been made available.  
Concerns with using secondary-source data. The use of census data can be 
somewhat problematic, though, for a number of reasons. First, it is often the case that 
particular groups (e.g. people with low incomes, immigrants who are undocumented, people 
with outstanding warrants) are poorly represented379. Further, these data are not always 
reported at the level of specificity needed by the researcher, reported data may contain gaps 
and errors for which the researcher cannot easily correct, and some data may simply not be 
formatted or reported in a way that the researcher will find useful380. Finally, definitions 
often change from one reporting period to the next, and the researcher must ensure that 
they are aware of these changes, and that they can correct for them381.  
In defense of secondary-source analysis. Although the use of census data is 
hardly free from perfection, it is a well-established method in exploratory research, with 
thousands of examples found across social sciences382. Decennial census data are considered 
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“complete count” data, with participation mandated by federal law; as such, these data are 
effectively measures of the research population, or at least, are as close to the actual 
population as is feasible383. Looking at the problem of statistical error, the Census Bureau 
documents margins of error in the census files themselves, while also noting where error 
may have been introduced for the purpose of protecting confidentiality384. Finally, 
considering the problem of under-representation, tremendous effort is undertaken to include 
members of difficult-to-reach populations, beyond what is feasible for most researchers 
outside of the Census Bureau385. These positions in mind, the use of census- and ACS data 
for the purposes of suggesting economic- and demographic trends within Dallas was 
considered to be appropriate. 
In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly introduces Dallas, Texas, the 
site of the Thometz and Elkin studies, as well as this study’s two focus neighborhoods: 
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it will detail the settings of the surveys and 
interviews themselves, so that future researchers can replicate the process, at least to the 
extent feasible when repeating studies in natural (rather than laboratory) settings.  
Study Focus Areas: Dallas and Two Central Urban Neighborhoods 
 This study focuses on three geographic areas for its analysis: the City of Dallas as a 
whole, and two of its central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. 
In the sections that follow, this study will briefly introduce each, in turn.  
 The City of Dallas, Texas. The City of Dallas is located in North Central Texas, 
and is the seat of Dallas County. The city was founded on the banks of the Trinity River, as a 
trading post located on a natural river crossing used by Native American tribes. Now, 
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instead of traces, the city is crossed by four major Interstate highways: 20, 30, 35, and 45, as 
well as a number of rail lines, and is served by a major international airport386.  
As Chapter 2 detailed, for nearly all of Dallas’ postwar history, city policies have 
reflected the desires of city leaders to keep Dallas business-friendly, as well as deeply divided 
by race, with people identifying as White tending to cluster north of the Trinity River, and 
minorities, particularly people of Hispanic or Latino heritage and people identifying as Black 
or African American, confined to Oak Cliff, clustered to the south387. Chapter 2 recounted 
much of this history, at least with respect to the city’s history of developmental politics and 
the differential developmental trajectories of its two halves. The effects of those histories 
and trajectories can be seen even today, in the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and 
Downtown Dallas, which are both revitalizing, but in strikingly different ways.  
 North Oak Cliff. Looking first at North Oak Cliff, recall that Chapter 2 recounted 
the political- and economic disinvestment through this once-vibrant commercial hub within 
southern Dallas. Much of southern Dallas has been broadly ignored by both city leaders and 
the general public for decades, and has garnered a reputation for commercial disinvestment, 
high crime, and poor school performance388. As Chapter 2 recounts, North Oak Cliff is 
becoming an exception to this, and is rapidly gentrifying through a mix of new construction 
and adaptive reuse of existing structures. As Chapters 4 and 5 will expand upon, these 
changes have divided opinions, with many newcomers praising the growth and revitalization, 
while a subset of existing residents, many of whom cannot afford to live in a Disneyfied 
version of the former streetcar suburb, and are unsure of where they will move when they 
are forced out of their rental houses and commercial pad sites. Finally, although the specific 
                                                          
386 McElhaney & Hazel, 2015 
387 Graff, 2008, pp. 157-164, 181 




boundaries of North Oak Cliff are somewhat fluid and subjective, a common definition 
bounds the neighborhood within Interstate Highway 30, Interstate Highway 35E, 12th Street, 
and Hampton Road; these boundaries are reflected in figure 3.01 shows a map of North Oak 
Cliff389. 










 Downtown Dallas. The home of the city’s skyline, Downtown Dallas is the city’s 
visible face; as later chapters will note, many people believe this to be the heart of Dallas, 
and that its health (or decay) is representative of the rest of the city. As Chapter 2 noted, the 
Downtown Dallas skyline is largely a result of a publicly-funded push to move Dallas 
beyond the Kennedy assassination by bulldozing offices and warehouses from the early 20th 
century and replacing them with convention centers, stadiums, and office buildings in a 
construction boom that lasted from the mid-1960s until the real estate, financial, and oil 
markets collapsed throughout the early-mid 1980s. After floundering for over a decade, 
starting in the mid-late 1990s, Downtown Dallas entered a second period of revitalization 
                                                          




that continues today, under the Downtown Dallas 360 master plan. Rather than gentrifying an 
existing residential area, much of Downtown Dallas’ real estate is being reclaimed from 
existing commercial properties, with offices being converted into upscale lofts; nonetheless, 
there is little room in the neighborhood for people with low- or moderate incomes. In terms 
of geographical boundaries, figure 3.02 shows a map of Downtown Dallas390, using Spur 366, 
State Highway 75 (Central Expressway), Interstate Highway 30, and Interstate Highway 35E 
as commonly-accepted neighborhood boundaries.  










Study Focus Areas, in summary. Like other entrepreneurial governing coalitions, 
leadership in Dallas often seeks to solve its problems through growth and development. 
Indeed, as Chapter 2 describes, throughout the city’s history, Dallas’ leaders have strived to 
make city policies favorable to businesses and growth, although a legacy of racism has 
focused this growth into white neighborhoods like Downtown Dallas, often at the expense 
of majority-minority southern neighborhoods like North Oak Cliff. Although these 
neighborhoods continue to lag behind, recently, a subset of them have begun to gentrify as 
                                                          




affluent whites migrate back to the city from Dallas’ northern suburbs391. Although both 
Downtown Dallas and North Oak Cliff have experienced high vacancy rates and 
abandonment, the particular shape of that abandonment, as well as each neighborhood’s 
respective paths to revitalization have been differentially affected by decisions made at the 
citywide level, neighborhood-level leaders (at least in North Oak Cliff) have also played a 
role. While the actions of past decision-makers are responsible for the current state of Dallas 
as a whole, as well as both North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, from this point forward, 
this study will focus on the current decision-makers in these areas, as well as the effects of 
the decisions that they make – particularly with respect to equitable economic development. 
Setting and Context of Data Collection 
Looking first at quantitative data collection, records were collected and added to the 
dataset between April and June of 2015. For 1980 and 1990, data are not generally available 
in electronic format, so this phase of data collection was performed in the libraries of the 
University of Louisville and the University of Texas at Dallas using physical copies of 
Census Bureau publications. For 2000 and 2010, data are available through the American 
FactFinder website, which is produced and maintained by the Census Bureau. 
For qualitative data collection, surveys and interviews were conducted over a four-
week period, beginning on June 3, 2015, and ending on July 2, 2015. To accommodate the 
participants, each was slotted into a two-hour window, with 3-4 interviews being conducted 
each weekday. Participants were invited to select the meeting slot and location, based on 
their availability. Of the 79 total participants, 43 chose to meet in their offices or nearby 
meeting rooms 31 elected to meet in coffee shops and cafes, 3 identified hotel conference 
rooms, and 2 chose to meet in locally-owned, independent businesses. While a more 
                                                          




rigorous experimental design would mandate the use of a specific, controlled meeting room, 
it was decided that because of the sensitive nature of the questions being asked of the 
participants, their preferences would be honored.  
Research Sample and Data Sources 
The purpose of this section is to outline the data sources used. First, it will list all 
data points selected for quantitative analysis of the city of Dallas, first for 1980, and then for 
1990, 2000, and 2010. Then, it will describe the target population for the reputational 
analysis, as well as the sample of participants and how participants were identified and 
invited to participate. Finally, it will evaluate ethical considerations, and how confidentiality 
is protected.  
Quantitative Data Sources 
Data collected at each year. For all yearsiv, v, vi, vii this study uses the following data: 
population (all races combined), population (white alone), population (black or African 
American alone), population (American Indian or Alaskan native alone), population (Asian 
American, Pacific Islander, or native Hawaiian alone), population (other or mixed-race), 
population (nonwhite), and population (Hispanic, regardless of race). It also uses the 
following income and poverty data: median household income, poverty (all races combined), 
poverty (white alone), poverty (black or African American alone), poverty (American Indian 
or Alaskan native alone), poverty (Asian American, Pacific Islander, or native Hawaiian 
alone), poverty (other or mixed-race), poverty (nonwhite), and poverty (Hispanic, regardless 
of race), unemployment (all races combined), and employment by industry (manufacturing).  
Notes for 1980 and 1990. It is important to note that in 1980 and 1990, definitions 
for a number of employment categories are not analogous to those listed in census files from 




Employment Commission. These data, while the best available, are less granular than those 
presented in the decennial census. For example, for 1980, data are presented for the Dallas/ 
Fort Worth standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA)392, while in 1990, data are 
presented for the Dallas-Fort Worth primary metropolitan statistical area (PMSA). These 
terms were both deprecated in 2000, replaced by the broader term “metropolitan statistical 
area” (MSA). The differences between an SMSA and a PMSA relate to how statistical areas 
are classified, with PMSAs being reserved for statistical areas with at least one county 
featuring a city of at least one million people, while SMSAs only require a county with a city 
of at least 50,000. Thus, as Dallas’ population topped one million people in 1990, its 
statistical area became a PMSA; this change in nomenclature has no bearing on the data 
themselves. Nonetheless, it is critical to understand that these data are not limited to Dallas 
itself, and include its surrounding statistical area, which includes large cities such as Fort 
Worth and Arlington. This limitation will be revisited later in this study, but use of these data 
allow for comparisons over the entire period from 1980 to 2010 at the citywide level – 
comparisons which would be unavailable using census data alone.  
These caveats in mind, this study uses the following employment-related data: 
employment by industry (executive, administrative, and managerial), employment by industry 
(professional specialty occupations), employment by industry (technical and related support), 
employment by industry (sales), employment by industry (administrative support and 
clerical), employment by industry (private household), employment by industry (protective 
services), employment by industry (service occupations other than protective and private 
household), employment by industry (farming, forestry, and fishing), employment by 
industry (production, craft, and repair), employment by industry (machine operators, 
                                                          




assemblers, and inspectors), employment by industry (transportation and material moving), 
employment by industry (handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers), employment 
by industry (construction), employment by industry (manufacturing), employment by 
industry (transportation, communications, and utilities), employment by industry (wholesale 
and retail trade), employment by industry (finance, insurance, and real estate), employment 
by industry (professional and related services). Through analysis of relevant definitions, these 
categories (either alone or in combination) were found to be similar in scope to categories in 
census and ACS data, taking into account aforementioned limitations.   
Notes for 2000. For 2000, this study uses the following employment-related data: 
employment by industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining), employment 
by industry (construction), employment by industry (wholesale trade), employment by 
industry (retail trade), employment by industry (transportation and warehousing, and 
utilities), employment by industry (information), employment by industry (professional, 
scientific, management, administrative, and waste management), employment by industry 
(arts, entertainment and recreation, and accommodation and food services), employment by 
industry (other services, except public administration), and employment by industry (public 
administration).  
Notes for 2010. Finally, for 2010 this study also uses the following employment 
data: employment by industry (agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining), 
employment by industry (construction), employment by industry (wholesale trade), 
employment by industry (retail trade), employment by industry (transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities), employment by industry (information), employment by industry 
(professional, scientific, management, administrative, and waste management), employment 




employment by industry (other services, except public administration), and employment by 
industry (public administration). Of additional note, because of the comparatively recent 
nature of the 2010 decennial census, published records are incomplete. Where noted, this 
study uses ACS 5-year estimates, from the period of 2006 to 2010. While (arguably) less 
accurate than the decennial census, these data use incredibly complex modeling- and 
sampling techniques to remain a statistically valid representation of the population as a 
whole393.  
Qualitative Data Sources 
Target population. The current conceptualization of urban governance is largely a 
product of studies conducted from the early 1970s to the mid- to late 1990s, which in turn 
owe a heavy debt to the community power studies of the 1950s and1960s394. These earlier 
studies suggested that the informal coalition of city leaders primarily include prominent 
businesspeople and leading politicians, but that a lower-tier of leadership exists on an as-
needed basis, in order to help legitimize policies or development plans, with little overall 
input in the decisions being  made; this larger group consists of heads of community 
organizations and universities, community leaders, local experts, local media, construction 
companies, real estate developers, and regional banks, as well as leaders from religious 
orders, social service organizations, and cultural institutions among395.  
Survey sample. Because the exact makeup of Dallas’ governing coalition is not 
known, it was decided to cast a wide net for potential participants. Using previous literature 
as a guide, this study identified political leaders at the city-, state-, and national level; 
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executive leadership- and board members of large businesses in the city; administration and 
board members of the city’s school district; members of the state board of education; county 
judges; executive leadership- and board membership of CDCs, universities, and hospitals; 
members of every chamber of commerce in Dallas County396, membership rosters of social 
clubs397; leaders in local media (newspaper and television); retired mayors and city council 
members; pastors of large area churches; and neighborhood organization leaders.  
Identifying public- and private sector participants. Identifying potential public- 
and private sector participants for this study was relatively straightforward. First, potential 
public sector participants were identified through newspaper articles in the Dallas Morning 
News – the city’s newspaper of record – regarding development projects in south- and 
central Dallas, the Dallas City Council, the city’s Office of Economic Development, the 
Dallas ISD organizational chart, and the Office of the Mayor. In addition, county judges, 
membership rosters from city-wide and neighborhood-level chambers of commerce, and 
state - and national legislators were added to the list, based on similar lists from previous 
studies. Potential private sector participants were identified through the Fortune 500 list of 
companies headquartered in Dallas, lists of the largest employers in Dallas, largest companies 
in, a listing of the largest real estate developers in the city, and a listing of the city’s largest 
banks. For each of these organizations, key employees, executives, and boards of directors 
were identified through SEC filings and data found on corporate websites.  
Identifying third sector participants. To identify potential participants from 
CDCs, this study used the Guidestar Online database of nonprofits headquartered in Dallas-
                                                          
396 e.g. Greater Dallas Chamber of Commerce, the Dallas Black Chamber of Commerce, the East Dallas Chamber of Commerce, Oak Cliff 
Chamber of Commerce, among many others 




Fort Worth area, filtered by NTEE codes398 to limit results to organizations involved in 
development, housing, and workforce development, as well as neighborhood organizations 
and community centers. From these filters, over 1,200 organizations with tax records from 
the past 5 years were identified. Using criteria for the IRS 990 form, which nonprofits file 
annually to renew their nonprofit status, the list was filtered to include organizations with at 
least $200,000 in income, or over $500,000 in assets. Finally, the list was reduced by 
eliminating trade unions, duplicate organizations, and professional societies, as well as 
organizations not headquartered in Dallas County. Executive management, key employees, 
and boards of directors were identified using organization websites and IRS 990 records 
from the Guidestar database, and were added to the list of potential participants. Anchor 
institution participant identification was considerably simpler; potential participants were 
found through hospital- and both public- and private university websites, to identify 
leadership, key employees, and members of boards of trustees.  
Supplementing participant lists. Past reputational studies have used archival 
newspaper searches to add to their lists of potential influentials399. This study also utilized 
archival research, using newspaper articles regarding development in South- and Central 
Dallas from the Dallas Morning News (the city’s newspaper of record), as well as two alt-
newspapers: the Dallas Observer and the Oak Cliff Advocate. The resulting list of possible 
influentials contained 7,727 names, including duplicates. Of these, 341 names appeared 
twice, 83 appeared three times, 15 appeared four times, and 3 appeared five times. Each time 
a name appeared was counted as a single “vote” for that person being an influential 
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individual in Dallas’ decision-making body, so, for example, a name appearing two times was 
given two “votes.”  
Initial participant pool and final participant tally. All names with at least three 
votes were used to fill the participant pool; this initial pool contained 101 names. Each 
person on the list was invited to participate in this study through a letter mailed to their 
office four weeks prior to the beginning of data collection, with a follow-up email sent two 
weeks prior400. Physical- and email addresses were collected through organizational websites. 
Out of the 101 names in the initial potential participant pool, 43 responded; through three 
rounds of snowball sampling, an additional 28 participants were recommended. These 
potential participants were contacted by phone, with an email follow-up three days later; 
from these, 19 additional participants were added to the sample. In addition, as surveys were 
analyzed, it became apparent that a final wave of interviews would need to be conducted. 
From the surveys, 31 additional people were invited by phone to participate in the study, 
with a follow-up email sent three days later. Out of these, 17 participants were added to the 
pool, for a total of 79 surveys and interviews. 
A note on participant demographics. Of the 79 participants, 45 identified 
themselves as male, and 34 as female. Further, 41 participants identified themselves primarily 
as white, 19 as Asian-American, 16 as African-American, and 3 as another race or multiracial. 
Additionally, 13 participants identified themselves as Hispanic or Latino. Additionally, 2 
were between 25 and 35 years of age, 8 were between 35 and 44, 28 were between 45 and 54, 
35 were between 55 and 64, and 6 were 65 or older; the median age among all participants 
was 49.5. Finally, 75 participants identified themselves as having at least an undergraduate 
degree.    
                                                          




A note on snowball sampling and diminishing returns. For the first two rounds 
of surveys and interviews, participants greatly improved the reputational analysis by offering 
the names of several previously-unidentified participants, reinforcing existing lists of 
potentially influential actors, and providing valuable narrative to contextualize the results. 
This pattern declined sharply at the third round of sampling, and given the limited amount 
of time remaining for data collection in the field, it was decided to not engage in another 
round of snowball sampling. This is not to suggest that, had additional interviews been 
conducted, new insight would not have been gained, but given the limits of time and 
financial resources, it was deemed infeasible to continue. 
Ethical Considerations and IRB Statement 
The University of Louisville’s IRB approved the study in April 2015, and the study is 
in full compliance with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Code of Federal 
Regulations,45 CFR § 46 (2009); a renewal was granted in April 2016. The IRB deemed the 
study to be one of minimal risk to participants, and that the probability and magnitude of 
harm or discomfort anticipated in the research was not greater than any ordinarily 
encountered in daily life, or during the performance of routine physical or psychological 
examinations or tests.  
To protect anonymity, this study was granted approval to waive signed consent, and 
instead participants were given a letter stating that their participation in the study was 
equivalent to granting that consent, although they were free to withdraw that consent at any 
time, and doing so would carry no penalty; to date, no participant has withdrawn consent. 
Throughout the survey and interview, participants were reminded that their answers would 
be kept in confidence, and that no direct quotations would be used without permission. With 




recommendation would be kept anonymous, and that additional participants would not be 
informed about who volunteered their information with prior consent; this proved to be a 
moot point, however, as all participants gave their consent to be identified as a source.  
Completed surveys and interview notes were kept in possession of the data collector 
while in the field, and stored in a locked filing cabinet within a controlled-access office 
during the collection phase. After returning from the field, surveys and interview notes were 
stored in another locked filing cabinet within a controlled-access office. Only the data 
collector had access to these documents, which were shredded after being anonymized and 
converted to digital copy. Confidentiality of collected data was be maintained at all times, 
and identification of participants was not made available during or after the study.  
Data Collection 
The purpose of this section is to chronicle the data collection methods used by this 
study. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will document the methods used to collect 
quantitative data collection, using decennial census and limited ACS records. Then, it will 
chronicle the context and process for collecting the qualitative data, using surveys and 
interviews.  
Quantitative Data Collection 
For all years, both decennial- and ACS data are recorded from tables reporting data 
at the city level, using all tracts wholly- or partially within Dallas. In addition, for all years, 
tract data are aggregated at the neighborhood level by overlaying neighborhood maps401 
provided by the Dallas Morning News and BC Workshop, a nonprofit urban research 
institute, atop decennial census tract maps402, and then approximating census tracts into 
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neighborhoods representing North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. This process is 
repeated for 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010, in order to capture any changes in census tract 
boundariesviii.  
For 1980 and 1990, census data are not generally available in electronic format, so 
data were copied from physical publications of the Census of the Population and Housing 
for 1980 and 1990 into the study dataset - a series of Microsoft Excel tables. For 2000 and 
2010, data are available through the American FactFinder website403, which is produced and 
maintained by the Census Bureau. Necessary data were downloaded in a Microsoft Excel-
compatible format, and then copied the data into the study dataset. Finally, the study dataset 
was verified for accuracy against the source tables by two independent readers.  
Qualitative Data Collection 
Participants were asked to complete a paper survey, and also to participate in a brief 
interview session. First, this section details the survey itself, which was constructed based on 
the examples of older reputational analyses, including a previous study of Dallas, with 
modifications recommended by the dissertation committee404. Then, it discusses the 
interview questions used, which offered the participants the opportunity to contextualize 
their survey responses, offer deeper insight into both Dallas’ development in recent years, 
and into its informal governance structure. 
Survey outline. After a brief introduction, study participants were asked to complete 
a survey regarding how projects in Dallas come about, and who gets involved. First, 
participants were asked to provide informed consent, and gave them the opportunity to opt 
out of completing the survey. Once consent was given, the participants were asked to 
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complete the survey of leadership and development in Dallas (a reproduction appears in 
Appendix 8); the five sections of the survey are detailed below.   
In the first section, participants were presented with the master list of 101 
influentials, and for each, was first asked to indicate how influential each person is with 
respect to policy decisions or development in Dallas as a whole, ranging from 1 (not very 
influential) to 4 (highly influential); participants were instructed to respond based on their 
own opinions, and were given an option to select “Don’t Know / Not Sure.” Then, for each 
of the 101 names, participants were asked to briefly elaborate on why they gave the rating 
that they did. Third, participants were asked to disclose whether they had served on a 
committee or project team with each of the 101 names. Finally, participants were asked to 
select which phrase (“Never heard of,” “Know slightly,” “Know well,” or “Personal friend 
or relative”) best described their relationship with each of the names listed. Participants were 
also invited to provide write-in names, in case the survey failed to identify someone who, in 
their opinion, was influential in city-wide projects.  
In the second section, the survey asked participants to imagine that they were 
responsible for a project that would have an impact felt throughout the city, and that this 
project would require a decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly 
everyone would accept. Using the lists from the previous section, as well as their own 
knowledge of Dallas’ leaders, participants were asked to select up to 10 people for their 
team. For each of these names, participants were asked to disclose whether they had been on 
a committee or project team with that person in the past five years, and to describe (using 
the same phrases from above) their relationship with that person.  
In the third- and fourth sections, participants were asked to imagine that they were 




Cliff, which would require a decision to be made by a group of leaders whose opinions 
nearly everyone would accept.  Using the lists from the first section, as well as their own 
knowledge of Dallas’ leaders, participants were asked to select up to 10 people for their 
team. For each of these names, participants were asked to disclose whether they had been on 
a committee or project team with that person in the past five years, and to describe (using 
the same phrases from above) their relationship with that person.  
Finally, in the fifth section, the survey asked participants to record any concluding 
thoughts on the nature of decision-making in Dallas, such as their thoughts on how 
decisions are made, who makes them, or the types of people who get most heavily involved 
in Dallas’ decision-making body - either for the city as a whole, or for projects in particular 
neighborhoods. Participants were also asked to list any names of people who might be 
willing to provide additional information that may be helpful for this study. 
Interview outline. After completing the survey, participants engaged in a brief 
interview with the data collector; this interview405 contained four questions. These questions 
were intended to be kept brief, but participants often had much to say, and interviews 
frequently took up the majority of the meeting time. For each interview, the data collector 
kept detailed notes, labeled with the date and interview number; for example, the second 
interview on the date June 23, 2015 would be labeled “2015072302.”  
The first interview question asked participants about their subjective opinion about 
development in Dallas; specifically, which individuals and organizations (public-, private-, 
and third-sector) tend to get involved, and whether (and to what extent) residents of 
neighborhoods being developed are part of the development process. The second question 
asked participants to contrast development in Dallas’ CBD, particularly the Downtown 
                                                          




Dallas 360 plan, with development in the Oak Cliff area, particularly with respect to the 
Bishop Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway projects. These specific projects were chosen 
because, based on newspaper articles and discussions with local media reporters, these are 
largest and most visible of the developments in the respective areas. The third question 
asked participants to talk about the involvement of particular organizations in development, 
and was tailored based on previous answers. For example, participants frequently discussed 
the private sector’s involvement in development, so this question was often modified to ask 
specifically about public- and third-sector organizations. The final question asked 
participants to discuss their individual involvement with development in these areas, and 
their individual experiences with the process. For participants who were most closely 
associated with projects in either the CBD or Oak Cliff, this question was tailored to their 
particular focus area, and for participants who were less-directly connected to one project, 
the question was kept intentionally broad.  
Data Processing and Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to outline methods that were used to process the data 
after collection. First, it will briefly sketch how quantitative data are to be processed and 
analyzed. Then, it will detail a two-phase analysis to be undertaken of the qualitative survey- 
and interview data.  
Quantitative Data Processing and Analysis 
Quantitative data were analyzed in two phases. During the first phase, a series of data 
tables and charts were created to show changes in racial- and economic profiles for Dallas as 
a whole, as well as for North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. In the second phase, these 
data were compared to expected data based on literature regarding post-Fordist racial- and 




paragraphs that follow, this study will introduce these quantitative data processing and 
analysis methods. 
Phase 1: Comparing geographies over time. In the first round of quantitative 
analysis, economic and demographic census data were copied into a Microsoft Excel file; 
data from 1980 and 1990 were hand-copied, while data from 2000 and 2010 were available 
electronically, and were imported as .csv files, reducing the likelihood for transcription 
errors. Then, detailed tables and charts were constructed from this “master” file, the 
demographic- and economic profiles have changed over the 30-year period from 1980 to 
2010, for Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas. These data first appear 
in Chapter 4, and also serve as the basis of further analysis in Chapter 5.  
Phase 2: comparing data to literature-based expectations. In the second round 
of analysis, this study recast its quantitative data in the context of expectations based on 
literature regarding the effects of post-Fordism on cities overall, and within central urban 
neighborhoods. Recall that literature regarding post-Fordist shifts in central cities and urban 
neighborhoods suggests that, while wealthier whites largely abandoned central cities for 
suburban alternatives (conceptualized by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model), a subset of 
them are “rediscovering” central urban neighborhoods (conceptualized by the new donut 
model and gentrification literature). To test whether, or to what extent, these two trends 
appear in Dallas citywide, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas, this study made three 
primary comparisons: first, between Dallas and its surrounding suburbs; second, between the 
neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas; and third, between these 






Qualitative Data Processing and Analysis 
Completed surveys and interview notes were also analyzed in two phases. During the 
first phase, completed surveys and interview notes were used to first create a typology of 
decision-makers within Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas; these 
typologies will be presented in Chapter 4. In the second phase, this study examined the 
presence- and nature of decision-making structures that comprise these various typologies, 
first for Dallas citywide, then for North Oak Cliff, and finally for Downtown Dallas. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will introduce these qualitative data processing and analysis 
methods.  
Phase 1: Establishing a typology of decision-makers. Previous studies of Dallas 
found that the highest levels of decision-making were largely occupied by business 
executives and civic organizations406, supported by sympathetic public-sector officials 
through business-friendly legislation and public funding for private development, especially 
in Downtown Dallas. Recall that, in the decades following these studies, much of the 
commercial heart of Dallas had moved to its surrounding suburbs, and many of its locally-
owned firms have been merged into national- and international corporations. Additionally, 
recall that in 1991 Dallas’ city council underwent a dramatic restructure that distributed 
power from wealthy, white North Dallas into districts across the city. Finally, recall that 
Dallas’ leadership was suspected of having failed to identify successors to retiring leaders, 
leaving the future of the entrepreneurial regime in a degree of doubt. 
To the extent that business dominance of citywide decision-making was ever 
accurate, it may no longer be so today. Therefore, during the first phase of qualitative data 
analysis, this study analyzed coded participant responses, as well as characteristics of every 
                                                          




actor nominated to serve on any participants’ hypothetical decision-making team (even those 
that did not receive enough nominations to be included in further analysis). Because this 
study is also interested in decision-makers in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, it 
repeated this analysis for each of these neighborhoods. As a result of these three analyses, 
this study created a five-category typology of decision-makers in Dallas, which will be 
introduced in Chapter 4, and which will serve as a starting point for this study’s examination 
of structures of decision-making in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two of its component 
neighborhoods.  
Phase 2: Conceptualizing structures of decision-making. The previous 
reputational study of Dallas found that, at the citywide level, decision-making power was 
stratified among three levels, with a small cohort of key leaders at the top, a larger tier of top 
level leaders supporting them, and a still-larger pool of second echelon leaders below those407. To 
test whether, or to what extent, this remains an accurate depiction of the structure of 
citywide decision-making in Dallas, this study’s participants were asked to rate their influence 
in the city on a scale from 1 to 4, with higher numbers indicating a greater level of 
generalized influence throughout the decision-making process. In addition, participants were 
asked to nominate up to 10 of these names to serve on hypothetical decision-making teams.  
The previous reputational study of Dallas found that those individuals with the most 
nominations also tended to have the highest mean power scores. This result suggests two 
things: first, that participants’ perceptions of an individual’s degree of decision-making 
power are a valid indicator of their decision-making power in actuality; and second, that the 
reputational method is indeed a valid method for examining decision-making power. 
Building on these results, the previous study of Dallas also used a Duncan’s New Multiple 
                                                          




Range Test to establish a stratification of decision-makers within Dallas. Duncan’s test 
compares mean scores within a given dataset, and determines when the differences between 
any two means are statistically significant; in effect, Duncan’s test is a method that helps to 
establish whether subgroups exist within a larger dataset.   
To allow its results to be compared with those from the previous reputational study 
of Dallas, this study will first replicated methods used in the Thometz study for Dallas as a 
whole408. Because the present study is also interested in the structure of decision-making in 
two of Dallas’ component neighborhoods, it also replicated these analysis methods for both 
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. To contextualize these findings, this study also this 
study recast results from its statistical analyses in light of participant observations regarding 
decision-making in each respective geography, in order to understand the effects of the 
presence (or absence) of types of decision-makers on the kinds of decisions that are made, 
with respect to both urban policy and economic development projects. These results will 
appear in Chapter 5, and also serve as the basis for larger themes regarding the role (or lack 
thereof) of anchor institutions and CDCs in contemporary decision-making structures, as 
well as conclusions drawn in Chapter 6.  
Assessing Internal and External Validity 
No study, no matter how well-planned, is immune to concerns over the validity of its 
results; in the paragraphs that follow, this study will offer an initial foray into possible 
concerns over both internal- and external validity of the study’s findings. First, it will outline 
the methods used to check for internal validity, or whether the results actually measure what 
this study claims they do. Then, it will discuss external validity, which establishes the extent 
to which whether findings are transferrable to other cities. 
                                                          




Assessing Internal Validity 
Looking first at the quantitative data, of prime importance to this study is whether 
the data are free of error, to the extent that the study can control for it. Because decennial 
census- and ACS data contain some amount of error, but the primary-source data contained 
within their reports are generally unavailable, this source of error cannot be controlled for by 
this study. Transcription errors were identified and corrected by verifying data against the 
source material; after the data are copied from Census Bureau records, three readers (the 
researcher and two volunteer assistants) verified the inputted data against the source 
material, correcting as-needed. After the data were used to construct the charts and tables 
that appear throughout this work, these were also validated by volunteer readers.  
This study’s survey and interview data were validated by summarizing and discussing 
results with participants, so that each had ample opportunity to clarify or contextualize their 
responses. First, participants were given opportunities to clarify their statements at the end 
of each interview; additionally, participants were asked clarifying questions during natural 
pauses in their interviews, giving them the chance to revise previous statements. In order to 
preserve the confidentiality of the participants, outside readers were not allowed to read 
interview notes, though it should be noted that past reputational studies have validated this 
method against alternative techniques, and regularly found that these methods are able to 
identify individuals who are deeply involved in the policymaking process409.  
Assessing External Validity 
Although this study argues for Dallas as a crucial case, it also argues that the city is not 
so unique as to make results of this study inappropriate for comparison against other cities; 
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in short, although Dallas is argued to be a least-likely scenario for supporting the presence of 
third-sector actors in urban development, the city’s context is still similar to that of other 
cities, and many aspects of the city’s historical- and present contexts will sound familiar to 
urban scholars.  
Like many cities, Dallas is divided by the lingering effects of white flight, with its 
(comparatively) newer, northern neighborhoods tending to be wealthier (and whiter) than 
those found to the south of the Trinity River. Unsurprisingly, these neighborhoods have 
been the primary recipients of development, job growth, and infrastructure improvements, 
while the predominately African-American and Hispanic portions of the city have fallen into 
decades of decline and neglect, leading one newspaper to declare Dallas “worst in the 
nation” for neighborhood inequality410. Additionally, the city, like many others, is locked in 
competition with its suburbs for new businesses and residents; while the Dallas region 
(known as the “DFW Metroplex”) continues to grow, new development in Dallas is on 
sharp decline. Further, existing corporations have been vacating the city for lush corporate 
campuses in northern suburbs like Plano, Frisco, and Allen411.   
Even as businesses continue to abandon the city, a counter-trend is for younger 
residents to move back – often finding highly affordable options those same neighborhoods 
that have been historically neglected412. As demand grows for smaller housing, in walkable 
neighborhoods, and with proximity to office buildings, these once-blighted areas are rapidly 
gentrifying, causing concern among existing residents413. As a result of these trends, the city 
is engaged in a number of development projects, both in its CBD and in inner-ring 
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neighborhoods,414 and like other cities, Dallas’ third sector seems to be involved in some of 
this development415.  
Dallas’ history of white flight and corporate abandonment, and its current trend of 
white return and rediscovery of the city are hardly unique, especially among cities that are 
prospering in the post-Fordist economy416. In addition, the city’s response to these trends, 
and the presence of third-sector actors in the redevelopment of low-income areas, are largely 
similar to trends in other cities417. These positions in mind, this study argues that its results 
are likely to be transferable to other cities in the United States.  
Limitations  
Every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that shape the 
conclusions that can be drawn418. While Chapter 5 will offer an expansive discussion of study 
limitations, it is nonetheless useful to introduce a subset of these before presenting this 
study’s results and their analyses. In the paragraphs that follow, this section will first 
introduce limitations related to the surveys and interviews. Then, it will introduce a number 
of additional limitations, not directly related to the surveys and interviews.  
With respect to survey and interview limitations, because they were collected in a 
natural (rather than laboratory) setting, it is extremely difficult for future scholars to replicate 
the study in other settings. Further, the responses were limited by the time constraint on the 
meetings; participants may have truncated responses in order to fit within the time allotted, 
reducing their overall quality. Next, because a number of survey items restricted the range of 
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possible responses, the results are narrower than they may have been, were the questions 
written to be open-ended. Additionally, the lack of cross-case comparative data case study 
limits the ability of this study to eliminate alternative explanations for the findings, including 
the possibility that Dallas is an extreme outlier. Also, the nonrandom nature of snowball 
sampling introduces the possibility that the study sample is not actually representative of the 
(arguably unknowable) population. Finally, because this study incorporates secondary-source 
data, any error present in the source data is inherited by this study.   
With respect to other aspects of this study, secondary-source data (e.g. decennial 
census, ACS) may contain unknown errors in reporting and data collection; while every 
attempt to use corrected data was made, it is possible that some error remains. In addition, 
with particular respect to data regarding employment by industry, this study is limited by the 
availability and sourcing of data; when possible, the decennial census was utilized, but for 
two years (1980 and 1990), these data were unavailable, due to irreconcilable differences in 
data reporting. In these cases, non-census data were used, and while these data are reliably-
sourced from the Texas Employment Commission (TEC), a state agency, they present 
additional challenges, only some of which could be overcome. Differences in reporting 
between TEC datasets and those in census records were successfully reconciled, but this 
“translation” process introduces the possibility that a category was translated in error. In 
addition, TEC data are representative of the entire Dallas-Fort Worth (now Dallas-Fort 
Worth-Arlington) statistical area, and are not limited to Dallas itself. Third, TEC data are 
derived from employer reports (rather than employee self-reports), and this difference in 
methodology introduces a further source of error. Finally, these data preclude analysis at 
levels more granular than the statistical error, so for years 1980 and 1990, employment by 




neighborhoods. For these reasons, discussions of employment by industry should be seen as 
a “rough estimate,” based on data that are flawed beyond what should be expected from 
census data in particular, and secondary-source data more broadly.  
Chapter Summary 
 As noted in its introduction, the purpose of this chapter is to outline the research 
setting and methods used to assess whether cities are still governed by the political-business 
coalitions conceptualized in the 1970s and 1980s, or whether some subset of the third sector 
has achieved legitimacy as a primary, rather than ancillary, component of urban governance. 
In the preceding sections, this study restated its research questions, and then offered a series 
of hypotheses to be tested in order to answer them. Third, it described the study design, and 
argued for its appropriateness. Fourth, it discussed the setting for this study, as well as the 
target population and sample. Fifth, it outlined the data collection methods and 
instrumentation implemented, including a summary of ethical considerations. Sixth, it 
detailed how data were analyzed and processed. Finally, it discussed validity and limitations 
related to this study’s findings, which follow in the next chapter.
iv Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 1980 appears in Appendix 1. 
v Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 1990 appears in Appendix 2. 
vi Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 2000 appears in Appendix 3. 
vii Author’s note: a detailed listing of tables referenced for 2010 appears in Appendix 4. 
viii Author’s note: a detailed listing of changes to census tracts appears in Appendix 6; a listing of all tracts used appears in Appendix 7. 





PRESENTATION OF DATA 
The purpose of this chapter is to report data collected using the methods introduced 
in Chapter 3, in order to address this study’s research questions and hypotheses. In the 
sections that follow, this study will first report quantitative data regarding select 
socioeconomic changes from 1980 to 2010, first for Dallas as a whole, then for the study’s 
two focus neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it will detail 
participant responses to surveys and interviews regarding decision-making in Dallas as a 
whole, North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas.  
Quantitative Data 
This study is primarily interested in the nature of governance, both formal and 
informal, in the City of Dallas, as well as within two of its neighborhoods – Downtown 
Dallas and North Oak Cliff. Before reporting qualitative data regarding the actors who 
govern, and the structure in which they operate, this study will report quantitative data 
regarding the economic- and social profiles of the people being governed. In the following 
sections, this study will present findings from census-based data collection; first, this study 
will first outline a brief demographic- and economic profile for Dallas as a whole, with data 
reported at 10-year intervals to coincide with decennial census reports. Then, it will repeat 






Dallas as a Whole 
This study hypothesized that Dallas as a whole has undergone demographic- and 
economic transitions consistent with the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model of cities. While 
evaluation of whether this is indeed the case will be held until Chapter 5, in the chapter 
sections that follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in Dallas’ 
citywide demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data documenting 
changes in the citywide economic profile over that same period.  
Citywide demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, this 
study will report relevant changes in Dallas’ demographics from 1980 to 2010. First, it will 
report trends in Dallas’ population size, primarily to serve as an anchor for the data that 
follows. Then, it will report decennial changes in Dallas’ demographics by race and Hispanic 
status.  
Citywide population. Table 4.01 shows Dallas’ citywide population changes from 
1980 to 2010.  
As the table shows, Dallas’ overall population rose steadily from 1980 to 2000, with the city 
gaining over 250,000 residents between those years, even in spite of the Savings & Loan 
Crisis that ruined Dallas’ financial markets and sent its economy into a severe retraction. 
Equally striking is the lack of population growth between 2000 and 2010 (0.008% growth – 
effectively no change), suggesting a growth plateau. 
Citywide race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the context of the city’s 
rapid growth and subsequent plateau, figure 4.01 shows the changing demographic profile of 
Dallas’ population with respect to race and Hispanic origin.  
 
Table 4.01: Citywide Population, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 904,078 1,006,877 1,188,580 1,197,816 




Figure 4.01: Citywide Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010 
 
Data suggest that, since 1980, the proportion of the population represented by the largest 
two racial groups in Dallas tend to decline from one census to the next, with people 
identifying as “white alone” falling from 61.4% in 1980 to 50.7% in 2010, and people 
identifying as Black or African American falling (though less precipitously) from 29.4% in 
1980 to 25.0% in 2010. By contrast, the populations of people identifying as Asian 
American, and especially those identifying as “Other” or multiracial has increased. Finally, of 
particular note, the population identifying as Hispanic (of any race) increased nearly four-
fold, from 12.2% in 1980 to 42.4% in 2010.  
Citywide economic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, this study 
will report relevant changes in Dallas’ economic context from 1980 to 2010. First, it will 
report basic data on workforce size and unemployment as an anchor for data to follow. 
Then, it will report employment by industry cluster, combining data reported by BLS 
industry code into the following categories: creative classix, blue collarx, services and tradexi, 
and public administrationxii. Finally, it will report data related to median household income 
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Citywide labor force. Table 4.02 shows Dallas’ workforce size and unemployment 
rate in from 1980 to 2010.  
While the size of Dallas’ workforce has increased at the 1990, 2000, and 2010 census, data 
suggest that the rate of gain at each census appears to be slowing, with the labor force 
gaining fewer new people at each census than at the census before. Data also show that, 
somewhat unsurprisingly, citywide unemployment increases between 1980 and 1990, as well 
as between 2000 and 2010; these periods both bookend financial downturns – the Savings & 
Loan Crisis of the 1980s419, and the Great Recession from 2007 to 2009420.  
 Citywide employment by industry cluster421. Figure 4.02 shows the percentages of 
Dallas’ citywide workforce employed in the creative class-, service sector-, blue collar-, and 
public administration fields from 1980 to 2010. As a reminder, data from 1980 and 1990 are 
representative of the statistical area; while not as precise as census data from 2000 and 2010, 







Figure 4.02: Citywide Employment By Industry Cluster, 1980 - 2010 
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Table 4.02: Citywide Labor Force Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Workforce Size 481,224 552,303 588,385 610,562 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) 71,079 36,082 22,177 
Unemployment Rate 7.4% 12.2% 4.3% 5.6% 






These data suggest that, between 1980 and 1990, there is a notable increase in the percentage 
of working Dallasites employed in creative class fields, while over that same period, there is a 
nearly-equal decrease in employment within blue collar and service sector fields. Since 1990, 
these three employment clusters have remained relatively stable, with slightly over half of 
working Dallasites being employed in creative class fields, roughly one-quarter of working 
Dallasites being employed in blue collar fields, and about one-fifth of working Dallasites 
being employed in service sector fields. Finally, at all four data collection points, about 2% of 
working Dallasites have been employed in public administration.  
Citywide median household income and poverty. Table 4.03 shows data related 
to Dallas’ citywide median household income (MHI) in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, as 
















1980 (Est.) 1990 (Est.) 2000 2010
Creative Class Blue Collar Service Sector Public Administration
Table 4.03: Citywide MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI in 2015 Dollars $79,611 $50,461 $52,146 $45,616 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) ($29,150) $1,685 ($6,530) 
Poverty Rate 18.0% 18.0% 17.8% 22.3% 




These data suggest that median household income in Dallas fell sharply from 1980 to 1990, 
holding relatively steady in 2000, and falling again in 2010, with median household incomes 
in 2010 holding at just over 57% of their 2015-adjusted level in 1980. Additionally, data 
show that the poverty rate held at roughly 18% between 1980 and 2000, but increased to 
over 22% in 2010.  
North Oak Cliff 
 This study hypothesized that the neighborhood of North Oak Cliff has undergone 
demographic- and economic transitions consistent with gentrification literature regarding 
central urban neighborhoods, and the new donut model of cities. As with data regarding Dallas 
as a whole, evaluation of whether any identified changes in North Oak Cliff are consistent 
with said literature will be held until Chapter 5. Nonetheless, in the chapter sections that 
follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in the neighborhood’s 
demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data documenting changes 
in North Oak Cliff’s economic profile over that same period.  
Neighborhood demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, 
this study will report relevant changes in North Oak Cliff’s demographics from 1980 to 
2010. First, it will report trends in population size, and then, it will report decennial changes 
in the neighborhood’s demographics by race and Hispanic status.  
Neighborhood population. Table 4.04 shows the population changes from 1980 to 
2010 for North Oak Cliff.  
Data suggest that, between 1980 and 2010, the neighborhood’s population has declined, 
losing over 2,500 people, or 15% of its population. Data also suggest that these losses have 
Table 4.04: North Oak Cliff Population, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 17,713 17,544 19,617 15,055 




been inconsistent, with an insignificant loss at the 1990 census, a significant gain of slightly 
over 2,000 people at the 2000 census, but then a loss of over twice that by the 2010 – a 
census-over-census loss of over 23%.  
Neighborhood race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the growth and 
abandonment of the neighborhood, Figure 4.03 shows the changing demographic profile of 
North Oak Cliff’s population with respect to race and Hispanic origin.  
Figure 4.03: North Oak Cliff Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010 
 
Anecdotally, people who live outside of the southern half of Dallas often assume the area to 
be “mostly black” 422, although whether this was ever true for North Oak Cliff, data suggest 
that this hasn’t been true since (at least) the 1980 census. At that time, North Oak Cliff was 
majority-white, but by 1990, the neighborhood became majority-minority. This trend 
reversed in 2000, and by 2010, people identifying as “white alone” had risen to their largest 
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share of the population during the time period studied, at over 61%. Meanwhile, people 
identifying as Black or African American have never held more than one-fifth of the area’s 
population over that same period, and have not made up more than 10% of the population 
since 2000. Until the 2010 census, the trend in the percentage of North Oak Cliff’s 
population identifying as Hispanic or Latino followed the growth found in Dallas as a whole, 
but by 2010, this trend had reversed, and the neighborhood’s demographics returned to 
showing a white majority.  
Neighborhood economic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, 
this study will report relevant changes in the economic characteristics of North Oak Cliff 
from 1980 to 2010. First, it will report basic data on workforce size and unemployment. 
Then it will report employment by industry cluster. Finally, it will report data related to 
median household income and poverty rates. 
Neighborhood labor force. Table 4.05 shows sizes of- and trends for North Oak 
Cliff’s labor force and unemployment rates from 1980 to 2010.  
Data suggest that, from 1980 to 2000, the area’s labor force remained relatively stable, with 
unemployment below the citywide average in 1980 and 1990, and only 0.1% higher in 2000. 
Significantly, at the 2010 census the labor force dropped by over 4,000 workers, in a trend 
similar to the overall population loss in the neighborhood; at the same time, the 
unemployment rate increased to 0.5% over the citywide average.  
Neighborhood employment by industry cluster. Figures 4.04 and 4.05 show the 
percentages of North Oak Cliff’s workforce employed in the creative class-, service sector-, 
blue collar-, and public administration fields in, respectively, 2000 and 2010. 
Table 4.05: North Oak Cliff Labor Force Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Workforce Size 8,580 7,852 8,559 4,421 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) (728) 707 (4,138) 
Unemployment Rate 5.3% 6.6% 4.4% 6.7% 




Figure 4.04: North Oak Cliff  
Employment by Industry Cluster, 2000 
Figure 4.05: North Oak Cliff  
Employment by Industry Cluster, 2010 
  
Although data are unavailable for 1980 and 1990, available data suggest a loss of 20 
percentage points in blue collar employment between 2000 and 2010, and a gain of 20 points 
in creative class employment, which in 2010 holds a clear majority of the neighborhood’s 
employment by industry cluster.  
 Neighborhood median household income and poverty. Table 4.06 shows the 
median household income (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars) (MHI) and poverty rate for 
North Oak Cliff, from 1980 to 2010.  
Data suggest that, from 1980 to 1990, MHI decreased while the poverty rate increased. Of 
greater note is that, in 2000, neighborhood MHI increased to more than 200% of its 1990 
level, while the neighborhood poverty shows an increase of over 135% over that same 
period. Data also suggest that, in 2010, neighborhood MHI decreased to just over 75% of its 
2000 level, while the neighborhood poverty rate also decreased, to just under 90% of its level 
in 2000. The implications of these dramatic changes in MHI and poverty rates, especially in 
Table 4.06: North Oak Cliff MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI in 2015 Dollars $28,861 $25,617 $51,915 $39,106 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) ($3,244) $26,298 ($12,809) 
Poverty Rate 17.5% 18.0% 24.3% 21.8% 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) 0.5 pts. 6.3 pts. (2.5 pts.) 
44.7%34.9%
18.3% 2.1%
Creative Class Blue Collar
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the context of the neighborhood’s gentrification, will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
Downtown Dallas 
 This study hypothesized that the neighborhood of Downtown Dallas, like that of 
North Oak Cliff, has undergone demographic- and economic transitions that are consistent 
with gentrification literature regarding central urban neighborhoods, and the new donut model 
of cities. While evaluation of data with respect to this hypothesis will be held until Chapter, 
in the chapter sections that follow, this study will first present data documenting changes in 
the neighborhood’s demographic profile from 1980 to 2010, and then it will present data 
documenting changes in Downtown Dallas’ economic profile over that same period.  
Neighborhood demographic changes, 1980 to 2010. In the following subsections, 
this study will report relevant changes in Downtown Dallas’ demographics from 1980 to 
2010. As with North Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole, this subsection will first present data 
on changes in population, and then on race and Hispanic status for people living in the 
neighborhood.  
Neighborhood population. Table 4.07 shows the population changes from 1980 to 
2010 for Downtown Dallas. 
Table 4.07: Downtown Dallas Population, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 2,828 3,444 2,198 9,262 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) 616 (1,246) 7,064 
Data suggest that the growth rates in Downtown Dallas vary widely, but of significant note 
is the significant decline from 1990 to 2000, just before a dramatic increase in 2010, wherein 
the neighborhood’s population increased to nearly three times its 2000 level.  
 Neighborhood race and Hispanic or Latino status. Within the context of 
Downtown Dallas’ growth and decline, Figure 4.06 shows the changing demographic profile 




Figure 4.06: Downtown Dallas Race and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010 
 
Data suggest a negative correlation between the percentages of neighborhood populations 
identifying as “white alone” and Black or African American, throughout the entire time 
period from 1980 to 2010, even as the neighborhood’s population increases over that same 
period. Overall, the trend is one of growth for people identifying as “white alone,” with this 
group making up a nearly two-thirds majority of the neighborhood’s population at the 2010 
census. Of additional note is that the growth pattern for the percentage of the population 
identifying as “other & mixed-race” similar to – though less dramatic than – that for the 
population of people who identify as “white alone.” Finally, much like in Dallas as a whole, 
the percentage of people identifying as Hispanic or Latino has grown at each census.  
Neighborhood economic changes, 1980-2010. In the following subsections, this 
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1980 to 2010. First, it will report basic data on workforce size and unemployment. Then, this 
study will report data regarding employment by industry cluster. Finally, it will report data 
related to MHI and poverty. 
Neighborhood labor force. Table 4.08 shows sizes of- and trends within 
Downtown Dallas’ labor force size and unemployment rates from 1980 to 2010.  
Data suggest that, while the size of the labor force residing in the neighborhood declined 
between 1980 and 1990, it has been growing ever since, with a large expansion between 2000 
and 2010. Data for unemployment rates in 1980 and 1990 suggest a small decrease, but the 
unemployment rate has held relatively steady since then, growing, though at a much smaller 
rate than the expansion in the labor force overall.  
Neighborhood employment by industry cluster. Figures 4.07 and 4.08 illustrate 
relevant characteristics of Downtown Dallas’ labor force in both 2000 and 2010.  
As with North Oak Cliff, while data for Downtown Dallas’ employment profile are 
unavailable for 1980 and 1990, available data suggest that the majority of neighborhood 
Table 4.08: Downtown Dallas Workforce Size and Unemployment Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Workforce Size 582 273 1,157 4,370 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) -309 884 3213 
Unemployment Rate 6.7% 5.5% 5.4% 5.7% 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) (1.2 pts.) (0.1 pts.) 0.3 pts. 
Figure 4.07: Downtown Dallas  
Employment by Industry Cluster, 2000 
Figure 4.08: Downtown Dallas  
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residents are employed in creative class fields for both 2000 and 2010. Between these two 
years, there is an increase in the percentages of residents employed in both creative class 
fields, and in services and trade, with subsequent decreases in blue collar employment and 
public administration, though blue collar employment saw the largest decrease of the two.  
Neighborhood median household income and poverty. Table 4.09 shows 
Downtown Dallas’ MHI in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, the neighborhood’s poverty rates, 
and basic trends in both, each for the period of 1980 to 2010.  
Data suggest that MHI more-than doubled from 1980 to 2000, with the majority of that 
increase occurring between 1990 and 2000, although there is a significant decrease at the 
2010 census. Additionally, data suggest that, although the percentage of people living in 
poverty fell precipitously between 1980 and 1990, it has been rising ever since, with nearly 
one in five neighborhood residents living in poverty in 2010, only 2.4 percentage points 
lower than the 1980 high of 22.0%. Finally, data suggest that the largest rise in poverty rate 
occurred between 1990 and 2000, the same years that bookend the largest MHI increase. 
Quantitative Data, in Summary 
 In the preceding sections, this study presented various data regarding economic- and 
demographic transitions in Dallas as a whole, as well as in this study’s focus neighborhoods. 
Although this study is primarily interested in the nature of Dallas’ governance structure, 
these data are suggestive of (arguably) inescapable socioeconomic changes with which any 
governance structure, if it exists at all, must contend. This study makes several hypotheses 
regarding the significance of these data, and Chapter 5 will revisit them in order to address 
those hypotheses; before that, however, this study will report its qualitative findings. 
Table 4.09: Downtown Dallas MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI in 2015 Dollars $38,324 $46,678 $78,897 $64,618 
Decennial Gain (Loss) (x) $8,354 $32,219 ($14,279) 
Poverty Rate 22.0% 7.7% 15.5% 19.6% 





The previous reputational study of Dallas described three “classes” of leaders within 
the city’s decision-making structure, and each class was comprised almost exclusively of 
business executives and wealthy elites423. To determine whether (or to what extent) the 
previous reputational analysis’ results remain valid, and to expand on its findings, this study’s 
79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the nature of decision-
making in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two focus neighborhoods. 
Previously, this study reported quantitative data regarding Dallas’ demographic- and 
economic changes since 1980, and building on this, in the following sections, this study will 
report data from its qualitative data collection. First, it will describe the broad categories into 
which participants’ responses were ordered. Then, it will summarize results from surveys and 
interviews; first, those regarding Dallas’ citywide decision-makers, then for decision-makers 
in North Oak Cliff, and finally for decision-makers in Downtown Dallas.  
Categorizing Decision-Makers 
Through participant surveys and interviews, it quickly became clear that Dallas’ 
decision-makers regularly fell into thematic categories. Whereas the Thometz study of Dallas 
proffered three categories of decision-makers: key leaders, top level, and second echelon424, this 
study categorizes participant-identified decision-makers into five categories: formal authorities, 
first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs, and anchor captains. In the sections that 
immediately follow, this study will broadly introduce each of these categories.  
Formal authorities. Actors in this category consist of elected officials, members of 
council-appointed boards, committees, and commissions, and senior bureaucrats. As the 
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category title suggests, these actors are defined primarily by their formal authority to make 
decisions, and this authority is generally derived from a combination of Dallas’ city charter, 
various ordinances and policies, and unwritten practices of professional deference and 
delegation. Participants universally acknowledged that these actors are the primary decision-
makers in Dallas, and that their authority is often difficult to meaningfully challenge.  
First Tier Influentials. These actors have long-standing connections to the city, or 
at least to particular neighborhoods within it, as well as reputations for remaining active in 
the politics of decision-making, though this activity is normally indirect, through the use of 
intermediaries (or, as some participants called them, “proxies”). While these actors lack 
formal authority to make decisions, participants acknowledged that they have tremendous 
financial capital, real capital, and/or social capital, and use these resources to influence the 
agendas of those who do have that authority, in service of a broadly agreed-upon vision that 
normally consists of neoliberal urban development strategies and packages of publicly-
funded inducements for private development.  
Second Tier Influentials. This category’s actors are the most diverse, and can be 
divided into three particular subcategories. First, retired formal authorities, such as former 
mayors and city councilmembers, who remain active in the politics of development, often on 
behalf of private-sector employers. Second, retired first tier influentials who remain connected to 
Dallas’ most elite social institutions, but are no longer deeply involved in the politics of 
decision-making. Finally, prominent leaders within Dallas’ developer class, including executives 
within national- and global construction, real estate development-, investment-, and sales 
offices, as well as senior partners in real estate law firms. Participants suggested that actors in 
this category are regularly marshaled for support and advice on individual projects and 




 Civic Chairs. Actors in this category are heads of civic organizations, and are 
charged with representing the interests of their constituents, so while they may have 
significant leeway in interpreting those interests, participants repeatedly called these actors 
“mouthpieces” for the organizations that they represent. Participants concurred that these 
actors are well-known for building (temporary) alliances among actors in other categories, 
either in support for- or opposition against particular issues, based on their organizational 
missions and agendas. Participants frequently proposed that these actors benefit from the 
social capital surrounding their organizations, and the support of their members, even when 
actors in other categories (and, in some cases, the general public) oppose their efforts on a 
particular project or policy decision.  
Anchor Captains. Actors in this category are comprised of leaders within locally-
anchored organizations and institutions, such as university presidents, departmental deans, 
and hospital directors. Like civic chairs, these actors are able to draw support from actors in 
other categories, as well as from outside of the decision-making process, but unique to these 
actors is that they are not necessarily linked to any particular geographic group or social 
class. Participants regularly noted that these actors benefit from a perception that their 
organizations are politically neutral, and their support generally brings tremendous public 
support for projects and policies.  
Categorizing decision-makers, in summary. Expanding on previous research, 
this study uses themes from participant interviews to group participant-identified decision-
makers into five categories: formal authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs, 
and anchor captains. How these categories interact, and the particular constitution of each at 
the citywide- and neighborhood levels will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter. In 




Dallas as a whole; then, for North Oak Cliff; and finally, for Downtown Dallas.  
Decision-makers in Dallas as a whole. 
Recall that Chapter 2 recounted two previous studies of Dallas; the 1963 Thometz 
study identified a decision-making structure heavily populated by-, and biased towards the 
interests of high-ranking business leaders, and the 1987 Elkin study that agreed with 
Thometz, but also found that  cracks were beginning to form in the city’s entrepreneurial regime. 
In order to understand the structure and nature of Dallas’ contemporary decision-making 
structure, and the extent to which anchor institutions and CDCs have found a more 
prominent role within it, this study asked participants knowledgeable about Dallas’ decision-
making process to identify- and describe actors who get involved in making citywide 
decisions, and to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for 
making a decision that would affect the city as a whole.  
With 79 participants, a maximum of 790 nominations were possible, and out of 
those possible nominations, 726 of those nominations, or 91.9%, are represented by the 32 
individual- or group actors who will be identified in the sections that follow. In reporting on 
these actors, this study will first detail Dallas’ citywide formal authorities; next, it will introduce 
the city’s its first tier influentials; third, its second tier influentials; fourth, its civic chairs; and finally, 
the citywide anchor captains. 
Formal authorities. Table 4.10 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide 
formal authorities, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need 























(1 - 4) # % # % 
District-Based Councilmembers (14) Dallas City Council 79 100% 4.00 44 56% 2.93 
Mike Rawlings Mayor 73 92% 3.78 21 27% 2.10 
A.C. Gonzalez City Manager 64 81% 3.78 15 19% 2.38 
Appointed Commissioners (15) City Plan Commission 26 33% 3.51 17 22% 2.11 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 61 77% 3.77 24 31% 2.38 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 23 29% 3.11 20 26% 2.27 
At the citywide level, this category consists of two individual actors (i.e. the mayor and city 
manager), and two group actors425 (i.e. the Dallas City Council and the City Plan 
Commission, or CPC). Compared to other categories, formal authorities have above-average 
numbers of nominations to decision-making committees, as well as above-average power 
ratings, shared committee service with participants in the past five years, and familiarity with 
participants. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will summarize participant thoughts on 
each actor in this category, and how they fit into the citywide decision-making process.  
Dallas’ City Council. The Dallas City Council’s powers include setting citywide 
policies, approving annual budget- and capital improvement plans submitted by the city 
manager, establishing and managing tax rates, municipal services, and municipal ordinances, 
issuing municipal bonds, and creating municipal departments426. In explaining why the 
inclusion of at least one councilmember is critical for a citywide decision-making team, 
participants agreed that the city council is Dallas’ primary decision-making body, and that 
successful policy- and project proposals must be written such that they will gain the approval 
of an eight-councilmember majority; as one participant put it:  
Dallas is run by the eight-vote majority; those votes change from one issue to another, but 
every proposal is made to appeal to eight out of fifteen. A unanimous approval is the best 
possible outcome, but short of that, eight is the magic number. 
 
                                                          
425 Author’s note: at the citywide level, the city council and CPC were considered as group actors, rather than as individual actors, because 
participants often used generic titles (“a councilmember” or “someone on the CPC”), rather than giving specific names. Additionally, 
participants suggested that, in many cases, the specific actor within these groups was less important than having any actor within them, 
for purposes of supporting a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole.   




Dallas’ Mayor. Dallas features a weak mayor form of government, and its mayor acts 
as an at-large 15th councilmember, in addition to a number of administrative and ceremonial 
roles427. When asked to elaborate on including Mayor Rawlings on their decision-making 
committees, participants often pointed out that Rawlings, like his predecessors, partners 
closely with actors like the ones found in Dallas’ citywide first- and second tier influentials, as 
well as many citywide civic chairs, and most considered these partnerships particularly valuable 
in getting a citywide decision accepted by a majority of Dallasites, or at least, a majority of 
the individuals with the influence and resources to put up a significant challenge; describing 
this phenomenon, participants regularly admitted that:  
For mayoral candidates, powerful endorsements and large contributions are a necessity; for 
the elite, endorsements and contributions are investments. In exchange for their support, 
Dallas’ regents expect a certain degree of access to their candidates, so if you have the 
mayor’s support on a project, it’s a safe bet that you have the support of his masters, too.  
Appointed City Plan Commissioners. Although fewer than one-third of 
participants named  “someone from the CPC,” or, less commonly, particular members who 
serve on this commission, participants who did commonly explained that the CPC is the 
primary gatekeeper for development projects that need council approval, but that the 
commission’s role is narrow, and does not extend to other types of decisions. Within that 
narrow role, the CPC hears proposals and requests related to new development and zoning 
changes throughout Dallas428, and its recommendations are passed to the City Council for a 
final decision. In practice, participants overwhelmingly considered each commissioner to be 
a proxy vote for the councilmember who appointed them; participants often suggested that 
this allows the city council to, as one participant put it, “outsource their fighting, because 
                                                          
427 Dallas City Charter, 2015, p. 9; pp. 13-24; 75; 91 




CPC meetings are rarely attended.” When explaining why they included a member of the 
CPC on their decision-making team, one response well- summarized the general opinion:  
Most decisions in Dallas deal with development, so it makes sense to have the CPC on board if you 
can get them. If the CPC likes your idea, and passes along a favorable recommendation, you’ve got a 
good shot at a rubber stamp from the city council.  
Dallas’ City Manager. Over 80% of participants named City Manager A.C. 
Gonzalez (by title or name) to their respective decision-making teams. In elaborating on 
why, participants pointed out that under Dallas’ weak mayor system, tremendous decision-
making power is vested in the office of its city manager. Variously, participants identified 
that Gonzalez’ office is responsible for implementing the decisions of the mayor and city 
council, preparing the city’s annual budget, coordinating city operations and programs, 
managing nearly all non-appointed city personnel, and enforcing municipal ordinances 
(including oversight of Dallas’ police department), entering into financial agreements on 
behalf of the City of Dallas, and recommending how to use bonds and TIF revenue, among 
many other administrative responsibilities429. Participants also acknowledged that, like Mayor 
Rawlings, Gonzalez works closely with first- and second tier influentials, and that he has the 
broad support of organizations represented by citywide civic chairs; summarizing many of 
their comments: 
Dallas’ City managers have always been told to go out and bring economic development to 
the city. A.C. (Gonzales), like Mary (Suhm) before him, tries everything he can to keep 
Dallas business-friendly, whether that’s TIF money, easing regulations, or just working with 
developers to find financing, navigate zoning and construction permits, or break logjams on 
the bureaucratic side of things.  
Formal authorities, in summary. Within Dallas’ citywide decision-making body, 
participants identified top-level elected leaders, political appointees, and its bureaucratic 
chief. United by their formal decision-making authority, derived from a combination of 
                                                          




Dallas’ city charter, various ordinances and bureaucratic policies, and professional deference, 
data suggest that these formal authorities are among Dallas’ most powerful decision-makers. 
Critically, however, no participant named an entire team of actors from this category, which 
suggests that for a decision to truly be accepted by Dallasites, there is room for actors who 
operate outside of the public sector.  
First tier influentials. Table 4.11 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ 
citywide first tier influentials, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of the city.  
Table 4.11: Citywide First Tier Influentials 
Name 















(1 - 4) # % # % 
Ray Hunt Hunt Consolidated 39 49% 3.86 8 10% 2.08 
John Wiley Price Dallas County Commissioner 32 41% 3.84 12 15% 2.45 
Harlan Crow 
Crow Holdings 
Son of Trammel Crow 
21 27% 3.74 30 38% 2.09 
Ross Perot Jr. Hillwood 17 22% 3.66 14 18% 2.09 
Kay Bailey 
Hutchison 
U.S. Senate (former)  
TX House of Rep. (former) TX 
State Treasurer (former) 
14 18% 3.59 8 10% 2.12 
Caroline Hunt Rosewood Corp. 13 16% 3.38 12 16% 2.38 
T. Boone Pickens BP Capital 11 14% 3.29 8 10% 2.10 
Ruth Collins Altshuler Philanthropist 11 14% 3.13 14 18% 2.09 
Bobby Lyle 
Lyco Holdings 
Southern Methodist University 
10 13% 3.03 8 10% 2.46 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 19 24% 3.50 13 16% 2.21 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 23 29% 3.11 20 26% 2.27 
Participants identified nearly every actor in this category as being part of Dallas’ old guard, 
that is, a selective, enduring mix of civically-engaged actors who were born into the city’s 
first families, or who have been “blessed” into this category through careers of service to 
Dallas. Compared to actors in other categories, category means for first tier influentials are 
above-average for mean power- and familiarity ratings, but not for recent shared committee 
service or nominations to decision-making committees. In the following paragraphs, this 
study will describe how these actors involve themselves in citywide decision-making, first 




In general, participants concurred that Dallas’ citywide first tier influentials hold a 
tremendous degree of influence over the decision-making process, though close connections 
with each other, privileged access to several of Dallas’ formal authorities and civic chairs, and 
tremendous reserves of social-, physical-, and financial capital. However, while many of 
these individuals are independently wealthy, participants regularly agreed that these actors 
intentionally curate strong social ties; summarizing many other comments, one participant 
said that: 
These people are in all the same country clubs, they serve on all the same boards, they pray 
in all same churches; their kids go to the same exclusive private schools, (and) the same top-
level universities. They don’t have to organize, because they already are – they’re always 
forming new projects to fit into their vision of the city.  
 
Participants regularly admitted that the purpose of these social ties is, in many cases, to “feel 
out” actors in other categories, and to identify partners who will allow these first tier 
influentials to remain influential in Dallas’ decision-making process while keeping out of the 
public eye. Participants also opined that shared social network either creates, or was created 
by, what many called “shared vision” for Dallas, which many summarized as: 
A city full of the most beautiful stadiums, the tallest skyscrapers, the largest convention 
centers, the most beautiful hotels and luxury condos, and the widest highways to connect all 
of it to the suburbs.  
 
Category standout: John Wiley Price. Over 40% of participants nominated Dallas 
County Commissioner John Wiley Price to their decision-making committees, and he 
received an average power rating of 3.84, among the highest of all actors at the citywide 
level. In nominating Price to their decision-making teams, participants often referred to him 
as “the Black vote,” noting that throughout his career, Price has, for decades, billed himself 
as “our man downtown,” connecting his identity as an African-American to the largely 
African American district he represents, and that Dallas’ formal authorities and other first tier 




process430. Indeed, participants repeatedly conjected that he has become the “token” 
African-American in many of Dallas’ policy- and developmental decisions.  
For nearly as long as Price has been active in forwarding the interests of his 
constituents, he has been mired in scandals, including bribery, money laundering, and 
accusations of unethical behavior431. Participants, especially those with close relationships to 
Price, were unsurprised by the recent FBI investigations into Price’s behavior, and suggested 
that his behavior is an “open secret” among Dallas’ leaders; sentiments well-summarized by:  
Price has been “our man downtown,” the voice of the Black community in Dallas’ all-white 
leadership for a long, long time, and lined his pockets by taking a cut of every deal he sent 
our way. Of course he’s been on the take – he looks out for his own, and for himself. He’s 
making $130,000 as a commissioner, but owns multiple houses, multiple luxury cars, and 
wears suits that cost more than some of us make in a year.  
 
For this reason, as well as the rising number of African-American political leaders and 
ranking bureaucrats, nearly two-thirds of participants suggested that, to varying degrees, his 
influence has declined rapidly, especially in the wake of federal bribery allegations that have 
been under investigation since 2014, and which include many of Price’s staff, including 
himself. As one participant put it: 
Price’s star rose for many years, because he was the only [African American] running in an 
all-Black part of town. Now that better has come along, you’re seeing him get what’s been 
coming to him.   
First tier influentials, in summary. Participants recognized that nearly every one 
of Dallas’ first tier influentials has achieved a level of celebrity in the city, and many participants 
pointed out the biographies, newspaper features, civic awards, and allegations of scandal 
connected to each. Many called actors in this category “modern cowboys,” evoking a 
romanticism that (arguably) pervades the Dallas myth432. Within Dallas’ citywide decision-
making process, participants agreed that this exclusive group of highly influential operatives 
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have historically exerted tremendous influence in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, 
and in spite of decaying membership, and that it continues to influence decisions in the city, 
either directly, or (more commonly) from behind more publicly-visible actors. Data seem to 
support these assertions, suggesting that within the citywide decision-making body, these 
actors are second only to citywide formal authorities in power ratings, but no one particular 
actor is seen on a large number of shared committees or boards.  
Returning to a broad view of Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, participants 
noted that this category of actors is exceptionally exclusive, and acknowledged that this 
exclusivity has resulted in a decline in this category’s size, as aging members die – often 
without naming heirs – and that the second tier influentials who have been looked to as their 
replacements seem to have little interest in becoming “regents” in Dallas. As a result, 
participants regularly conceded that Dallas has historically been run by a small collection of 
elite influential operatives, and to some extent, remains as-such, but that the shrinking of this 
category of actors has created a power vacuum in the highest echelons of citywide decision-
making, and the results of this vacuum, as participants noted, are two-fold: first, formal 
authorities have reclaimed significant decision-making authority, and second, there is more 
space for competing interests to enter into the decision-making structure, especially from 
more progressive formal authorities and ad-hoc collaborations involving second tier influentials. 
Second Tier Influentials. Table 4.12 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ 
citywide second tier influentials, named by eight or more participants to their citywide, 







Table 4.12: Citywide Second Tier Influentials 
Name 














(1 - 4) # % # % 
Mary Suhm City Manager (former) 23 29% 3.26 24 30% 2.09 
Clint McDonnough Ernst & Young, LLP 15 19% 3.04 27 34% 2.49 
John Scovell Woodbine Development 16 20% 2.95 25 32% 2.29 
Robert Chereck PlainsCapital 16 20% 2.95 18 23% 2.13 
Arcilia Acosta CARCON Industries 13 16% 2.78 26 33% 2.50 
Michael Caffey C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE) 14 18% 2.71 25 32% 2.01 
Angela Hunt Dallas City Council (former) 12 15% 2.64 19 24% 2.36 
Albert Black 
On-Target Supplies & Logistics 
Dallas Regional Chamber (former) 
11 14% 2.45 18 23% 2.36 
Donna D. Halstead 
Dallas City Council (former) 
Dallas Citizens Council (former) 
8 10% 2.39 18 23% 2.04 
Jeff Staubach Jones Lang LaSalle 8 10% 2.38 25 32% 2.38 
Alan Walne 
Dallas City Council (former) 
Texas State Fair Board 
9 11% 2.32 21 27% 2.49 
Steve Everbach Colliers International 8 10% 2.22 21 27% 2.06 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 13 16% 2.67 22 28% 2.27 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 23 29% 3.11 20 26% 2.27 
This category features the largest number of actors out of any category at the citywide level, 
and is primarily composed of two groups: retired formal authorities, and members of Dallas’ 
developer class. Data in table 4.12 suggest that these actors have, on average, an above-average 
number of nominations to decision-making committees, as well as (slightly) above-average 
recent shared committee membership. Data also suggest that these actors have a below-
average power rating, and average ratings of familiarity. In the following sections, this study 
will use participant interview responses to elaborate upon these actors, first, Dallas’ ex-formal 
authorities; second, the citywide developer class, and finally, category standout Mary Suhm. 
Ex-formal authorities. Participants spoke to particularly active roles of a subset of 
Dallas’ former city councilmembers and mayors, who after leaving office, have “retired into” 
prominent positions in real estate law-, investment-, and development firms, as well as on 
high-profile philanthropic boards. These actors are often hired into these positions 
specifically for their willingness utilize the connections they made while in office to garner 
council support for their new employers’ projects, as well as regulatory and development 
assistance from city staff. Summarizing many comments, two participant (respectively) 




Some people never leave City Hall, even after they retire or get voted out. They land a job 
with a high-powered law firm, or with a developer, and then go right back down to City Hall 
to lobby their successor and former coworkers.  
 
The experience of a top-level city employee, like a department head or elected official, is 
incredibly valuable to any business that interacts with those offices, so it’s only reasonable 
that those employees would find their skills and contacts valuable in the private sector.  
 
The developer class. Participants regularly nominated one (or more) of a handful 
of real estate developers, investors, financiers, and sales agents to their decision-making 
bodies, and frequently agreed that these actors share similar characteristics. First, each works 
for a company that operates in multiple cities throughout the United States, and most also 
have international presences as well. Second, each of these actors generally subscribes to a 
demand-based approach to development, and largely avoids speculative building in the 
hopes of attracting tenants, or building solely to elevate Dallas’ civic profile. Finally, these 
individuals tend to be disinterested in serving on multiple high-profile civic boards and 
committees. As a result, these actors are more open to collaborating with a rotating cast of 
stakeholders (such as formal authorities, civic chairs, and anchor captains) on particular projects, but 
unlike their predecessors, do not form enduring coalitions; in describing this difference, 
participant comments are well-summarized by:  
It’s a different Dallas, now. Back in the day, Trammell Crow thought that Dallas needed a 
convention center and hotel to compete with other cities, so he went to City Hall and got a 
sack of money to help build a mid-sized convention space and hotel. Now, Dallas has a 
flagging convention center, so Jack Matthews built a hotel onto it – not because he believed 
Dallas needed it to compete, but because A.C Gonzales took half a billion city dollars and 
threw it at Matthews’ company to build the […] thing.   
 
Category standout: Mary Suhm. Dallas’ former city manager received the highest 
number of participant decision-making team nominations of any actor in this category 
(29%), and also had the highest power rating of any actor in this category (3.26). In 
describing Suhm’s role as a former city official, participants agreed that, even though she no 
longer draws a city paycheck, Suhm continues to remain a fixture in City Hall, negotiating 




various boards and committees – often at the personal request of Mayor Rawlings. Speaking 
to this, participants commonly made statements similar to: 
Mary (Suhm) never really left office. They don’t pay her anymore, but she’s always around, 
getting her hands into different projects. She retired under a cloud of suspicion, and a lot of 
bad blood with the city council, but she’s got a proven history of getting things done, so it’s 
hard to know what exactly to do with her. It seems like the plan is to keep her around as a 
volunteer until she moves on, one way or another.  
 
Among participants who selected Suhm to serve on their hypothetical decision-making 
committees, common consensus was that the former city manager continues to have 
preferential access to Mayor Rawlings (and through him, the city council), top-level 
executives in the private sector, and many of Dallas’ first tier influentials; as several allowed, 
“Having Mary (Suhm) on your team is almost like having A.C. (Gonzalez), most of the 
power, but none of the scrutiny that comes with being an official public employee.” 
Second tier influentials, in summary. Within Dallas’ citywide decision-making 
process, participants identified a collection of actors, each of whom is only selectively 
involved in decision-making, but whose involvement is often a deciding factor in the success 
of a project or policy decision. Because of their numbers, as well as the lack of a common 
agenda, participants agreed that individual actors in this category tend to not be as 
individually influential as their first tier counterparts; however, many offered that, taken as a 
whole, these actors are still able to exert influence over the decisions of formal authorities at 
the citywide level.  
Civic Chairs. Table 4.13 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide civic 
chairs, named by eight or more participants to a hypothetical committee responsible for 
making a decision that would affect Dallas as a whole, and that would need to be supported 






Table 4.13: Citywide Civic Chairs 
Name 















(1 - 4) # % # % 
Alice Murray Dallas Citizens Council 48 61% 3.53 42 54% 2.38 
Mabrie Jackson North Texas Commission 28 35% 3.14 22 28% 2.47 
Dale Petrosky Dallas Regional Chamber 20 25% 2.97 23 29% 2.12 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 32 41% 3.21 29 37% 2.32 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 23 29% 3.11 20 26% 2.27 
This category consists of three leaders of civic organizations whose members include (and 
are often limited to) high-ranking business executives, city-, regional-, and statewide elected 
officials, and long-time civic philanthropists, in other words, the actors participants regularly 
referred to as the “ruling regents” of Dallas. In general, actors in this category received 
above-average nominations to decision-making teams, and the average scores for actors in 
this category are higher than averages from all categories combined in power, recent shared 
committee service, and familiarity. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first describe 
the roles of Dallas’ regional civic chairs, and then the role of category standout, Alice Murray. 
Regional civic chairs. In explaining the inclusion of these actors to their 
hypothetical decision-making teams, participants acknowledged that these actors are able to 
act as go-betweens for Dallas’ first tier and second tier influentials, and its formal authorities, and are 
able to garner support for a decision from Dallas’ first tier and second tier influentials, and to 
marshal resources around making that those decisions into a reality. Many participants 
suggested that, while these actors are influential in their own right, their real presence in 
Dallas’ decision-making body comes from preferential access to many of Dallas’ formal 
authorities, and their ability- and willingness to assess and align the interests of their 
constituents, mobilize constituent physical- financial-, and social capital in service of those 
interests, identify- and support formal authorities who will be sympathetic, and use preferential 
access to those actors to push the agendas set forth by their organizations’ members; as 




Groups like the (Dallas) Citizens Council and the [North Texas Commission] are made up of Dallas’ 
old guard, as well as big players from the northern suburbs. They’ve got direct lines into City Hall, but 
they represent interests from all over North Texas, so when they push an agenda for Dallas, who are 
they really serving - us, or the rich, white suburbs? 
 
What used to be an oligarchy of Dallas’ business elite is getting drowned out by people who have their 
eyes on the greater region, especially the northern suburbs.  
 
Category standout: Alice Murray. Although participants concurred that each of 
these actors possesses access to tremendous resources and influence through their 
organizations’ members, interviews made it clear that one leader, Alice Murray of the Dallas 
Citizens Council, possesses a degree of influence on a much higher order than other actors 
in this category. Selected by over 60% of participants for inclusion on their decision-making 
teams, and with a power score of 3.53, data suggest that the Citizens Council, and its leader, 
continue to possess an incredible influence over the city’s decision-making process. 
Participant comments on Murray’s role can be summarized by the comment: 
Alice (Murray) is our unelected mayor. She doesn’t have to necessarily approve of a project, 
but she and her people in the Citizens Council have to at least be neutral – you really can’t 
get much done with them standing against you. They have the leaders of all the biggest 
banks, the construction companies, the nonprofits, the for-profits… anyone who is anyone 
is on the Citizens Council; they rule Dallas, and she basically rules them.  
 
 While participants conceded that Murray is a highly influential force, they regularly 
conjected that this influence is far weaker than it was in mid-to-late 20th century Dallas, when 
the city’s “ruling regents” enjoyed nearly limitless control over the decision-making process. 
This power started to fade in the 1970s, when Dallas moved to a mix of single-district and 
at-large councilmembers, and lost significant power in 1991, when Dallas moved to the “14-
1” council system employed today433. Participants also noted that Dallas’ Participants also 
suggested that, as members of the city’s old guard die or retire from the politics of decision-
making, the emerging leaders who appear likely to replace them are less active in supporting 
the Citizens Council, and that as Dallas continues to induce business migration within the 
                                                          




city limits, there are more executives and top leaders; these leaders come into the city from 
all over the world, and bring with them a diverse range of ideas for the city. In describing 
this, participants’ comments are well-summarized by: 
The Dallas Citizens Council endorsed nearly every mayor in recent memory, and their 
members filled up campaign contributions lists going back to the last century – even on city 
council elections, but that’s not as sure of a bet. A.C. (Gonzalez) is also one of their 
annointees, so when the Council wants something, they usually get it. Ordinary people have 
to make appointments to see their elected leaders, but Dallas’ ruling oligarchs get direct lines.  
 
Murray and her supporters don’t rule the city like they used to. Just look at the City Council 
– she’s lost seven seats since 2011, and as the current councilmembers hit their term limits, 
she stands to lose even more.  
Civic chairs, in summary. Participants identified three leaders of Dallas’ largest 
civic organizations as being particularly influential in the citywide decision-making process, 
citing their preferential access to formal authorities, and their ability- and willingness to 
combine this access with physical-, social-, and financial capital from many of Dallas’ first- 
and second tier influentials, in service of goals supported by a majority of their members. As 
Chapter 2 detailed, historically, the organizations that these actors represent have had an 
outsized influence over Dallas’ decision-making body, but external forces have significantly 
diminished this influence; as one participant put it:  
Dallas tried hard to remain true to its big-business, big-building attitude, but the times, and 
the Supreme Court got in the way. Gone are the smoke-filled rooms where men would lay 
out plans for the city, but not everyone is ready to give up the past.  
Even with their influence waning, though, participants agreed that actors in this category are 
highly influential in the citywide decision-making process, and will likely remain so for the 
foreseeable future.  
Anchor Captains. Table 4.14 shows summary statistics related to Dallas’ citywide 
anchor captains named by eight or more participants to their citywide, hypothetical decision-





Table 4.14: Citywide Anchor Captains 
Name 














(1 - 4) # % # % 
Gerald Turner Southern Methodist Univ. 21 27% 3.33 23 29% 2.10 
Joel Allison Baylor, Scott, & White 20 25% 2.71 19 24% 2.27 
David Daniel 
Univ. of TX at Dallas (former) 
Univ. of TX System 
14 18% 2.54 13 16% 2.37 
Lee Jackson Univ. of North TX System 12 15% 2.47 24 30% 2.24 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 17 21% 2.76 20 26% 2.24 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 23 29% 3.11 20 26% 2.27 
At the citywide level, this category consists of four leaders connected to local hospitals and 
prominent universities. Compared to other categories, anchor captains, on average, received 
below-average committee nominations, power ratings, and ratings of mean familiarity levels. 
Overall, these actors also scored on-average for shared committee memberships. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will first describe the roles in citywide decision-making of 
anchor captains broadly, and then it will focus on category standout Gerald Turner.  
Participants regularly noted that actors in this category have long-standing 
connections to Dallas, and as a result, have developed decades-long relationships with high-
ranking formal authorities, as well as first tier influentials, several of whom have university- and 
hospital departments and facilities named after themselves, or their relatives. Participants 
also recognized that in the past, these organizations were used for little more than ensuring 
public support for somewhat questionable development projects, and that while this is still 
often the case, many asserted that this is beginning to change. Several participants asserted 
that anchor captains are still courted by Dallas’ developer class to support development projects, 
so that these can qualify for state- and federal funding to offset construction costs, but that 
in exchange for that support, Dallas’ anchor captains are starting to demand a greater role in 
projects with which they affiliate their institutions, paying more attention to these 





Colleges and hospitals in Dallas, they don’t have to work with you on a project, because 
they’ll just work with the guy across the street who gives them a better deal. It’s not just 
money, either – it’s jobs for their students, or outpatient facilities that can do the biggest new 
scan. They know that you can’t touch them on public opinion, so they’re really starting to get 
into the driver’s seat on projects, looking to expand opportunities and meet their own 
agendas, but it’s all so new – maybe five or ten years, if that, so who knows whether it will 
last.  
Category standout: Gerald Turner. Over a quarter of participants nominated 
Gerald Turner, president of Southern Methodist University (SMU), a private, nonprofit 
university surrounded by some of the most expensive, prestigious neighborhoods in Dallas, 
to their decision-making teams, and his power rating (3.33) is markedly higher than the other 
anchor captains. When nominating Turner, participants often explained that his participation in 
Dallas’ decision-making process is unique among similar leaders, in that SMU has long-been 
associated with power and influence in Dallas; several participants said that:  
If you want to be someone in Dallas, and didn’t go to a private school like Hockaday, 
Usuline, or Dallas International, then you want that SMU ring. The network is valuable, and 
everyone who matters knows it.  
 
Indeed, in researching individuals named as influential operatives, this study found 
that a large number of participant-identified formal authorities and influential operatives 
have either graduated from the university, or serve (currently or formerly) on its board of 
directors, or within one of the university’s departments. Participants regularly admitted that 
Turner himself, and several of the administrators under him, are deeply connected to Dallas’ 
first tier influentials and civic chairs, and acknowledged that his support for a project can alleviate 
concerns among actors in these other categories, and that his support on a project is a viable 
alternative to direct support from actors in these other categories, and the “political 
baggage” that those actors often bring with them to projects. In describing this, participants 
regularly agreed that:  
SMU has been associated with [Dallas’] rich and powerful for so long that it’s almost a proxy 
for their approval, but the university has less negativity associated with its name than a group 
like the Dallas Citizens Council or the Dallas Petroleum Club, even though there’s huge 




 Anchor Captains, in summary. Participants identified four leaders of some of 
Dallas’ largest anchor institutions as being influential in the citywide decision-making 
process, citing connections with formal authorities, first tier influentials, and a subset of second tier 
influentials. Participants had difficulty explaining the role of these actors in decision-making, 
and usually suggested that the roles of these organizations are still evolving as Dallas’ leaders 
learn how to work together with them, rather than relegating them to “ancillary” status. 
Summarizing many participant comments, one said that:  
College presidents and hospital chiefs have always been part of the equation, at least when it 
got them a new building, but now they’re not just working alone, happy with whatever 
scraps get thrown their way; they’re being proactive, and that’s a whole new ballgame. 
Talking about really running Dallas, though – that’s a different thing completely. Who 
knows? Ask me again in five years.  
 
Decision-makers in Dallas as a whole, in summary. This study asked 
participants knowledgeable about Dallas’ decision-making process to identify- and 
describe actors who get involved in making citywide decisions, and to nominate 10 
people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a decision that 
would affect the city as a whole. A total of 79 participants delivered a combined 790 
nominations, and 726 of these went to the 32 individual- and group actors outlined 
in the previous section. These actors represent major public-, private-, and third-
sector organizations, but can largely be settled into support for one of two distinct 
agendas for Dallas: a neoliberal, growth machine past, and progressive, post-Fordist 
future. Before evaluating whether these actors, and the relationships among them, 
are suggestive of a structure within this decision-making process, this study will 
report its findings with respect to its two focus neighborhoods. 
Decision-makers in North Oak Cliff 
Recall that this study aims to extend previous studies of urban governance by also 




contemporary decision-making structure within North Oak Cliff, and whether (or to what 
extent) anchor institutions and CDCs have a primary role within it, this study asked 
participants knowledgeable about decision-making in North Oak Cliff to identify- and 
describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide decisions, and to nominate 
10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a decision that would 
affect the city as a whole.  
A total of 40 (out of 79) participants were identified as being particularly cognizant 
of decision-making in North Oak Cliff; therefore, a maximum of 400 nominations were 
possible, and out of these, 86 votes, or 21.5% were cast for actors who did not garner 
enough votes (a minimum of 4, or approximately 10%) to be included in the tables 
throughout this section. In reporting on these actors, this study will first detail North Oak 
Cliff’s formal authorities; next, it will introduce the city’s its first tier influentials; third, its second tier 
influentials; fourth, its civic chairs; and finally, the neighborhood’s anchor captains. 
Formal authorities. Table 4.15 shows summary statistics related to North Oak 
Cliff’s formal authorities, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.15: North Oak Cliff Formal Authorities 














(1 - 4) # % # % 
Scott Griggs Dallas City Council 40 100% 3.85 9 23% 2.23 
Michael Anglin City Plan Commission (CPC) 28 70% 3.40 6 15% 2.10 
Scott Hounsel Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA) 25 63% 3.38 2 5% 2.05 
Neva Dean Sust. Development & Construction 24 60% 3.18 5 13% 2.30 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 29 73% 3.45 6 14% 2.17 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 21 52% 2.96 4 10% 2.25 
Actors in this category consist of the neighborhood’s elected representative: 




planning director within the city’s Sustainable Design & Construction office, which handles 
issues related to zoning requests, variances, and exceptions, and development code 
amendments434. On average, actors in this category have the highest power rating of all 
categories, above-average decision-making committee nominations, above-average recent 
shared board or committee service, and below-average scores on familiarity. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will summarize participant responses regarding North Oak 
Cliff’s formal authorities; first, the neighborhood’s unelected leadership, i.e., its appointed CPC 
and BOA members, and city staff, and then, category standout Scott Griggs. 
City staff and political appointees. In considering bureaucratic involvement in 
North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, participants regularly discussed the role of its 
Neva Dean, the city’s interim planning director, and (commonly in the same breath), the 
roles of Councilmember Griggs’ appointees to the City Plan Commission (CPC) and Zoning 
Board of Adjustment (BOA). In some ways, city staff and political appointees serve similar 
functions as advisors to Councilmember Griggs, and as enforcers of his policy vision for the 
neighborhood, but a subset of participants proposed that city staff frequently advise as 
advocates of first tier- and second tier influentials, while CPC and BOA appointees reinforce 
Griggs’ ideas.  
Looking first at Interim Planning Director Neva Dean, whose office oversees 
permits and planning, and who works with city’s Landmark Commission, overseeing which 
buildings receive landmark status and associated protections, participants agreed that her 
office is a recurrent battleground between second tier influentials and civic chairs who, 
respectively, propose and challenge plans for new development in the neighborhood. 
Participants frequently suggested that city staff tend to keep a pro-development agenda, and 
                                                          




this bias is evident in Dean’s office, where staff are often unhelpful in assisting residents find 
particular ordinances that are being violated, but generally will act once specific violations are 
documented; several commented that:  
If a resident wants to complain about a project, they have to go to Planning and get a 
meeting, or know the codes and demand action through Scott (Griggs). It ends up being a 
fight down in Neva [Dean]’s office, or through public hearings, with her people taking the 
side of the developer.  
 
In selecting Dean for their decision-making committees, participants identified her ability- 
and willingness to selectively enforce various development ordinances, especially when a 
project has the support of Councilmember Griggs, so long as those violations are relatively 
minor, and not safety-related. Many participants agreed that: 
Dean doesn’t send inspectors out to deep-dive into every single project, because that’s a 
waste of time and people she doesn’t really have. If a proposal is good, and has [Griggs’s] 
support, then those inspectors might elect to not go after you on minor zoning or permit 
violations, and they might not even show up as long as nobody complains.  
 
In considering the roles of Griggs’ political appointees in neighborhood decision-
making, participants named Michael Anglin and Scott Hounsel (respectively, Griggs’ 
appointees to the City Plan Commission (CPC) and Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA) ), 
as the councilmember’s proxy votes during proposed zoning changes, battles over adding (or 
removing) historic district protections, and requested exceptions to extant zoning policies. 
To the extent that participants suggested pro-development bias in city staff, participants also 
identified an anti-development bias in these two actors, and recognized that these two, like 
Griggs himself, share a vision of a North Oak Cliff that respects its historical structures and 
density, rather than razing that history in favor of neoliberal renewal strategies. 
Participants regularly drew parallels between Griggs’ appointees and those of 
Councilmember Kingston (discussed in later sections), in that both sets of appointees are 
often in the minority when it comes to opposing particular developments, but participants 




estate plans for two reasons: first, the developer class in North Oak Cliff is less enmeshed 
within the city than the analogous class in Downtown Dallas, and second, North Oak Cliff’s 
civic chairs are actively involved in mobilizing neighborhood residents to oppose unpopular 
development, with a level of organization that does not exist in other neighborhoods. In 
drawing these distinctions, participants regularly called the neighborhood the “People’s 
Republic of Oak Cliff,” and commended the work of organizers; their comments are well-
summarized by: 
Oak Cliff was neglected for so long that people had to work together to get anything out of 
City Hall, and there’s a strong spirit of surviving even without Dallas’ help. Different blocks 
come together in a way you just don’t see anywhere else, and when you can get them all 
together, you get a voice that even the (City) Council can’t ignore. They don’t win every 
time, but they win more often than the developers would like.  
 
Category Standout: Councilmember Scott Griggs. Participants unanimously 
nominated Councilmember Scott Griggs to their neighborhood decision-making teams, and 
has the highest power rating (3.85) of all actors in North Oak Cliff. Often, participants 
would discuss the role of other neighborhood decision-makers in terms of how they work 
with the councilmember, and repeatedly said that other formal authorities serve primarily to 
inform- and implement Griggs’ decisions, especially as those decisions relate to construction 
and development; as many agreed:.  
Scott (Griggs) is the chief executive of this district – a leader whose authority here is basically 
unquestionable. If he likes your project, then you’ll get the permits and zoning taken care of 
quickly. If he doesn’t, then suddenly you get hit with all of these obscure zoning laws and 
code violations, enough to delay your project for years, if not killing it outright. Enough 
money can get through that, but it’s so expensive and time-consuming that most developers 
don’t mess with it.  
 
Participants also admitted that Griggs devotes much of his time to undoing the decisions of 
his predecessors, fighting to keep his district from becoming, as one participant put it, “a 
playground for the rich in North Dallas.” Although Griggs opposes the commodification of 




has worked with locally-based developers, as well as developers with an interest in infill 
construction and low-rise, new-urbanist style development. Participants’ regularly made 
comments similar to: 
Back in the 90s, and even through the early 2000s, there was an attempt to revive North Oak 
Cliff by rezoning for suburban-style development, without respect to the layout or history of 
the area, which is tied up in streetcars and walking everywhere. Scott (Griggs) can only 
rezone so many places each year, so he’s constantly fighting with developers to make sure 
they build with a sense of the scale and style of this place. We can’t stay stagnant forever, but 
he tries to make sure that new development respects the feel of the community.  
 
Formal authorities, in summary. When describing North Oak Cliff’s decision-
making body, participants agreed that the neighborhood’s city councilmember is the primary 
decision-maker. In addition to the unwritten policy of non-interference among 
councilmembers, participants acknowledged that within his district, Councilmember Griggs 
benefits from professional deference of the interim planning director, and from his 
involvement in working with his proxy votes appointed to the CPC and BOA. Summarizing 
many participant comments on this, one participant noted that: 
Councilman Griggs is the central authority in this area. It’s practically suicidal to fight him; 
sure, you can get permits and zoning approval without his okay, but he can bury you in 
regulations, historic district red tape, funding nightmares… he can either clear the way for 
your project, or have every city office stonewall and delay to the absolute legal limit.  
 
First tier influentials. Table 4.16 shows summary statistics related to North Oak 
Cliff’s first tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.16: North Oak Cliff First Tier Influentials 
Name 














(1 - 4) # % # % 
Jim Lake Jr.  Jim Lake Companies 17 43% 3.38 7 18% 2.53 
Joe McElroy Square Foot Inc. 16 40% 2.88 0 0% 2.10 
Tom Prohaska Texas Pro Properties, LLC 10 25% 2.78 0 0% 2.08 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 14 36% 3.01 2 6% 2.24 





Actors in this category consist of three locally-based rentiers who have built real 
estate empires on renting to residents with low- and moderate incomes, as well as leasing 
commercial space to area businesses. On average, actors in this category have fewer average 
nominations for inclusion in a decision-making committee than those in other categories, 
but have a slightly higher average power rating. Actors in this category are also lower, on 
average, on both shared committee service with participants and familiarity. In the 
paragraphs that follow, this study will examine the decision-making roles of North Oak 
Cliff’s rentiers, particularly category standout Jim Lake, Jr.  
Local rentiers. Participants largely agreed that actors in this subcategory are unified 
by their vast real estate holdings throughout North Oak Cliff (and southern Dallas in 
general), their long-standing involvement in area development decisions, especially in- and 
around development hotspots like the Bishop Arts District and the Oak Cliff Gateway, and 
their relative cooperation in partnering with the area’s second tier influentials on real estate 
development, and joint efforts to lobby formal authorities at the neighborhood- and citywide 
level to relax ordinances (or, at least, enforcement) related to conditions in their rental 
properties.  
While individually, no actor in this category received nominations from a majority of 
participants, many participants selected at least one of the three listed in table 4.16. In 
explaining why, participants often suggested that these actors usually opt to cooperate with-, 
rather than compete against one another, so gaining the support of one is usually enough to 
bring the others’ support as well. Participants also agreed that this cooperation stems from 
the largely weak demand for development in the neighborhood, especially compared to the 
demand in nearby Downtown Dallas, so it is practically unheard of for these actors’ interests 




The guys who own the land around here have no reason to fight each other, so they work 
together to bundle up their various tracts and sell them to hungry developers. It’s all quiet, 
and under the table, so the people – usually renters – living on that land usually don’t know 
anything until the eviction notices start coming in, or they see bulldozers knocking 
something down.  
 
Category standout: Jim Lake, Jr. A significant minority (43%) of participants 
nominated second-generation developer and Oak Cliff native Jim Lake, Jr., to their decision-
making teams; indeed, participants rated Lake higher in power, shared committee 
membership, and familiarity than either of the other two actors in this category. Although 
participants uniformly respected Lake for his devotion to the neighborhood, a strong subset 
heavily criticized the effects of his development projects.  
 “When Jim Jr. started down here,” one of Lake’s advocates began, “everything was 
all boarded up. Now look out there – it’s all alive. People shopping, eating… some even live 
here, who wouldn’t have come through here without a platoon ten years ago.” Participants 
frequently credited Jim Lake Jr. with successfully lobbying for the creation of a TIF district 
to induce development in both the Bishop Arts District and the Oak Cliff Gateway, but had 
divergent opinions of his motives. One group considered Lake a resource in fighting to 
preserve some of the neighborhood’s architecture and character, and largely agreed that: 
Jim (Lake) grew up here, and learned from his dad, Jim (Lake) Sr., that you don’t always have 
to tear down a building to make something new.. They worked with local businesses to fill 
up old warehouses, and made community anchors where other people would just tear down 
and put some generic, brown building full of retail chains and companies that don’t care 
about the neighborhood.  
Not all participants were as positive, however, and their comments are well-summed 
with: 
 
Jim (Lake) Jr. says that he cares about the neighborhood, but what he really cares about 
making money, and what makes money right now is saving old spaces. He’s knocked down 
plenty of buildings, and kicked out plenty of family businesses here, back before it was hip to 
keep that stuff around. 
 
First tier influentials, in summary. Within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making 




although standout Jim Lake is notably more active than others in this category. Data seem to 
support these impressions, with Lake holding notably higher power, Committee Service, and 
familiarity scores than other actors in this category. Participants conceded that these actors 
work (to differing degrees) with area formal authorities, and with second tier influentials and anchor 
captains to further a broadly noncompetitive pro-development agenda. Increasingly, this 
cooperation is drawing the ire of residents who oppose what they consider “destructive 
gentrification,” wherein local businesses and low-income renters are being displaced in favor 
of higher-income tenants imported from other parts of the city; this opposition, as well as 
attempts to mediate among different interests are being headed by area civic chairs.  
Second tier influentials. Table 4.17 shows summary statistics related to North Oak 
Cliff’s second tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.17: North Oak Cliff Second Tier Influentials 
Name 
















(1 - 4) 
# % # % 
Matt Segrest Alamo Manhattan 21 53% 3.23 3 7% 2.40 
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian Exxir Capital 19 48% 2.85 0 0% 2.35 
David Eitches Blackwood Developments, LLC 15 38% 2.70 0 0% 2.03 
David Spence Good Space 10 25% 2.33 7 18% 2.43 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 14 36% 2.78 3 7% 2.30 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 21 52% 2.96 4 10% 2.25 
Actors in this category are all members of the developer class, and each is connected to 
multiple development projects in North Oak Cliff. Data suggest that, compared to actors in 
other categories, actors in this category are likely to be nominated to participants’ decision-
making committees, have below-average ratings of power and recent shared committee 
service, and above-average familiarity ratings. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will 




then it will draw out participant perceptions of category standout David Spence.  
The developer class. When participants selected actors in this category for their 
hypothetical decision-making teams, they ofttimes acknowledged that these actors have 
forged strong relationships with neighborhood formal authorities, first tier influentials, and a 
subset of North Oak Cliff’s civic chairs. Among participants more broadly, there was general 
agreement that these actors do not have similar agendas with respect to development; many 
commented that there are two types of actors in this new group: infill developers like David 
Spence, who focus on revitalizing blocks through remodeling single buildings, and larger 
builders like Matt Segrest of Alamo Manhattan, Farrokh and Michael Nazerian of Exxir 
Capital, and David Eitches of Blackwood Developments of  whose projects involve 
significantly more demolition and reconstruction, commonly over multiple plots, if entire 
blocks at once. Nonetheless, participants drew a sharp contrast between developers active in 
North Oak Cliff and those revitalizing nearby Downtown Dallas, often saying that: 
It’s different here (in North Oak Cliff); larger developers like CBRE aren’t as big of a 
presence, because they’re focusing on projects in the hundreds of millions of dollars, 
whereas the biggest projects here are in the tens of millions. 
 
Finally, participants opined that these actors ofttimes utilize their local knowledge to exploit 
historic divisions among neighborhood organizations, intentionally developing in places 
where multiple neighborhoods stand to benefit (or suffer) to varying extents. Many accused 
local landowners of using their knowledge of neighborhood mistrust to guide new 
developers into areas where inter-neighborhood distrust will act as a roadblock to a unified 
resistance to development, and as one participant put it: 
Bishop Arts and the (Oak Cliff) Gateway are basically artificial – they’re just lines on a map, 
and they cut across different neighborhoods in different ways. If the neighborhoods would 
work together, they could put up some opposition to development, but they won’t, and 





Category standout: David Spence. Although David Spence, owner of Good 
Space, had the lowest rating of power (2.33), and was the actor least nominated for inclusion 
on participants’ decision-making teams (25%), he scored higher than other actors in this 
category on both shared committee service and familiarity. In describing Spence’s role in 
North Oak cliff, participants drew a distinction between him and other actors in this 
category; specifically, they noted that, whereas other actors in this category focus on larger 
developments, Spence’s company repurposes existing, abandoned buildings. Participants 
regularly commented that:  
In North Oak Cliff, everything used to be low-rise brick, laid out along trolley lines that were 
buried years ago. The big guys like Alamo Manhattan don’t seem to get that we want to stay 
true to that, but David (Spence) does. For years now, he’s been piecing together his 
developments, little by little, and with a lot of work himself.  
 
While his projects lack the scope and magnitude of many others, participants often 
noted that he has much more community support, and that he has been integral in 
developing spaces for locally-owned businesses, and for fostering locally-oriented 
development in a neighborhood that is quickly being, as several conveyed, “parceled out” by 
larger developers. Finally, in their interviews, even participants who did not nominate Spence 
for their decision-making teams identified him as someone who is heavily involved in 
projects around the Bishop Arts District, and several conjected that his positive relationships 
with first tier influentials, formal authorities, and the general public would make him a formidable 
successor to Councilmember Griggs, once Griggs leaves office.  
Second tier influentials, in summary. Comprised of real estate developers, North 
Oak Cliff’s second tier influentials work closely with first tier influentials and formal authorities to 
reshape North Oak Cliff, particularly in the Bishop Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway, 
both of which are covered by a TIF district. While participants did not commonly select any 




least one, agreeing that these actors are willing- and able to use their access to financial 
capital to bring much-needed development to the area, and that many are willing to utilize 
somewhat-questionable tactics in service of their agendas. However, participants noted 
exceptions to these blanket statements in David Spence of Good Space, whose practice of 
renovating existing structures has, in the eyes of many, saved many structures from 
demolition, and has been crucial in supporting the development of a local economy.  
Civic chairs. Table 4.18 shows summary statistics related to North Oak Cliff’s civic 
chairs, named by four or more participants to their hypothetical neighborhood decision-
making committees.  
Table 4.18: North Oak Cliff Civic Chairs 














(1 - 4) 
# % # % 
Pam Conley Kidd Springs Neighborhood Association 27 68% 2.85 5 13% 2.25 
Lisa Benskin Old Oak Cliff Conservation League 27 68% 2.83 7 18% 2.28 
Jason Roberts Better Block; Oak Cliff Transit Authority 13 33% 1.68 5 13% 2.33 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 22 56% 2.45 6 14% 2.28 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 21 52% 2.96 4 10% 2.25 
 
Actors in this category consist of two leaders of neighborhood associations and one 
neighborhood activist associated with a number of highly-acclaimed civic organizations 
active in North Oak Cliff. On average, these actors are slightly more likely than actors in 
general to be nominated to participants’ decision-making committees, tend to serve on more 
shared boards and committees with participants, and are rated higher on familiarity. These 
actors also have a lower than average rating of power, compared to actors more broadly. 
While participants identified more similarities between Pam Conley and Lisa Benskin than 
between these two and Jason Roberts, participants had strong, unique opinions about each, 
and their respective roles in decision-making within North Oak Cliff. As a result, in the 




Category standout: Pam Conley. Over two-thirds of participants knowledgeable 
about North Oak Cliff named Pam Conley to their decision-making teams, and she holds the 
highest power rating (2.85) of any actor in the category. Conley is the president of the Kidd 
Springs Neighborhood Association, and is long-time resident of the area, although 
participants commented that she is most regularly found in city offices, meeting with 
Councilmember Griggs, or in public hearings regarding development – particularly regarding 
the Bishop Arts District, but also around the neighborhood broadly.  
Participants – even those who did not nominate Conley for their decision-making 
committees – considered her to be a political force to be reckoned with, limited only by her 
propensity for irritating both her allies and her opponents. Participants regularly cited to her 
ability- and willingness to study zoning ordinances and building codes, work with local media 
(including the Dallas Morning News, Dallas Observer, and Oak Cliff Advocate) to keep media 
pressure on Councilmember Griggs, and most importantly, her ability to whip up resident 
opposition to development projects. Summarizing these points, participants acknowledged 
that: 
“Pam Conley” is a name even Scott Griggs has to pay attention to, because she doesn’t 
waste time. She knows codes and zoning regulations better than the departments do, and 
most importantly, she can- and will get voters to come out and raise a fuss.  
 
She’s done more to stop questionable development than anyone else. Two things balance 
her out: first, there are more developers with more projects than she has time to fight, and 
second, she pisses off just near as many people as she lines up as supporters.  
 
Category standout: Lisa Benskin. As many participants selected Benskin as did 
Conley, and rated her nearly-identically on power (2.83). Participants described Benskin as 
less-polarizing than Conley, as well as more moderate when considering whether, or to what 
extent, to challenge new development in North Oak Cliff. In explaining why, participants 
pointed to the purpose of the organization she leads – the 34-neighborhood coalition called 




Lisa Benskin, is often looked to by Councilmember Griggs, city offices, and members of the 
media to speak on behalf of neighborhood residents, while also being looked to as a 
moderator among competing neighborhood interests. Participants recognized that Benskin 
often fosters close ties with first tier influentials and second tier influentials, and uses these 
connections to “nudge development along in ways that are less disruptive to the existing 
residents” and “preserve the spirit of the area, while addressing the results of long-time 
neglect and abandonment,” rather than opposing all development outright. Participant 
thoughts can be summarized as follows: 
In Dallas, development is a given – it’s like breathing around here, you can’t stop it forever. 
Under Lisa (Benskin), the [OOCCL] doesn’t totally oppose development, and would rather 
work with developers than against them, because that leads to results that the neighborhoods 
might be able to live with.  
 
Category standout: Jason Roberts. Out of North Oak Cliff’s civic chairs, Jason 
Roberts had the fewest nominations (33%) to decision-making committees, as well as the 
lowest rating of power (1.68). Although Roberts is not the head of a neighborhood 
association, he is affiliated with a number of civic organizations in North Oak Cliff, 
including the Better Block Project and Bike Friendly Oak Cliff, and is the founder of the 
North Oak Cliff Transit Authority, a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization responsible 
for successfully blending local-, state-, federal-, and private-sector funds, funneling these into 
designing and constructing a streetcar line connecting North Oak Cliff to Downtown 
Dallas435. Participants who nominated Roberts to their decision-making teams (and several 
who did not) considered Roberts a “rising star” in the North Oak Cliff’s decision-making 
process, but many criticized his forward-thinking advocacy as being “out of touch” with the 
needs of neighborhood’s current residents, many of whom participants considered likely to 
                                                          




be displaced as North Oak Cliff continues to gentrify. Summarizing participant comments, 
many suggested that: 
Jason (Roberts) is going to get elected to high office someday, probably after millennials 
move south of the Trinity (River) and kick out the folks who live here now. Streetcars and 
bike lanes and urban gardens are nice, but we still can’t even get enough decent grocery 
stores for the folks who don’t have cars, or can’t afford to use a lot of gas. He’s the right 
man to solve problems that the neighborhood will have in ten years, after all the poor folks 
are pushed out.  
Civic chairs, in summary. Actors in this category consist of two presidents of 
neighborhood associations and one neighborhood activist associated with a number of 
highly-acclaimed civic organizations active in North Oak Cliff. Participants agreed that each 
actor’s approach to protecting and improving North Oak Cliff is unique, simultaneously 
appealing to- and distancing various constituent groups within the neighborhood. 
Additionally, participants frequently that actors in this category spend tremendous amounts 
of their own time (often lacking financial resources to hire assistants) in service of their 
constituents, frequently to be met with more disappointments than successes. This is nearly 
the opposite of how participants described the experience of North Oak Cliff’s sole anchor 
captain, to be discussed in the following subsection. 
Anchor captains. Table 4.19 shows summary statistics related to North Oak Cliff’s 
sole anchor captain named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.19: North Oak Cliff Anchor Captains 
Name 














(1 - 4) # % # % 
Martin Koonsman Methodist Dallas Medical Center 22 55% 3.05 3 8% 2.38 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 22 55% 3.05 3 8% 2.38 




Martin Koonsman is the president of Methodist Dallas Medical Center (commonly 
referred to as Methodist Hospital), which has a significant amount of history with the 
neighborhood, tracing its roots in North Oak Cliff to 1924436. Compared to actors in other 
categories, Koonsman has an above-average number of nominations to decision-making 
committees, as well as an above-average score in both power and familiarity, but has recently 
served on fewer-than-average committees or boards with participants. In the paragraphs that 
follow, this study will discuss participant perspectives on Koonsman’s role in neighborhood 
decision-making.  
In reflecting on Koonsman’s role as the president of the hospital, as well as the role 
of the hospital in decision-making, a strong subset of participants often accused Koonsman 
of using the hospital’s history with North Oak Cliff, its presence as one of the few area 
medical facilities, and its status as a large employer to gain tremendous leeway with its 
expansion projects, to the point that many of these projects are able to proceed over 
objections of surrounding neighborhoods. As many agreed: 
That hospital has been around for as long as anything else around here, and has hundreds, if 
not thousands of jobs connected to it. They get almost anything they want, because there’s 
just nobody else that can soak up all those people if the hospital leaves.  
 
Participants also often concurred that, outside of using its influence to ease restrictions on 
expansion, the hospital is generally uninvolved in neighborhood decision-making; in this 
way, the hospital behaves as “part time” member of the neighborhood’s decision-making 
body. As several participants put it: 
Martin Koonsman doesn’t care about Oak Cliff, because none of his doctors or lead nurses 
live here, and he certainly doesn’t either. None of those people wake up at 5am to the sound 
of supply trucks barreling down the street, but the people who live here have had to do that 
for months now. He wants to act like the hospital’s a cornerstone of the neighborhood when 
it might get them some free money to build a new wing, but then his contractors will go and 
bulldoze a block of houses for the construction.  
 
                                                          




It is important to note that not all participants had a negative appraisal of the role of 
Koonsman and the hospital in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making process, or the effects of 
this involvement. Several considered the hospital to be an economic engine in an otherwise-
derelict part of the city, pointing to the thousands of jobs created by the hospital directly, as 
well as indirectly through its surrounding affiliated medical offices, its suppliers, and nearby 
businesses. One participant, echoing the thoughts of many others, said that: 
Methodist Hospital has been an economic anchor south of the Trinity (River), even when 
everything else had abandoned the area. The commitment shown over the years, the jobs – 
good, stable, well-paying jobs – created and maintained here can’t be forgotten, even when it 
would have made more sense to move north with everyone else. The kinds of services that 
Methodist provides now couldn’t have been dreamed of back in 1924, so if the hospital 
doesn’t expand, it would have to move somewhere else.  
 
Another, acknowledging the complicated relationship between the hospital and surrounding 
neighborhood, commented that: 
[The hospital hasn’t] always been a good neighbor. For a long time, [Methodist Hospital] 
ignored complaints, knowing that there wouldn’t be repercussions. Those days have been 
gone for a long time, but under Dr. Koonsman, [the hospital has] really stepped up, to 
become a neighbor that isn’t just an economic boon, but a real center for the community, 
working quickly to address neighborhood concerns in a meaningful way, and taking time to 
really listen to what people need from [the hospital].  
 
Anchor captains, in summary. Participants often (but not always) held a negative 
view of the role of Martin Koonsman, and the hospital he represents, in North Oak Cliff’s 
decision-making process. As a major employer and economic driver, participants agreed that 
it has a tremendous amount of clout with neighborhood formal authorities, and with its 
growing footprint, close relationships with first- and second tier influentials, but that it often only 
uses this clout to serve its own agenda, rather than becoming an advocate for the people 
who live in the community it serves. 
Decision-makers in North Oak Cliff, in summary. This study asked participants 
knowledgeable about Dallas’ decision-making process to identify- and describe actors who 




that would be responsible for making a decision that would affect the city as a whole. A total 
of 40 participants delivered a combined 400 nominations, and 314 of these went to the 15 
individual- and group actors outlined in the previous section. These actors represent all three 
sectors, but also a deep division in North Oak Cliff, between use-value, represented by 
residents who seek to remain in their homes and locally-owned businesses, and exchange-
value, represented by the coalition of larger developers and landowners who are actively 
engaged in clearing older development in favor of higher-rent residences and retail outlets 
catering to the post-Fordist generation of young adults who are rapidly gentrifying the area. 
Before evaluating whether these actors, and the relationships among them are suggestive of a 
structure within this decision-making process, however, this study will report its findings 
with respect to Downtown Dallas.  
Decision-makers in Downtown Dallas 
To understand the contemporary decision-making structure within Downtown 
Dallas, and whether (or to what extent) anchor institutions and CDCs have a primary role 
within it, this study asked participants knowledgeable about decision-making in Downtown 
Dallas to identify- and describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide 
decisions, and to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for 
making a decision that would affect the city as a whole.  
A total of 39 (out of 79) participants were identified as being particularly cognizant 
of decision-making in Downtown Dallas; therefore, a maximum of 390 nominations were 
possible, and out of these, 81 votes (20.8%) were cast for actors who did not garner enough 
votes (a minimum of 4, or 10%) to be included in the tables throughout this section. In 
reporting on these actors, this study will first detail Downtown Dallas’ formal authorities; next, 




civic chairs. No anchor captains were nominated by enough participants to be included in this 
study’s discussion of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process.  
Formal authorities. Table 4.20 shows summary statistics related to Downtown 
Dallas’ formal authorities, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
 
Table 4.20: Downtown Dallas Formal Authorities 
Name 













(1 - 4) # % # % 
Philip Kingston Dallas City Council 39 100% 3.97 9 23% 2.23 
A.C. Gonzalez City Manager 23 59% 3.90 6 15% 2.48 
Karl Zavitkovsky Office of Econ. Development 13 33% 3.77 5 13% 2.43 
Mark Rieves Zoning Board of Adjustment 15 38% 3.26 0 0% 1.95 
Paul Ridley City Plan Commission 9 23% 3.10 4 10% 2.05 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 20 49% 3.60 5 6% 2.23 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 17 44% 3.29 11 28% 2.31 
As in both Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, participants asserted that the 
primary agents of decision-making within Downtown Dallas. Actors in this category consist 
of the area’s city councilmember, two of his political appointments, and two high-level city 
bureaucrats. On average, actors in this category have above-average numbers of nominations 
to decision-making committees and power ratings, and below-average recent shared 
committee service and familiarity. In describing the role of these actors in Downtown Dallas, 
this study will first introduce the role of city staff and appointed members of boards and 
commissions, and finally, category standout Philip Kingston.  
City staff and political appointees. Looking first at the role of city staff in 
neighborhood decision-making, participants knowledgeable about Downtown Dallas’ 
decision-making process regularly brought up the roles of ranking city staff, as well as 




Board of Adjustment (BOA). As in North Oak Cliff, participants concurred that city staff 
and political appointees serve similarly as advisors to Councilmember Kingston, and as the 
implementers of his vision for Downtown Dallas, but participants regularly submitted that 
city staff recurrently serve as mouthpieces of- and liaisons for first tier- and second tier 
influentials, while CPC and BOA appointees remain fiercely loyal to Kingston’s wishes.  
Looking first at city staff, participants often nominated either (and not uncommonly 
both) City Manager A.C. Gonzalez, and Director of Economic Development Karl 
Zavitkovsky to their hypothetical decision-making teams. Looking first at City Manager 
Gonzalez, although his role in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making body is similar to his role 
in citywide decision-making, participants conceded that he is generally only involved in the 
largest development projects, whose implications are likely to reverberate throughout the 
city; participants repeatedly cited examples of recent upgrades to the city’s convention 
center, as well as rumors surrounding a plan to build a downtown baseball stadium, both 
with the enthusiastic support of area first tier influentials.  
Gonzalez’ economic development chief is Karl Zavitkovsky, whose office has 
authority over planning, permits and code compliance, as well day-to-day administration of 
the city’s TIFs and PIDs), several of which several are contained within Downtown Dallas437. 
Participants agreed that Zavitkovsky’s support for a project can, as several noted, “smooth 
the process” of project approval, particularly when there is no proposed change to land-use 
or zoning policies (which necessitate approval of Councilmember Kingston). Participants 
frequently admitted Zavitkovsky and Gonzalez work to both encourage- and enable 
development, rather than regulate developers, and many comments categorized development 
is an “outside proposal,” wherein city departments are disinterested in project particulars, 
                                                          




and are instead concerned with the amount of economic growth brought to Downtown 
Dallas. In describing this, participants’ comments are well-summarized by the following: 
Karl and his boss are firm believers in the old-school “growth gospel” of Dallas, and 
Downtown is the jewel of the city’s crown, so why wouldn’t they push to bring as much 
development to the CBD as they can? They’ve completely subordinated regulations and 
planning policies to development, and any planner who wants to keep his job around here 
learns quickly to not concern himself with regulating proposals.  
 
Looking at the role of Councilmember Kingston’s appointees in neighborhood 
decision-making, participants acknowledged that Kingston’s appointees to the CPC and 
BOA, like those of the other councilmembers, act as his proxy votes, deliberating and voting 
on proposals with his input, and assisting Kingston in countering the neoliberal tendencies 
found within Dallas’ city hall. Participants recognized that, like Kingston, his appointees 
envision a Downtown Dallas open to more than just wealthy Dallasites and suburban 
visitors, but admitted that this remains a minority opinion, and one that opposes the position 
of ranking city staff. As a result, participants agreed that projects that do not have the 
approval of these appointees are not doomed to failure at the committee or council level, but 
that it is much easier to achieve positive outcomes with their support. Participant comments 
are well-summarized by the following: 
Kingston gets one proxy on the CPC, and one on the (Zoning) Board of Adjustment. 
You’ve got his proxies, and the proxies of a few other councilmembers who share his 
progressive vision, but the majorities on both committees are still pro-development, and 
Downtown Dallas is the jewel of the city, so if you’re going to see a dust-up over 
development, it’s gonna (SIC) happen here. Egos run strong (SIC) here, so developers and 
their backers fight harder here than they might in other parts of town.  
Category standout: Councilmember Philip Kingston. All 39 participants 
nominated Councilmember Philip Kingston, who represents Downtown Dallas, to their 
decision-making teams, and his power score (3.97) is highest among both first tier influentials, 
and among all listed decision-makers in Downtown Dallas. Within Downtown Dallas, 




over land-use decisions, and like his predecessor Angela Hunt, uses this authority in service 
of a vision for Downtown Dallas that embraces the post-Fordist tendencies of millennials 
who seek locations where work, home, and entertainment all exist in close proximity, while 
also advocating for historic preservation and incorporation of affordable housing within new 
development projects; describing this vision, participants consistently concurred that:  
Philip (Kingston) is part of a newer wave of leaders in Dallas; they’re not “anti-
development,” but they’re against the kind of speculative, “build for building’s sake” style 
that got Dallas in so much trouble in the 1980s. They want to develop, but they want to do it 
in a way that won’t leave the city center vacant if this push to move back into Downtown 
turns out to just be a fad.  
Participants admitted that Kingston’s vision often puts the councilmember in opposition 
with City staff, as well as their backers found among Downtown Dallas’ first tier influentials 
and civic chairs, many of whom continue to mobilize resources in ongoing attempts to remake 
Downtown Dallas around stadiums, convention centers, and high-end hotels, retail, and 
dining. Participants frequently conceded that Kingston, his staff, and his appointees to 
various boards and committees are able to challenge these projects, but are largely unable to 
completely halt them, primarily because of the close connections that persist between Dallas’ 
public- and private sectors; many described this as a “David and Goliath” scenario, wherein, 
as one participant noted: 
You have Philip (Kingston) and his people on one end, and then you’ve got A.C. 
(Gonzalez), (Mayor) Rawlings and the masters who control them on the other. In every 
development decision, Gonzalez and Rawlings come together and try to frame the issue in a 
way that makes every option one they like, but Kingston keeps coming back and pointing 
out alternatives, and finding holes in their proposals. He says the things people in City Hall 
don’t want to hear, and that gets him a lot of popular support, but costs him the favor of 
Dallas’ ruling elite. It’s also not always effective, so sometimes he spends hours and hours on 
a plan that gets defeated in minutes.  
 Formal authorities, in summary. While participants acknowledged that these 
actors are among the most central in Dallas’ decision-making process, interviews suggest that 
this category is less effective than it might otherwise be, due to frequent within-category 




as being in a degree of opposition with first tier and second tier influentials, some of whom are 
also considered highly influential in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, while other 
actors in this category enjoy a more collaborative set of relationships. Acting to mediate 
these tensions is the neighborhood’s sole civic chair, although participants admitted that this 
actor’s role in neighborhood decision-making is hardly neutral. In the sections that follow, 
these tensions, and the actors involved, will be explored.  
First tier influentials. Table 4.21 shows summary statistics related to Downtown 
Dallas’ first tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.21: Downtown Dallas First Tier Influentials 
Name 













(1 - 4) # % # % 
Ray Hunt Hunt Consolidated 21 54% 3.92 5 13% 2.54 
Harlan Crow Crow Holdings 13 33% 3.51 8 21% 2.10 
Ross Perot Jr. Hillwood 13 33% 3.41 5 13% 2.03 
Jody Grant Texas BankCap (Emeritus) 9 23% 2.90 4 10% 2.48 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 14 36% 3.44 6 14% 2.29 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 17 44% 3.29 11 28% 2.31 
Actors in this category consist of three particularly active members of Dallas’ most 
influential families, and a financier who participants often credited with financing 
Downtown Dallas’ revitalization following the Savings and Loan Crisis; participants 
considered each of these actors as part of the old guard in Dallas, and regularly made this 
known throughout their interviews. Compared to actors in other categories, Downtown 
Dallas’ first tier influentials have above-average power ratings, and below-average nominations 
for decision-making teams, ratings of familiarity, and recent shared committee service with 
participants. In the following paragraphs, this study will outline participants’ general 




The old guard. Participants conceded that, while it is increasingly inaccurate to 
suggest that a small coalition of wealthy business executives, elite financiers, and civic leaders 
controls the priorities and politics of Dallas, a subset of the old guard’s remnants remain 
exceptionally active in Downtown Dallas. Many of the comments about first tier influentials in 
Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure overlap significantly with those made about first 
tier influentials in Downtown Dallas, which is unsurprising, given that three of the four actors 
listed in table 4.21 also appear in table 4.11, and the fourth (Jody Grant) was one vote shy of 
being included as well.  
 Participants were encouraged to consider whether, or to what extent, these first tier 
influentials had different roles in decision-making in Downtown Dallas, as compared to 
citywide decision-making. Participants agreed that, in Downtown Dallas as in the city as a 
whole, these actors utilize their access to physical-, financial-, and social capital to achieve a 
common, neoliberal agenda, but participants also suggested that there is a unique 
relationship between these actors and Downtown Dallas. Several commented that these 
actors, and their families, have been long-associated with large developments in Downtown 
Dallas, including skyscrapers and civic amenities that defined Dallas’ skyline for decades. 
These participants also admitted that, increasingly, both the skyline itself and neighborhood 
surrounding it are transforming, with less and less input from the old guard, while the city 
council and bureaucracy is slowly transitioning away from dependence on their resources. As 
a result, those actors who do remain active focus their fading influence on Downtown 
Dallas, rather than spreading projects throughout the city. Well-summarizing many 
comments, one participant said that: 
These men look back on their careers building Dallas, and the projects that their family 
names are connected to, and then they look at the new projects that they haven’t been a part 
of. They see their works being crowded out by projects that belong the “new Dallas” that’s 




the city, so a lot of them are trying to get that one last, big project before they go, as a way of 
leaving the most visible mark on the city they can, by changing its skyline.  
Category standout: Ray Hunt. Over half (54%) of participants named billionaire 
Ray Hunt to their decision-making teams, and his power score (3.92) is among the highest of 
all actors considered by this section. In explaining why, many participants admitted that the 
Hunt family has been intertwined with decision-making for decades, with several suggesting 
that: “Dallas has ‘first families,’ like the Perots, Jones’, Crows, and Bush’s, but none of them 
have the pull of the Hunts.” Describing Hunt, participants often agreed that: 
Most of the “old guard” is gone, but Ray Hunt stuck around, and he’s got enough land 
downtown and money in his pocket to keep things interesting. You won’t see his names on 
as much these days, because he works through proxies to keep his name out of the 
newspaper. Hunt may be a dinosaur, but he outlasted all the others because he’s smart, and 
he’s probably going to keep pushing his old ideas for Downtown until he dies.  
Participants frequently noted that Hunt prefers to keep his own name out of the 
public eye, and instead acts through proxies, such as citywide civic chair Alice Murray as well 
as formal authorities like Mike Rawlings and A.C. Gonzalez, in his efforts to develop his 
tremendous landholdings in Downtown Dallas into office buildings, luxury residential and 
retail properties, and perennial plans for urban sports arenas. Because Hunt develops 
primarily on land he already owns, uses a preferred development company, Woodbine 
Development, which is run by long-time business partner (and second tier influential) John 
Scovell, and works directly with aforementioned formal authorities and civic chairs to gain 
necessary permits, concessions, and support in final project approval by the City Council, 
participants conceded that he is well-equipped to sidestep the authority of Councilmember 
Kingston, who is ofttimes unable to meaningfully prevent Hunt’s projects. 
First tier influentials, in summary. Participants identified four actors that can be 
categorized as first tier influentials, and three among these were also identified as first tier 




their resources and influence with civic chairs and a subset of formal authorities to forward a 
common vision for Downtown Dallas. Several participants conceded that the actors in this 
category represent what many called the “last breath” of mid-late 20th century Dallas, and 
that while these actors’ remain influential, their projects are not universally embraced by area 
formal authorities, which effectively limits what these actors are able to accomplish. About this, 
several participants’ comments can by summarized by: 
The big men all died off, retired out, or moved on; [Eugene] McDermott, [Trammell] Crow, Jack 
Evans, Bob Folsom – the men who built Dallas – so many just aren’t around anymore. You still got 
(SIC) a few hanging on, but it’s not like things used to be.  
Second tier influentials. Table 4.22 shows summary statistics related to Downtown 
Dallas’ second tier influentials, named by four or more participants to a hypothetical committee 
responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that would need 
to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.22: Downtown Dallas Second Tier Influentials 
Name 













(1 - 4) # % # % 
Scott Krikorian Trammell Crow Co.  
(subsidiary of CBRE) 20 51% 3.15 16 41% 2.33 
Jim Truitt Forest City 19 49% 3.13 21 54% 2.40 
Michael Caffey C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE) 18 46% 3.08 12 31% 2.53 
Vince 
Ackerson 
Texas Capital Bank  
(subsidiary of Texas BankCap) 
12 31% 3.05 12 31% 2.40 
Jack Matthews Matthews Southwest 21 54% 3.03 20 51% 2.35 
John Scovell 
Woodbine Development 
Dallas Citizens Council  
11 28% 2.85 16 41% 2.25 
Ted Hamilton Hamilton Properties 7 18% 2.69 16 41% 2.08 
Brock Bailey Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP 7 18% 2.51 9 23% 2.08 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 14 36% 2.94 15 39% 2.30 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 17 44% 3.29 11 28% 2.31 
Actors in this category consist of members of the developer class, including several executives 
within real estate development firms, one executive of a major real estate financial services 
provider (founded by first tier influential Jody Grant), and a senior partner in a large real estate 
law firm. Compared to actors in other categories, Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials 




average ratings of power and familiarity, but scored above-average on recent shared 
committee service with participants. In discussing the role of these actors in decision-making 
within Downtown Dallas, this study will outline the role of the neighborhood’s developer class, 
particularly the role of category standout John Scovell. 
Participants often said that Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials are generally 
uninvolved with the formation of new projects, and instead, are mobilized by first tier 
influentials and formal authorities for particular projects, primarily through shared membership 
within CBD’s booster organization, Downtown Dallas Inc. Participants also admitted that 
that these newer developers, many of which located offices in Dallas after the Savings & 
Loan Crisis, are less-likely to form enduring partnerships with one another, or with political 
leaders, because many are simply branch offices of national- or international firms. This is 
not to suggest, however, that second tier influentials are uninvolved in decision-making.  
Participants frequently suggested that, once mobilized by first tier influentials and formal 
authorities to develop a project, that these actors exert tremendous control over the final 
product, as the ones primarily responsible for day-to-day project management. Participants 
also agreed that, although stiff opposition to a project is rare, when that happens, these 
actors rely on first tier influentials to collaborate with sympathetic formal authorities to gain 
regulatory concessions, or (if the opposition comes from Councilmember Kingston) a 
supportive vote from the City Council to overrule him, especially in parts of Downtown 
Dallas that are not in high-demand. As several put forward: 
Dallas has a long history of working with the private sector, especially in Downtown, and 
historically, political leaders don’t write Dallas’ planning code – developers do. If someone in 
City Hall tries to stop a project that has the right backers, and those backers can’t get it 
worked out, then you’ll see someone pitch a fit about how they’re going to have to 
“reconsider” development, and just like that, they get whatever they want out of the eight 
vote majority on the City Council. It’s a script, and you’ll see it over and over again, if you’re 





As a result, participants regularly considered these actors to be the “spiritual successors” to 
the men who build Dallas in the mid-to-late 20th century, and that although their level of 
involvement in particularly large, high-visibility projects brings each a degree of celebrity, 
most resist joining any enduring coalitions; summarizing this, participants often commented 
along the lines of: 
These new mega-builders are reshaping Dallas, and they’re not asking permission from 
anyone to do it. They’re like Trammel Crow was back in the ‘60s and ‘70s, but once they 
finish a project, they just go home. They’re not lobbying to change Dallas, and the old 
oligarchs don’t know what to make of them.  
 
Finally, participants repeatedly suggested that, as the recent development boom in 
Downtown Dallas continues to slow, these actors have been especially vocal in pressuring 
formal authorities for regulatory- and zoning concessions, as well as for additional public 
funding to complete particularly ambitious projects. Several participants agreed that: 
In Downtown, most of the “easy” projects are done, so the projects now get complicated by 
unexpected surprises that crop up along the way – it happens with these older, abandoned 
buildings. The developers went in with plans, timelines, and financing, but backers pull out 
when plans change, and deadlines get missed. Some of these big builders are starting to go to 
City Hall, saying things like: “Hey, we did all this good work for you when you needed us, 
look at how great those are. If you want us to keep producing at that level, you need to work 
with us to make that happen, or we aren’t going to finish and you’ll be left with an eyesore 
that nobody can use.” 
 
Category standout: John Scovell. While only a minority of participants (28%) 
nominated John Scovell to their decision-making teams, and his power rating (2.85) is 
among the lowest within Downtown Dallas’ second tier influentials, participants often discussed 
Scovell’s unique role in decision-making, as a director and chair for the Dallas Citizens 
Council, and as the CEO of his development company, co-founded with first tier influential 
Ray Hunt. Participants frequently referred to Scovell as either Ray Hunt’s “proxy” or 
“gatekeeper,” and proposed that this role sets him apart from other developers, while also 
not elevating him into the first tier influentials, because Scovell and his company most 




and on projects for which Hunt and other first tier influentials lobby formal authorities, 
particularly in Economic Development, to support. In describing this, participants often 
agreed that:  
John (Scovell) is a firecracker, but he’s content to do his job, make his money, and go home. 
He’s not trying to build monuments to himself, but he’ll build them for other people, 
because he doesn’t have that thirst for immortality that you see in some of the other big 
names around here. 
 
Second tier influentials, in summary. Participants identified eight individuals 
within Dallas’ developer class as being particularly beneficial for decision-making in Downtown 
Dallas, and that these actors are particularly active in in pressuring formal authorities to support 
private development, albeit to a lesser extent than traditionally occurs in Dallas. Participants 
also identified one actor with an especially close tie to first tier influential Ray Hunt. Overall, 
participants agreed that these actors are willing to work on a wide variety of projects, beyond 
any particular vision for Downtown Dallas. The job of coordinating these various projects, 
and providing some broad guidance, falls to the only civic chair with enough nominations to 
be included in this study.  
Civic chairs. Table 4.23 shows summary statistics related to John Crawford, the only 
civic chair in Downtown Dallas named by four or more participants to a hypothetical 
committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the neighborhood, and that 
would need to be supported by a majority of neighborhood’s population.  
Table 4.23: Downtown Dallas Civic Chairs 
Name 













(1 - 4) # % # % 
John Crawford Downtown Dallas Inc. 39 100% 3.87 27 69% 2.80 
 
Mean Value (Actors in This Category) 39 100% 3.87 27 69% 2.80 
Mean Value (Actors in All Categories) 17 44% 3.29 11 28% 2.31 
 
John Crawford, the CEO of Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI), was nominated to serve 




Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process making him the only unelected actor to be so 
frequently nominated in this neighborhood. Compared to actors in other categories, 
participants rated Crawford above-average on power and level of familiarity, and a majority 
of participants have served on a board or committee with him in the past five years, more-
than double the average level of shared board or committee service. The following 
paragraphs will discuss Crawford’s role in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process. 
In their surveys and interviews, participants explained that Crawford leads 
Downtown Dallas Inc., a private nonprofit booster organization, which for the past half-
century has dedicated itself to economic development and revitalization efforts in- and 
around Downtown Dallas438. The organization is funded through membership dues from 
firms whose interests generally involve the area in- and immediately surrounding Downtown, 
contracts with the City of Dallas439, as well as funds generated by the Downtown 
Improvement District, a PID wherein property owners are assessed an additional fee based 
on the value- and size of their property. Monies from this fee are reinvested within the 
district, often for “quality of life” improvements, infrastructure & maintenance, and safety & 
security initiatives440. Participants regularly indicated that, practically speaking, DDI acts as a 
networking tool and facilitator for informal business transactions and development deals, 
and that this function continues even today, as the organization brings together high ranking 
private-, public-, and third-sector organizations as members, and through its board of 
directors441; summarizing participant comments, one emphatically noted: 
Make no mistake, they (DDI) are not a nonprofit developer in the way that, say, Habitat for 
Humanity is a nonprofit developer. Downtown Dallas Inc. is, and always has been, a vehicle 
for big-time developers to get a piece of whatever public funds are out there, and to find the 
right people to come together for a project.  
                                                          
438 Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015a; 2015b, p. B3 
439 Downtown Dallas Inc., 2015c, p. 1 
440 Dallas Office of Economic Development, 2015 




Within the structure of neighborhood decision-making, DDI works with Dallas’ city 
manager and OED to oversee- and implement Downtown Dallas 360, a master economic 
development- and revitalization plan that encompasses both the CBD and 14 surrounding 
“districts” that loosely map onto various neighborhoods surrounding the urban core. 
Participants concurred that DDI in general, and Crawford particularly, are able to shape 
development decisions by providing a less-formal space for public-private partnerships to 
form, and for project proposals to be developed before they officially reach the OED and 
City Council for support. Participant thoughts on this are well-summarized by two 
comments: 
Look at who serves on DDI’s board: you’ve got Economic Development, developers, law 
firms, mega real-estate, and city councilmembers – it’s all politics and money. Deals that 
come out of that group (DDI) are approved before they’re ever approved. If Crawford is 
willing to publicly support something, then all the people who need to agree to the idea are 
probably already on board, in one way or another, or they’ve at least already weighed in. 
 
(John) Crawford has worked with developers and with City Hall for years – he’s got the 
blessing of the “old guard” around town. He knows who to talk to, how to get things done; 
he knows when to lean on City Hall to bring more TIF money, and when a project isn’t 
going anywhere.  
In selecting Crawford for their decision-making teams, participants regularly noted 
that he has strong support from multiple stakeholders, including Dallas’ old guard, many of its 
newer, more progressive leaders, area businesses, and much of the general public. However, 
participants also acknowledged that the organization’s support is not universal, especially 
among residents who feel that DDI is only interested in new development, rather than in 
addressing the complaints and concerns of existing residents. This dissatisfaction, however, 
has not resulted in the formation of strong resident advocacy groups, and existing 
neighborhood associations are frequently supported by DDI, so their leaders are loathe to 
openly criticize the organization. In their description of the opposition to the tremendous 




Downtown Dallas Inc. isn’t in the business of development – it’s in the business of the 
politics of development. John (Crawford) knows how to match investors with developers, 
and that gets you the form of a neighborhood, but not the substance. What gets built where 
has nothing to do with what residents want, or what the neighborhood needs if it’s ever 
going to sustain itself after the building boom dies off. We have restaurants and museums 
and parks for block after block, but no grocery stores.  
The residents of Downtown Dallas don’t have the numbers to really coalesce around an 
activist neighborhood organization, or someone like Pam Conley in North Oak Cliff. The 
associations they have collect part of the money from the PID that supports DDI, but they 
use that on social events, not on lobbying down at City Hall.  
Civic chairs, in summary. Participants summarized the role of Crawford and his 
organization as a unifying, networking organization that combines public- and private-sector 
ideas, as well as physical-, social-, and financial capital in service of a particular revitalization 
strategy for Downtown Dallas, and as a result, Crawford is a nexus of informal influence in 
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process, and that the approval of his organization, and 
its stakeholders, have been crucial the success of many projects in the area; as one participant 
explained it:  
We have some amazing public-private partnerships in Downtown, and from those, we get 
parks, museums, and culture cornerstones that make people want to spend a little more time 
down here. We get people moving back to the inner city, where this place used to be 70% 
vacant, whereas, used to be, nobody came to Downtown unless they worked here. If some 
people had their way, that’s all this area would ever be, but John (Crawford) and his team 
have pulled together something special down here.  
Decision-makers in Downtown Dallas, in summary. This study asked 
participants knowledgeable about decision-making in Downtown Dallas to identify- 
and describe actors who get involved in making neighborhood-wide decisions, and 
to nominate 10 people to form a committee that would be responsible for making a 
decision that would affect the city as a whole. A total of 39 participants made 390 
nominations, and out of those, 309 were cast for the 18 actors appearing on tables 
throughout this section.  
Participant-identified actors represented four out of five broad categories used 




points of, respectively, collaboration and conflict among these actors. Throughout 
participant interviews, a common thread was that in Downtown Dallas, much like in North 
Oak Cliff and in the city as a whole, leaders can be divided into an old guard and a new guard, 
each with its own ideas for the future of the neighborhood; participant thoughts on this are 
well-summarized by the following:  
Downtown Dallas is the jewel in the city’s crown, and everyone who has a part in leading 
Dallas wants that area to be healthy again, and to thrive. Some people think that a healthy 
downtown looks like convention centers, hotels, and stadiums intermixed with high-end 
residential and retail, and others see a more inclusive Downtown that has a place for the 
whole spectrum of people – the rich, the poor, the middle-class, and everyone from 
millennials to the elderly.  
Qualitative Data Summary 
The previous reputational study of Dallas described three “classes” of leaders within 
the city’s decision-making structure, and each class was comprised almost exclusively of 
business executives and wealthy elites442. To determine whether (or to what extent) the 
previous reputational analysis’ results remain valid, and to expand on its findings, this study’s 
79 participants completed detailed surveys and interviews regarding the nature of decision-
making in Dallas as a whole, as well as in two focus neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and 
Downtown Dallas. Each participant provided information on decision-makers within Dallas 
as a whole, while 40 of these provided information on decision-makers in North Oak Cliff, 
and 39 provided similar information for Downtown Dallas.  
Decision-makers were categorized thematically, and tables throughout this section 
reported data for those decision-makers who were nominated by at least 10% of participants 
knowledgeable about each geographic area of interest, including names, primary 
organizational affiliations, power ratings, recent shared board and committee service with 
participants, and participant ratings of familiarity. In addition to the five thematic categories 
                                                          




of decision-makers, participants identified a theme of conflict between Dallas’ development-
focused old guard and, and more progressive, often younger (or at least, less-experienced) 
leaders. This conflict (to be revisited in Chapter 5) manifests uniquely in Dallas as a whole, as 
well as within both North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, but is nonetheless a consistent 
source of tension.  
Chapter Summary 
This chapter aimed to report data collected using the methods introduced in Chapter 
3, in order to address this study’s research questions and hypotheses. In the previous 
sections, this study reported quantitative data regarding select socioeconomic changes from 
1980 to 2010, first for Dallas as a whole, then for the study’s two focus neighborhoods: 
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. Then, it detailed participant responses to surveys 
and interviews regarding decision-making in Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff, and 
Downtown Dallas.  
ix Author’s note: this study’s operational definition of creative class employment is guided by Richard Florida’s description, which includes 
careers in: “design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or 
creative content” (2002, p. 8), and this category is comprised of the following industries: information; finance and insurance, and real 
estate and rental and leasing; professional, scientific, and management, and administrative and waste management services; educational 
services, and health care and social assistance; and arts, entertainment, and recreation, and accommodation and food services. 
x Author’s note: this study’s operationalization of “blue collar” is defined as class of employment wherein tasks usually involve manual labor, 
and often require work-specific clothing (dictionary.com, 2016), and is comprised of the following industries: agriculture, forestry, fishing, 
hunting, and mining; construction; manufacturing; transportation & warehousing, and utilities.  
xi Author’s note: this study’s operationalization of “service sector” is comprised of the following industries: wholesale trade; retail trade; and 
“other services, except public administration.” 
xii Author’s note: census data report public administration as an industry code unto itself, so it is reported by this study in order to ensure that 
the employment percentages across all industry categories add up to 100%.  












QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and evaluate the quantitative data reported 
in Chapter 4, in order to address this study’s first three research questions – those related to 
the evolving context surrounding Dallas, as well as this study’s two focus neighborhoods: 
North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. In the chapter sections that follow, this study will 
first restate the relevant subset of its research questions and hypotheses. Next, it will review 
and synthesize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4, before evaluating them with 
respect to urban literature regarding expected demographic- and economic shifts found in 
post-Fordist cities, as well as with respect to the effects of these shifts on creating a new 
normal in Dallas, compared to the old normals studied by Elkin and Thometz. Finally, this 
study will revisit limitations introduced in Chapter 3, before introducing additional 
limitations related specifically to these hypotheses.  
First Research Question and Context Hypotheses Revisited 
 The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study 
attempts to address, as well as its series of hypotheses to be tested. First, it will list the 
research questions that guide this study, and then, it will outline the hypotheses that this 
study’s data will be used to evaluate.  
First Research Question Revisited 
 As previous chapters have noted, this study aims to answer three primary research 




demographics and economy evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous 
urban scholars?  
Context Hypotheses Revisited 
In order to guide its attempts at addressing its first research question, this study 
forwards three (of six) primary hypotheses, relate to the changing socioeconomic context of 
Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas; 
these hypotheses are as-follows:  
 Hypothesis 1. First, and consistent with expectations of modern, economically-
prosperous cities in the globalized, post-Fordist paradigm and the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs 
model, in the decades since the Elkin & Thometz studies, Dallas’ citywide socioeconomic 
context has changed in four primary ways: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a smaller percentage of the population 
in 2010 (the most recent decennial census) than they did 1980 (the census 
immediately prior to the Elkin study).  
 
• A smaller percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in blue collar fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of Dallas’ workforce is employed in creative class fields in 2010 
than in 1980. 
 
• Dallas, as a whole, shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
  
Hypothesis 2. Second, and consistent with expectations of literature surrounding 
gentrification of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within North Oak Cliff, 
recent urban redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with 
four primary changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 





• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 
in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Third, and consistent with expectations of literature surrounding 
gentrification of urban neighborhoods and the new donut model, within Downtown Dallas, 
recent urban redevelopment projects and neighborhood gentrification are associated with 
four primary changes in the neighborhood’s respective socioeconomic context: 
• People identifying as “white alone” represent a larger percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population in 2010 than they did in 1980. 
 
• A smaller percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in blue collar fields 
in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• A larger percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce is employed in creative class 
fields in 2010 than in 1980. 
 
• The neighborhood shows signs of greater economic polarization in 2010 than in 
1980.  
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
 The purpose of this section is to evaluate this study’s first three research hypotheses. 
In the sections that follow, this study will first evaluate those hypotheses, which (as noted 
above) are related to the changing social- and economic contexts within Dallas as a whole, 
North Oak Cliff, and Downtown Dallas.  
Evaluation of Hypothesis 1 
 The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4 
data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 1, regarding the socioeconomic profile of Dallas as an 
economically-prosperous city in the post-Fordist paradigm, and changes in that profile since 




indeed an economically-prosperous city. Then, this study will evaluate whether, in keeping 
with the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, Dallas proper is noticeably “less white” than its 
surrounding suburbs, by comparing data from Dallas as a whole to data representing the 
suburban components of Dallas’ surrounding MSA. Third, this study will concurrently 
evaluate whether Dallas’ workers are less likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010 
than they were in 1980, and whether those workers are more likely to be employed in creative 
class fields in 2010 than they were in 1980. Fourth, this study will evaluate whether Dallas’ 
residents are, on the whole, more economically polarized in 2010 than Dallas’ residents were 
in 1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components holistically, to make a 
determination whether evidence supports (or fails to support) Hypothesis 1.  
 Evaluation of the assumption of Dallas as an economically-prosperous city. In 
evaluating whether Dallas could be considered an “economically prosperous” city, this study 
aims to define that term in a measurable way, supported by some subset of extant literature.  
To that end, a basic literature search for “economic prosperity” in scholarly publications 
resulted in roughly 141,000 scholarly articles443, and uncovered various approaches to 
measuring this concept, including measuring concepts as esoteric as light pollution444, 
degrees of religious freedom445, and birthplace diversity446. This study is not intended to be 
an exhaustive interrogation of the various facets of economic prosperity, so a narrower 
conceptualization is required, even if this narrower approach limits the study’s findings. 
 To develop this narrow conceptualization, this study begins by defining the term 
“prosperity” as “the condition of being successful or thriving447.” Expanding on the latter 
                                                          
443 Google Scholar, 2016 
444 cf. Henderson, Storeygard, & Weil, 2011  
445 cf. Alon & Chase, 2005 
446 cf. Alesina, Harnoss, & Rapoport, 2016 




part of this definition yields that “to thrive” is defined in terms of successful development or 
growth448. Thus, a useful (and measurable) alternative to measuring the broad concept of 
economic prosperity is to measure economic growth. Although competing measurement 
tools for analyzing economic growth exist, review of a variety of these methods suggested 
that, within the data already collected for this study, both population growth and 
unemployment rates are reliable measures of economic growth; more specifically, population 
growth is positively correlated with economic growth, and unemployment rate is negatively 
correlated with economic growth449. In operationalizing economic prosperity in terms of 
economic growth, this study is now able to test its assumptions about Dallas as an 
economically prosperous city, using data regarding citywide population totals and 
unemployment rates, which are restated from Chapter 4 in table 5.01.  
Table 5.01: Citywide Population and Unemployment Rates, 1980 – 2010 
Year 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 904,078 1,006,877 1,188,580 1,197,816 
Unemployment 7.4% 12.2% 4.3% 4.6% 
 
 Looking first at population growth as a positive correlate of economic growth, a 
growing economy requires a growing population to increase both the number of available 
workers and the number of available customers450. Further, given the (relative) mobility of 
labor in the United States, migration patterns follow growth opportunities451. Put into 
simpler terms, growing economies require growing pools of workers and consumers, and 
worker-consumers move to growing economies where they can (presumably) find work. 
This in mind, table 5.01 shows, the city’s population grew by nearly one-third from 1980 to 
2010, though it should be noted that the rate of that growth peaked between 1990 and 2000. 
Although a thorough interrogation of the reasons for this decline in growth rates from 2000 
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to 2010 is beyond the scope of this study, it is reasonable to suggest that causes may include 
the pressures of the Great Recession leading to less economic opportunity and an increased 
aversion to the risks of relocation among would-be residents, as well as increased 
competition for residents from Dallas’ affluent, northern suburbs. Nonetheless, the 
unbroken, positive growth of Dallas’ population suggests that the city’s economy has grown 
over the period of 1980 to 2010.  
 In considering the relationship between unemployment and economic growth, cities 
with higher unemployment rates can be viewed as having a labor force that lacks (for 
whatever reason) the necessary training to be appealing to productive businesses in a given 
economic period452. Thus, a growing economy needs more than simply “enough” workers; 
instead, a growing economy needs enough adequately-trained workers. The relationship 
unemployment rates and Gross Domestic Product are connected by Okun’s Law, which 
suggests that a one-percentage point change in unemployment is negatively correlated with a 
(roughly) three-percentage point change in GDP453. While this ratio has historically proven 
stable for most Western economies, since the Great Recession (and its “jobless recovery”), 
some scholars have begun to question the specific numbers, while continuing to support the 
overall presence of a negative correlation between unemployment rates and economic 
growth454. This relationship in mind, there are three critical trends to be found in Dallas’ 
unemployment data. First, there are two periods – 1980 to 1990, and 2000 to 2010 – when 
unemployment grew from one census to the next, suggesting two downturns in the city’s 
economic growth. These data fit with the economic history of the city, and bookend the two 
economic downturns related to, respectively, the combined S&L Crisis and oil bust 
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throughout the 1980s, as well as the Great Recession in the 2000s. Overall, though, it is 
important to note that Dallas’ unemployment rate has declined from its peak in 1990, and in 
2010, is only 62.1% of what it was in 1980. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that, based 
on Dallas’ unemployment data (and setting aside economic downturns), the city’s economy 
has grown from 1980 to 2010.  
 Certainly, these findings are limited, and in many ways they fail to adequately capture 
the many factors related to Dallas’ economic growth. Nonetheless, when they are combined 
with, for example, the city’s high concentration of headquarters’ for Fortune 500 companies, 
its centralized location with respect to major highways and rail lines, its large, international 
airport, and the presence of municipal-, county-, and state incentives for development and 
business relocation to Dallas, a strong argument can be made in support of the overall 
assumption that Dallas is economically prosperous within the post-Fordist paradigm455.  
 Evaluation of Dallas as “less white.” To evaluate whether Dallas as a whole has 
become “less white” between 1980 and 2010, this study collected data related to the city’s 
racial profile for those census years; first presented in Chapter 4, these data are restated in 
table 5.02.  
Table 5.02: Citywide Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 904,078 1,006,877 1,188,580 1,197,816 
White Alone 61.4% 55.3% 50.8% 50.7% 
Nonwhite 38.6% 44.7% 49.2% 49.3% 
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race) 12.2% 20.9% 35.6% 42.4% 
 
These data suggest that, even as Dallas’ overall population has grown between 1980 and 
2010, people in Dallas identifying as “white alone” have decreased as a percentage of the 
population at each census, with the sharpest declines occurring between 1980 and 1990. 
Returning to conceptualizations of race and urban geography, these data are consistent with 
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the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model, which suggests that throughout the mid-late 29th 
century, comparatively affluent whites abandoned central cities in favor of bedroom 
communities around the urban periphery, leading to majority-minority (“chocolate”) cities 
surrounded by majority-white (“vanilla”) suburbs.  With respect to Dallas, although people 
identifying as Black or African-American make up the largest component of the city’s 
nonwhite population, the most notable growth has been among Dallas’ Hispanic and Latino 
population, which has more-than tripled from 1980 to 2010 – a growth rate that dwarfs 
those of any other racial- or cultural identifier. Indeed, when considering the overlap 
between this cultural identifier and racial identifiers, Dallas becomes majority-minority. 
 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to exhaustively study the causes of this 
growth, it is reasonable to suggest that a number of causes could explain (at least) some 
subset of this. These reasons include Dallas’ location along major highway routes to the 
Mexican border, its relative proximity to the international border, the relatively low cost of 
housing – especially in the city’s southern neighborhoods, its economic prosperity, and its 
proclivity for construction projects; in short, Dallas’ economic prosperity drives demand for 
low-wage, often unskilled workers, its geography places it squarely in the migration path of 
these workers, and a portion of its housing is affordable enough to house them (examples of 
poor conditions notwithstanding).  
 While Dallas itself could be considered a “chocolate city,” at least in the spirit of the 
term, can its suburbs be accurately considered “vanilla,” for purposes of the model? To 




Dallas and the suburban counties456 in the remainder of its MSA457 at the 2010 census458.  
Table 5.03: Race and Hispanic or Latino Status for Dallas and Surrounding Suburban MSA Counties, 2010 
 Dallas Suburban MSA Counties 
Population 1,197,816 4,003,634 
White Alone 50.7% 73.1% 
Nonwhite 49.3% 26.9% 
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race) 42.4% 21.1% 
 
Although these data are limited, they nonetheless suggest that the suburban counties in 
Dallas’ MSA are indeed consistent with the expectations of the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs 
model. Compared to its suburbs, people in Dallas do not identify as “white alone” at nearly 
twice the rate of people who live in the city’s surrounding suburbs. In addition, over twice 
the percentage of Dallasites identify as Hispanic or Latino than residents of Dallas’ 
surrounding suburban counties.  
 Certainly, the data used throughout this discussion suffer from a number of flaws, 
which will be expanded upon later in this study. Nonetheless, based on data presented in 
figures 5.02 and 5.03, this study supports its assertion that Dallas has become “less white” in 
2010 than it was in 1980. Further, this study supports its assertion that the chocolate cities, 
vanilla suburbs model remains a valid conceptualization of the racial- and ethnic polarization 
in Dallas and its suburban counties.  
 Evaluation of Dallas’ workforce as less blue collar and more creative class. 
Recall that this study hypothesized that since 1980, Dallas’ workforce has shifted to include a 
greater percentage of employees in creative class fields, as well as a smaller percentage of 
employees in blue collar fields – shifts that are basically consistent with what would be 
expected of the workforce of a thriving, post-Fordist economy.  
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 To review how this study defines these terms, recall that the operational definition of 
creative class employment includes careers in: “design, education, arts, music and 
entertainment, whose economic function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or 
creative content” 459; examples include careers in the FIRE sectors, as well as those in 
education and fine arts. Additionally, this study’s operationalization of blue collar employment 
includes fields wherein tasks usually involve manual labor, and often require work-specific 
clothing460; examples include manufacturing and construction. Third, this study operationally 
defines service sector employment as a combination of the census categories of wholesale trade, 
retail trade, and “other services, except public administration.” Finally, and primarily in order 
to ensure that category data add up to 100%, this study also reports employment in public 
administration fields, which are reported as separate industry codes, and primarily include 
careers in government positions.  
 These operational definitions in mind, to evaluate whether the hypothesized 
workforce transition from employment in blue collar fields to creative class alternatives has 
occurred, this section revisits data related to employment by industry. There data were first 
introduced in Chapter 4, and are restated in table 5.04. As a reminder, data for 1980 and 1990 
are based on Dallas’ statistical area, while data for 2000 and 2010 come from census records 
based only on Dallas itself.  
Table 5.04: Citywide Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster 
 1980 (Est.) 1990 (Est.) 2000 2010 
Creative Class 36.6% 53.2% 51.6% 52.7% 
Blue Collar 34.0% 26.1% 25.7% 25.7% 
Service Sector 27.4% 18.5% 20.6% 19.5% 
Public Administration 2.0% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 
As Chapter 4 notes, data suggest that the largest transition in Dallas’ employment profile 
occurs between 1980 and 1990, when the percentage of working Dallasites employed in 
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creative class fields grew by over 16 percentage points, with a similar percentage point loss 
spread over the service sector and blue collar clusters. Since 1990, the relative composition 
of Dallas’ citywide employment in creative class-, blue collar-, service sector-, and public 
administration fields has held relatively steady, suggesting that the city may have reached a 
new equilibrium point with respect to the broad types of work that employees perform.  
 This new equilibrium point also coincides with the time in which Dallas’ 
unemployment rate hit its highest point over the measurement period (12.2%), as well as the 
height of economic tumult brought on by both the Savings & Loan Crisis and oil bust. Prior 
to these crises, recall that Dallas was known as a regional manufacturing hub461, 
supplemented by a growing number of firms in real estate, banking, and finance462. If the 
data for 1980 and 1990 are indeed representative of Dallas itself (and not just the most 
representative of available data), then it would appear that, even though the CBD’s brand-
new skyscrapers saw unprecedented vacancy rates throughout the early 1990s, it was Dallas’ 
blue collar firms that suffered the most, with employment losses between 1980 and 1990 
that have not been seen since.  
 These data contain a number of unfortunate limitations (revisited later in this 
chapter); nonetheless, based on data in table 5.04, this study supports its hypothesis that, 
when comparing citywide employment data from 2010 to 1980, Dallas’ employees are more 
likely to be employed in creative class fields, and less likely to be employed in blue collar fields. 
Still, it is critical to note that blue collar employment continues to make up a significant 
portion of the city’s employment profile, and later sections of this chapter will suggest that 
there is significant intra-city variance with respect to where workers are employed.  
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 Evaluation of Dallas as more economically polarized. In evaluating whether 
Dallas is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was in 1980, first recall that this study 
operationally defines “greater economic polarization” as the presence of both higher median 
household income (MHI) and higher poverty rates. Chapter 4 presented data regarding both 
of these variables; these data are replicated in table 5.05. As a reminder, MHI is expressed in 
2015 inflation-adjusted dollars, to better facilitate comparison among years.  
Table 5.05: Citywide MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars) $79,611  $50,461 $52,146  $45,616  
Poverty Rate 18.0% 18.0% 17.8% 22.3% 
For this study, greater economic polarization is operationalized in terms of both MHI and 
poverty rates; if both are higher in 2010 than in 1980, then the data would support greater 
economic polarization.  Data suggest that, while MHI effectively decreased by over 40% 
between 1980 and 2010, the city’s poverty rate increased by just under 24% over that same 
period.  
 Taking a long-term view of Dallas’ economic profile, note that MHI seems to follow 
the health of the overall economy – recessions in the 1980s and early 2000s are accompanied 
by decreases in MHI, while the census betwixt these downturns suggests a (small) increase, 
as the economy started to recover. Additional data points would be needed to verify this 
speculation, but it fits with archival media accounts suggesting that, as early as the mid-
1970s, affluent Dallasites were migrating into the city’s suburbs, following corporate 
migrations to expansive campuses in the city’s suburbs, especially those in adjacent Collin 
County463. This growth was acknowledged by Dallas’ leaders as early as 1986, and was a 
primary motivator for the city’s revised 1993 Thoroughfare Plan464, the construction of the 
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DART light rail network, which runs along the city’s major north-south highway, and major 
expansions to the regional interstate highway network465.  
 Additionally, data in table 5.05 suggest that Dallas’ poverty rate remained stable from 
1980 until 2000, upticking in 2010 following the Great Recession. Recall that Dallas’ regional 
economy remained strong throughout the recession, which suggests that the increase in 
poverty rate, coupled with the 2010 losses in MHI that more-than erased gains seen at the 
2000 census, it is reasonable to speculate that many high-income positions have moved 
beyond the city limits, while the positions that remain are filled by workers who utilize the 
aforementioned expansions in the regional transportation network to commute to urban 
jobs from suburban residences. For residents of Dallas with low incomes, a half-hour (or 
longer) drive to work may be unrealistic, if not impossible, so if these workers are limited to 
employment opportunities within the city (or even within the subset of Dallas served by 
mass transit). It is, therefore, likely that the trending decrease in MHI and recent increase in 
poverty rate both point to the same conclusion: economic opportunities in the growing 
regional economy may be increasingly out of reach for many Dallasites – a topic which will 
be revisited later in this chapter. 
 As has been noted throughout this chapter, data presented are far-from perfect. 
Flaws notwithstanding, the data in Table 5.05 fail to support the partial hypothesis that 
Dallas’ economy has grown increasingly polarized between 1980 and 2010. Citywide, MHI 
has fallen significantly from 1980 levels, while unemployment has largely remained static. 
Finally, this study speculates that, while Dallas overall is not more economically polarized in 
2010 than in 1980, it may be that the Dallas region is more polarized; people with low- and 
moderate incomes are concentrating within Dallas itself, while wealthier people are 
                                                          




distributed among the city’s surrounding suburbs and exurbs – certainly, this trend can be 
seen in central cities across the nation, so it would be hardly surprising to see it in Dallas as 
well. Additionally, as future sections will suggest, data and trends at the citywide level mask 
some degree of neighborhood-level variance.    
Evaluation of Hypothesis 2 
 The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data first presented in Chapter 4 
data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 2, regarding the socioeconomic profile of North Oak 
Cliff, a gentrifying central urban neighborhood characterized primarily by majority-nonwhite 
residents with low- to moderate incomes, and historically associated with decades of 
disinvestment, decline, and disconnection from the structures of citywide governance. In 
evaluating this hypotheses, this study will first evaluate whether, in keeping with the new donut 
model of urban demographic composition, North Oak Cliff is “more white” than it was in 
1980. Then, this study will concurrently evaluate whether neighborhood workers are less 
likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010 than they were in 1980, and whether those 
workers are instead more likely to be employed in creative class fields. Third, this study will 
evaluate whether North Oak Cliff’s residents are more economically polarized in 2010 than 
neighborhood residents were in 1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components 
holistically, to make a determination whether (or to what extent) evidence supports this 
hypothesis.  
 Evaluation of North Oak Cliff as “more white.” To evaluate whether North Oak 
Cliff has become “more white” between 1980 and 2010, this study collected data related to 
the neighborhood’s racial profile for those census years; these data are restated in table 5.06. 
Table 5.06: North Oak Cliff Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Percentages, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 17,713 17,544 19,617 15,055 
White Alone 58.8% 46.9% 49.3% 61.4% 
Nonwhite 41.2% 53.1% 50.7% 38.6% 




These data suggest that, while the neighborhood’s population rapidly declined following the 
Great Recession, which itself was preceded by a significant population jump, the population 
of people identifying as “white alone” has been increasing from its 1990 nadir to a clear 
majority in 2010. To better understand what happened, table 5.07 shows the demographic 
numbers (rather than percentages) for North Oak Cliff.  
These data suggest that much of the neighborhood’s 2000-2010 population loss is in is 
community of people who identify as “other or mixed-race,” as well as in the 
neighborhood’s community of people who identify as Hispanic or Latino; as a reminder, this 
latter category is independent of racial identification, so it is possible that there is overlap 
between these two groups. Nonetheless, these data suggest that, rather than there being a 
surge of people identifying as “white alone,” the change in North Oak Cliff’s demographic 
profile is best explained by population losses across several minority groups – losses also 
seen in the overall population figures for the neighborhood. Within the context of citywide 
growth in people identifying as nonwhite as a percentage of the population, these data 
suggest that there may be a migration of some minority groups away from North Oak Cliff.  
 Certainly, the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs narrative describes the declining percentage 
(and counts) of people identifying as “white alone” in North Oak Cliff; this is also reflected 
in personal accounts of the neighborhood prior to 2000466. From the 2000 census forward, 
however, data in tables 5.06 and 5.07 support this study’s assertion that a greater percentage 
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Table 5.07: North Oak Cliff Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Counts, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 17,713 17,544 19,617 15,055 
White Alone 10,408 8,229 9,679 9,239 
Black or African American 3,119 2,668 1,544 1,412 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 108 177 162 197 
Asian American or Native Hawaiian 173 82 71 149 
Other or Mixed-Race 3,905 6,388 8,161 4,058 




of North Oak Cliff’s population reports as “white alone” in 2010 than in 1980, consistent 
with the expectations of the new donut model. Later in this chapter, a similar analysis of 
Downtown Dallas’ demographic trends will allow this study to evaluate whether this 
neighborhood is an outlier, or whether it is suggestive of a larger trend within Dallas.  
 Evaluation of North Oak Cliff’s workforce as less blue collar and more 
creative class. In evaluating whether North Oak Cliff’s workforce (like that of Dallas as a 
whole) has shifted to include a greater percentage of employees in creative class fields, as well 
as a smaller percentage of employees in blue collar fields, Chapter 4 first introduced data 
regarding employment by industry cluster for North Oak Cliff. As a note, recall that these 
data, reproduced alongside citywide estimates in table 5.08, are limited to years 2000 and 
2010.  
Table 5.08: Citywide and North Oak Cliff Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster 
 1980 (Est.) 1990 (Est.) 2000 2010 
 Dallas N. Oak Cliff Dallas N. Oak Cliff Dallas N. Oak Cliff Dallas N. Oak Cliff 
Creative Class 36.6% n.d. 53.2% n.d. 51.6% 44.7% 52.7% 65.3% 
Blue Collar 34.0% n.d. 26.1% n.d. 25.7% 34.9% 25.7% 14.3% 
Service Sector 27.4% n.d. 18.5% n.d. 20.6% 18.3% 19.5% 17.3% 
Public Administration 2.0% n.d. 2.2% n.d. 2.1% 2.1% 2.1% 1.8% 
 
Between 2000 and 2010 the percentage of North Oak Cliff’s resident workforce employed in 
creative class fields has grown at a much more rapid pace than that for Dallas as a whole, while 
the percentage of the neighborhood’s workforce employed in blue collar fields has shrunk by a 
similarly extreme degree. As with Dallas as a whole, changes in the neighborhood’s 
workforce employed in service sector and public administration fields are comparatively slight, 
suggesting greater stability in these fields.  
 Within the greater context of neighborhood depopulation between 2000 and 2010, it 
is reasonable to speculate about the possibility that blue collar employment is abandoning the 
workers of North Oak Cliff, and that employees of these firms are leaving as well, hoping to 




fields dry up, only households with workers in creative class, service sector, and public administration 
fields are able to afford to remain in the neighborhood. Whatever its cause, analysis of 
Downtown Dallas will begin to reveal whether the transitions in North Oak Cliff are 
outliers, or indicators of a greater story of displacement of people of color and blue collar 
workers within a revitalizing urban core.  
 Lacking data specific to North Oak Cliff for both 1980 and 1990, the “best guess” 
data for the makeup of its workforce employment profile would come from data 
representing Dallas’ statistical area. However, this study argues that the scope of those areas 
is so large as to make them unusable; whereas Dallas itself represents a significant portion of 
its statistical area, North Oak Cliff is just one neighborhood out of hundreds within Dallas, 
so it would be inappropriate to substitute area-wide data for missing values within the 
neighborhood. As a result, while the rapid expansion of creative class employees and 
simultaneous decline of blue collar employees as percentages of North Oak Cliff’s workforce 
suggests a trend in-line with literature regarding the gentrification of central urban 
neighborhoods, this study cannot reasonably support its assertion that, compared to its 
workforce in 1980, the neighborhood’s workforce in 2010 can be characterized as “less blue 
collar and more creative class.” 
 Evaluation of North Oak Cliff as more economically polarized. Although 
Dallas as a whole did not exhibit signs of economic polarization, can the same be said for its 
gentrifying neighborhoods? Using data regarding median household income (MHI) and 
poverty rates, table 5.09 shows the changes in North Oak Cliff from 1980 to 2010.  
Table 5.09: North Oak Cliff MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars) $28,861  $25,617  $51,915   $39,106  
Poverty Rate 17.4% 23.3% 23.4% 25.0% 




2010, and additionally, that the neighborhood’s poverty rate has also increased over that 
same period.  
 Of greater interest, however, is that while Dallas’ MHI sunk dramatically between 
1980 and 1990, likely resulting from the severe economic downturn in the mid-1980s, the 
MHI decrease in North Oak Cliff is comparative smaller; while the MHI for Dallas as a 
whole is more-than $50,000 higher than that for the neighborhood ($79,611 vs. $28,861) in 
1980, the difference shrinks to just under $25,000 in 1990 ($50,461 vs. $25,617). Given the 
history of commercial and political neglect in this part of Dallas, it is reasonable to suspect 
that during this period, North Oak Cliff had already “bottomed out,” that is, neighborhood 
median incomes were already so depressed that they simply had less room to fall. With 
median incomes so low at the 1990 census, it is reasonable to suspect that some amount of 
the growth seen at the 2000 census is merely regression toward a mean; however, this hardly 
seems adequate to explain a doubling of neighborhood MHI, when the citywide MHI only 
increased by roughly $1,500. It is important to note that, at the 2000 census, the 
neighborhood- and citywide MHI figures are within $500 of each other, although the 
significant decline at the 2010 census suggests that the groundswell of interest in North Oak 
Cliff had abated, likely as a result of the Great Recession.   
 For a neighborhood whose residents’ median incomes are so depressed when 
compared to the citywide median, it should be unsurprising that, for three out of four 
censuses, poverty rates are significantly higher than those for Dallas citywide. That residents 
are able to remain in the neighborhood, even with such low incomes, also suggests that there 
is a significant amount of low-cost housing stock concentrated in the area – the kind of 
housing stock that is commonly targeted by both would-be gentrifiers and unscrupulous 




slum lords are present, active, and at the heart of several, often-heated disagreements within 
the community467.  
 Certainly, the rising MHI between 1990 and 2000, as well as the documented interest 
in North Oak Cliff by developers throughout the mid-late 1990s468 supports this speculation. 
In addition, the rapid increase in neighborhood MHI suggests some combination of an 
influx of people with higher incomes and an exodus of people with lower incomes occurred 
between 1990 and 2000, although the comparatively stable poverty rate suggests that the area 
attracted both people with high incomes (presumably to the gentrifying and middle-class 
neighborhoods) and people in lower income brackets (presumably to the derelict 
neighborhoods often adjacent to nicer ones). The growth in MHI and poverty rates between 
1980 and 2000, but especially between 1990 and 2000 suggest that pockets of the 
neighborhood are gentrifying, while others continue to decline. Indeed, evidence of these 
block-by-block disparities in North Oak Cliff were visible even in the early 1980s469, and the 
schizophrenic approach to neighborhood redevelopment since then has likely only 
exacerbated these differences.  
 Confounding this speculation, however, is the decrease in MHI found at the 2010 
census; this may be a result of the Great Recession, or it may be a regression toward the 
mean. Although future study of this neighborhood will be required to fully address this issue, 
recall that the neighborhood’s population declined by over 20% (or roughly 4,000 people) 
between 2000 and 2010, so it may be that people with higher incomes simply moved on, 
possibly as a result of the economic downturn, but perhaps also to seek opportunities in 
neighborhoods with access to better amenities (e.g. schools, newer housing stock, access to 
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quality foods). While these data fail to capture some of the more nuanced, granular changes 
in the economic profile of North Oak Cliff, they nonetheless support the conclusion that the 
neighborhood has grown more economically polarized from 1980 to 2010, even in spite of 
citywide economic downturns.  
 Evaluation of Hypothesis 3. The following paragraphs will utilize quantitative data 
first presented in Chapter 4 data in order to evaluate Hypothesis 3, regarding the 
socioeconomic profile of Downtown Dallas, a mixed-use neighborhood being carved out of 
the repurposed “see-through skyscrapers” of Dallas’ CBD. As with its previous discussion of 
North Oak Cliff, in evaluating Hypothesis 3, this study will first evaluate whether 
Downtown Dallas is “more white” than it was in 1980, in keeping with the prediction of the 
new donut model. Second, this study will evaluate whether neighborhood’s employed workers 
are less likely to be employed in blue collar fields in 2010 than they were in 1980, and whether 
those workers are instead more likely to be employed in creative class fields. Third, this study 
will evaluate whether the neighborhood is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was 
1980. Finally, this study will evaluate these components holistically, to make a determination 
whether (or to what extent) evidence supports this hypothesis. 
 Evaluation of Downtown Dallas as “more white.” As it did with North Oak 
Cliff, to evaluate whether the percentage of Downtown Dallas’ population identifying as 
“white alone” has, as-predicted by the new donut model, increased over the measurement 
period, this study examined census data related to the neighborhood’s racial profile. These 
data, presented first in Chapter 4, are restated in table 5.10. 
Table 5.10: Downtown Dallas Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Percentages, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 2,900 3,444 2,198 9,262 
White Alone 50.3% 36.6% 69.0% 64.6% 
Nonwhite 49.7% 63.4% 31.0% 35.4% 





These data suggest that, much like with North Oak Cliff, after a decline in the percentage of 
the population identifying as “white alone” between 1980 and 1990, the white population of 
Downtown Dallas has grown dramatically, spiking at the 2000 census before a slight decline 
(within the greater context of a significant increase in neighborhood population) found at 
the 2010 census. These data are consistent with this study’s position that, prior to 1990, 
Dallas is best described by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs mode, while after 1990, the new 
donut model appears more accurate, based on the demographic changes of these two central 
urban neighborhoods. It is also noteworthy that, although the percentage of the population 
identifying as Hispanic or Latino has also increased at each census, this group comprises a 
smaller percentage of Downtown Dallas’ population than that of both Dallas as a whole and 
North Oak Cliff.  
 Digging deeper, table 5.11 shows, in greater detail, the demographic shifts found in 
Downtown Dallas between 1980 and 2010.  
Table 5.11: Downtown Dallas Population and Racial and Hispanic or Latino Status, Counts, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Population 2,900 3,444 2,198 9,262 
White Alone 1,460 1,259 1,517 5,985 
Black or African American 1,269 2,089 466 2,156 
American Indian or Alaskan Native 30 25 17 67 
Asian American or Native Hawaiian 12 10 34 294 
Other or Mixed-Race 129 61 164 760 
Hispanic or Latino (Any Race) 78 242 304 1,804 
These data suggest that the neighborhood population loss between 1990 and 2000 is due 
primarily to a sharp decline in the number of residents who identify as Black or African 
American; however, given that this population returned to its 1990 level in 2010, this decline 
may simply be an error in the initial data collection. Local media report a different story, 
however – one of working-class majority-minority residential- and commercial corridors 




for upscale versions of themselves, as well as new commercial- and office spaces470.  During 
this same time, efforts at the city level were made to remove the large concentration of 
homeless people from the neighborhood, primarily through pressuring food distribution 
centers to move operations elsewhere, using police officers to aggressively deter vagrants 
and panhandlers, and in some cases, actively rounding up and moving people into other 
areas471. Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that, the loss of so many people identifying 
as Black or African American can be well-described by a combination of purges of the 
neighborhood’s homeless population and gentrification of minority-majority communities.  
 This urban gentrification only expanded after the turn of the century, culminating in 
the Downtown Dallas 360 master revitalization plan introduced in Chapter 4, and which will 
be revisited in Chapter 6. Following the Great Recession, data in tables 5.10 and 5.11 suggest 
that the growth in Downtown Dallas’ population is largely attracting people who identify as 
“white alone,” although smaller gains can be seen in the percentages of the population 
identifying as, respectively, African American and Hispanic or Latino. To a lesser extent than 
in North Oak Cliff or Dallas citywide, there is evidence to support the pattern of “white 
flight” described by the chocolate cities, vanilla suburbs model between 1980 and 1990. Also as 
was found in North Oak Cliff, since 1990, and especially following the Great Recession, data 
in tables 5.10 and 5.11 instead support this study’s assertion that a greater percentage of the 
neighborhood’s population identifies as “white alone” in 2010 than in 1980, a finding that is 
wholly consistent with the new donut model. 
  Evaluation of Downtown Dallas’ workforce as less blue collar and more 
creative class. In evaluating whether Downtown Dallas’ workforce (like that of both North 
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Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole) has shifted to include a greater percentage of employees in 
creative class fields, as well as a smaller percentage of employees in blue collar fields, Chapter 4 
first introduced data regarding employment by industry cluster for the neighborhood; as a 
note, recall that these neighborhood-level data are limited to 2000 and 2010. Neighborhood 
workforce data (where available), as well as comparative data for Dallas as a whole, are 
restated in table 5.12. 
Table 5.12: Citywide and Downtown Dallas Employment Percentages by Industry Cluster 















Creative Class 36.6% n.d. 53.2% n.d. 51.6% 55.5% 52.7% 60.0% 
Blue Collar 34.0% n.d. 26.1% n.d. 25.7% 25.7% 25.7% 20.0% 
Service Sector 27.4% n.d. 18.5% n.d. 20.6% 16.6% 19.5% 18.2% 
Public Administration 2.0% n.d. 2.2% n.d. 2.1% 2.3% 2.1% 1.3% 
These data suggest that, as with Dallas as a whole and North Oak Cliff, the percentage of 
Downtown Dallas’ workforce employed in creative class fields is growing, while the percentage 
of the workforce employed in blue collar fields is on the decline. These shifts are not as 
dramatic as those found in North Oak Cliff, although they are larger than those found in 
Dallas as a whole. This should be unsurprising, however, as Downtown Dallas encompasses 
and surrounds the city’s CBD, presenting an historical availability of jobs in creative class 
firms, while the city’s industrial base has historically been centered closer to neighborhoods 
in the city’s southern sector, although notable exceptions exist, such as the Del Monte Foods 
produce processing plant, and Kinki Sharyo International, which produces and maintains 
vehicles in the city’s commuter light rail fleet. Further, as office towers in CBD increasingly 
become mixed-use centers, combining retail, residential, commercial, and hotel spaces, it is 
reasonable to speculate that, consistent with the post-Fordist “back to the city” movement 
described by the new donut model, the idea of a downtown apartment is attractive to the 




nonprofit development company Downtown Dallas, Inc. (DDI)472.  
 As with North Oak Cliff, lacking data specific to Downtown Dallas for both 1980 
and 1990, the “best guess” data for the makeup of the neighborhood’s workforce 
employment profile would come from data representing Dallas’ statistical area. However, 
this study continues to assert that the scope of those areas is so large as to make them 
unusable; whereas Dallas itself represents a significant portion of its statistical area, this 
neighborhood is just one neighborhood out of hundreds within Dallas, so it would be 
inappropriate to substitute area-wide data for missing values within the neighborhood. As a 
result, while the rapid expansion of creative class employees and simultaneous decline of blue 
collar employees as percentages of Downtown Dallas’ workforce suggests a trend in-line with 
literature regarding the gentrification of central urban neighborhoods, this study cannot 
support its assertion that, compared to its workforce in 1980, the neighborhood’s workforce 
in 2010 can be characterized as “less blue collar and more creative class.” 
 Evaluation of Downtown Dallas as more economically polarized. Recall that, 
although evidence of increasing economic polarization was not found in Dallas as a whole, 
evidence was found for increasing economic polarization in the adjacent North Oak Cliff 
neighborhood.  
Table 5.13: Downtown Dallas MHI and Poverty Rate, 1980 - 2010 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
MHI (in 2015 inflation-adjusted dollars)  $38,324   $46,678   $78,897   $64,618  
Poverty Rate 22.0% 7.7% 15.5% 19.6% 
These data suggest that, although MHI is over $25,000 higher in 2010 than in 1980, even 
after adjusting for inflation, the poverty rate has decreased, which suggests a decline in 
economic polarization over the measurement period. However, when considering the 
                                                          




positive trend in poverty rate growth since 1990, it is evident that polarization is on the rise 
within Downtown Dallas.  
 Of particular interest is the significant decline in the neighborhood poverty rate 
found at the 1990 census, followed by a sharp increase by 2000. It is reasonable to suspect 
that some portion of the decline is a result of the aforementioned efforts undertaken by City 
Hall to remove homeless people from the central city, but these efforts were at their greatest 
between 1990 and 2000, peaking in the months leading up to the city’s hosting of the 1994 
World Cup473. this study speculates that a larger portion of this decline can be explained by 
early attempts (especially in the mid-late 1990s) to revitalize residential portions of 
Downtown Dallas, which were characterized by the demolition of lower-income 
neighborhoods in favor of lower density, mixed-use, new urbanist developments that 
previous residents could ill-afford474. This early gentrification can be seen in the 
neighborhood depopulation illustrated in table 5.11, especially among people identifying as 
African American.  
 If the late 20th century decline in poverty rate is attributable (at least in significant 
part) to homeless removal and gentrification in economically-marginalized residential 
pockets, how can the increases since the 1990 increase be explained? In part, these rises are 
attributable to a slight increase in the number of available housing units for people with low 
incomes; in 2005, 50 cottages were built for people with low incomes475. Additionally, in 
2010, 200 apartment units were made available, although within three months, all units had 
been filled, and 300 people were waitlisted476. Third, media from that era reported that city-
wide efforts to force vagrants off of private property concentrated these individuals onto 
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public land, much of which is concentrated in Downtown Dallas477. Finally, at the dawn of 
the 21st century, new service providers had opened up, focusing on the homeless and people 
with low incomes478.  
 To speculate on additional causes of the growth in poverty rates and declining 
median household incomes, it is also possible that, in the older, less-pristine segments of the 
neighborhood that have not yet been redeveloped, landlords are taking advantage of the lack 
of affordable housing units in the area to rent units to large groups of people with low 
incomes, effectively creating shared-bedroom dormitories that “warehouse” the lower-
income workers who provide, for example, security- and janitorial services to the creative class 
firms throughout Downtown Dallas. Finally, in older neighborhoods with aging 
homeowners, it may be that several generations are living together, sharing costs to remain 
in the area when incomes are low, or during extended stretches of unemployment – a trend 
found to have grown dramatically in the wake of the Great Recession479. 
 Considering the trends in Downtown Dallas discussed so far, evidence supports this 
study’s assertion that Downtown Dallas is more economically polarized in 2010 than it was 
in 1980. In addition, data presented so far support the speculation that as the city itself 
emerged from the economic malaise of the 1980s and early 1990s, Downtown Dallas began 
to transform itself into a neighborhood more fitting with the post-Fordist narrative of urban 
cores as centers of capital consumption, rather than centers of capital accumulation. The 
largely white, higher-income residents returning to Downtown Dallas, lured by the new 
amenities and development found in the Downtown Dallas 360 master plan, are putting a new 
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face on the city center, but this “new face” hides a growing chasm between the 
neighborhood’s “haves” and its “have-nots.” 
 Discussion of Context Hypotheses 
 Throughout its evaluations of Dallas itself, as well as the neighborhoods of North 
Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, this study found evidence suggestive of a new normal in 
Dallas, following the city’s economic collapse during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Broadly 
speaking, the residents of the post-collapse Dallas are less wealthy, and less-white than those 
of the pre-collapse Dallas, but when taking neighborhood-level data into account, it is clear 
that this broader trend contains notable exceptions. In the sections that follow, this study 
will first discuss the new normal at the citywide level, and then for the adjacent neighborhoods 
of Downtown Dallas and North Oak Cliff.  
Dallas as a Whole 
 So what is the new normal in Dallas? As noted above, the residents of the 
contemporary city are a far cry from the Dallas depicted in its namesake television series. 
Much of Dallas is no longer majority-white, and a growing subset of the city’s residents are 
growing increasingly poor, and increasingly economically segregated. In the wake of Dallas’ 
white flight between 1980 and 1990, a growing population of people identifying as Hispanic 
or Latino is earning less and less, as-evidenced by the general decline in MHI from 1980 to 
2010.  
 These trends have not gone unnoticed by Dallas’ leaders’. A 2016 report by the 
Mayor’s Task Force on Poverty reported that, since 1979, households earning more than 
$50,000 annually have declined, while households earning less than $35,000 have grown, and 
over half of the households in Dallas earn less than $50,000 per year480. Further, over 41% of 
                                                          




Dallas’ adult population lives below the poverty line, even while 70% of the city’s “low 
income” workers are employed, and many hold full-time positions481. 
Intersecting racial disparities with Dallas’ position as a growing economy in the post-
Fordist paradigm, minority workers often fill low-wage positions in creative class and service 
sector firms, such as data entry, entry-level finance, and healthcare, and many more are found 
in “producer services” fields like security, dining, janitorial- and facilities management 
services, and child care482. Further, as in other cities, members of Dallas’ minority groups are 
disproportionately burdened by poverty; that same task force found that, in 2016, nearly 
one-third of nonwhites in Dallas live below the poverty line, and since 2000, the percentage 
of people who identify as Hispanic or Latino has expanded by just over 20%, but the 
percentage of that population who live below the poverty line has increased by over 50%483. 
As Dallas’ economy expands, with job growth increasing by over 15% between 2000 and 
2014, and positive growth trajectories projected through 2023484, it is clear that people with 
low incomes are being increasingly left behind. 
 As the support workers underpinning Dallas’ growth, these employees are 
indispensable, but with the lowest MHI of all major Texas cities, it is clear that they these 
workers are increasingly being paid at levels that suggest they are disposable. Not only is 
poverty in Dallas growing, data suggest that it is increasingly concentrated within particular 
neighborhoods, and even within these neighborhoods, within particular blocks – indeed, 
economic inequity is higher in Dallas than in any other city with a population over 
250,000485. It is, therefore, reasonable to speculate that this intense, deepening economic 
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segregation has its own effects on upward mobility, separating low-income workers (and 
their children) from opportunities to escape generational poverty486. The effects of widening 
economic (and often racial) segregation can be seen in the revitalization efforts found within 
two neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas.  
North Oak Cliff  
 If the 1990 census heralded a new normal in Dallas as a whole, this study speculates 
that a similar event has occurred in North Oak Cliff, albeit on a ten-year delay. In many 
ways, the new, upscale face of North Oak Cliff broadly embodies the ideal of urban 
revitalization. First, blue collar employment is dropping, and creative class employment is on the 
rise within the overall workforce. Second, new shops fill repurposed, original architecture, 
and the commercial corridors buzz with activity unseen in decades. Finally, instead of 
garnering attention from stories of violence and crime, the neighborhood is now garnering 
attention as a hip, young urban community for the post-Fordist millennials looking to live 
near, but not necessarily inside of, the central city487.  
Economists often suggest that there is “no such thing as a free lunch,” and in North 
Oak Cliff, the cost of the ongoing rebirth that has defined a new neighborhood trajectory is 
being paid by the displaced residents and businesses that once called the neighborhood 
“home.” Far from the white flight that characterized this neighborhood at the close of the 
20th century, at the beginning of the 21st, whites have returned at a notable rate, leading to a 
number of media-documented battles between an ever-shrinking number of old residents, 
and an ever-growing number of new ones488. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that, within 
this neighborhood, the new normal consists of a reality in which both wealthier and less-
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wealthy individuals are coexisting within adjacent, homogeneous enclaves. This speculation 
fits with media observations of the neighborhood489, and is not dissimilar to changes found 
in gentrifying neighborhoods in, for example, Paris since the late 1990s490. 
 Further, even with workforce profile data limited to the 21st century, it appears that 
as blue collar employment drops, so too does MHI, and in addition, data suggest that both 
unemployment and poverty rates are also rising in the neighborhood. From this, it is 
reasonable to suggest that, for all the articles lauding the redevelopment of an historically-
disinvested neighborhood, the reinvigoration found in North Oak Cliff is leaving some 
people behind; given the data collected, this study speculates that the shrinking availability of 
blue collar employment is pushing neighborhood residents – primarily nonwhites – to move 
elsewhere for employment, or to accept lower-paying positions within creative class industries. 
In other words, it appears that in this neighborhood, market forces and gentrification are 
overruling the “native” residents’ right to place, resulting in some degree of dispersal. As one 
study participant, interviewed for their particular knowledge of North Oak Cliff described it: 
There’s a new neighborhood being built out of the old one [...]. Here, you had a community 
that was surviving, and just needed a little more attention from City Hall to fix the problems 
with the broken-down streets, the schools, and the crime. That’s what we wanted, but what 
we got was this slap in the face – new buildings with shops selling nine-dollar slices of pie 
that we can’t afford, new apartments we can’t afford, and new people who don’t want 
anything to do with the neighborhood they just moved into. We already had something, and 
it’s like someone decided one day that it wasn’t good enough, and that something else had to 
come in instead, and more and more of us are being pushed somewhere else.  
To counter this trend, some residents have attempted to band together, but these efforts are 
often slow at best, and ineffective at worst. Built on a history of mistrust, the antiregime of 
North Oak Cliff’s past continues to challenge efforts to unite the communities, and the 
internal debates within various alliance groups lead to inaction that can be capitalized upon 
by organized, resource-rich development firms, but also allow tremendous freedom for 
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nontraditional actors, such as Jason Roberts and David Spence, both of whom were 
introduced in Chapter 4, to engage in smaller, interconnected development projects that 
unite area businesses, and strengthen the local economy in less-disruptive ways. These 
actors, and their efforts within the greater context of neighborhood disunity, will be revisited 
in both Chapters 5 and 6.  
Downtown Dallas  
 Dallas is a city that rewrites itself in response to setbacks, and this habit is most 
visible in Downtown; following the Kennedy assassination, the city spent roughly two 
decades replacing pre-war construction with massive office buildings, riding on the 
generosity of investors – both domestic and international – who used real estate 
development to evade taxes, while continuing to reap record-breaking profits. In the years 
following the economic implosion and IRS crackdown on investment properties as tax 
shelters, Downtown Dallas is once again rewriting itself – turning a former commercial hub 
into a mixed-use, post-Fordist utopia for the creative class, and utilizing a dizzying number 
public-private partnerships that arise from the Downtown Dallas 360 master development plan 
to achieve this makeover.  
 The effects of this makeover can be seen in the widening economic polarization in 
the neighborhood since 1990, even as median household incomes have dramatically 
increased over that same period, and unemployment between 2000 and 2010 has remained 
largely static; they can also be seen in the ever-growing population of people identifying as 
“white alone” since 1990. Given the broader connection between whiteness and wealth – 
supported by the city’s own research – it is reasonable to suggest that, like in North Oak 
Cliff, the new normal in Downtown Dallas is a neighborhood designed for- and populated by 




nonwhites eek out an existence in the shadows of this new growth – certainly 
metaphorically, but also literally, in the parts of Downtown Dallas that lie between its 
skyscrapers, museums, public art displays, civic structures, and deck parks.  
 Whereas in North Oak Cliff, affluent whites are frequently displacing less-affluent 
people of color, in Downtown Dallas, the redevelopment of economically-marginalized 
spaces is a smaller story than the redevelopment of office buildings into mixed commercial-
residential spaces. Thus, rather than (or, more accurately, in addition to) displacing 
marginalized populations, new neighborhood residents are instead creating new places where 
previously none existed. Therefore, the division between the “haves” and “have-nots” also 
takes on a geographic component – rather than gentrifying an existing low-income 
community, or creating a mixed-income alternative, the contemporary Downtown Dallas is a 
high-density, wealthy enclave being carved out of high-rises and office buildings, bringing a 
geographic component to division between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This 
geographic division, unsurprisingly, facilitates an attitudinal, “us versus them” mentality as 
well; indeed, when participants interviewed specifically for their knowledge of Downtown 
Dallas, the majority (34; 87.2%) described the “new residents” of Downtown Dallas as being 
largely disinterested in the plight of the residents with lower incomes; one participant event 
went so far as to describe the situation as such: 
The new people moving into the old office buildings, they may vote progressives into City 
Hall, but in the very next breath they’re telling them (SIC) same people that the homeless are 
a nuisance to be eliminated, and to get the cops to crack down on panhandling and loitering, 
and to get the group homes either shut down or moved out into the poor Black 
neighborhood. They want bike lanes built, but then complain when poor people are riding 
bikes to get to work, slowing down traffic in the mornings. They want a DART (transit) bus 
that connects all the hot spots in- and around Downtown, but then they demand police to 
keep the homeless from riding when it’s 100 degrees out here. They want the Disney version 
of Jane Jacobs – not a real community.  
While in North Oak Cliff, there is a contingent of organizing, politically-active residents 




this does not appear to have happened. It is reasonable to suspect that some of this comes 
from the lack of population prior to redevelopment – in the former office buildings, for 
example, there were no previous residents to displace. In addition, the population that has 
been displaced – people who are homeless, as well as people living in now-gentrified 
neighborhoods – often have little (or no) voice in the political system, and are not well-
equipped to mount resistance to redevelopment and displacement. Further, Downtown 
Dallas has traditionally been the epicenter of the city’s redevelopment efforts, and is the area 
in which the city’s power elite have historically held the most influence over political leaders. 
Finally, Downtown Dallas underwent the bulk of its modern-day redevelopment during a 
time when Dallas’ city leaders were desperate to return to the untrammeled growth and 
development to which Dallasites were once accustomed. As a result, this study proposes that 
the pressure to redevelop, and the level of resources available to developers – in terms of 
both financial support and political support – simply overwhelmed the capacity of people 
who would have otherwise organized.  
The New Normal of Dallas Today vs. the Old Normals of Thometz and Elkin  
 The Dallas of Thometz’ early 1960s can be characterized by a deep optimism for the 
future, combining a desire to see the city move out from the shadow of the JFK 
assassination with an (at the time) boundless supply of private investment in urban 
redevelopment. The city was experiencing untrammeled growth on once-vacant land, as well 
as redevelopment where extant structures could no longer meet the needs of a budding 
metropolis, all guided by a tightly-knit pure entrepreneurial governing coalition. This 
development was uneven, however, and focused primarily on the “white half” of the city, 




 Roughly two decades later, this coalition had been so successful that city had built 
itself out of most of its developable land, at least in terms of land where developers were 
actively seeking to build. The city’s southern neighborhoods continued to suffer from a 
dearth of development, as well as the loss of political ties as neighborhood whites fled across 
the river, leaving abandonment and decay in their wake. In the northern half of Dallas, as 
well as in the city’s northern suburbs, commercial growth and residential relocation saw 
Dallas building itself out of developable land, and pitted the various interests in Dallas’ 
governing coalition against one another, both over use value versus exchange value with respect 
to redeveloping existing land, and over public works projects, such as highway expansions 
and the construction of a commuter light rail service. As the men who built Thometz’ Dallas 
retired or died, successors often failed to emerge, leaving the governing coalition fragmented 
and on the brink of collapse, but still broadly in control of what Elkin dubbed the complex 
entrepreneurial governing coalition.  
 Further complicating matters, recall that as Chapter 2 first discussed, shortly after 
Elkin’s study, Dallas’ economy completely collapsed. In the wake of this collapse, data from 
this chapter suggest a white exodus into Dallas’ northern suburbs, while people identifying as 
Hispanic and Latino, and to a lesser extent, African American, moved out to fill the 
neighborhoods left behind. More recently, these data suggest a smaller-scale white 
rediscovery of the central city, through the gentrification of both North Oak Cliff and 
Downtown Dallas. In North Oak Cliff, this takes the appearance of long-time community 
residents and businesses being displaced in favor of both wealthier whites and the shops, 
restaurants, and entertainment venues that cater to them. Meanwhile in Downtown Dallas, 
the commercial hub of the city is being rebuilt into towering enclaves of wealthy whites, 




many of these people likely work in the same creative class firms – possibly even in the same 
building, but while the whites enjoy positions of privilege, members of minority groups 
barely make ends meet.  
 As Dallas’ economic- and demographic patterns change, so too must change its 
political boundaries – recall that the city’s councilmembers are elected from districts that 
must maintain particular racial quotas in order to prevent voter disenfranchisement under a 
federal court order, so as populations migrate, council district borders will too. As these 
districts change, it is possible that long-time political leaders will find themselves 
representing new constituents (as occurred with Councilmember Scott Griggs, whose district 
was realigned in 2013), as well as new private-sector interests. As Dallas’ minority population 
continues to grow, and as millennials return to the central city, it is reasonable to suspect that 
a more progressive set of political leaders are likely to be elected; to some extent, this is 
already happening, and the implications of this shift will be revisited in Chapter 6.  
Limitations, Revisited and Expanded 
As Chapter 3 notes, every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that 
shape the conclusions that can be drawn491. Understanding these limitations is critical for 
these findings to be properly evaluated, so in the paragraphs that follow, this study will 
revisit- and expand upon limitations first introduced in Chapter 3.  
Looking first at this study’s use of secondary-source data, any problems in the source 
data are inherited by this study, and this study is forced to rely on definitions and 
conceptualizations present in the source material. For example, participation rates for people 
identifying as Hispanic or Latino are questionable, presumably because people worry that 
census records will be used to identify them as undocumented immigrants, and they fear 
                                                          




deportation492. As a result, recall that this study examined changes in poverty rates and 
median household income (MHI), as well as changes in demographics with respect to race 
and Hispanic or Latino status, which was complicated because MHI is available by race and 
Hispanic or Latino status at the tract level, but poverty rates by race and Hispanic or Latino 
status are not, therefore this study could only make broad inferences about the face of 
poverty in these two neighborhoods.  
Additionally, in at least one case, data are unavailable because definitions used by the 
census bureau changed. One key example of this is that census definitions regarding 
employment industries changed dramatically between 1990 and 2000, so data comparing blue 
collar and creative class employment from 1980 and 1990 could not be reconciled with data 
from 2000 and 2010. Finally, recall that economic data span the decades from 1980 to 2010, 
inclusively, but during that time, Dallas experienced two large economic slowdowns – the 
Savings & Loan Crisis, and the Great Recession – both of which likely affected the 
economic data, further weakening this study’s quantitative findings. This particular limitation 
is not unique to this study; indeed, any case study would have similar complications.  
Finally, this study relies on a somewhat “loose” conceptualization of economic 
prosperity, derived from a combination of dictionary definitions and a subset of past 
research. Using different definitions, a case could be built to suggest that Dallas is not 
actually economically prosperous, and that most of the prosperity associated with the city is 
actually attributable to the Dallas region, with the city itself in dire economic straits. This 
position, while an interesting thought experiment, fails to account for documented economic 
growth in the city, although as this chapter has noted throughout, this growth is not being 
felt by a significant subset of the city’s population.  
                                                          





 The purpose of this chapter was to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter 
4, in order to address this study’s research questions. In the preceding chapter sections, this 
study first revisited its research questions and hypotheses. Next, it synthesized quantitative 
data first presented in Chapter 4, before evaluating them with respect to urban literature 
regarding expected demographic- and economic transitions found in post-Fordist cities, as 
well as with respect to the effects of these transitions on Dallas’ political landscape. Finally, 
this study revisited and expanded upon a subset of the limitations introduced in Chapter 3, 












QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter 4, 
in order to address this study’s final two research questions – those related to the city’s 
contemporary governing coalition. In the chapter sections that follow, this study will first 
revisit its second and third research questions, as well as its second set of hypotheses. Next, 
it will evaluate its qualitative findings in order to render an image of contemporary urban 
governance in Dallas, the relationship between the city’s decision-making structures and 
entities involved in equitable economic development projects, and how these projects 
compare to efforts in a subset of other cities.  
Second and Third Research Questions and Coalition Hypotheses Revisited 
 The purpose of this section is to outline the research questions that this study 
attempts to address, as well as its series of hypotheses to be tested. First, it will list the 
second and third research questions that guide this study, and then, it will outline the three 
hypotheses that this study’s survey- and interview data will be used to evaluate. 
Second and Third Research Questions Revisited 
 As previous chapters have noted, this study aims to answer three primary research 
questions. In Chapter 5, this study examined how Dallas’ demographics and economy 
evolved in the decades since the city was studied by previous urban scholars. Now, this study 




Dallas’ governing coalition, and further, if they are active, what the effects of that 
involvement are on urban development and policymaking.  
Coalition Hypotheses Revisited 
 In order to guide its attempts at addressing this second research question, this study 
revisits the final three of its primary hypotheses – those related to the decision-makers of 
Dallas as a whole, as well as the neighborhoods of North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas; 
these hypotheses are as-follows:  
 Hypothesis 4. In Dallas as a whole, representatives of anchor institutions and 
CDCs are primary (rather than ancillary) members of a citywide governing coalition, and this 
involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
 Hypothesis 5. In North Oak Cliff, representatives of anchor institutions and CDCs 
in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing coalition, and 
this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the value-neutral 
development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
 Hypothesis 6. In Downtown Dallas, representatives of anchor institutions and 
CDCs in are primary (rather than ancillary) members, of a neighborhood governing 
coalition, and this involvement portends a more equitable development paradigm than the 
value-neutral development seen in cities throughout the mid-late 20th century. 
Evaluation of Coalition Hypotheses 
 While Chapter 5 evaluated the relatively straightforward “context” hypotheses, the 
sections that follow will engage in evaluations of this study’s three “coalition” hypotheses. In 
these sections, this study will first evaluate the presence and nature of decision-making 




to understand whether, or to what extent, anchor institutions and CDCs are involved in 
contemporary decision-making. As a note of caution, throughout the sections that follow, 
this study will often make references to study participants; in the sections related to 
Hypothesis 4, the term “participants” will refer to all 79 participants in this study, while in 
those sections regarding Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6, the term will refer only to those 
participants involved in discussions of those neighborhoods.  
 Evaluation of Hypothesis 4. The following paragraphs will utilize data first 
presented in Chapter 4 data in order to address Hypothesis 4, regarding the status of anchor 
institutions and CDCs in a governing coalition within Dallas as a whole. In the paragraphs 
that follow, this study will first seek to establish the presence- and nature of citywide 
decision-making power. Second, it will evaluate the relationship between power and 
nominations to decision-making committees. Third, it will evaluate the respective 
relationships between power and familiarity, and between power and recent shared board or 
committee service. Finally, it will relate these findings to the present hypothesis, in order to 
establish whether, to what extent, and to what end anchor institutions and CDCs are 
involved in contemporary citywide decision-making.  
 Citywide decision-makers. Of the study’s 79 participants, only a subset admitted 
familiarity with Dallas’ leadership in prior decades. Six participants (7.6%) spoke to personal 
familiarity with the city’s leaders and its decision-making processes in 1960s, while 26 
(32.9%) expressed familiarity with decision-makers and decision-making throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. When asked to describe contemporary citywide decision-making, and the 
extent to which it differs from decision-making in the past, many of these more “tenured” 





There was a time when you had a basic group of two or three dozen men who would come 
together informally and fix problems, or address things as we needed to. Dallas was a lot 
smaller then, and people looked up to the men who made decisions like that. Things are a lot 
different now…. [Dallas] is so much bigger, and the world is so much faster, and I don’t 
think we can ever go back to the old way of doing things, even if it was a lot easier.  
 
Nonetheless, data first introduced in Chapter 4 suggest that, on some level, Dallas still has 
people who have a reputation for being able to make decisions that affect the city as a whole. 
Seventy-nine participants identified 32 individual- and group actors who have some 
combination of formal decision-making authority and informal influence, and whose 
presence on a citywide decision-making committee would help ensure that the decision 
would be accepted by the community; table 6.01 revisits these decision-makers. 
Table 6.01: Citywide Decision-Makers 
Category Name Most Notable Affiliation(s) 
Formal 
Authorities 
District-Based Councilmembers (14) Dallas City Council 
Mike Rawlings Mayor 
A.C. Gonzalez City Manager 
Appointed Commissioners (15) City Plan Commission 
First Tier 
Influentials 
Ray Hunt Hunt Consolidated 
John Wiley Price Dallas County Commissioner 
Harlan Crow Crow Holdings 
Ross Perot Jr. Hillwood 
Kay Bailey Hutchison U.S. Senate (former); TX House of Rep. (former); TX State Treasurer (former) 
Caroline Hunt Rosewood Corp. 
T. Boone Pickens BP Capital 
Ruth Collins Altshuler Philanthropist 




Mary Suhm City Manager (former) 
Clint McDonnough Ernst & Young, LLP 
John Scovell Woodbine Development 
Robert Chereck PlainsCapital 
Arcilia Acosta CARCON Industries 
Michael Caffey C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE) 
Angela Hunt Dallas City Council (former) 
Albert Black On-Target Supplies & Logistics; Dallas Regional Chamber (former) 
Donna D. Halstead Dallas Citizens Council (former); Councilmember (former) 
Jeff Staubach Jones Lang LaSalle 
Alan Walne Dallas City Council (former) 
Steve Everbach Colliers International 
Civic 
Chairs 
Alice Murray Dallas Citizens Council 
Mabrie Jackson North Texas Commission 
Dale Petrosky Dallas Regional Chamber 
Anchor 
Captains 
Gerald Turner Southern Methodist University 
Joel T. Allison Baylor Healthcare 
David Daniel Univ. of Texas at Dallas (former); Univ. of Texas System 
Lee Jackson Univ. of North Texas System 
 
 Contemporary distribution of citywide decision-making power. The previous 
reputational study of Dallas’ leaders found that decision-makers in the early 1960s were 




communications), finance (including banking and insurance), manufacturing, and law, but 
also included a handful of leaders from education, government, organized labor, and 
religious institutions493. Even into the 1980s, the dominance of business leaders – both 
directly, and through civic organizations – in Dallas’ decision-making remained evident494. 
 This study proffers that that Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition is no longer 
quite so narrow, though there continues to be a strong bias toward finance and real estate 
among the city’s leaders, and the support of the old guard within Dallas’ leadership can still 
advance or sustain a career in public leadership. To the extent that table 6.01 is an accurate 
representation of Dallas’ citywide decision-makers, the data within suggest that Dallas’ 
decision-makers are a collection of government officials (current and former), private-sector 
executives in local branches of multinational businesses, real estate offices, finance and 
investment firms, construction companies, and law firms, as well as heads of area anchor 
institutions and elite civic organizations. Additionally, unlike the Thometz study495, the 
decision-makers in table 6.01include both women and people of color.  
 Recall that Chapter 4 described five categories of decision-makers in Dallas: formal 
authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic chairs, and anchor captains. As an added 
layer to these categories, in their interviews, all 79 participants agreed that some people in 
the city have more power than others. Table 6.02 extends survey data introduced Chapter 4, 
which listed mean power scores for each decision-maker, by including both total power 
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Table 6.02: Power Ratings of Citywide Decision-Makers 
Rank 
Order 
Name Category Power Score Mean Power 
Score 
1 District-Based Councilmembers (14) Formal Authorities 316 4.00 
2 Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials 305 3.86 
3 John Wiley Price First Tier Influentials 303 3.84 
4 Mike Rawlings Formal Authorities 299 3.78 
4 A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities 299 3.78 
6 Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials 292 3.74 
7 Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials 289 3.66 
8 Kay Bailey Hutchison First Tier Influentials 284 3.59 
9 Alice Murray Civic Chairs 279 3.53 
10 City Plan Commissioners (15) Formal Authorities 277 3.51 
11 Caroline Hunt First Tier Influentials 267 3.38 
12 Gerald Turner Anchor Captains 263 3.33 
13 T. Boone Pickens First Tier Influentials 260 3.29 
14 Mary Suhm Second Tier Influentials 254 3.26 
15 Mabrie Jackson Civic Chairs 248 3.14 
16 Ruth Collins Altshuler First Tier Influentials 247 3.13 
17 Clint McDonnough Second Tier Influentials 240 3.04 
18 Bobby Lyle First Tier Influentials 239 3.03 
19 Dale Petrosky Civic Chairs 235 2.97 
20 John Scovell Second Tier Influentials 233 2.95 
20 Robert Chereck Second Tier Influentials 233 2.95 
22 Arcilia Acosta Second Tier Influentials 220 2.78 
23 Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials 214 2.71 
23 Joel T. Allison Anchor Captains 214 2.71 
25 Angela Hunt Second Tier Influentials 206 2.64 
26 David Daniel Anchor Captains 201 2.54 
27 Lee Jackson Anchor Captains 195 2.47 
28 Albert Black Second Tier Influentials 191 2.45 
29 Donna D. Halstead Second Tier Influentials 189 2.39 
30 Jeff Staubach Second Tier Influentials 188 2.38 
31 Alan Walne Second Tier Influentials 183 2.32 
32 Steve Everbach Second Tier Influentials 175 2.22 
Two findings from table 6.02 achieve statistical significance. First, power score and mean 
power score share a perfect, positive correlation with one another496, which suggests that 
actors who received higher power scores also tended to receive higher ratings from each 
participant; additionally, when formal authorities, first tier influentials, second tier influentials, civic 
chairs, and anchor captains were coded, respectively, 0-4, the resulting moderate negative 
correlation497 between category and mean power score suggests that actors in some thematic 
categories (chiefly formal authorities and first tier influentials) tend to have higher mean power 
scores than actors in other categories (particularly second tier influentials and anchor captains). 
 These results suggest that there is a particular hierarchy among categories of actors in 
Dallas’ decision-making structure; indeed, in describing the structure of citywide decision-
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making, 77 of 79 participants (97.5%) used specific terms, e.g. “tiers,” “echelons,” or 
“levels.” To derive an empirically-supportable number of decision-making tiers, and 
following the practice of a previous reputational study of Dallas498, this study utilizes 
Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test (DMRT) to measure the differences between each 
power score and every other power score listed, in order to determine whether any gaps in 
these scores are statistically significant, with significant gaps suggesting that scores are 
clustered together; table 6.03 shows the results of this test for Dallas as a whole. 
Table 6.03: Citywide Decision-Maker Levels of Power 
Name Thematic Category 











District-Based Councilmembers (14) Formal Authorities    4.000 
 
Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials   3.861  
John Wiley Price First Tier Influentials   3.835  
Mike Rawlings Formal Authorities   3.785  
A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities   3.785  
Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials   3.744  
Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials   3.658  
Kay Bailey Hutchison First Tier Influentials   3.595  
Alice Murray Civic Chairs   3.532  
City Plan Commissioners (15) Formal Authorities   3.506  
  
Caroline Hunt First Tier Influentials  3.380   
Gerald Turner Anchor Captains  3.329   
T. Boone Pickens First Tier Influentials  3.291   
Mary Suhm Second Tier Influentials  3.256   
Mabrie Jackson Civic Chairs  3.139   
Ruth Collins Altshuler First Tier Influentials  3.127   
Clint McDonnough Second Tier Influentials  3.038   
Bobby Lyle First Tier Influentials  3.025   
Dale Petrosky Civic Chairs  2.975   
Robert Chereck Second Tier Influentials  2.949   
John Scovell Second Tier Influentials  2.949   
  
Arcilia Acosta Second Tier Influentials 2.785    
Joel T. Allison Anchor Captains 2.709    
Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials 2.709    
Angela Hunt Second Tier Influentials 2.641    
David Daniel Anchor Captains 2.544    
Lee Jackson Anchor Captains 2.468    
Albert Black Second Tier Influentials 2.449    
Donna D. Halstead Second Tier Influentials 2.392    
Jeff Staubach Second Tier Influentials 2.380    
Alan Walne Second Tier Influentials 2.316    
Steve Everbach Second Tier Influentials 2.215    
 
                                                          




These data broadly support findings from table 6.02, and share superficial similarities to 
findings in the Thometz study499, in that they both suggest a series of statistically significant 
tiers within mean power scores for each of Dallas’ citywide decision-makers. Figure 6.01 
presents a visual representation of these tiers of citywide decision-making power.  
Figure 6.01: The Structure of Citywide Decision-Making Power 
 
 
These findings take into account data in table 6.02 and table 6.03, as well as participant 
observations introduced in Chapter 4. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will broadly 
describe these findings with respect to previous studies, and then it will examine each of the 
four tiers.  
 Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure, broadly. While Thometz found three tiers of 
power in mid-century Dallas (key leaders, top level, and second echelon), this study finds four: high 
tier, high-middle tier, low-middle tier, and low tier. Taken together, table 6.03 and figure 6.01 suggest 
a number of key findings that largely (but not wholly) agree with the previous reputational 
                                                          




study of Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will outline key differences between 
its findings and those of its predecessors. 
 First, recall that the Thometz study described actors in Dallas’ highest echelons of 
leadership as being involved in most aspects of decision-making, either themselves or 
through their representatives on various boards and committees, while lower echelons 
tended to be occupied by younger, less experienced leaders and older decision-makers who 
are retiring out of the politics of governing the city500. This study’s findings largely agree with 
this; in describing actors found to be within the highest two tiers (respectively, high and high-
middle) participants generally described each as being deeply involved in most, if not all 
citywide decisions, while actors within lower tiers (low-middle and low), these actors are more 
likely to be described as only being involved in a subset of decision-making. In describing 
the difference, one participant commented that: 
Here (in Dallas), we [have] always had “big men” who run most things, and smaller men 
who come around here and there with an opinion or who look to help. [...] It’s still a little bit 
like that – some people are part of every decision that matters, and other people are closer to 
what you’d call an “expert” on a certain area – there’s (SIC) go-to people for education, or 
schools, or whatever you want, and they don’t have much say in anything else.    
 
 Second, the Thometz study found that Dallas’ leaders were primarily members of the 
business community, most often finance and utilities, but also in manufacturing and trade501. 
Two decades later, the Elkin study broadened the scope of city leadership to include 
government officials, citing the simultaneous weakening of Dallas’ once-unified business 
coalitions and disruptive changes in the city’s mayoral- and councilmember election systems, 
but conceded that the result was similar; in the entrepreneurial regime, Dallas’ leaders continued 
to place development policies over redistribution502. Table 6.03 suggests that Dallas’ 
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leadership is still heavily dominated by business leaders – especially those in real estate 
development and construction – but that the seeds of transition away from the entrepreneurial 
regime may have already been planted; this will be revisited later in this study.  
 Finally, Thometz argued that, as actors in the higher tiers of Dallas’ decision-making 
structure retired, they nominated actors in lower tiers to replace them503, though twenty years 
later, Elkin argued that this system had broken down, and new leaders were no longer being 
“brought up” to replace their predecessors504.  In this study, 75 (94.9%) of participants, 
including the 32 participants personally familiar with citywide leadership in the mid-late 20th 
century, agreed that this system is largely a relic of history; as one put it: 
[...] It used to be that the business leaders were the political leaders. The men at the top 
would give the younger men small tasks to handle, and if they did good (SIC), then they got 
put on bigger projects. [...] That changed when the Charter Association fell apart, though, 
and now it’s a whole new world.  
 
 In considering the four-tier system conceptualized in figure 6.01 with respect to the 
five categories of decision-maker introduced in Chapter 4, the highest echelons of leadership 
are primarily occupied by actors in categories that are largely restricted. Note that the high tier 
is composed entirely of formal authorities; to join this category, an actor would need to either 
be elected to public office or be appointed to a high position in city bureaucracy. Further, 
the high-middle tier is made up of formal authorities and first tier influentials, as well as the civic chair 
in charge of the Dallas Citizens Council (itself composed largely of first tier influentials). Recall 
that, at the citywide level, first tier influentials are composed of key figures in Dallas’ first 
families and a subset of outsiders with long careers serving the interests of these families; as 
an “invite only” category, membership is simply not open to a majority of actors involved in 
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citywide decision-making. This is conceptualized in figure 6.01 as a solid line between the high 
tier and high-middle tier, and another solid line between the high-middle tier and low-middle tier.  
 By contrast, lower echelons are more open to individuals – there can by any number 
of business leaders with an interest in the politics of development, or directors of nonprofit 
organizations with an interest in providing policy expertise. Indeed, actors in the low-middle 
tier and low tier are more varied, and analysis of participants’ comments suggests that there are 
three broad categories of these actors, at least at the citywide level. First are actors whom 78 
(98.7%) of participants identified as being largely retired out of the politics of decision-
making, but who retain strong connections to current city officials, and who can be relied 
upon to serve on boards or committees; summarizing this category, one participant noted 
that: 
Nobody really retires out of City Hall. They might not have a formal, paying job, but there’s 
always a committee that needs someone who knows how things work. Sometimes you’ll see 
people down here more often after they’re off the payroll than you did when they were on it. 
 
Another participant described this phenomenon of post-retirement service as-
follows: 
 
It’s hard to leave public service, even when you leave the public sector. Part of it is that 
everything in Dallas is politics, and it all takes forever to get done, but a bigger part of it is 
that, for a lot of us, service gets in your blood – you want to keep being involved, and it’s 
easy to use your old connections to do that. 
A second category was identified by 49 (62.0%) of participants; in this category are the 
“policy experts,” like leaders of nonprofit organizations, who have long-standing 
connections to Dallas’ leaders, but are themselves only involved in subsets of decision-
making, such as decisions related to educational policy or inter-governmental relations; One 
participant commented that these actors: 
… usually end up married into one of the big names in Dallas, or they’re a second or third 
son or daughter; their name is worth something to the big philanthropies in the area, but 
they aren’t going to take over anyone’s family business someday. They turn into experts on 
one particular issue, and they’re the go-to folks whenever the mayor, or the council, or the 




A second participant said that: 
City leaders don’t have to be experts on anything, because they have a stable of “experts” to 
call up whenever they need to know something. Most of the councilmembers get real (SIC) 
bright people to advise them, usually from a related nonprofit, or from one of the local 
colleges, but others, not so much. Either way, those advisors start to get a reputation – their 
names end up in the newspaper, or on television. If they weren’t an expert before, suddenly 
they become one, and they have an impact on policy for years. 
A third category identified by a majority of participants (42 participants; 53.2%) are younger 
executives, primarily involved in real estate development and construction firms. These 
actors have not yet been elevated into a higher tier, often because they have no interest in 
doing so. In describing this situation, one participant said that: 
Years ago, you could always find someone willing to step into a bigger leadership role; it 
meant the chance to do something big in this great city, but it also meant promotions, raises, 
and the chance to rub elbows with famous Dallasites. That doesn’t mean as much to a lot of 
people – they work for companies that have offices all over the world, and they’re busy 
working on things in other cities... other counties... they don’t have time for Dallas, beyond 
the occasional project here and there.  
 In differentiating low-middle tier and low tier actors, analysis of participant comments 
suggests that low-middle tier actors are most commonly people with at least ten years of history 
in citywide leadership positions, such as appointments to several civic boards or committees, 
having previously held elected office, participation in high-level fundraising for a civic 
project, or social connections to high-level leaders. While low-middle tier actors are involved in 
a wider array of decision-making, low tier actors tend to only be involved on particular 
projects or policy issues. This loose, fluid differentiation is represented in figure 6.01 as a 
dashed line between the low-middle tier and low tier, suggesting that actors could more easily 
shift between these tiers than between, for example, low-middle tier and high-middle tier.  
 Key leaders, past and present. Thometz, in describing Dallas’ leadership structure, 
identified seven key leaders of the city, who were involved in most citywide decisions, and 
whose opinions carried the most weight in the decision-making process505. These seven 
                                                          




leaders consisted of two banking and finance executives, two executives of utility companies, 
one manufacturing executive, and one trade executive506. This study argues that, in Dallas’ 
contemporary decision-making structure, high tier leaders occupy this same central position; 
comprised entirely of the district-based city councilmembers, this tier is responsible for 
nearly all citywide decisions. In describing Dallas’ city council, participants broadly agreed 
that the council supports a progressive social agenda for Dallas, but with respect to 
economic development – particularly when it comes to using publicly-funded inducement 
packages to lure new businesses and economic development – the council is divided into 
two camps: one that supports an untrammeled pro-development position, and another that 
supports a more limited development position, in which economic development is tied to, 
for example, provisions for affordable housing, or improvements to area infrastructure or 
schools. The presence of this division (and lack of “neutral” councilmembers) was 
unanimously agreed-upon, while the degree of nuance within it is reflected in table 6.04. 








Pro-Development  Progressive-Development  
Strong Leaning Leaning Strong 
Four-Category Participant Clusters 
Cluster 1 8 10.1% 6 3 3 3 
Cluster 2 4 5.1% 5 3 4 3 
Cluster 3 5 6.3% 4 5 2 4 
Cluster 4 12 15.2% 4 4 4 3 
Cluster 5 14 17.7% 4 4 3 4 
Two-Category Participant Clusters Pro-Development  Progressive-Development  
Cluster 6 36 45.6% 8 7 
These data suggest that a plurality of participants (36; 45.6%) support a simple dichotomy on 
the city council between pro-development and progressive-development camps, and among 
these, there is agreement that a once-councilmember advantage is held by those who argue 
for policies in-line with those expected within an entrepreneurial governing coalition. Further, 
these data suggest that this 8-7 split is agreed upon by an additional 26 participants (32.9%) 
                                                          




from clusters four and five, and all 79 participants (100%) agreed that the pro-development 
alliance is larger than its progressive-development counterpart. Therefore, all participants 
agree on the presence- and nature of this council division, and 62 of these (78.5%) agree on 
the sizes of the two alliances within the councilmembers themselves.  
 In elaborating on their respective positions, participants regularly cited ties between 
pro-development councilmembers and Dallas’ neoliberal past, and admitted that these 
councilmembers benefit from the support of Dallas’ first tier influentials and civic chairs, while 
the progressive-development councilmembers often experience challenges from these extra-
governmental sources. Describing this scenario, one participant said that: 
In parts of Dallas, especially in the rich neighborhoods to the north, you have people who 
have made a lot of money under the way we’ve always done things here, and they’re going to 
support candidates who promise to keep things the same.   
Another said that: 
The men who built up Dallas in the 70s, and who sold it out to the suburbs in the 80s and 
90s had kids, and those kids are looking to come back now that Dallas is starting to look like 
dollar signs again. They’re doing everything they can to keep an advantage on the (city) 
council, and to hamstring the younger councilmembers who want a different future in the 
city.  
Nearly all participants (63; 79.7%) qualified their observations by noting that, at nearly every 
council election since 2011, the “progressive development” contingent has grown, and that 
several of the pro-development councilmembers are rapidly approaching their term limits. 
Even participants who did not make such a qualification agreed that, if the progressive 
minority ever gains an additional council seat, such a change would dramatically affect the 
kinds of projects and policies undertaken by the highest echelons of Dallas’ leadership. This 
situation will be revisited later in this study, although several comments regarding it are well-
summarized by the following: 
The old Dallas – where businessmen made decisions on behalf of the city, and bringing new 
business was the only policy that mattered – that Dallas is going away. [...] Dallasites are 
getting tired of that old way, and you’re seeing it in the council elections. Give it five, maybe 




 Top level leaders, past and present. Of the 55 top level leaders identified in the Thometz 
study, only one represented a government employee, while the remaining 54 were executives 
in banking and finance, insurance, utilities, manufacturing, local media, and trade. These 
leaders were often consulted on important decisions, and were only slightly less-involved 
than key leaders in decision-making. In addition, these actors often served to inform key leaders 
about issues about which critical decisions would need to be made507. This study finds that 
actors in the high-middle tier are loosely analogous to Thometz’ top level. Actors in this tier are a 
combination of formal authorities, first tier influential and civic chair categories, and consist of high-
level political leaders (including the mayor and city manager), elite business leaders, civic 
philanthropists, leading members of Dallas’ first families, and civic power brokers whose 
organizations have historically held strong influence in citywide decision-making.  
 With the exception of Mayor Rawlings, who has a vote on the city council, 
participants speaking broadly about actors who were categorized in the in the high-middle tier, 
described them as acting primarily in advisory capacity to high tier actors (or, less charitably, 
as “puppetmasters”), and participants reported that they have varying degrees of influence 
over particular councilmembers. Out of the 79 participants, 49 (62.0%) spoke openly about 
deep ties between councilmembers representing districts in northern Dallas and particular 
private-sector high tier actors. Notably, 12 (15.2%) were equally adamant about connections 
between councilmembers representing the city’s southern districts and at least one private-
sector actor found in the high tier category, and 6 (7.6%) argued that all councilmembers have 
some connections with at least one private-sector actor found in the high tier; an additional 12 
(15.2%) participants declined to comment, even after reassurances of confidentiality; one 
participant, summing the thoughts of several others, said that “nearly everyone who gets up 
                                                          




high enough in Dallas politics has at least one friend who called in a favor or two to help 
them get there, or help them stay there.” Recall that in Chapter 2, this study recounted the 
findings of the Elkin study of Dallas in the 1980s – primarily that Dallas’ well-organized 
coalition of business leaders formed natural alliances with public officials, but were often at 
“arm’s length” from the day-to-day running of the city508. Taken holistically, the participant 
observations noted above seem to suggest that, as Elkin found in 1987, the interests of the 
city’s business community are well-represented in the highest levels of the city’s formalized 
governance structure, even though this representation is primarily indirect; a representative 
description of this arrangement came from one participant, who said that: 
Mayors and councilmen used to get elected by the [Citizen’s Charter Association] and the 
[Dallas Citizens Council]; those two groups controlled access to the ballot, and so their 
candidates were more-or-less the only choices. It was understood that the mayor and the 
council would include their benefactors on most decisions in the earliest stages; really, you 
could’ve turned the city over to the business community and not seen a difference, in those 
days. That’s (SIC) been a lot of years, and the men who used to do that, the ones still alive, 
aren’t so active anymore. They’re more behind the scenes, sending one of their associates to 
meet over lunch, for example, and they aren’t getting involved in every land deal or little 
detail in running the city.  
 Second echelon leaders, past and present. For Thometz, the second echelon category was 
effectively a “catch-all” containing each decision-maker who did not fit into one of the 
previous categories. These leaders broadly fell into three categories: first, younger men who 
lacked the experience to move into a higher tier; second, older men retiring out of 
leadership; and third, men who had tremendous expertise or influence surrounding a 
particular topic or set of problems, but who lacked a generalized level of influence, and who 
were only invited to participant in particular decisions509. The present study finds that actors 
in Thometz’ second echelon are loosely analogous to those found in the low-middle tier and low 
tier. This modern second echelon is broader than its historic counterpart, and contains 
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executives of national (and international) FIRE- and producer services firms, as well as 
retired (or term-limited) formal authorities who have elected to remain active in the decision-
making process, anchor captains in charge of urban universities and hospitals, and civic chairs 
whose organizations comprise constituents from across Dallas’ MSA.  
 The present study also finds that this category no longer functions as a “farm league” 
from which actors in higher tiers draw their successors. As an aside, while only a minority of 
participants (22; 27.8%) made reference to when this system broke down, the general 
consensus among participants links the breakdown of the city’s structure of civic promotion 
to the time period between the late 1980s and mid-1990s; as one participant described it: 
Back when the S&L Crisis really gutted Dallas, I mean, really sent people packing for the 
suburbs, and ran a lot of the big companies out of business – that’s when things got ugly 
with the “old guard.” Men who would normally be looking for heirs to their empires were 
too busy trying to keep from going broke, and once people started moving out of Dallas for 
Richardson and Plano, they didn’t so much care about what was going on in the big city.  
Returning to the present second echelon, roughly two-thirds of participants (52; 65.8%), 
including all 39 participants with primary expertise in Downtown Dallas, commented that 
the private-sector executives in this category are part of firms that operate in several states 
(or countries), and as such, have little interest in the politics of decision-making, while many 
of the former formal authorities seem to have little current interest in seeking new roles in city 
government, although a minority of participants (23, or 29.1%) speculated that this might 
change as the city’s political landscape shifts; summarizing several other comments, one 
participant said that: 
Thirty-, forty-, fifty years ago, young men “on their way up” got involved in what you might 
call “civic organizations,” like the (Citizens) Charter Association or the (Dallas) Citizens 
Council. Now, young men and women “on their way up” in Dallas are part of global 
companies; even the big developers still headquartered in Dallas have offices all over the 
world. How can anyone spend their time working on improving this city, when they’re 
working on projects in half-a-dozen (SIC) others?  
Another, speculating about other reasons younger business executives avoid the politics of 




Everyone knows that the (city) council will be changing soon, as Dallas’ voters wake up and 
realize what’s happening with their tax money. Why get involved now, and maybe end up on 
the wrong side of the new city leaders? If you’re going to be working in Dallas for a few 
years, it makes sense to wait and see how things shake out.  
 This study also finds that actors in the low-middle tier and low tier continue to lack 
significant generalized influence; all actors found in these tiers were described by at least one 
participant as being involved in particular projects, but not in a majority of citywide decision-
making. Further, in describing the particular involvement of the anchor captains in these 
tiers, a slim majority (41; 51.9%) of participants described them as filling “expertise gaps” for 
particular projects, particularly around those regarding higher education and healthcare. As 
one participant described it: 
For the most part, if you don’t run a business, your seat at the table only lasts as long as you 
can be the expert on a given topic being discussed. If you can do that long enough, and 
maybe make the right friends along the way, (then) that can change.    
 Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In 
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in 
Dallas, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10 individuals to 
form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the entire city, and 
that needed to be broadly accepted by the city as a whole. As in the Thometz study510, 
several participants commented that 10 people would not be sufficient to ensure broad 
support, but many also noted that, among the 10 nominees, most would be able to “bring 
others in line” with the committee’s decision. Participants who wanted to be able to 
nominate more than 10 people tended to be younger, with a median age of 39.1 (compared 
to the overall median age of 49.5), but there was no other discernable characteristic among 
them. In addition, some participants did not select the full 10 committee members; the 
lowest number of selected committee members was 6, and on average, participants 
                                                          




nominated 9.2 individuals to their hypothetical citywide decision-making team. The fact that 
some participants did not nominate a full 10 committee members negatively affects the 
validity of the results; nonetheless, table 6.05 shows the number of nominations that each 
decision-maker received, for all decision-makers receiving nominations from at least 10% (8) 
of the participants. 
Table 6.05: Comparison between Citywide Decision-Making Committee Nominations and Decision-Maker Power Score 




Count Rank Score Rank 
District-Based Councilmembers (14) Formal Authorities High Tier 79 1 316 1 
Mike Rawlings Formal Authorities High-Middle Tier 73 2 299 4 
A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities High-Middle Tier 64 3 299 4 
Alice Murray Civic Chairs High-Middle Tier 48 4 279 9 
Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials High-Middle Tier 39 5 305 2 
John Wiley Price First Tier Influentials High-Middle Tier 32 6 303 3 
Mabrie Jackson Civic Chairs Low-Middle Tier 28 7 248 15 
City Plan Commissioners (15) Formal Authorities High-Middle Tier 26 8 277 10 
Mary Suhm Second Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 23 9 254 14 
Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials High-Middle Tier 21 10 292 6 
Gerald Turner Anchor Captains Low-Middle Tier 21 10 263 12 
Dale Petrosky Civic Chairs Low-Middle Tier 20 12 235 19 
Joel T. Allison Anchor Captains Low Tier 20 12 214 23 
Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials High-Middle Tier 17 14 289 7 
John Scovell Second Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 16 15 233 20 
Robert Chereck Second Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 16 15 233 20 
Clint McDonnough Second Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 15 17 240 17 
Kay Bailey Hutchison First Tier Influentials High-Middle Tier 14 18 284 8 
Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 14 18 214 23 
David Daniel Anchor Captains Low Tier 14 18 201 26 
Caroline Hunt First Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 13 21 267 11 
Arcilia Acosta Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 13 21 220 22 
Angela Hunt Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 12 23 206 25 
Lee Jackson Anchor Captains Low Tier 12 23 195 27 
T. Boone Pickens First Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 11 25 260 13 
Ruth Collins Altshuler First Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 11 25 247 16 
Albert Black Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 11 25 191 28 
Bobby Lyle First Tier Influentials Low-Middle Tier 10 28 239 18 
Alan Walne Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 9 29 183 31 
Donna D. Halstead Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 8 30 189 29 
Jeff Staubach Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 8 30 188 30 
Steve Everbach Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 8 30 175 32 
These data suggest that, broadly speaking, high tier and high-middle tier actors tended to receive 
the most nominations for citywide decision-making committees, while low-middle tier and low 
tier actors tended to receive the fewest nominations, although some exceptions do exist, and 
there is some overlap among these four tiers toward the middle of the table. What is clearer 
is that committee nominations and power are positively related; indeed, Spearman’s ρ for 




lower than the same calculation in the previous study of Dallas511, it is nonetheless a strong, 
positive indicator of the close relationship between a participant’s perceptions of an actor’s 
power, and their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions at the citywide level. 
In effect, the question of committee selection is one of the practical application of power, 
therefore the strength of the correlation among these variables supports the use of a 
reputational analysis in studying the nature of power in Dallas.  
  In considering the role of power tiers within Dallas’ decision-making structure, table 
6.06 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees received by 
actors in each of the three tiers, and compares these to the hypothetical maximum number 
of nominations that could have been granted to these actors.  
Table 6.06: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a Citywide Decision-Making Committee by Tier 
Tier Actors in Category Total Nominations Total Possible 
Nominations 
% 
High 1 79 79 100.00% 
High-Middle 9 334 711 46.98% 
Low-Middle 11 184 790 23.29% 
Low 11 129 790 16.33% 
These data suggest that participants’ nominations for citywide decision-making teams are 
skewed toward particularly powerful actors, with high tier being much more likely to be 
nominated for decision-making committees than high-middle tier actors, while actors in the low-
middle tier and low tier were least likely to be nominated out of the four categories. As such, it 
is clear that participants would rely heavily on high tier and high middle tier actor for leadership 
on a citywide decision. The reliance on top-level leaders is in-line with findings from the 
previous reputational study of Dallas512, even though the contemporary makeup of top-level 
leadership is dramatically different from what it was over 50 years ago. These data continue 
to suggest the nature of decision-making at the citywide level; high tier and high-middle tier 
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actors are most likely to be strategically involved in a greater number of decisions, while 
lower-tier actors occupy less robust, though not unimportant roles.  
 Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the 
actors involved in Dallas’ citywide decision-making process, and are these relationships 
related to participants’ perceptions of citywide power? As part of their surveys, participants 
were asked to report on their level of familiarity with over 100 potential decision-makers in 
Dallas; possible responses included: “never heard of,” “know slightly,” “know well,” and 
“personal friend or relative.” These responses were recoded onto a scale of 1 to 4, with 
“never heard of” corresponding to 1, and the remaining scores coded to 2, 3, and 4, 
respectively.  Table 6.07 shows the mean familiarity scores for each of the four tiers in Dallas’ 
decision-making structure.  
Table 6.07: Citywide Decision-Maker Mean Familiarity Score by Tier 





The previous reputational study of Dallas found that key leaders had the highest mean 
familiarity score, with top level actors having slightly lower mean familiarity scores, and second 
echelon actors having the lowest scores513. These data suggest that, while high tier actors have 
the highest mean familiarity scores, there is a notable decrease in mean familiarity with actors 
the high-middle tier, and an increase in mean familiarity as the tiers themselves decrease. These 
data also suggest that participants are most familiar with senior elected officials and lower-
tier decision-makers (some of whom are former elected leaders), while actors in the highest 
levels of informal influence are more distant. Finally, it should be noted that the differences 
                                                          




in mean familiarity among the four tiers are slight, and the overall correlation between mean 
familiarity and power score is not statistically significant514.  
 This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years, 
served on a board or committee with each of the 101 potential citywide decision-makers, in 
addition to any individuals they wrote in. Table 6.08 shows the mean percentage of 
participants that actors in each thematic category and decision-making tier at the citywide 
level. 
Table 6.08: Citywide Decision-Maker Mean Shared Board or Committee Service by Tier 





These data are similar to those in table 6.07, and suggest that that, on average, participants are 
most likely to have recently served on a board or committee with an actor in the high tier (i.e., 
a city councilmember), while actors in the high-middle tier and low-middle tier are least likely to 
have recent shared board or committee service. These findings are in-line with the previous 
reputational study of Dallas, which found that the city’s elite private-sector leaders preferred 
to limit their committee involvement in order to keep out of the public eye, and reduce their 
likelihood of being involved in controversy515. Critically, the Spearman coefficient between 
shared committee service and power score, like with the correlation between familiarity and 
power score, is not statistically significant516. As a result, this study rejects the possibility that, 
in plain terms, participants merely nominated their friends, colleagues, or familiar-sounding 
names to serve on citywide decision-making teams, as well as the possibility that familiarity 
with any particular actors is linked to perceptions of power associated with that actor.  
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 Evaluation of Hypothesis 5. While Hypothesis 4 refreshes the image of Dallas’ 
governing coalition, Hypothesis 5 refines this image, expanding upon urban scholarship 
regarding Dallas by focusing in on one of the city’s central neighborhoods – North Oak 
Cliff. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will reframe data first presented in Chapter 4 
in order to address the status of anchor institutions and CDCs within a neighborhood power 
structure. This study will first seek to establish the presence- and nature of organized 
neighborhood decision-making power. Then, as it did in the section regarding Hypothesis 4, 
this study will evaluate the relationship between power and nominations to decision-making 
committees. Third, it will evaluate the respective relationships between power and 
familiarity, and between power and recent shared board or committee service. Finally, it will 
relate these findings to the present hypothesis, in order to establish whether (and to what 
end) anchor institutions and CDCs are involved in neighborhood decision-making within 
North Oak Cliff.   
 North Oak Cliff’s decision-makers. Out of this study’s 79 participants, just over 
half (40) were able- and willing to answer survey items and interview questions regarding the 
decision-making process within North Oak Cliff, and the actors who have roles within it. As 
Chapter 4 details, these participants identified 16 individual- and group actors, who are 
particularly involved in neighborhood decision-making; these actors revisited in table 6.09.  
Table 6.09: North Oak Cliff Decision-Makers 
Category Name Most Notable Affiliation(s) 
Formal Authorities 
Scott Griggs Dallas City Council 
Michael Anglin City Plan Commission (CPC) 
Scott Hounsel Zoning Board of Adjustment (BOA) 
Neva Dean Sustainable Development & Construction 
First Tier Influentials 
Jim Lake Jr.  Jim Lake Companies 
Joe McElroy Real Estate Investor 
Tom Prohaska Texas Pro Properties, LLC 
Second Tier 
Influentials 
Matt Segrest Alamo Manhattan 
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian Exxir Capital 
David Eitches Blackwood Developments, LLC 
David Spence Good Space 
Civic Chairs 
 
Pam Conley Kidd Springs Neighborhood Association 
Lisa Benskin Old Oak Cliff Conservation League 
Jason Roberts Better Block 




 Contemporary distribution of neighborhood decision-making power. As 
Chapter 2 recounts, throughout the early-mid 20th century, North Oak Cliff’s strong (and 
exceptionally racist) business community wielded so much political influence that even city 
leaders dared not speak out against them publicly517, but by the late 1970s, white flight, 
corporate abandonment, and the “us” versus “them” mentality dividing the city along the 
Trinity River left the neighborhood largely bereft of these resource-laden, politically 
connected actors. Racial and socioeconomic divisions split greater Oak Cliff into three 
camps – blue collar whites, African Americans moving into areas left behind by white flight, 
and a shrinking enclave of wealthy whites. Smaller ethnic- and socioeconomic groups 
agglomerated into particular blocks, and it was not uncommon for each block to be home to 
a different, independent community with its own set of leaders. As a result, there was not 
enough consensus for any particular leader to give the neighborhoods (including North Oak 
Cliff) a voice in Dallas politics518. As one participant put it: 
For a long time, Dallas picked its leaders from at-large elections, which meant that the rich 
whites up in the north made all of the decisions. Down here, you had two dozen churches 
with pastors who all wanted to be the voice of the community, and every couple of blocks 
was a new neighborhood organization, and they all wanted to speak too. They were all too 
busy fighting each other for the scraps sent across the river by City Hall to ever mobilize, or 
to build the kind of civic clout you need to really make a difference. People could unite to 
fight off the things they didn’t like, but couldn’t come together to fight for things they really 
wanted, so the city stopped paying attention to us. 
 
 When participants were interviewed regarding how decisions in North Oak Cliff are 
made today, they described thematic categories of decision-makers, identical (in description, 
though not in individual membership) to those found in Dallas as a whole. Participants’ 
comments in Chapter 4 described Councilmember Scott Griggs as being the center of 
neighborhood decision-making, with support from city staff and his hand-picked advisors.  
Data introduced in Chapter 4 also suggests the involvement of a number of long-tenured 
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rentiers, real estate developers, neighborhood leaders, and the head of a local hospital in the 
decision-making process. Holistic examination of participants’ comments suggests that while 
individuals may involve themselves in decision-making at the neighborhood level on 
particular projects, this involvement is often more informal than it is in Dallas as a whole. 
While at the citywide level, projects and policy priorities often necessitate the creation of 
formal task forces created by the mayor and city council, or the engagement of particular city 
departments, these formal structures are largely absent at the neighborhood level. Often, ad-
hoc task forces are composed of long-standing leaders, who have a reputation for being able 
to gather and consolidate public interest around a project or policy, and accurately speak for 
their communities, but these kinds of leaders are in short supply in North Oak Cliff, 
primarily because so few people have been able to gather enough enduring support. In 
describing this situation, one participant said that: 
The folks have all been fighting each other so long that, to be honest, they wouldn’t know 
how to get along anymore, and everyone is so scared to lose out on what little they already 
have that they won’t risk anyone else getting ahead enough to become a real leader. 
To attempt to structure these various actors, and to serve as the basis for comparisons made 
in discussing the nature of neighborhood decision-making, table 6.10 extends survey data 
introduced Chapter 4, which listed mean power scores for each decision-maker, by including 









Table 6.10: Power Ratings of North Oak Cliff Decision-Makers 
Rank 
Order 
Name Category Power Score 
Mean Power 
Score 
1 Scott Griggs Formal Authorities 154 3.85 
2 Michael Anglin Formal Authorities 136 3.40 
3 Scott Hounsel Formal Authorities 135 3.38 
4 Jim Lake Jr.  First Tier Influentials 135 3.38 
5 Matt Segrest Second Tier Influentials 129 3.23 
6 Neva Dean Formal Authorities 127 3.18 
7 Martin Koonsman Anchor Captains 122 3.05 
8 Joe McElroy First Tier Influentials 115 2.88 
9 Pam Conley Civic Chairs 114 2.85 
10 Farrokh & Michael Nazerian Second Tier Influentials 114 2.85 
11 Lisa Benskin Civic Chairs 113 2.83 
12 Tom Prohaska First Tier Influentials 111 2.78 
13 David Eitches Second Tier Influentials 108 2.70 
14 David Spence Second Tier Influentials 93 2.33 
15 Jason Roberts Civic Chairs 67 1.68 
At the citywide level, power score and mean power score shared a strong, positive 
correlation with one another; for North Oak Cliff, these two share a perfect positive 
correlation519, which suggests that actors with high power scores tended to receive more 
individual high scores (that is, more ratings of 3 and 4 on a four-point scale) than actors who 
received lower power scores. Additionally, when thematic categories are coded to a dummy 
variable, both total power score and mean power score are negatively correlated with 
thematic category520, suggesting that formal authorities and first tier influentials tend to have 
higher power scores than second tier influentials and civic chairs; anchor captains defy this trend, 
which is reflected in the relatively modest Spearman correlation coefficient521.  Even with 
this more modest correlation (and obvious exception), these results suggest that there is a 
particular structure to decision-making in North Oak Cliff. 
 To test for the presence of tiers within the citywide decision-making structure, this 
study used Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test (DMRT) to measure differences among 
mean power scores; the results of repeating this test for North Oak Cliff appear in table 6.11.  
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Table 6.11: North Oak Cliff Decision-Maker Levels of Power 
Name Thematic Category 
Subset for α = 0.05 
Low Tier Middle Tier High Tier 
Scott Griggs Formal Authorities     3.85 
 
Michael Anglin Formal Authorities   3.40  
Scott Hounsel Formal Authorities   3.38  
Jim Lake Jr.  First Tier Influentials   3.38  
Matt Segrest Second Tier Influentials   3.23   
Neva Dean Formal Authorities   3.18   
Martin Koonsman Anchor Captains   3.05   
Joe McElroy First Tier Influentials   2.88   
Pam Conley Civic Chairs   2.85   
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian Second Tier Influentials   2.85   
Lisa Benskin Civic Chairs   2.83   
Tom Prohaska First Tier Influentials  2.78   
David Eitches Second Tier Influentials  2.70   
 
David Spence Second Tier Influentials 2.33     
Jason Roberts Civic Chairs 1.68     
 
In general, these data support the findings in table 6.10; formal authorities occupy higher 
positions, and civic chairs tend to occupy lower positions, but there is also notable overlap, 
especially throughout the middle tier; figure 6.02 presents a visual representation of these data. 
Figure 6.02: The Structure of North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Power 
 
 
These findings take into account data in table 6.11, as well as participant observations first 




Oak Cliff decision-making structure broadly, and then it will individually examine each of 
this structure’s three tiers. 
 North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, broadly. At the citywide level, this study 
identified four tiers of decision-making power – high tier, high-middle tier, low-middle tier, and low 
tier, and evaluated them with respect to Thometz’ three-tier model. In North Oak Cliff, this 
study identifies three tiers: high tier, middle tier, and low tier, and equates them with two of 
Thometz’ three tiers – key leaders and second echelon. Though awkward, this is in-line with 
participant observations about decision-making in North Oak Cliff; primarily that formal 
decision-making is concentrated within the city councilmember’s office, while other actors 
are limited to using their often-limited resources to influence his decisions one way or 
another. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will outline four key differences between 
the decision-making structures of North Oak Cliff and Dallas as a whole.  
 First, while North Oak Cliff (like Dallas as a whole) once operated under an 
entrepreneurial regime, commercial disinvestment, residential abandonment, and political 
disconnection flowing from white flight and suburbanization induced an antiregime. Briefly, 
recall that an antiregime is one possible result of a collapsed (or otherwise failed) governing 
coalition, composed of fragmented interest groups that fail to coalesce around a particular 
agenda, establish ties with the business community, or reconcile their various agendas with 
the political system522. An antiregime is successful at blocking unfavorable policies and 
development, but because it lacks the support of bureaucrats or organized institutions, it is 
unable to promote (or even passively allow) beneficial urban policies or development 
projects523. 
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 Returning to North Oak Cliff, historical evaluation of the neighborhood suggests 
that, during the neighborhood’s decline through the 1970s and 1980s, would-be coalition 
members524 lacked the financial capital and connections to the Dallas political machine 
needed to create a successor coalition, and while some leaders emerged, none successfully 
pulled together competing interest groups into an enduring coalition with a shared agenda, 
and instead, were only successful in keeping out development, rather than selectively 
allowing particular development projects to breathe new life into an economically-
marginalized community525.  
 Second, when district-based council leadership returned to the neighborhood 
following the 1991 reorganization, there were no strong community institutions in place, and 
as a result, city councilmembers have been able to exert more influence here than in other 
districts. Recall that, in Chapter 4, participants praised the results of issue-based coalitions 
when they can successfully form; of the 40 participants highly knowledgeable about 
decision-making North Oak Cliff, all 40 mentioned that these coalitions largely fail to endure 
beyond individual issues; describing this, one participant said that: 
There’s 50 years of bad blood around here; racism, classism, (and) fights (that have) gone on 
so long, nobody remembers why they don’t get along with the people across the street. You 
have rich living next to middle class, and “almost broke” living next to “dead broke,” and so 
no one issue affects anyone the same as their neighbors. That’s why nobody gets together, 
outside of a few. 
 
Another commented that: 
 
People south of the Trinity, they get riled up and unite about particular problems, like 
getting streets fixed, or stopping a specific development, but after that gets resolved, they all 
go their separate ways, and start all over again when something else comes up. Issues and 
problems can make a movement, but they can’t make a community. It’s (SIC) just not the 
same thing.  
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Qualifying the above sentiments, 37 participants (92.5%) made an exception to this for the 
Old Oak Cliff Conservation League (OOCCL). Commenting directly about the OOCCL and 
its longevity, one participant said that: 
The [OOCCL] normally only takes a stand when a clear majority of its neighborhoods 
agree on something, and whatever they decide is usually some kind of compromise. They 
stay pretty neutral, supporting things like better schools, historic preservation districts, 
community service, (and) fixing roads, and they usually oppose things like widening a 
freeway, or building a big office building right next to houses. The only way that 
organization sticks together is if nobody rocks the boat too hard, and makes some 
neighborhood mad enough to want out. Individual neighborhoods might get more agitated, 
and take to the streets about something, but the whole group tends to let that happen, and 
remain overall pretty quiet.  
 
 Third, earlier in this chapter, this study found that at the citywide level, the highest 
echelons of leadership are involved in most aspects of decision-making, either individually or 
through proxies, while lower tiers tend to be occupied by less-active actors, who are 
generally only involved in particular projects. Now, this study finds a similar differentiation 
in North Oak Cliff, with the one high tier actor – Councilmember Scott Griggs – being 
involved in nearly every neighborhood-level decision, as noted in Chapter 4. At the same 
time, middle tier and low tier actors are generally only involved in particular projects – chiefly 
those involving real estate development. Of the 40 participants, 12 (30.0%) clearly made this 
distinction by specifically mentioning economic development, while another 17 (42.5%) 
spoke more broadly about concerns including area schools, police presence, strategic use of 
code enforcement (or “code crawls”), among others. Additionally, outside of the public-
sector officials found in the middle-tier, there is tremendous disagreement among decision-
makers, often resulting from years of mistrust, primarily among racial- and ethnic groups, as 
well as between wealthier residents and their poorer neighbors. It should be noted, however, 
that 31 of the participants (77.5%) mentioned that, to some extent, these overall divisions 




 Fourth, recall that at the citywide level, higher decision-making tiers (high tier and high-
middle) were considered to be essentially closed to new membership; elected officials, 
appointees, and bureaucrats are largely replaced on a “one-for-one” basis, so these positions 
are effectively only available when there is a vacancy, while first tier influentials are created by 
virtue of family ties or invitation (i.e., “born in or blessed in”), and so this echelon is, in 
practical terms, only available to particular actors. Meanwhile, lower tiers (low-tier and low-
middle tier) were considered more open to membership, with no fixed limits on size or 
qualifications. In North Oak Cliff, this study finds a similar combination of “restricted” and 
“unrestricted” tiers. In figure 6.02, this is conceptualized as a solid line between the high tier 
and the middle tier, and a dashed line between the middle tier and low tier. Figure 6.02 also shows 
a second, solid line dividing the middle tier; this represents the presence of particular actors 
within this tier – formal authorities – whose positions are effectively “locked” in place, and are 
only open to new actors as openings are created, most commonly as the result of a vacancy. 
 Note that, as with Dallas as a whole, North Oak Cliff’s high tier, as well as the top 
positions in its middle tier are composed of public-sector officials who are replaced when 
vacancies exist; as a result, these positions are comparatively static, and participants 
unanimously agreed that actors in these positions tend to remain in them for years, and only 
leave office due to term limits, promotions, or retirement. By comparison, the remainder of 
the middle tier is more open; for example, another developer could attempt to develop 
property in North Oak Cliff, or a coalition of community members could form around a 
particular issue. Thus, taken holistically with participant observations about the overall 
decision-making structure of North Oak Cliff, the data in table 6.11 and figure 6.02 suggest 
that Councilmember Griggs, and to a slightly lesser extent, the public-sector employees of 




other leaders generally only involve themselves on an ad-hoc bases, forming alliances with 
one another on one project, while simultaneously opposing each other on others. Describing 
the overall decision-making structure and process within North Oak Cliff, one participant 
said that: 
What’s happening, especially in the Bishop Arts part of the neighborhood, is a lot like what 
happens in the rest of Dallas, but on a smaller scale, with Councilmember Griggs calling the 
shots, and delegating out to make things happen, while everyone else tries to influence his 
decisions on a project that affects them, either as residents, or as developers looking to make 
some money before the boom goes bust again. 
 Key leaders and top level, past and present. Recall that, prior to the 1991 city council 
restructure, North Oak Cliff was effectively “cut off” from formal leadership, with no links 
to Dallas’ political machine, no significant private-sector coalition, and an antiregime in which 
no single individual or organization held enough support to be widely accepted as a speaker 
for the community526. Following the restructure, the highest echelon of neighborhood 
leadership has been occupied by the neighborhood’s city councilmember, who is the primary 
community decision-maker. Participants unanimously observed that Councilmember Griggs, 
in addition to effectively limitless authority over policy decisions and land-use within the 
community, also receives professional deference from members of the city’s bureaucracy 
regarding code enforcement, infrastructure investment, and public safety matters, among 
many others. Fifteen participants (37.5%) also considered the role of the historical dearth of 
investment in the neighborhood as a factor; with few competing economic interests taking 
up the councilmember’s time, he has little need for additional support in decision-making 
beyond his current staff and advisors. As a result, many participants (38; 95%) observed that 
there are few opportunities for other actors to meaningfully oppose a decision with which 
the councilmember agrees, suggesting in various (often colorful) terms: “There’s Scott 
                                                          




(Griggs), and then there’s everyone else. He has the power to decide, and everyone else can 
only try to get him to change his mind.”  
 Second echelon leaders, past and present. For Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure, 
this study found that a high-middle tier of leaders, composed of highly influential business 
executives, civic philanthropists, and city staff had particularly high levels of influence over 
decisions made by high tier actors. This is not the case in North Oak Cliff; while table 6.15 
shows formal authorities and first tier influentials occupying the highest three positions among the 
middle tier, 23 participants (57.5%) agreed that these actors often do not exert any outsized 
degree of influence over Councilmember Griggs, when compared to other actors involved in 
neighborhood decision-making; instead, these participants often described Griggs as, as one 
participant put it, “working hard to not show favorites when he makes a decision.” A 
minority of participants (6; 15.0%) strongly disagreed, describing the councilmember as a 
“sellout” or “shill for gentrification,” although of these, only 2 were able to point out a 
specific project to support their claim. Instead, nearly all (39; 97.5%) of participants 
observed that the private- and third-sector actors found within the middle-tier 0often work 
together in ad-hoc partnerships as evidence of community support for a particular project or 
policy request, although these partnerships are fluid, and fail to result in the formation of 
enduring coalitions. One participant clearly summarized this scenario, describing it as-
follows: 
People around here get passionate about an issue, and they go out and find other people 
with that same passion, and they form these grand coalitions around it. The problem is that 
nobody really invests in team-building, or forming relationships among the different 
members, so these sorts of coalitions just don’t last very long.  
Further complicating the issue, all 40 participants variously identified competing agendas 
within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure, supporting a three-agenda competition 




among active, engaged stakeholders in North Oak Cliff, participant observations suggest that 
there are no neutral parties, with respect to economic development.  
 Looking first at the pro-development agenda, table 6.12 shows the names most 
commonly associated with this perspective; this table also includes a summary entry for 
actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to be individually included for 
in-depth evaluation.  




Matt Segrest 29 72.5% 
David Eitches 17 42.5% 
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian 13 32.5% 
Martin Koonsman 13 32.5% 
Tom Prohaska 11 27.5% 
Joe McElroy 9 22.5% 
Scott Griggs 5 12.5% 
Jim Lake, Jr. 3 7.5% 
David Spence 2 5.0% 
Other Actor Not Listed 9 22.5% 
These data suggest that participants identified Matt Segrest, David Eitches, Tom Prohaska, 
and Farrokh & Michael Nazerian most closely with an agenda described by one participant 
as a “mix of modern steel and glass high-rises that tower over gentrified, whitewashed 
historic properties that nobody who grew up here could afford to live in” and another called 
“the dream of millennials imposed on the reality of blue-collar neighborhoods.” In more 
concrete terms, participants most commonly discussed attempts by these actors to lobby for 
relaxed development restrictions, especially regarding building height and density (21; 
52.5%), reduced mandatory minimum parking allotments (18; 45%), reduced (or eliminated) 
affordable housing minimums (15; 37.5%), reduced (or eliminated) restrictions on the types 
of businesses allowed to occupy proposed developments (13; 32.5%), and expanded limits to 
TIF support for development projects throughout the neighborhood (13; 32.5%). This 
                                                          




agenda is largely market-based, and is fueled by migration of younger, wealthier whites back 
into North Oak Cliff. Describing this, one participant said that: 
It’s the market in Dallas, but you see it in all kinds of other big cities. People are moving 
back to these old neighborhoods because they like the vibe, but not all of them want a fixer-
upper house – they want to be surrounded by history without having to worry about old 
knob-and-tube (electrical wiring) or lead pipes. North Oak Cliff is unique, though, because 
so much of it is still here – most cities bulldozed these old buildings back in the fifties.  
 Opposing this agenda are progressive-development and anti-development advocates; 
these actors (and the number of participants who identified them with a particular agenda) 
are listed, respectively, in tables 6.13 and 6.14. As with table 6.12, these tables each also 
include a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to 
be individually included for in-depth evaluation. 




Scott Griggs 34 85.0% 
Jim Lake, Jr. 29 72.5% 
Lisa Benskin 24 60.0% 
Michael Anglin 23 57.5% 
Scott Hounsel 21 52.5% 
Neva Dean 19 47.5% 
Jason Roberts 13 32.5% 
David Spence 12 30.0% 
Other Actor Not Listed 15 37.5% 
 




Pam Conley 40 100.0% 
Other Actor Not Listed 6 15.0% 
These data suggest that, overall, there is significant agreement among participants regarding 
which actors are associated with a progressive position on development in North Oak Cliff. 
Describing this positon, participants identified a number of characteristics, including 
community involvement in new development projects, including public design charrettes as 
part of the design process for new projects (27; 67.5%), community needs assessments (22; 
55.0%), local ownership of businesses in new commercial spaces (13; 32.5%), and 
                                                          
528 Author’s note: subcategory totals do not add up to, respectively, 40 or 100% 




modifications to TIF eligibility requirements to ensure that, whenever possible, existing 
residents can afford rents in new housing units (9; 22.5%).  
 Although participants’ opinions differ on exactly what constitutes progressive 
development in North Oak Cliff, many appeared to, as the adage goes, “know it when they 
saw it.” Citing specific examples of the work of actors supporting the progressive-
development agenda, 22 participants (55%) referenced a recent development proposal by 
Matt Segrest’s company, Alamo Manhattan, wherein community uproar over the design 
proposal led to a series of meetings between residents and the developer at Griggs’ behest. 
These meetings eventually led to a series of significant design changes, accommodations for 
affordable housing units, and additional parking to address residents’ concerns530.   
 For a smaller subset of decision-makers, the progressive-development agenda makes 
too many concessions, resulting in unnecessary displacement and what 5 participants 
(12.5%) called “the neighborhood losing its soul.” Participants unanimously named Pam 
Conley as the primary advocate for this position, which proffers heavy restrictions on new- 
and infill development, including strict interpretations (and enforcement) of zoning 
ordinances (19; 47.5%), limits on how many residential- and commercial tenants can be 
displaced by development (15; 37.5%), and a moratorium on new development until existing 
codes and zoning can be updated to keep new development in-line with extant buildings (7; 
17.5%). Speaking of Conley’s efforts specifically, participants commented on her fights to 
oppose the use of neighborhood streets for overflow parking (32; 80%), density increases 
that result from tearing down existing structures in favor of new development (16; 40.0%), 
and the creation of new restaurants with late hours in residential zones (11; 27.5%).  
                                                          




 Although participants often (29; 72.5%) expressed frustration at Conley’s hardline 
position with respect to development, most (28; 70%) considered her an effective voice 
when Councilmember Griggs and other formal authorities are powerless. For example, 13 
participants (32.5%) mentioned that, as long as a development project is within the 
constraints of how a plot is zoned, and does not seek TIF funding, Councilmember Griggs is 
largely unable to prevent it, even if he disagrees with the development itself. In these cases, 
those participants admitted that Conley’s knowledge of how to fight development and 
willingness to do so is often the only hope residents have to prevent disruptive development. 
While Conley is not always successful, a strong minority of participants (14; 35.0%) noted 
that she often wins significant battles over zoning and new development against much larger, 
better-funded developers531. Describing this, one participant said that: 
Pam (Conley) is a bulldozer, when it comes to protecting the quality of life for the poor folks 
living in the neighborhoods around here. Subtle, she ain’t, but she’s about the strongest, 
most effective change agent outside of the (city) council. If a fight can be won – and not all 
of them can – she stands the best chance of winning it.  
 While middle tier actors represent a majority of North Oak Cliff’s contemporary second 
echelon, low tier actors David Spence and Jason Roberts tend to operate independently of other 
decision-makers, circumventing the larger decision-making process, albeit with the support 
of Councilmember Griggs. Looking first at second tier influential David Spence, whose 
company (Good Space) purchases vacant buildings, many of which are slated for demolition, 
renovates them, and rents them to local businesses and residents532. Many participants 
credited Spence for much of the initial revitalization of the Bishop Arts District within 
North Oak Cliff (23; 57.5%), for saving commercial corridors throughout North Oak Cliff 
(23; 57.5%), and for ensuring that, within his own projects, existing development is not 
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displaced (11; 27.5%). One participant described Spence as a “privateer developer – not part 
of the mainstream, but supported by City Hall for doing what the big developers can’t do, 
which is keep the neighborhood fabric intact.” 
On a smaller scale, participants also identified civic chair Jason Roberts, who has been 
involved in two key projects within North Oak Cliff; first, the Oak Cliff Transit Authority, 
which wrote a successful application for 23 million dollars in federal TIGER funding to 
build a new streetcar line connecting the former “streetcar suburb” with Downtown 
Dallas533; and second, the Better Block Project, which collaborates with local residents, 
business owners, and artists to adapt intersections and vacant city blocks to include pop-up 
shops, improved pedestrian and bicycle infrastructure, and urban plazas using easily-
removable supplies like temporary paint, potted plants, and lightweight outdoor furniture534. 
Participants often commented that these projects draw attention to distressed areas within 
the neighborhood; as one put it: 
People outside the area see Bishop Arts, and they think that Oak Cliff is doing alright now, 
and that maybe it’s all turned around. That’s just not true, though – you go three blocks 
away from that area and it’s all still run down. Jason (Roberts) does a good job shining a light 
on places like that, showing what could happen in places that still need attention.  
Some participants expressed concern over both Roberts’ and Spence’s efforts in North Oak 
Cliff, accusing them of catering to the demands of newcomers to the neighborhood – the 
wealthier, white gentrifiers who are (slowly) displacing extant residents. As one put it: 
You can’t say that you’re building for the neighborhood when you renovate a building to 
avoid having to build enough parking, and then bring in a tenant that charges $10 for a slice 
of pie. People here don’t even make $10 an hour; at least, the people who were already here 
don’t. People here don’t have Saturdays off, so what good is an art project to them? How 
does a bike lane that cuts out a lane of traffic help someone get to work on time? For that 
matter, the streetcar doesn’t even run when people need to get to work, so who really 
benefits?  
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Nonetheless, even their detractors hold Roberts and Spence in high regard for bringing 
positive attention to the neighborhood, even if the results (i.e. gentrification) are 
problematic. Many participants (26; 65%) commented that, even when infill development 
brings additional parking headaches and traffic, the businesses are locally-owned, and hire 
local employees; one participant suggested that: 
We don’t like that the streets are packed with cars that don’t live here, but at least the shops 
hire locally, and the owners live around here – if not in southern Dallas, then at least 
somewhere in the area. It’s not like in other places, where the owner is a corporation out of 
some other state, who couldn’t care less what happens here, or which neighbors get hurt by 
their businesses. When someone lives nearby, at least we have a chance to work with them 
and make things right.  
 Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In 
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in 
North Oak Cliff, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10 
individuals to form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the 
entire neighborhood, and that needed to be broadly accepted by the neighborhood as a 
whole. Much like in Dallas citywide, some participants did not select the full 10 committee 
members; the lowest number of selected committee members was 4, and on average, 
participants nominated 7.25 individuals to their hypothetical neighborhood decision-making 
team. The fact that some participants did not nominate a full 10 committee members 
negatively affects the validity of the results; nonetheless, table 6.17 shows the number of 
nominations that each decision-maker received, for all decision-makers receiving 







  Table 6.15: Comparison between North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Committee Nominations and  
Decision-Maker Power Score 




Count Rank Score Rank 
Scott Griggs Formal Authorities High Tier 40 1 154 1 
Michael Anglin Formal Authorities Middle Tier 28 2 136 2 
Pam Conley Civic Chairs Middle Tier 27 3 114 9 
Lisa Benskin Civic Chairs Middle Tier 27 3 113 11 
Scott Hounsel Formal Authorities Middle Tier 25 5 135 3 
Neva Dean Formal Authorities Middle Tier 24 6 127 6 
Martin Koonsman Anchor Captains Middle Tier 22 7 122 7 
Matt Segrest Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 21 8 129 5 
Farrokh & Michael Nazerian Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 19 9 114 9 
Jim Lake Jr.  First Tier Influentials Middle Tier 17 10 135 3 
Joe McElroy First Tier Influentials Middle Tier 16 11 115 8 
David Eitches Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 15 12 108 13 
Jason Roberts Civic Chairs Low Tier 13 13 67 15 
Tom Prohaska First Tier Influentials Middle Tier 10 14 111 12 
David Spence Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 10 14 93 14 
Data in table 6.15 suggest that, within North Oak Cliff, high tier actor Scott Griggs received 
the maximum possible nominations to decision-making committees. Much like in Dallas 
citywide, there is a visible degree of overlap among actors in the various thematic categories. 
Further echoing this study’s findings at the citywide level, Spearman’s ρ for these two 
variables is 0.702, a finding that is statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. While this is 
lower than the same calculation at the citywide level, it is nonetheless a strong, positive 
indicator of the close relationship between a participant’s perceptions of a given actor’s 
power, and their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions at the neighborhood 
level. In addition, these results help validate the use of a reputational analysis in studying the 
nature of power in North Oak Cliff.  
  In considering the role of power tiers within North Oak Cliff’s decision-making 
structure, table 6.16 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees 
received by actors in each, and compares these to the hypothetical maximum number of 







Table 6.16: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a North Oak Cliff Decision-Making Committee by Tier 




High Tier 1 40 40 100% 
Middle Tier 12 251 480 52.3% 
Low Tier 2 23 80 28.8% 
Taken with data from table 6.15, these data suggest that participants’ nominations for 
neighborhood decision-making teams are skewed heavily in favor of Councilmember Griggs, 
evidenced his unanimous participant nominations for decision-making committees than 
other actors. Outside of Councilmember Griggs, these data show that middle tier actors are 
about half as likely to be nominated for neighborhood decision-making committees, but are 
nonetheless twice as likely as low tier actors to be selected. These data are in-line with 
aforementioned participant observations about the nature of decision-making in North Oak 
Cliff, particularly the centrality of Councilmember Griggs in decision-making, and the 
“outsider” status of low tier actors with respect to the politics of decision-making.   
 Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the 
actors involved in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making process, and are these relationships 
related to participants’ perceptions of neighborhood power? Table 6.17 shows the mean 
familiarity scores for each of the three tiers in North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure.  
Table 6.17: North Oak Cliff Mean Familiarity Score by Category and Tier 
Tier Mean Familiarity Score 
High Tier 2.23 
Middle Tier 2.24 
Low Tier 2.38 
At the citywide level, key leaders were found to have the highest familiarity score among the 
three decision-making tiers. Table 6.17 suggests that, for North Oak Cliff, these actors have 
the lowest mean familiarity scores, while low tier actors have the highest mean familiarity 




as this study found for Dallas citywide, the Spearman coefficient between familiarity and 
participants’ perceptions of power is not statistically significant535. 
 This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years, 
served on a board or committee with each of the actors that they nominated to 
neighborhood decision-making committees; these data are reported in table 6.18.  
Table 6.18: North Oak Cliff Mean Shared Committee Service by Tier 
Tier Mean Shared Board or Committee Service 
High Tier 22.5% 
Middle Tier 7.9% 
Low Tier 15.0% 
At the citywide level, participants were most likely to have recently served on a board or 
committee with high tier actors, followed by low tier actors. As the above data suggest, this 
pattern continues to hold for North Oak Cliff, although it should be noted that participants 
reported less shared board or committee service with these actors than their counterparts at 
the citywide level. In addition, it is critical to note that the correlation between shared 
committee service and perceptions of power is not statistically significant536. Therefore, as 
with Dallas as a whole, this study is able to reject the possibility that, in North Oak Cliff, 
participants’ perceptions of power were skewed by proximity to various actors throughout 
the neighborhood.  
 Evaluation of Hypothesis 6. While Hypothesis 5 focuses on one of the city’s 
central neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff, Hypothesis 6 examines the city’s innermost 
neighborhood – Downtown Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will reframe 
data from Chapter 4 in order to address the status of anchor institutions and CDCs within a 
neighborhood power structure. First, this study will seek to establish the presence- and 
nature of organized neighborhood decision-making power. Then, it will evaluate the 
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relationship between power and nominations to decision-making committees. Third, it will 
evaluate the respective relationships between power and familiarity, and between power and 
recent shared board or committee service. Finally, it will relate these findings to the present 
hypothesis, in order to establish whether (or to what end) anchor institutions and CDCs are 
involved in neighborhood decision-making within Downtown Dallas.   
 Downtown Dallas’ decision-makers. Out of this study’s 79 participants, just 
under half (39) were able- and willing to answer survey items and interview questions 
regarding the decision-making process within Downtown Dallas, and the actors who have 
roles within it. These participants identified 18 individual- and group actors, who are 
particularly involved in neighborhood decision-making; those actors are listed in table 6.19.    
Table 6.19: Downtown Dallas Decision-Makers 
Category Name Most Notable Affiliation(s) 
Formal Authorities 
Philip T. Kingston Dallas City Council 
A.C. Gonzalez City Manager 
Karl Zavitkovsky Office of Economic Development 
Mark Rieves Zoning Board of Adjustment 
Paul Ridley City Plan Commission 
First Tier Influentials 
Ray Hunt Hunt Consolidated 
Harlan Crow Crow Holdings 
Ross Perot Jr. Hillwood 
Jody Grant Texas BankCap 
Second Tier 
Influentials 
Scott Krikorian Trammell Crow Co. (subsidiary of CBRE) 
Jim Truitt Forest City 
Michael Caffey C.B. Richard Ellis (CBRE) 
Vince Ackerson Texas Capital Bank (subsidiary of Texas BankCap) 
Jack Matthews Matthews Southwest 
John Scovell Woodbine Development 
Ted Hamilton Hamilton Properties 
Brock Bailey Bracewell & Giuliani, LLP 
Civic Chairs John Crawford Downtown Dallas Inc. 
 
 Contemporary distribution of neighborhood decision-making power. For the 
past half-century, much of Dallas’ history has been baked into the bricks of its CBD. 
Anxious to shake off the association with a slain president, Dallas’ leaders invested 
significant sums of public dollars into razing depression-era offices and constructing modern 
skyscrapers – all within Downtown Dallas537. As the city’s commercial hub, this 
                                                          





neighborhood had few residents throughout much of the late 20th century, but was 
nonetheless at the center of Dallas’ power structure. Of the 39 participants who answered 
questions regarding decision-making in Downtown Dallas, all of them spoke to this general 
theme in one way or another; one participant’s comments stood out, however, and are as-
follows:  
The history of Dallas is the history of big men doing big things. A few of those men are still 
around, but even the ones who died years ago still watch over the city – their names are on 
the highways and skyscrapers and public places throughout the central business district. All 
of Downtown Dallas is basically a monument to the men who built it, and to the kind of 
leadership that allows that sort of thing to happen.  
 When participants were interviewed regarding the nature of decision-making in 
Downtown Dallas today, they described thematic categories of decision-makers, which were 
substantively identical to those found in Dallas as a whole, and as later tables will suggest, 
there are several decision-makers found both at the citywide level and in Downtown Dallas. 
As occurred in North Oak Cliff, when describing the nature of decision-making in the 
neighborhood, participants speaking with respect to Downtown Dallas unanimously agreed 
that its councilmember, Philip Kingston, is a crucial member of the decision-making process. 
However, a majority (28; 71.8%) also agreed that the councilmember shares many aspects of 
top-level neighborhood leadership, including city staff and long-standing business 
executives, as well as John Crawford, the developer-turned-director of the nonprofit 
development corporation and civic booster organization Downtown Dallas Inc. Of these 28 
participants, ten referred to this as “co-leadership,” with the councilmember acting more like 
a “first among equals” when it comes to Downtown Dallas specifically (as opposed to the 
remainder of his district). One participant summarized this, saying that:  
When Dallas went 14-1 back in 1994, you had 13 districts where the councilmember got to 
rule however they saw fit, and nobody could really push back against that. District 14 is 
really two districts – Downtown Dallas and Lakewood/East Dallas. On the Lakewood side, 
you have a district mostly like any other on this side of the river, but in Downtown itself, 




Outside of formal authorities and first tier influentials, Downtown Dallas’ governing coalition is 
composed primarily of second tier influentials made up of actors within the city’s developer class – 
business executives in construction, real estate development, and related fields. To attempt 
to structure these various actors, and to serve as the basis for future comparisons, table 6.20 
extends survey data introduced Chapter 4, which listed mean power scores for each 
decision-maker, by including both total power scores and rank-order data.  
Table 6.20: Power Ratings of Downtown Dallas Decision-Makers 
Rank 
Order 
Name Category Power Score 
Mean 
Power Score 
1 Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials 153 3.92 
2 A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities 152 3.90 
3 John Crawford Civic Chairs 151 3.87 
4 Philip T. Kingston Formal Authorities 150 3.97 
5 Karl Zavitkovsky Formal Authorities 147 3.77 
6 Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials 137 3.51 
7 Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials 133 3.41 
8 Paul Ridley Formal Authorities 128 3.10 
9 John Scovell Second Tier Influentials 123 2.85 
10 Jim Truitt Second Tier Influentials 122 3.13 
11 Mark Rieves Formal Authorities 121 3.26 
12 Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials 120 3.08 
12 Ted Hamilton Second Tier Influentials 120 2.69 
14 Jack Matthews Second Tier Influentials 119 3.03 
15 Jody Grant First Tier Influentials 113 2.90 
16 Scott Krikorian Second Tier Influentials 111 3.15 
17 Brock Bailey Second Tier Influentials 105 2.51 
18 Vince Ackerson Second Tier Influentials 98 3.05 
At the citywide level (and in North Oak Cliff), power score and mean power score shared a 
perfect, positive correlation with one another; for Downtown Dallas, this relationship is 
strong, but not perfect538, which suggests that actors with high power scores tended to 
receive more individual high scores (that is, more ratings of 3 and 4 on a four-point scale) 
than actors who received lower power scores, but this tendency is not as strong as in other 
geographies in this study. Additionally, when thematic categories are coded to a dummy 
variable, mean power score539 (but not total power score540) is negatively correlated with 
thematic category541. The relatively modest Spearman correlation coefficients describing 
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these relationships suggest that, while a connection exists, there are, as table 6.20 illustrates, 
multiple exceptions – most interestingly, that unlike in both Dallas citywide and North Oak 
Cliff, the highest raw power score is not held by the city councilmember representing the 
area. Nonetheless, these results suggest that there is a particular structure to decision-making 
in Downtown Dallas.  
 To test for the presence- and nature of such a structure, this study again utilized a 
Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test to measure the significance of differences among mean 
power scores for decision-makers in Downtown Dallas; the results appear in table 6.21.  
Table 6.21: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Levels of Power 
Name Thematic Category 
Subset for α = 0.05 
Low Tier Middle Tier High Tier 
Philip Kingston Formal Authorities   3.97 
Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials   3.92 
A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities   3.90 
John Crawford Civic Chairs   3.87 
Karl Zavitkovsky Formal Authorities   3.77 
 
Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials  3.51  
Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials  3.41  
Mark Rieves Formal Authorities  3.26  
Scott Krikorian Second Tier Influentials  3.15  
Jim Truitt Second Tier Influentials  3.13  
Paul Ridley Formal Authorities  3.10  
Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials  3.08  
Vince Ackerson Second Tier Influentials  3.05  
Jack Matthews Second Tier Influentials  3.03  
 
Jody Grant First Tier Influentials 2.90   
John Scovell Second Tier Influentials 2.85   
Ted Hamilton Second Tier Influentials 2.69   
Brock Bailey Second Tier Influentials 2.51   
Like its findings in North Oak Cliff, this study finds three tiers (high tier, middle tier, and low 
tier) in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure, but uniquely, data in table 6.21 suggest 
that the highest of these tiers is not occupied solely by the neighborhood’s city 
councilmember. These findings broadly support those found in table 6.20, as well as 
participant observations regarding a central conflict regarding decision-making in Downtown 
Dallas, which will be reconsidered later in this study. Finally, figure 6.03 illustrates the data in 





Figure 6.03: The Structure of Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Power 
 
 
These findings take into account data in table 6.20 and 6.24, as well as participant 
observations of the structure of power in Downtown Dallas. In the paragraphs that follow, 
this study will first discuss Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure broadly, and then it 
will individually examine each of this structure’s three tiers. 
 Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure, broadly. At the citywide level, this study 
identified a decision-making structure composed of four tiers, with actors in the highest tiers 
sharing decision-making involvement, actors in the lowest tier tending to only be involved 
on particular decisions, and some gradient between the two. In North Oak Cliff, this study 
identified a decision-making structure in which a strong city councilmember consolidated 
decision-making authority, and a variety of lower-tier actors worked through ad-hoc alliances 
to influence his decisions. In Downtown Dallas, figure 6.03 conceptualizes a leadership 
structure that (like the one in North Oak Cliff) features three tiers, but that (like Dallas 
citywide) emphasizes a coalition of top-level actors who are involved in most neighborhood-




Finally, as in Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, the highest echelons of decision-making 
in Downtown Dallas – the high tier occupied by formal authorities and first tier influentials – are 
particularly rigid in their membership. Echoing terms used for this category at the citywide 
level, 13 participants (33.3%) used some version of “born in” or “blessed in” to describe 
how various actors in the first tier influentials category joined the highest echelons of 
leadership in Downtown Dallas. Nonetheless, because the barrier dividing high tier leaders is 
particularly rigid, while the low tier middle tier) is largely more open to membership, figure 6.03 
depicts a solid line between high tier and middle tier, and a dashed line between the middle tier 
and low tier.  
 Key leaders and top level, past and present. While archival research uncovered a limited 
amount of literature regarding the decision-making structure (or lack thereof) in North Oak 
Cliff, archival research suggests that the history of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making 
structure is indivisible from that of decision-making in Dallas as a whole; this is in-line with 
extant scholarly research, as well as participant descriptions of how decisions in the 
neighborhood were made in the past; these are well-summarized by the following:  
Downtown (Dallas) has two things that come together to explain a lot about who runs the 
show. It’s the jewel in the crown, so anyone who wants to build something big is going to 
want to build it right there, but also, only so many have the vision and resources to build a 
skyscraper or Reunion Tower. Egos run high in Dallas, and they don’t run any higher than 
when there’s a chance to change the skyline.  
Therefore, this study argues that while North Oak Cliff suffered from a dearth of political 
leadership prior to the 1991 city council restructure, Downtown Dallas is the political heart 
of the city, where the city’s wealthiest and most powerful press for ways to leave enduring 
marks on the city. As figure 6.03 illustrates, Downtown Dallas’ high tier comprises a wider 
variety of actors than analogous tiers in Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, including 




corporation. Supporting this high tier are middle tier actors, who a clear majority of participants 
(24; 61.5%) agreed are effectively subservient to high tier actors, working to support (or 
oppose) various initiatives at the direction of their “superiors.”  
 Corroborating data found in table 6.21, participants almost universally (37; 94.9%) 
suggested that, while other councilmembers enjoy functionally limitless authority over 
development in their districts, Kingston is often challenged by Dallas’ first tier influentials and 
their sympathizers on the Dallas City Council. In describing this situation, participants 
identified two primary factors: approaching term limits for “developer-friendly” city 
councilmembers (identified by 25 participants; 64.1%), and the presence of an aging, though 
still powerful coalition of private sector leaders (35 participants; 89.7%). As a result, 
participants often suggested that Kingston may (and does) lose a number of battles with 
developers in the short run, his fights garner him support from other progressive city 
leaders, as well as the voters in his district; as one participant put it:  
It’s the 1980s and 90s teaming up to fight the 00s and 10s. What I mean is, men and women 
who succeeded in building Dallas in the 1970s, and rebuilding it in the 1990s are trying to do 
that again, but their ideas haven’t changed any – it’s all modern offices and luxury high-rises. 
The ideas are old, but there’s a lot of money and (City) Council support behind them, 
because old, rich men like Ray Hunt all-but own half the councilmembers, the mayor, and 
the city manager. That’s what Councilmember Kingston is fighting against, even though it’s 
hard for him to break even, much less win.  
 Analysis of participant comments regarding actors in Downtown Dallas’ decision-
making structure suggests strong agreement around two conflicting agendas: one supporting 
neoliberal, value-neutral development strategies in Dallas’ urban core, and one with a more 
progressive outlook. Looking first at the pro-development agenda, table 6.22 shows the 
actors most commonly associated with this perspective by study participants; this table also 
includes a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to 









A.C. Gonzalez 39 100.0% 
Ray Hunt 39 100.0% 
Karl Zavitkovsky 33 84.6% 
Harlan Crow 33 84.6% 
Scott Krikorian 30 76.9% 
Vince Ackerson 29 74.4% 
Jody Grant 23 59.0% 
John Scovell 21 53.8% 
John Crawford 19 48.7% 
Ross Perot, Jr.  19 48.7% 
Ted Hamilton 17 43.6% 
Jim Truitt 13 33.3% 
Michael Caffey 8 20.5% 
Other Actor Not Listed 18 46.2% 
This agenda, unsurprisingly, advocates continuing the historical practice of using city funds 
to induce high-end, mixed-use development, new office space, urban stadiums, and further 
expansion of the downtown convention center543. Describing the actions of this agenda’s 
adherents, participants specifically mentioned the use of TIF and BID districts (39; 100.0%), 
and to a lesser extent, tax abatements (20; 51.3%), earmarks within larger bond packages (8; 
20.5%), and preferential treatment during the contract bidding process (7; 18.0%), which five 
participants called “sweetheart deals.” In describing actors who adhere to this position on 
development, one participant said that: 
You have to remember that before the real estate market went belly-up in the 80s, Dallas 
was putting up skyscrapers as fast as we could bring in the concrete and pig iron. We took 
money from the schools, from the police, (and) from the roads to build all (of) this, and 
when the market fell apart, what did we have to show for it? Now you have this group – the 
same ones from before, or their kids, or their proxies – coming to City Hall, hats in hand, 
trying to say that the only way to save Downtown is to repeat what we did before. Isn’t that 
the definition of insanity – doing what you did before, and thinking things will be different?  
 
A more charitable participant, representing the views of the majority (20 participants; 
51.28%), characterized this agenda by suggesting that: 
We have to keep Downtown Dallas growing, because if we don’t grow here, then some 
other city will take those jobs out from under us. If it’s not Dallas, it’s Plano, Richardson, 
Irving, Arlington, or even suburbs further out – Allen, Fairview, McKinney, (and) Princeton. 
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If it’s not one of those, then maybe a different city in a different state. Point is, we either 
grow or we die, and Downtown is where growth happens.  
 As an alternative, participants unanimously identified a second, progressive-
development agenda, which seeks to bind public development incentives to more equitable 
economic development strategies and considerations for people who cannot afford upscale 
housing, dining, shopping, and entertainment544; table 6.23 shows which actors participants 
identified as being most closely associated with this perspective; as with table 6.22, this table 
includes a summary entry for actors who did not receive enough participant nominations to 
be individually included for in-depth evaluation..  




Phillip Kingston 39 100.0% 
Mark Rieves 28 71.8% 
Paul Ridley 26 66.7% 
John Crawford 19 48.7% 
Other Actor Not Listed 16 42.0% 
As data in table 6.23 suggest, support for this agenda is largely found among formal authorities 
Phillip Kingston and two of his political appointees. These three actors hold within-district 
authority over zoning change proposals, land-use policies, and zoning exemptions to push 
for a number of progressive provisions added to development subsidies; participants 
variously identified examples such as: “middle class” retail and dining options (18 
participants; 46.2%), expanded affordable housing beyond legal requirements for TIF 
funding (14; 35.9%), investment in local infrastructure improvements such as bike lanes (12; 
30.8%), mid-block pedestrian crosswalks (11; 28.2%), and traffic calming measures (11; 
28.2%), and requirements to bring in businesses like mid-range grocery stores, to support a 
growing population (9; 23.1%).  
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  In the fight over development projects in Downtown Dallas, participants 
unanimously identified one actor whose organization attempts (often successfully) to broker 
agreements between these disparate factions: civic chair John Crawford, who has become 
central in brokering what many participants (31; 79.5%) considered to be “compromise 
deals” for development projects. It should be somewhat unsurprising, then, that tables 6.22 
and 6.23 suggest that as many participants identify Crawford with the local pro-development 
agenda as identify him with the progressive-development alternative. 
 Recall that Crawford’s organization, Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI) has been part of 
Downtown Dallas’ business community for over five decades. Traditionally, DDI has been a 
booster organization for the CBD, but since 2010, DDI has been at the center of fulfilling 
Downtown Dallas 360546, the master redevelopment plan for Downtown Dallas. Crawford 
himself has a decades-long career in real estate development in- and around Downtown 
Dallas, and most participants (25; 64.1%) considered his professional- and social ties to be 
crucial in legitimizing him among first tier influentials, while the public oversight of DDI, 
through its board of directors, serves as a basis for the support of formal authorities both 
within the neighborhood and at the citywide level. While Crawford is not always successful 
in finding compromise between Kingston and his opponents, two-thirds of participants (26) 
agreed that Crawford is involved in nearly every development-related decision in the 
neighborhood, with many suggesting that Crawford’s support among other key leaders 
places him as a de facto equal to Kingston himself, at least with respect to development 
decisions.  
 Second echelon leaders, past and present. Recall that, although the Thometz study did not 
specifically mention Downtown Dallas, literature regarding the city in the 1960s and 1970s 
                                                          




suggests that decisions regarding the neighborhood were largely the purview of the business 
leaders and real estate developers who made decisions at the citywide level547; therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that, if second echelon actors from the Thometz study took active roles in 
decision-making within Downtown Dallas, these actors (as a subset of all second echelon actors) 
were likely younger executives in real estate development, finance and investment, utilities, 
trade, and manufacturing. As figure 6.03 illustrates, this study finds that Downtown Dallas’ 
contemporary second echelon is composed of its second tier influentials, which (as shown in table 
6.21) notes are composed of executives in real estate development, finance and investment, 
and real estate law.   
 The vast majority of participants (36; 92.3%) suggested that actors found in 
Downtown Dallas’ contemporary second echelon are not individually involved in the early 
stages of neighborhood-level decisions, and their involvement tends to be project-specific. 
Where these actors differ from their likely predecessors is that, as participants often 
described it, they often intentionally avoid becoming key leaders in decision-making. All 
participants broadly agreed, however, that these actors are not tied to Dallas itself; their 
companies have offices across the United States (and in some cases, internationally), so their 
loyalties, if they exist at all, are primarily to their employers. Additionally, a minority of 
participants (19; 48.7%) also suggested that, because the future Downtown Dallas’ leadership 
is uncertain, executives would normally transition into a more central role in decision-making 
are waiting to see what happens; as one participant suggested: 
Dallas is in the middle of a power struggle, and it plays out here in Downtown because this 
is where the power players are the most invested, in terms of their reputations and their 
money. Progressive leaders like Philip (Kingston) are a seven-vote minority today, but they 
may not be in the minority forever, so the smart move, if you’re an up-and-coming civic 
leader, is to wait a few years to see how it shakes out. 
 
                                                          





If these younger ones pick a side now, and that side ends up losing out in the end, then that 
hurts their business long-term.  
 
 Decision-making power and nominations to decision-making committees. In 
addition to asking participants to give ratings of power for potential decision-makers in 
Downtown Dallas, the survey introduced in Chapter 3 asked participants to nominate 10 
individuals to form a committee responsible for making a decision that would affect the 
entire neighborhood, and that needed to be broadly accepted by the neighborhood as a 
whole. Much like in Dallas as a whole and North Oak Cliff, some participants did not select 
the full 10 committee members; the lowest number of selected committee members was 7, 
and on average, participants nominated 9.18 individuals to their hypothetical neighborhood 
decision-making team. Once again, the fact that some participants did not nominate a full 10 
committee members negatively affects the validity of the results, but nonetheless, table 6.24 
shows the number of nominations that each decision-maker received, for all decision-makers 
receiving nominations from at least 10% (3.9, rounded up to 4) of the participants.  
  Table 6.24: Comparison between Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Committee Nominations and  
Decision-Maker Power Score 




Count Rank Score Rank 
John Crawford Civic Chairs High Tier 39 1 151 3 
Philip Kingston Formal Authorities High Tier 39 1 150 4 
A.C. Gonzalez Formal Authorities High Tier 23 3 152 2 
Ray Hunt First Tier Influentials High Tier 21 4 153 1 
Jack Matthews Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 21 4 119 14 
Scott Krikorian Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 20 6 111 16 
Jim Truitt Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 19 7 122 10 
Michael Caffey Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 18 8 120 12 
Mark Rieves Formal Authorities Middle Tier 15 9 121 11 
Karl Zavitkovsky Formal Authorities High Tier 13 10 147 5 
Harlan Crow First Tier Influentials Middle Tier 13 10 137 6 
Ross Perot Jr. First Tier Influentials Middle Tier 13 10 133 7 
Vince Ackerson Second Tier Influentials Middle Tier 12 13 98 18 
John Scovell Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 11 14 123 9 
Paul Ridley Formal Authorities Middle Tier 9 15 128 8 
Jody Grant First Tier Influentials Low Tier 9 15 113 15 
Ted Hamilton Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 7 17 120 12 
Brock Bailey Second Tier Influentials Low Tier 7 17 105 17 
The data in table 6.26 show that Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure broadly 




having the most decision-making committee nominations, middle tier actors appearing in the 
middle of the list, and low tier actors receiving the fewest overall nominations, although (as in 
other geographies) exceptions to this exist. As was found in both North Oak Cliff and 
Dallas citywide, there is overlap among actors in each of the four thematic categories (no 
anchor captains were identified), but of particular interest is that civic chair John Crawford 
received as many nominations as the neighborhood’s city councilmember; in this study, this 
is unique to Downtown Dallas. These results suggest that although Councilmember 
Kingston is the de jure primary decision-maker in Downtown Dallas, in practice, this position 
is shared (to varying extents) with civic chair John Crawford, formal authority A. C. Gonzalez, 
and first tier influential Ray Hunt.  
 This study also compares the correlation between decision-making committee 
nominations and power score. These variables, like their counterparts in North Oak Cliff 
and Dallas citywide, are positively correlated548, but not to the same level of significance as 
measures for these other geographies. In short, while participants’ perceptions of power are 
positively related to their willingness to nominate that actor to make decisions that would 
affect the neighborhood, in Downtown Dallas (moreso than in other geographies studied), 
additional factors are involved. This limitation in mind, the statistical significance of the 
relationship between committee nominations and power score nonetheless continues to 
validate the use of a reputational analysis in studying neighborhood-level power.  
  In considering the role of power tiers within Downtown Dallas’ decision-making 
structure, table 6.25 shows the total number of nominations to decision-making committees 
received by actors in each tier, and compares these to the maximum number of nominations 
that could have been granted to these actors.  
                                                          




Table 6.25: Decision-Makers Selected to Serve on a Downtown Dallas Decision-Making Committee by Tier 
Tier Number in Category Total Nominations Total Possible Nominations % 
High Tier 5 135 195 69.2% 
Middle Tier 9 140 351 39.9% 
Low Tier 4 34 156 21.8% 
These data echo findings found in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas, and suggest that 
high tier actors are more likely to be involved in neighborhood-level decision-making than 
middle tier actors, who are themselves more likely to be involved than low tier actors. This is 
in-line with participants’ observations about decision-making, and is also consistent with 
expectations regarding the presence of a hierarchical structure in decision-making in 
Downtown Dallas.  
 Familiarity and shared committee service. How well do participants know the 
actors involved in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process, and are these relationships 
related to participants’ perceptions of power? Table 6.26 shows the mean familiarity scores 
for each of the four thematic categories and two tiers in Downtown Dallas’ decision-making 
structure.  
Table 6.26: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Mean Familiarity Score by Tier 
Category or Tier Mean Familiarity Score 
High Tier 2.50 
Middle Tier 2.24 
Low Tier 2.22 
 At the citywide level, high tier actors were found to have the highest familiarity score 
among the three decision-making tiers, while in North Oak Cliff, these actors were found to 
have the lowest familiarity scores. Data in table 6.26 suggests that, like Dallas citywide, in 
Downtown Dallas, participants are most familiar with high tier actors, and comparatively less 
familiar with middle tier and low tier actors. These differences, though interesting, are 




the relationships between familiarity and participants’ perceptions of power in Downtown 
Dallas is not statistically significant549. 
 This study also asked participants to identify whether they had, in the past five years, 
served on a board or committee with each of the actors that they nominated to 
neighborhood decision-making committees; these data are reported in table 6.27.  
Table 6.27: Downtown Dallas Decision-Maker Mean Shared Committee Service by Tier 
Tier Mean Shared Committee Service 
High Tier 26.7% 
Middle Tier 27.9% 
Low Tier 28.8% 
These data suggest that, on average, participants are most likely to have recently served with 
low tier actors on a board or committee, with these percentages decreasing for middle tier and 
high tier actors. These findings are dissimilar to those found in Dallas as a whole and North 
Oak Cliff, but nonetheless, the relationship between shared committee service and 
participants’ perceptions of decision-making power is not statistically significant550. Recall 
that this lack of significance also occurs when comparing familiarity with power; therefore, 
this study is able to reject the possibility that, in Downtown Dallas, participants’ perceptions 
of power were skewed by proximity to various actors throughout the neighborhood.  
Discussion of Coalition Hypotheses 
 In light of the changing demographic- and economic contexts of cities in the United 
States, and the growing roles of CDCs and anchor institutions in economic development and 
policymaking in cities like Cleveland551 and Philadelphia552, this study forwarded a need to 
revisit “big city politics.” Building on a previous study of Dallas, this study systematically 
determined the relative decision-making power of individuals at the citywide level, as well as 
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in two neighborhoods uniquely impacted by aforementioned contextual changes. A major 
aim of this study was to provide data regarding the nature of contemporary urban 
governance, and the role (or lack thereof) of anchor institutions and CDCs in governing the 
modern commercial republic. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will first briefly 
summarize the methods used to address its coalition-centered hypotheses, as well as results 
of this study’s qualitative data analysis. Then, it will compare real-world equitable economic 
development programs found in a subset of other cities to those found in Dallas.  
Dallas as a Whole  
In evaluating its second three hypotheses, this study began by updating knowledge of 
Dallas’ citywide governing coalition. To summarize, during the summer and early fall of 
2015, this study asked 79 participants to rate the levels of power for over 100 individuals 
active on various boards, committees, and civic projects, including business executives, 
political leaders, high-level bureaucrats, and directors of nonprofit organizations and local 
anchor institutions. This study, in repeating measures from previous work regarding Dallas, 
used Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test to determine that the ranges of mean power ratings 
represented four distinct decision-making tiers at the citywide level. These tiers substantiate 
participant observations about the nature of decision-making at the citywide level, and 
suggest that high-ranking public sector officials have largely (but not entirely) supplanted 
business leaders at the highest echelons of decision-making.  
 Analysis methods used. Following in the footsteps of Hunter’s 1953 analysis of 
Atlanta, and Thometz’ 1963 analysis of Dallas, participants were asked to nominate ten 
actors to hypothetical decision-making committees, whose decisions would need to be 
accepted by the city as a whole. The number of nominations received were correlated with 




are a valid proxy for decision-making power, and validating the use of the reputational 
method in studying the nature of contemporary urban governance at the citywide level. 
Participants were also asked to indicate their amount of recent shared board- and committee 
service with these actors, and their level of familiarity with each. These results were 
correlated with power scores, but were not found to be statistically significant, which helps 
to negate the possibility that participants’ perceptions of power were confounded by 
proximity to particular actors, while also helping to validate the reputational method itself.  
 CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. A primary goal of 
this study was to find whether, or to what extent, CDCs and anchor institutions are part of 
Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition, and to understand the effects of that involvement. 
With respect to the role of anchor institutions and CDCs in citywide decision-making, no 
CDC director achieved enough nominations to be included in this study’s examination of 
citywide decision-making. However, four leaders of anchor institutions – three university 
presidents, and one hospital director – did receive enough nominations. This is a greater 
representation than was found in previous studies, but both qualitative and quantitative data 
suggest that the role of anchor institutions in citywide decision-making is limited; while these 
actors appear in the mid-range of power scores, data suggest that in general, they are only 
involved in decisions related to education and healthcare, or when a development project 
seeks to include facilities for their institutions. 
 Importantly, there is one exception to the above characterizations of the roles of 
anchor captains in decision-making – Gerald Turner, the president of Southern Methodist 
University. As detailed in Chapter 4, Turner and the university appear to be unique among 
Dallas’ anchor institutions, in that have both long-been associated with power and influence 




university as a proxy supporter of various projects, allowing them to indirectly express 
approval without the “political baggage” associated with a direct endorsement.   
 The structure and nature of decision-making in Dallas as a whole. Based on its 
analysis of 79 participant surveys and interviews, this study affirms its suspicion that the 
strong, entrepreneurial governing coalition found in the Thometz study, which weakened 
and fragmented into the complex entrepreneurial governing coalition by Elkin’s study, has 
continued to fragment and fade, although it would be inaccurate to suggest that this coalition 
has completely died. In the 1963 reputational study of Dallas, only two of 67 identified 
leaders were not then-current members of the business community553, but in this study, nine 
actors out of 32 are not directly affiliated with the city’s business community; recall that this 
also contains two sets of actors (the city council and the CPC) who were considered jointly; 
were these separated, the number of “non-business actors” would more-than triple. A 
majority of these actors represent the public sector, especially at the highest levels of 
citywide decision-making, so while private sector elites and civic organizations remain highly 
influential, data strongly suggest that government officials have filled the “power vacuum” 
left behind by a fragmented business community. The sympathies of these formal authorities 
broadly still lie with the business- and real estate development communities, with a clear pro-
development agenda being supported by a coalition containing the city manager, seven (out of 
fourteen) district-based councilmembers, and the mayor, and it is supported by an elite, 
wealthy, and older cohort of first tier influentials and the civic chairs whose organizations 
represent the old guard ideas of Dallas’ past. However, an additional seven councilmembers 
support more progressive alternatives, and their ranks have been growing for several years, 
following the creation of the 14-1 election system.  
                                                          






North Oak Cliff  
 This study also moved beyond previous research, by performing reputational 
analyses on two neighborhoods within the city – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. 
Looking first at North Oak Cliff, 40 of this study’s 79 participants self-reported as being 
particularly knowledgeable about the decision-making process within this neighborhood, and 
through their surveys and interviews, it was clear that these actors had a thorough 
understanding of the history and current state of community-level leadership. Each 
participant was asked to nominate ten actors to hypothetical decision-making committees, 
whose decisions would need to be accepted by the neighborhood as a whole. Further, for 
each actor that they nominated, participants were asked to rate the power level of that 
individual, and to indicate any recent shared board- and committee service with that actor, 
and their level of familiarity.  
 Analysis methods used. Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test was used to determine 
that the ranges of mean power ratings indicated three tiers of decision-making power. As 
with Dallas citywide, the number of nominations to decision-making committees that an 
actor received was found to be positively correlated with power scores, again suggesting that 
participant perceptions of power are a valid proxy for decision-making power in actuality. As 
with Dallas as a whole, neither recent shared committee service nor familiarity were found to 
be significantly correlated with participants’ perceptions of decision-making power, which 
continues to validate the reputational method.  
 CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. As with Dallas as 




anchor institutions are part of North Oak Cliff’s decision-making structure. Although one 
anchor captain, hospital director Martin Koonsman, was found to be influential in the 
neighborhood decision-making process, analysis of participant surveys and interviews 
suggests that Koonsman is only likely to involve himself in decisions that relate directly to 
the hospital, such as facilities expansion plans, or ongoing conflicts with the residents of 
households adjacent the hospital complex. Therefore, this study finds no particular evidence 
that anchor institutions or CDCs have become part of any governing coalition in North Oak 
Cliff, and no particular evidence to support the role of these institutions in equitable 
economic development programs. 
 The structure and nature of decision-making in North Oak Cliff. Based on its 
analysis of 40 participant surveys and interviews, this study finds that the antiregime of North 
Oak Cliff’s past has been largely subsumed by the renewed presence of formal authorities in the 
neighborhood – particularly its city councilmember, Scott Griggs, who occupies the highest 
tier in the Duncan’s test for North Oak Cliff, and whom participants considered to be the 
core actor in decision-making at the neighborhood level. Immediately below Griggs are his 
appointees to development-related boards and commissions, as well as pro-development city 
staff who (in most cases) defer to Griggs’ wishes, but on matters of development, advocate 
on behalf of the developers. As participants unanimously agreed, other actors in the 
neighborhood are often forced to work together to sway Griggs’ position on various policies 
and development projects. This leads to the ad-hoc formation of temporary alliances, and 
participants agreed that it is not uncommon for two leaders to work together on one issue 
while simultaneously opposing one another on a different one.  
 Participants agreed that, broadly speaking, new development and gentrification in 




North Oak Cliff. Participants also identified alliances among rentiers and developers – the 
first tier influentials and second tier influentials active in neighborhood decision-making. In 
characterizing these alliances, participants observed that the three largest neighborhood 
landowners work together with area developers in order to “bundle together” smaller parcels 
of land to be more suitable for larger development projects, often at the cost of displacing 
extant residents and businesses. Neighborhood leaders like Pam Conley and Lisa Benskin, 
while lacking in direct authority over land-use decisions, nonetheless work to educate and 
organize residents and business leaders who are at risk of displacement. Through mobilizing 
neighborhood residents, these two have been somewhat successful in changing development 
plans in ways that benefit their communities, and pressuring Councilmember Griggs to use 
his land-use powers to keep new projects small, and within the scale of existing structures.  
While Conley and Benskin organize social capital in the neighborhood, two 
additional leaders – developer David Spence and “guerilla urban designer” Jason Roberts – 
work to develop the physical capital in North Oak Cliff in ways that, while sometimes 
controversial, nonetheless attract positive press to the area and help to anchor locally-owned 
businesses into once-vacant commercial corridors.  These two actors occupy the low tier of 
the neighborhood’s decision-making structure, and often, participants characterized them as 
independent actors who generally circumvent the larger decision-making process, albeit with 
the support of Councilmember Griggs.  
Downtown Dallas 
 In considering Downtown Dallas, 39 of this study’s 79 participants self-reported as 
being particularly knowledgeable about the decision-making process within this 
neighborhood, and through their surveys and interviews, reports that were validated through 




questions regarding North Oak Cliff, each of these 39 participants was asked to nominate 
ten actors to hypothetical decision-making committees, whose decisions would need to be 
accepted by the neighborhood as a whole. Further, for each actor that they nominated, 
participants were asked to rate the power level of that individual, and to indicate any recent 
shared board- and committee service with that actor, and their level of familiarity.  
 Analysis methods used. Duncan’s New Multiple Range Test was used to determine 
that the ranges of mean power ratings indicated three tiers of decision-making power. As 
with Dallas citywide and North Oak Cliff, the number of nominations to decision-making 
committees that an actor received was found to be positively correlated with power scores, 
again suggesting that participant perceptions of power are a valid proxy for decision-making 
power in actuality. Additionally, neither recent shared committee service nor familiarity were 
found to be significantly correlated with participants’ perceptions of decision-making power, 
which continues to validate the reputational method.  
 CDC and anchor institution involvement in decision-making. As with Dallas as 
a whole and North Oak Cliff, a primary aim of this study was to find whether, or to what 
extent, CDCs and anchor institutions are part of Downtown Dallas’ decision-making 
structure. This study finds no particular evidence that anchor institutions or CDCs have 
become part of any governing coalition in Downtown Dallas and no particular evidence to 
support the role of these institutions in equitable economic development programs. 
However, as noted previously in this chapter, the private nonprofit development corporation 
Downtown Dallas Inc. (DDI), and its CEO John Crawford, have become integral to 
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making process.  
Recall that, for over half a century, DDI has acted as a booster organization for 




subset of like-minded formal authorities, first tier influentials, and second tier influentials, who 
combine public- and private resources to fulfill a common agenda: attracting economic 
development and improving the vitality of Downtown Dallas. In effect, the supporting 
members, directors, and senior leadership of DDI have created a neighborhood-level 
governing coalition within the larger structure of governance for Dallas as a whole, and prior 
to the transition to district-based councilmembers, many older participants referred to these 
actors as the “real power” in Dallas, with one going so far as to say that: 
Up until maybe the mid-nineties, you had Downtown, and then you had the rest of the city. 
If any big idea came out of the “Big Men Downtown,” no matter how crazy it was, it was 
probably going to happen. That’s how we got most of the more imaginative projects you see 
through Downtown, from the underground mall to the top of (local landmark) Reunion 
Tower. The mayor and the council ran the rest of the city, but the Big Men – the Hunts, the 
Crows, the Coxes, the Perots, the Caruths – all of those families with museums and 
highways named after them – they ran Downtown like their own personal sandbox, and the 
truth is, for a long time it really was.  
 
This coalition, as it existed before the current structure of the Dallas City Council, and 
before the city’s economy collapsed, is likely part of the complex entrepreneurial governing 
coalition that Elkin identified – the one less interested in the day-to-day operations of Dallas’ 
government, and more interested in a city government that facilitates “good development 
opportunities” 554. Recall that Elkin already identified this coalition’s weakening following the 
amendments to Dallas’ charter in the 1980s, and from participant comments that, following 
the 1994 restructure of Dallas’ elected leaders, this coalition seems to have largely evaporated 
outside of Downtown Dallas. Thus, what does the continued presence of a unified 
governing coalition mean for decision-making within the “mini-fiefdom” represented by 
Downtown Dallas’ council district, and headed by its councilmember?  
 To answer this, consider that according to Miles’s Law, actors are more likely to 
support policies that benefit their organizations over those that serve collective interests, or 
                                                          




in other words, “where you stand depends on where you sit.” While initially resulting from 
observations at the national level, survey and interview data from this survey suggest that 
this axiom applies to perspectives on Crawford and DDI as well. For example, a common 
theme among supporters of Crawford and DDI is that the organization’s involvement has 
resulted in less infighting among competing interests, and a more unified vision of 
Downtown Dallas as part of DDI’s involvement in the Downtown Dallas 360 development 
plan. Additionally, it is clear from participant comments that Crawford personally 
encourages more collaboration with City Staff and Councilmember Kingston than would 
have appeared in the past; comments representative of this position include:  
DDI supports a lot of projects that end up controversial, but it won’t support a bad project 
just because it’s a big one – you really have to show how your idea fits with the bigger plan. 
Sometimes that means making concessions to folks like Kingston and his allies on City 
Council, and other times that means digging in for a long fight.  
 
It’s not like “The Godfather,” where you go to John (Crawford) for approval on something, 
and if you don’t get it, nothing happens. This is still Dallas, and if you really want to build 
something Downtown, there’s always a way to get it built. It’s just a lot easier when your 
vision aligns with his, since his team basically wrote Downtown Dallas 360 and he’s got more 
sway with the banks and City Hall than near (SIC) anyone else.   
 
 Presenting an alternate viewpoint, the participants presented negative opinions of 
Crawford and DDI often suggested that the organization’s support structure undermines the 
principles of a democratic society, by allowing private developers to circumvent the wishes 
of Councilmember Kingston in ways that are not possible on other districts; recall that one 
participant (whose comments were echoed by a number of others) said that: “What gets built 
where has nothing to do with what residents want, or what the neighborhood needs if it’s 
ever going to sustain itself after the building boom dies off.” Additionally, detractors 
suggested that Crawford and his organization are often used as a proxy for public input. As 
part of Downtown Dallas 360, DDI produces annual status reports on the state of Downtown 




various projects. However, these events are often held on weekday evenings, frequently 
require reservations to be made in advance, and are all-but exclusively marketed through 
social media. As a result, people who work unstable schedules, or who are unable to find 
childcare, or simply cannot afford to take the time to attend these meetings are unable to 
effectively voice their opinions. Describing this situation, two participants said that: 
There’s (SIC) a lot of poor people living in Downtown, but you’d hardly know it by looking 
at the crowd in one of these big meetings. I don’t even know if some of them would be let in 
the building, if they even knew to get an RSVP and could show up.  
 
Decisions get made behind closed doors, in the closed sessions of directors’ meetings, and 
over lunch and dinner meetings all over the city. When all that’s done, and DDI wants it to 
look like there’s neighborhood buy-in, they’ll plan something in one of these gorgeous hotels 
around Downtown, but only at a time of day when folks with a regular 9-5 job can go, and 
they’re all saying the same things about how they want more night life and how the poor 
folks and the homeless are all criminals to be locked up or removed. Those homeless folks, 
poor folks, (and) even the few parents with kids around here – they don’t show up, but it 
wouldn’t really matter if they did.  
 
It should be noted that this sense of inevitability regarding projects that Crawford and DDI 
support (sometimes bordering on hopelessness or resignation) was a frequent theme among 
participants, appearing in 22 (56.4%) of 39 the interviews.  
 While Councilmember Kingston’s objections to value-neutral development in 
Downtown Dallas are often overridden by the city council’s pro-development majority, it cannot 
be assumed that the councilmember is completely powerless with respect to economic 
development. Indeed, recall that individual councilmembers hold broad authority over TIF 
funding within their district, and this control is largely protected from the will of a council 
majority. As such, when a particular developer wants to access that funding within the large 
TIF districts in Downtown Dallas, they must negotiate with Councilmember Kingston. 
Once again, this places Crawford and DDI in a position of being able to assemble a package 
of concessions and design revisions that are likely to be agreeable to the councilmember, and 
which already meet the requirements of Dallas’ various construction and design codes; as 





[Crawford] knows what it’s like to work with councilmembers who don’t really 
agree with his vision for Downtown. He knew how to work with Angela (Hunt) 
before, and he knows how to work with Philip (Kingston) now, so when he tells 
you that you need to change something in a project to get that TIF money, then 
you’d be well-served by listening.  
 
 The structure and nature of decision-making in Downtown Dallas. Based on 
its analysis of 39 participant surveys and interviews, this study finds that the emerging rift 
between pro-development and progressive development leaders is writ largest in Downtown Dallas, 
the city’s traditional epicenter of development. As noted previously, the majority of 
Downtown Dallas’ decision-making structure (like that of Dallas as a whole) continues to 
strongly resemble the complex entrepreneurial governing coalition described in the Elkin 
study, even as such a coalition has largely faded throughout the remainder of Dallas. The 
purpose of this contemporary governing coalition, as it was during Elkin’s study (and 
Thometz’s before that) is to promote business- and real estate development interests, 
particularly those interests that, returning to extant urban theory, increase the exchange value 
of real estate in Dallas’ urban core. This entrenched, pro-development agenda is composed of 
two clusters of actors – first, the first tier influentials who are personally able to access city-level 
formal authorities in order to find support for their projects, and second, the second tier 
influentials who are individually unlikely to secure an audience with citywide formal authorities. 
Therefore, while a subset of the most influential actors within the pro-development agenda can 
reliably count on support of actors like billionaire oilman-turned-developer Ray Hunt and 
City Manager A.C. Gonzalez, actors with less clout must rely on John Crawford and DDI to 
act as an intercessor and advisor for their projects, making Crawford a “swing vote” of sorts 




 The success of Downtown Dallas’ pro-development agenda lies in its ability to reliably 
sideline its opposition, while also silencing a disorganized (but growing) list of detractors, but 
how long can this success last? In the two decades since the start of district-based council 
elections, those councilmembers who continue to support the “Dallas Way” have seen their 
numbers decline, in favor of councilmembers (like Kingston) who favor a more progressive 
future. In addition, recall that younger business leaders and real estate developers frequently 
show little (if any) interest in getting involved in the politics of development, leaving few (if 
any) true successors to the “Big Men Downtown.” Describing this transition, and what it 
portends for the future, participants’ comments are well-represented by the following:  
The main players in Downtown all see that the old way of building isn’t going to 
last much longer. (Councilmember) Kingston and the folks who agree with him are 
the future. The developers who aren’t too stubborn to change are finally embracing 
things like historic preservation and “complete streets,” and there’s even some 
serious talk about mixed-income housing in Downtown. They don’t want to be on 
the wrong side of the future, so they’re starting to change things now. Others, 
especially the younger ones, are just staying out of big projects for now, waiting to 
see what happens over the next couple of elections.  
 Equitable economic development in the commercial republic. At its outset, this 
study argued that, although CDCs and anchor institutions hold the potential to advance 
beyond “ancillary” status in the urban governing coalition, there is debate as to whether this 
occurs in actuality. While this study found no evidence supporting the role of these 
particular kinds of third-sector organizations in driving equitable urban economic 
development projects or policymaking within Dallas as a whole, or in either North Oak Cliff 
or Downtown Dallas, this is not the case in other cities. In the sections that follow, this 
study will briefly summarize efforts of anchor institutions and CDCs actively implementing 
these projects in two cities: Philadelphia and Cleveland. Then, it will speculate on why this 
kind of involvement was not found in Dallas. Finally, it will expand upon the efforts of two 




networks of locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses within a community that, in many 
ways, is more similar to the aforementioned Rust Belt cities than it is to the rest of Dallas. 
 Equitable economic development in a subset of other cities. One example of 
third-sector involvement in urban economic development and policymaking is in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In this city, like in Dallas, political and business leaders exercise 
tremendous control over urban policy and economic development555. However, since (at 
least) the turn of the 21st century, actors involved in Philadelphia’s third-sector have begun 
injecting themselves into decisions regarding education556 and economic development557.  
 The results of this involvement can be seen in cross-sector partnerships within the 
city’s economically-marginalized neighborhoods. For example, Drexel University, the 
William Penn Foundation, and the City of Philadelphia are leveraging over $575 million in 
local- and federal Promise Zone funds, in order to support job creation, access to education, 
and spur economic development into low-income, majority-minority neighborhoods in West 
Philadelphia558. This involvement may also be part of a potential progressive shift in the 
city’s governing coalition, with anchor institutions like the University of Pennsylvania 
providing public forums for progressive citizen engagement, and successfully pushing the 
city’s development-focused governing coalition into retreat559.  
 A second example is in Cleveland, Ohio, which is also the traditional home of a 
tightly-knit pro-development governing coalition560. Here, the cross-sectoral involvement of 
CDCs in economic development stretching back (at least) to the Voinovich (1980-1988) and 
White (1989-2001) administrations561 have opened the door to a more progressive, 
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heterarchic governing coalition with a heavy emphasis on neighborhood redevelopment 
involving the public-, private-, and third sectors562; as a result, the city’s growth-minded elites 
are more willing to accommodate neighborhood-level interests (even if only begrudgingly)563.  
 Following the mid-century collapse of its industrial base, Cleveland has suffered 
economically for decades, and its population is under half its 1950 level564, but continued 
cross-sector collaboration has created a sustainable, equitable economic development model 
that, while still small, suggests a new possibility for other, economically-challenged cities. 
Since 2008, the Evergreen Cooperative – a partnership between the Cleveland Foundation, 
Cleveland Clinic, University Hospitals, Case Western Reserve, and the city’s municipal 
government – has leveraged over $35 million in grants to create three worker-owned 
businesses in six of the city’s most economically-marginalized neighborhoods565, providing 
hundreds of jobs and allowing workers to generate wealth through equity stakes in the 
companies themselves566.  
 So, with respect to the role of CDCs and anchor institutions in urban economic 
development and public policy, why Philadelphia and Cleveland, but not Dallas? To begin, 
governments must bargain over the conditions for inducing capital investment, in order to 
achieve the economic goals of dominant political interests. Further, the ability to bargain for 
capital investment is dependent upon the market position of a city, so an economically weak 
city like Cleveland or Philadelphia is less able to bargain with the private sector than an 
economically advantaged city like Dallas or Chicago567.  
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 Building on this argument, this study suggests the possibility that there may be little 
(or no) private-sector capital investment available in cities with significant, decades-long 
patterns of commercial disinvestment – cities like both Philadelphia and Cleveland, which 
saw tremendous population- and economic losses during the Fordist crisis, and remain 
economically troubled decades later, even though signs point to some amount of recovery 
following the Great Recession568. Therefore, it may be that, in the absence of private-sector 
actors willing (or able) to invest capital into a particular city, even the most ardent pro-
development leaders in Rust Belt cities like Philadelphia and Cleveland are simply more 
amenable to working with nontraditional organizations like CDCs and anchor institutions.  
 Returning to the Dallas example, recall that this study found no evidence supporting 
the role of CDCs or anchor institutions leveraging more equitable economic development in 
Dallas or either of the study’s focus neighborhoods. Although Dallas is not dissimilar to 
Cleveland and Philadelphia with respect to urban poverty indicators, unlike both of these 
cities, it is a hotbed of private investment and real estate development. In 2015, commercial 
real estate investment was up by 45% over 2014; further, of the $129 billion invested in 
2015, over half went to commercial real estate ($33.5 billion) and apartments ($33 billion), 
with over $22 billion dollars in investment coming from foreign sources – primarily Asia and 
Canada569. In many respect, contemporary Dallas looks increasingly like the Dallas of the 
early 1980s, with tremendous investment in Downtown Dallas, as well as over 5 million 
square feet in mixed-use development located along previously-undeveloped tracts adjacent 
DART light rail stops since 2013570. With such a strong economy being fueled primarily by 
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private investment, what need is there for public-sector leaders to enter into arrangements 
with third-sector dollars to induce cross-sectoral development?  
 Economic boom times aside, recall also the “Dallas Way,” that is, the city’s long-
standing habit of using development to pave over the plight of the city’s poor. Even if 
Dallas’ economy lacked its current strength, it is unclear whether political leaders would 
consider these kinds of partnerships – certainly, these were not pursued during the economic 
downturn stretching from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. Then again, the city’s political 
leadership was still dominated by pro-business interests, and while transition was underway, 
the complex entrepreneurial coalition was still headed by the “big men downtown,” whose ideas 
for economic revitalization were still heavily anchored in the private sector, and the use of 
public incentives for private development. Would Dallas’ current political leadership, with its 
(slim) pro-development majority be willing to entertain the idea of equitable alternative 
development strategies if the city’s economy once again faltered? In Downtown Dallas, 
could Downtown Dallas Inc., its private nonprofit development corporation, address the 
issues of the poor (assuming it had the will to do so, which is certainly questionable).  
 Dallas, and scholars thereof, may not have to wait long to find out. Although real 
estate investment and economic growth are both still high in Dallas, especially in Downtown 
Dallas and its surrounding neighborhoods, commercial vacancy remains between 10% and 
28% throughout the urban core, and new properties are sitting on the market longer, 
signaling an impending slowdown571. While Dallas’ economy has greatly diversified itself 
after the Oil Boom went bust, if the bottom should fall out again, this study argues that 
Downtown Dallas Inc., which is funded by the real estate developers and businesses whose 
activities are focused primarily in- and around the CBD, would largely lack the financial 
                                                          




resources to engage in equitable alternative development strategies, like those seen in 
Philadelphia and Cleveland. If Dallas “hot” real estate market cools, these private firms 
would likely shift their focus to other cities where they have significant operations, leaving 
(at best) token offices in the Dallas market, and these may be responsible for both the 
central city and its surrounding suburbs.  
 In its current economic context, Dallas is doing precious little to address the growing 
economic disparities between its “haves” and its “have-nots,” and given its past, and the 
present state of the city’s decision-making structure, it is unlikely that the city’s current 
leadership would engage in partnerships with anchor institutions and CDCs to create 
equitable economic development opportunities if that economic context should cool. While 
the current pro-development leadership is – slowly – being replaced by a growing progressive 
development coalition, it is unclear when the “8-7 split” will fall in favor of leaders who favor 
new strategies, and further, it is also unclear when significant numbers of leading bureaucrats 
will follow suit. Within this somewhat-dismal outlook, however, there are two emerging 
leaders who, by finding ways to operate outside of the decision-making structure – albeit 
with the support of some of its members, are finding success at equitable alternative 
development strategies; these emerging leaders will be the focus of the next section.  
 Equitable economic development, the Dallas way. While Philadelphia and 
Cleveland have suffered economically, Dallas’ history since deindustrialization is largely 
characterized by economic growth, even without the inclusion (or, as some might see it, 
interference) of the third sector. As a result, it should be unsurprising that leaders of CDCs 
and anchor institutions are largely absent from the highest echelons of decision-making. 
Nonetheless, the continued preference for continuing neoliberal, corporate-centered 




should not be taken to indicate that efforts to induce alternative, equitable economic 
development are not being undertaken, if not at the citywide level, then at least in (a subset 
of) Dallas’ neighborhoods.   
 In Chapters 4 and 5, this study introduced the roles of local developer David Spence 
and “guerilla urban designer” Jason Roberts, and how each, on a (comparatively) small scale, 
is working to bring economic development into the North Oak Cliff neighborhood in ways 
that keep ownership within the neighborhood itself. Although their particular projects differ, 
what unites these two actors is that they have proven themselves willing to operate 
independently of other decision-makers, and circumvent the larger decision-making process 
in order to achieve their objectives. In the sections that follow, this study will briefly expand 
on how each of these actors works to improve economic equity within their neighborhood, 
using specific examples for each, and connecting them to extant urban theory. 
 David Spence. Jane Jacobs, in her seminal work, argued that neighborhoods devolve 
into slums in a cascading pattern, with small changes rapidly leading to decay; she also 
suggested that the reverse could also be true – small improvements in a neighborhood could 
lead to rapid improvements572; in Dallas, this “cascading effect” can be seen in the work of 
David Spence. Embodying Jacobs’ mixed-use, diverse, organic development mantra, 
Spence’s most upscale projects are surrounded by taquerias, tire shops, and quinceanera 
boutiques that have been locally-owned for generations. Participants regularly credited 
Spence for his role in the ongoing revitalization of the Bishop Arts District, for saving 
commercial corridors throughout North Oak Cliff, and for his adaptive reuse of existing 
                                                          




space has encouraged other local entrepreneurs to revive shuttered movie theaters, markets, 
and retail outlets573.  
 The key to Spence’s success is more than simply redevelopment existing space; 
Spence also reaches out to area business owners looking to grow, and acts as a networking 
hub between his old clients and his new ones, helping to found- and expand collaborations 
among North Oak Cliff’s locally-owned businesses. One of Spence’s most successful 
collaborations has been with Shannon and Jenni Neffendorf, owners of Oak Cliff Coffee 
Roasters. In 2008, the Neffendorfs began roasting coffee in their garage, selling locally 
within the neighborhood574. Five years later, a partnership with Spence allowed them to open 
a storefront (Davis Street Espresso), and expand their clientele to include over two dozen 
restaurants and markets throughout North Oak Cliff and the Dallas area, while offering 
pastry options sourced from two neighborhood bakeries575. As their business has grown, 
their success has enabled the Neffendorfs to open a second shop next door to the original576.  
Jason Roberts. Not everyone has the capital to invest in repurposing vacant and 
abandoned buildings, though. Jason Roberts became a public figure in 2005, when he helped 
found the Oak Cliff Transit Authority – a nonprofit organization that advocated for 
installing an electric streetcar to link North Oak Cliff (a former streetcar suburb) with 
Downtown Dallas. While some observers praised the five-year effort to connect these two 
growing neighborhoods, others describe the project as “by hipsters, for hipsters,” and 
begrudged the $50 million price tag, roughly half of which was covered by a federal TIGER 
grant577. Opponents also criticized the limited number of stops and limited hours of 
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operation as unhelpful for residents with low incomes who reside in North Oak Cliff. 
Although the line has proven controversial, with frequent service interruptions for 
maintenance issues since the 2015 inaugural run, it has already been successful enough that 
millions in additional city- and federal funding has been allocated to construct new stops 
throughout North Oak Cliff578. 
As Chapters 4 and 5 note, Roberts – who also works as a full-time IT consultant579 – 
is more commonly known as a “guerilla urban designer,” who sees blocks that have been 
“written off” as blighted, and envisions flower-lined, pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly streets, 
where empty lots are replaced with small, locally-owned shops selling locally-produced 
goods, and where people can see a place as something more than “that place” where “those 
people” live. His organization (a group of his friends with $1,000 between them) called 
themselves Team Better Block, and identified an abandoned commercial corridor in North 
Oak Cliff that, while lined with abandoned storefronts, was zoned as light industrial, and 
(thanks to Dallas’ draconian zoning laws) could not be easily rezoned.  
Not satisfied with leaving this block to continue declining, Roberts and his team 
declared it a target for temporary, guerilla-style urban development. The team painted mid-
block pedestrian crosswalks, used potted plants to create protected bicycle lanes, installed 
(temporary) outdoor seating, and worked with local businesses and craftspeople to create 
pop-up shops and turning vacant storefronts into cafes that lined the street580. Strictly 
speaking, none of this was legal, but Roberts had the approval of the area’s city 
councilmember, and the city’s code enforcement team was notoriously absent from the area 
during the event581. The project was so successful that Roberts has repeated it in North Oak 
                                                          
578 Moto, 2015; Young, 2016 
579 R. R. Ross, 2012 
580 R. R. Ross, 2012; Team Better Block, 2016b 




Cliff, and now his team consults with other cities (most recently, Detroit) to engage in 
similar programs582. Importantly for the neighborhood, though, several of the businesses that 
participated in the Better Block’s projects have remained in North Oak Cliff, hiring locally 
and forming a network of businesses that support one another583. 
Good spaces and better blocks in building a local economy. Although the effects of projects 
undertaken by Spence and Roberts remain small compared to the size of the neighborhood 
and the magnitude of the need for equitable economic development, they are nonetheless 
crucial components of equitable economic development in North Oak Cliff in a number of 
different ways. In the paragraphs that follow, this study will connect these actors’ real-world 
projects with extant urban theory regarding locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses. Then, 
it will consider the role of neighborhood context in the ability of projects like these to be 
successful, or even exist in the first place. 
To begin, the businesses that work with Roberts and Spence often become part of 
North Oak Cliff’s interconnected, organic network of locally-owned, locally-oriented 
businesses; this network serves a number of purposes. First, it strengthens the economic 
links between each business, allowing firms to more easily communicate their needs to one 
another. Second, it helps local businesses identify new opportunities for expansion into new 
markets. Finally, it helps local businesses match buyers and sellers584. Indeed, all of these 
benefits can be seen in the aforementioned example of Oak Cliff Coffee Roasters, which was 
able to move from being a (literal) garage industry to becoming an anchor business within 
the neighborhood and a regional exporter of goods, bringing dollars from all over the Dallas 
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region back into an economically-marginalized neighborhood, thanks (at least in part) to the 
local business network found in the neighborhood.   
Additionally, Roberts’ and Spence’s focus on supporting home-grown businesses 
through adaptive reuse of space preserves the “local flavor” of the neighborhood – that is, 
its culture, architecture, history, and art, when chain businesses would be more likely to 
bulldoze and rebuild585. Further, these businesses allow local dollars to be circulated 
repeatedly through North Oak Cliff, creating a local economic multiplier effect and 
increasing local tax revenues586. Finally, this interconnected dependence among local 
businesses makes it harder for any one of these to abandon the area587. For this reason, and 
because of the added variety found among these businesses, the entire local economy 
becomes more resilient in the face of economic shocks588. Looking toward North Oak Cliff’s 
future, economic stability underpins enduring citizen engagement with politics and decision-
making structures589– something currently lacking among long-time neighborhood residents.  
North Oak Cliff: Philadelphia and Cleveland writ small. With respect to attempts at 
equitable economic development, why North Oak Cliff, but not Downtown Dallas or Dallas 
as a whole? This study argues that, when considering the respective contexts of these three 
geographies, North Oak Cliff is actually more similar to the previously-discussed cities of 
Cleveland and Philadelphia than it is to either Downtown Dallas or Dallas as a whole. Like 
those cities, North Oak Cliff has experienced decades of economic decline and residential 
abandonment, and its population – especially its people of color – generally earn low 
incomes, even as much of the northern half of Dallas continues to thrive. However, unlike 
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Cleveland and Philadelphia, as a single neighborhood, North Oak Cliff is unable to enter 
into cross-sectorial partnerships with anchor institutions and CDCs, and Dallas’ city council 
has historically shown little interest in devoting significant resources to improving “those 
neighborhoods” occupied by “those people.”  
Dallas’ contemporary governing coalition. To briefly review the state of Dallas’ 
governing coalition in the years prior to this study, recall that as Chapter 2 first described, 
when Carol Thometz looked across Dallas in the early 1960s, and looked through the eyes of 
the city’s leaders to understand how the Dallas was run, she found a structure composed of 
nearly 70 men from industries like finance, commerce, and manufacturing590. Among these, 
about 10% were centrally involved in nearly every aspect of decision-making, while a further 
80% acted in many, but not all decisions, while the final 10% were only involved tangentially 
as “technical experts” on particular issues591. At that time, Dallas’ political leadership was 
selected by its strong, unified, and resource-laden business community, forming close 
professional- and personal ties among political and business leaders in what Elkin would 
refer to as a pure entrepreneurial governing coalition592; the at-large electoral system ensured 
that, with few exceptions, the wealthy, white voters of northern Dallas reliably supported the 
candidates forwarded by groups like the Dallas Citizens Council and the Citizens Charter 
Association, while the voices of minority groups in southern Dallas were largely silenced (or 
in later years, tokenized)593.  
This governing coalition would grow Dallas from a regional manufacturing hub into 
a global city, and would elect as mayors men like Bob Folsom and Starke Taylor, real-estate 
developers whose policies toward development would expand the city’s footprint to well 
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over 300 square miles (of land that their companies largely owned), and would fill in that 
land with everything from skyscrapers to apartment complexes and acres of single-family 
housing, in a decade-long building boom that only ended when the local economy collapsed 
in the mid-1980s. In the years leading up to this collapse, Stephen Elkin looked across 
Dallas, and found that the city’s untrammeled success in attracting globalized businesses, 
executives of which had little loyalty to Dallas itself, combined with the city’s first attempt to 
modernize its election system, had left the city’s governing coalition both depleted, and 
marred by infighting594. Gone were the days when Dallas’ industrial titans played key roles in 
the day-to-day running of the city, and many of the aging leaders had found themselves 
without successors to carry on with the “Dallas Way.” Even though the pure entrepreneurial 
coalition had given way to a complex entrepreneurial coalition, Elkin found that when business 
leaders and real estate developers wanted support for their projects from Dallas political 
leaders, support was nearly always found595.  
This study does not challenge the notion that Dallas’ decision-making structure was, 
at one time, an archetypical entrepreneurial governing coalition; it also does not challenge 
Elkin’s differentiation between the pure entrepreneurial coalition of the 1960s and 1970s with 
the complex entrepreneurial coalition lasting from the 1980s until (at least) the mid-1990s. 
Instead, this study proffers that as Dallas emerged from economic ruin as a globalized 
economy composed largely of multinational firms with no particular loyalty to Dallas itself, 
and transitioned its political leadership to a district-based system that crippled the once-
unstoppable political machine found in civic organizations like the Dallas Citizens Council 
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and (now-defunct) Citizens Charter Association, the seeds for structural transformation were 
sewn.  
Also recall that the precursor elements that signal structural transformations among 
governing coalition typologies are poorly-studied, though the Elkin study notably includes a 
number of criteria that could divorce political leaders from the lure of economic elites – in 
effect, charting a hypothetical course that could transition entrepreneurial governing coalitions 
toward some (arguably) more progressive alternative. These conditions include a lowering of 
barriers to political dissent, reducing the eagerness and tenacity of business leaders with 
respect to public inducement packages, reducing the advantages that business leaders have 
when it comes to collecting and dispersing political funds, curbing the natural tendency of 
political leaders to facilitate inducements, and improving the grasp of public officials on the 
considerations of bowing to commercial interests at the expense of the principles of 
republican government596. Given the transitions since the Elkin study, are some subset of 
these criteria now satisfied?  
This study argues that, in part, a subset of Elkin’s conditions for transformation have 
been met. First, this study argues that barriers to political dissent were effectively reduced 
when the city switched from an at-large city council and mayor to its present hybrid of 
district-based councilmembers with an at-large mayor, 14 of 15 political leaders were 
suddenly held accountable primarily to their constituents. Councilmembers today are often 
seen in their communities, for example, to hold public hearings and gather public input, 
especially when the public is unhappy with a decision. To remain in the good graces of their 
constituents, councilmembers must approach decisions with an eye for the costs and 
benefits to their particular district, lest they be punished during re-election attempts. Second, 
                                                          




this study argues that district-based political leaders are somewhat less willing to pursue a 
pro-business agenda, especially when that agenda contains no considerations for their 
constituencies. Finally, without a unified business community, there is no longer a single 
“pro-business” agenda for political leaders to follow, and benefits to, for example, real estate 
developers seeking to repurpose occupied buildings must be weighed against the risk of 
harm to the residents and businesses that occupy them.  
Thus, if political leaders are bound to the will of their constituents, and the business 
community is too disorganized to produce a unified agenda for those leaders to follow, 
Dallas’ citywide decision-making structure seems to resist categorization using the existing 
typologies. If Dallas’ decision-making structure has stumbled its way into a structure that no 
longer resembles the entrepreneurial governing coalition archetype, and if this divergence is too 
great for qualified descriptors (e.g. Elkin’s complex entrepreneurial nomenclature), then how can 
Dallas’ contemporary decision-making structure be most accurately described? In answering 
this question, first recall that this study recognizes seven broad types of governing coalitions; 
a summary of these, restated from Chapter 2, is provided in table 6.28. 
These definitions in mind, figure 6.04 combines data previously introduced throughout this 
chapter, repackaging them into a comprehensive view of decision-making in Dallas as a 
whole, as well as in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. These data first illustrate the 
tiered decision-making structures found at the citywide level and in both focus 
neighborhoods, as well as the composition of each tier with respect to category of decision-
Table 6.28: Typology of Governing Coalitions 
Coalition Type Lead Actors 
Activist 
Minority-led electoral coalitions, engaged citizens, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, 
social justice or broker mayors, fiscal populists 
Caretaker Caretaker mayors, anti-growth bureaucrats, fiscal populists, post-materialists 
Demand-Side Neighborhood organizations, single-district councilmembers, minority mayors, post-materialists 
Entrepreneurial Business-led coalitions, strong mayor, pro-growth bureaucrats 
Progressive Minority-led electoral coalitions, single-district councilmembers, neighborhood governments, social justice mayors 
Stewardship Group coalitions, engaged citizens, fiscal populists, "broker" mayors 
 




maker. Further, the figure portrays the divisions within each separate structure with to the 
three development agendas found by this study – the pro-development and progressive development 
agendas found in all three geographies, and the anti-development agenda found in North Oak 
Cliff. Finally, the figure shows where these three separate decision-making structures are 
connected by actors with shared membership.  
Figure 6.04: The Interconnected Decision-Making Structure in  







These data suggest a number of trends that connect contemporary decision-making 
structures in Dallas to those of the Elkin and Thometz studies. To begin, these data support 
the prior assertion that a majority of decision-makers in Dallas support a pro-development 
agenda, with roughly twice as many actors supporting this agenda than support alternatives. 
Additionally, these data suggest that a larger subset of leaders in Downtown Dallas is also 
active at the citywide level, when compared to leaders in North Oak Cliff. These findings are 
both telling and unsurprising, given the history of Dallas with respect to white flight and 
political disconnection of southern-sector neighborhoods, as well as the city’s traditional 
penchant for using value-neutral economic development as a response to urban problems.  
Data also suggest that that to whatever extent Elkin’s complex entrepreneurial governing 
coalition persists, it is at its strongest within Dallas’ central urban core. However, at the 
citywide level, whatever remains of that decision-making coalition has grown far more 
limited in 2016 than it was in either 1963 or 1987. What remains is a pair of loosely-
organized citywide agendas regarding economic development, and while adherents of the 
pro-development agenda currently holds a slim majority of decision-making power, their 
opponents continue to make gains at each election. As such, can Dallas’ decision-making 
structure even be considered a governing coalition?  
Dallas’ decision-making structure as a nonregime. For a decision-making 
structure to be a governing coalition, several criteria must be met; these include: 
• informal, stable groups of actors with access to resources; 
• public- and private-sector members, allowing the coalition to cross the state-
market divide; 
• cooperation across sectors 
• distinct policy agendas; and 
• a history of consensus and selective incentives to perpetuate it.597 
                                                          




Dallas’ contemporary structure no longer features a stable, informal group of actors who can 
marshal enough resources to push a specific agenda (and it is unclear whether, except in the 
case of Downtown Dallas 360, such an agenda exists); instead, individual actors (and civic 
organizations) support particular projects, sometimes with the support of other actors, and 
sometimes in opposition to those same individuals. With lingering fragmentation among the 
city’s business community precluding partnerships across business sectors, and a sharp 
divide among pro-development and progressive development councilmembers, there is also little 
enduring cooperation across the state-market divide outside of individual projects (again 
excepting Downtown Dallas 360). Finally, with a lack of a single policy agenda at the citywide 
level, this study found little evidence to suggest a pattern of selective incentives used to build 
consensus support for anything resembling a distinct policy agenda on the level of, for 
example, Stone’s famous Atlanta case. Thus, this study considers Dallas to be a nonregime; but 
more than that – Dallas appears to be a collapsed entrepreneurial coalition with enough 
vestiges of the “old way” to prevent a “new way” from fully emerging, but not enough to 
revive the development-first agenda that once was. This divide creates a situation similar to 
that of New Orleans in the early 2000s598, though for different reasons, and with different 
possible outcomes.  
In the New Orleans example, this nonregime city lacks a stable of would-be political 
leaders within its business community, and this community also fails to provide monetary 
and non-monetary resources to the leaders that do emerge. Slow-growing, issue-based 
coalitions must negotiate (and re-negotiate) all policy decisions, and without stable ties 
among them, each new negotiation must start from square one599. Such coalitions may 
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individually draw resources from private interests, but these resources are limited, and as a 
result, various actors only have enough resources to govern within particular interest areas, 
such as attracting a professional basketball team in 2002, or reducing the city’s high crime 
and murder rates in the 1990s600. In their initial assessment of the New Orleans nonregime, 
Scholars Burns and Thomas suggested that the city’s amorphous decision-making non-
structure served well enough to avoid municipal bankruptcy or state takeover, but that was 
wholly inadequate during both the city’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and during its 
reconstruction because it lacked the stability necessary to smoothly allocate resources and 
enact relevant policies in the lead-up to- and immediate aftermath of the disaster601. While 
this initial assessment raised concerns over whether an enduring governing coalition could 
form to address the city’s ongoing needs602, a more recent assessment suggests that some 
amount of stability eventually returned to the city’s leadership structure, and that an alliance 
between Uptown whites and the business community has emerged, albeit to the detriment of 
people of color and people with low incomes603.  
Like New Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Dallas does not 
have a single, unified governing coalition, resulting from the collapse of the coalition that 
once existed. However, an important distinction must be made; while New Orleans in the 
early 2000s lacked any enduring decision-making structure, Dallas suffers from having too 
many. Consider that, at the citywide level, two sorts of governing coalitions exist, though 
with differential access to various resources. At the center of each of these coalitions is a 
subset of the city’s mayor and city council – the 15 people with formal decision-making 
authority – as well as leading bureaucrats who are responsible for interpreting and 
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implementing the decisions that are made. Each of the 14 district-based councilmembers is 
principally accountable to their district, rather than the city as a whole. Further, each of these 
councilmembers, the mayor, and those leading bureaucrats, holds a unique agenda, a unique 
set of preferences, unique loyalties, and a unique willingness to be influenced by particular 
actors. As a result, there are 15 different entry points into the decision-making process, and 
numerous entry points into the implementation of decisions, once they are made.  
Further complicating the decision-making structure, consider that each council 
district is composed of perhaps innumerable neighborhood-level decision-making 
arrangements. Thus, city-level leadership is characterized by temporary arrangements 
between two semi-stable coalitions with differential access to private capital, and featuring 
political leaders who are themselves answerable solely to members of within-district issue-
based associations that individually fail to possess the resources required to support 
permanent civic leaders aligned with a singular agenda. Thus, in considering the decision-
making structure of Dallas, it may be more accurate to consider Dallas as a league of micro-
cities with a “first among equals,” at-large mayor, with decisions being framed in order to 
achieve an “eight-vote majority,” rather than with an eye toward effectiveness and equity. 
To differentiate Dallas’ decision-making structure from what is found in New 
Orleans, and further, to differentiate the contemporary iteration of this structure from those 
of Dallas’ own past, this study considers Dallas’ current decision-making to be an unstable 
nonregime. What, however, does this mean? To begin, as an unstable decision-making structure, 
it is relatively amenable to change – consider that at the citywide level, the slim majority of 
pro-development agenda proponents is shrinking, while the minority of progressive development 
agenda proponents grows as political leaders reach their term limits; further, while progressive 




Councilmember Kingston and his predecessor, Councilmember Hunt), this is not always the 
case for pro-development actors (e.g. Councilmember Griggs and his predecessor, 
Councilmember Jasso).  
Further, as a nonregime, citywide decision-making power is first fragmented among 
districts, and then divided among district-based political actors, their appointees, and various 
levels of bureaucrats who follow semi-stable agendas. Each of these agendas draws support 
(or at least non-opposition) from a variety of private- and (to a much lesser extent) third-
sector actors, who use their access to resources to influence various decisions, but who 
generally have no particular authority to make decisions on their own (with exceptions for 
organizations explicitly given authority, such as Downtown Dallas Inc.), and who most often 
act on their individual agendas, rather than “going along to get along” within a larger 
coalition. In addition, each council district studied seems to feature its own decision-making 
structure, independent of the kinds of structures found in other districts, although more 
research would be needed to verify whether this claim holds for all 14 districts. This study 
argues that, assuming that each of the 14 districts possesses a unique decision-making 
structure, if Dallas is to be moved toward a more equitable future with respect to economic 
development, changes must occur at the district level first, such that a majority of districts 
feature progressive, equitable economic development agendas, and leaders who support 
these agendas and provide necessary resources; this perspective (and implications thereof) 
will be revisited and expanded upon in Chapter 7.  
 Discussion of coalition hypotheses, in summary.  This study’s second three 
hypothesis are designed to address its second and third research questions, respectively: “To 
what extent (if any) are CDCs and anchor institutions active participants in Dallas’ governing 




what is the effect of their involvement on urban development and policymaking?” In the 
preceding sections, this study evaluated qualitative results of surveys and interviews from its 
79 participants, in order to first uncover the nature of governing coalitions for Dallas as a 
whole, but also for two of its central urban neighborhoods: North Oak Cliff and Downtown 
Dallas.  
 Through its evaluation, this study found that, although there are signs of a growing 
progressive minority among Dallas’ leaders, the city as a whole continues to embody an 
entrepreneurial governing coalition, focused on corporatist economic development strategies 
and maintaining a pro-business environment. Further, this study found speculative evidence 
suggesting that, as Dallas’ old guard continues to fade, uncertainty about the future of Dallas’ 
leadership may be preventing younger executives from joining in the politics of decision-
making, out of concern for choosing the “losing” side. Additionally, although this study 
found no particular evidence to support the presence of anchor institutions and CDCs at the 
highest levels of decision-making, it did find that in North Oak Cliff, there are nonetheless 
efforts to engage in equitable economic development strategies, through the development of 
a network of locally-owned, locally-oriented businesses. Their results, while limited, offer 
real-world examples of the theoretical benefits of interconnected, locally-owned businesses, 
and do so with a flavor that respects the neighborhood “as it is,” while offering a vision of 
what the neighborhood could be in the future. Finally, this study presented data supporting 
its conclusion that, at the citywide level, Dallas’ decision-making structure is best 
conceptualized as an unstable nonregime, owing to a lack of cohesive, enduring, cross-sector 
support for a single developmental agenda. Because citywide decision-makers are divided 




decision-making with respect to economic development is difficult, and coalitions tend to 
form around a patchwork of individual projects that generally lack any sort of overall vision.  
Chapter Summary 
 The purpose of this chapter was to analyze and evaluate the data reported in Chapter 
4, in order to address this study’s research questions. In the preceding chapter sections, this 
study first revisited its research questions and hypotheses. Then, it evaluated its qualitative 
findings in order to render an image of contemporary urban governance in Dallas, the 
relationship between the city’s decision-making structures and entities involved in equitable 
economic development projects, and how these projects compare to those in a subset of 
other cities. The implications of these relationships, as well as possibilities for Dallas’ future, 












CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS RE-REVISITED, AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
 Conceptualizing urban decision-making structures based on theory is one thing; 
understanding those structures from the perspectives of the decision-makers themselves, and 
situating them within evolving socioeconomic- and historical contexts is an altogether 
different proposition. While decades of urban scholarship has focused on the former, there 
appears to be a relative dearth of recent studies in the vein of the latter, especially as cities 
muddle their way through the post-Fordist landscape. This is problematic, because 
historically, as cities have transitioned from one socioeconomic paradigm to the next, the 
theories that scholars consider reliable and accurate (notwithstanding all of the usual 
normative and empirical caveats about using these terms in the social sciences) have also 
transitioned, moving from community power studies of Fordist cities in the 1950s and 1960s 
to the crisis-era growth machines and urban regimes of the 1980s and 1990s. Now, cities 
have transitioned into yet another new socioeconomic paradigm (post-Fordism), but there 
appears to be no particularly new “grand” urban theory to match.   
  Thus, the purpose of this study is to reevaluate contemporary theories of urban 
governance in light of contemporary contexts of urban governance, utilizing the perspectives 
of both decision-makers themselves and persons knowledgeable about the urban decision-
making process. In the sections that follow, this chapter will first summarize briefly those 
chapters that precede it. Then, it will summarize a number of particularly interesting 




case, considering that this case may contain lessons for other large, economically-vibrant 
cities in the United States. Following this, it will engage in a brief expansion of limitations 
first introduced in Chapter 3. Finally, it will suggest new directions for future scholarship, 
based on this work.  
The Present Study in Review 
Chapter 1 argued that, in the decades since scholars first examined United States 
cities using the urban political economy perspective, those cities have undergone both racial- 
and economic transitions. To the former, while white flight allowed (some) residents to 
abandon central cities, a smaller, counter-migration of wealthier, highly educated whites 
moved back into gentrifying urban neighborhoods, at the cost of displacing people of color 
and people with lower incomes. To the latter, corporate disinvestment over that same period 
left many central cities all-but abandoned, and a subset of these central urban cores are 
transitioning into mixed-use hubs of capital accumulation, culture, and entertainment. 
Alongside these two transitions, CDCs and anchor institutions expanded into urban 
economic development projects and urban policymaking – roles previously assumed by 
actors in governing coalitions. From these, Chapter 1 suggested that it is possible that the 
entrepreneurial governing coalition archetype, characterized primarily by informal cooperation 
and resource-sharing among public- and private-sector actors is no longer an accurate 
representation of contemporary urban decision-making structures.   
Anchoring Dallas’s story in the greater context of United States cities following 
World War II, Chapter 2 explored the co-evolving histories of theories of urban governance; 
postwar socioeconomic paradigm shifts in the United States; and the growth, decline, and 
resurgence of Dallas through the intersecting lenses of urban governance and 




structure. This chapter drew out summaries of contemporary urban theory, as well as a 
subset of particularly salient critiques, in order to more deeply establish the depth and 
breadth of the gap in extant literature that this study intended to fill, and introduced a new 
angle in the study of urban decision-making structures: the study of neighborhood-level 
decision-making structures, and an analysis of whether (or to what extent) actors, 
organizations, and institutions involved at one level interact with those at other levels, and 
the effects of that interaction. Owing to limited resources, Chapter 2 also established a focus 
on two neighborhoods: Downtown Dallas, which is composed of the as the city’s rapidly-
revitalizing CBD and its immediate surroundings, and North Oak Cliff, a traditionally 
majority-minority, economically-marginalized neighborhood also undergoing revitalization, 
but that is experiencing internal turmoil regarding the displacement of long-time 
commercial- and residential occupants, and concerns over the potential loss of identity that 
may coincide with the influx of urban pioneers. Thus, Chapter 2 suggested that the structure 
of the story of Dallas is structurally similar to the story of the study of urban governance – 
well-researched in the past, but lacking in contemporary follow-up, and that as a result, it 
would be valuable to revisit the city as the setting for a new study of who governs.   
Chapter 3 outlined the setting of this study’s data collection, and the methods used 
those data, arguing for the continued use of reputational crucial case analysis based on the 
resources available to the researcher, the benefits proffered by this method broadly, and the 
ability to compare the results of the present study to prior research. For its part, Chapter 4 
described this study’s quantitative data regarding select socioeconomic changes from 1980 to 
2010, first for Dallas citywide, and then for the study’s two focus neighborhoods. Then, 
Chapter 5 synthesized the aforementioned quantitative data, before evaluating them with 




in post-Fordist cities, as well as with respect to the effects of these transitions on Dallas’ 
political landscape. Finally, Chapter 6 synthesized this study’s qualitative findings in order to 
render an image of contemporary urban governance in Dallas, the relationship between the 
city’s decision-making structures and entities involved in equitable economic development 
projects, and how these projects compare to those in a subset of other cities.  
Summary of Findings 
The Dallas case allows for a number of findings into the nature of contemporary 
urban governance as it actually exists, which appears to deviate from the predictions of aging 
theories of urban governance. To begin, the Dallas case shines a light on the interconnected 
nature of contemporary decision-making the historical context of the city itself. Additionally, 
this case study reaffirms the importance of structures in decision-making, as well as the 
effect of those structures on the outcomes of the decision-making process. Third, this study 
suggests that CDCs and anchor institutions have a long way left to go, if they desire to 
become primary, rather than ancillary members of governing coalitions. Finally, this study 
suggests that under the right pressures, even the dominant decision-making archetype – the 
entrepreneurial governing coalition – can become something else, even if that transition is 
somewhat haphazard. In the sections that follow, each of these findings will be discussed in-
turn.  
 Finding 1: the interconnected nature of real-world urban decision-making. 
This study argues that contemporary decision-making in Dallas is bound to the city’s racial 
history. At the citywide level, first consider the landmark federal order for the city’s election 
system to be reconstructed around racially-balanced districts, resulting from a federal lawsuit 
filed using the Voting Rights Act wherein plaintiffs successfully arguing that the white-




belonging to people of color. Additionally, as wealthy whites fled the city during the mid-late 
20th century, there was a similar exodus of corporate capital, with firms whose leaders often 
found themselves elected to high political office relocating to those suburbs. Thus, Dallas 
was left with fewer (and increasingly disinterested) leaders to act as successors. From these 
critical wounds, the city’s traditional entrepreneurial governing coalition has all-but vanished. 
Certainly, signs of this collapse were visible during the Elkin study, when the damage was 
limited to the business side of the political-business alliance, but this study finds that by 
2015, people with knowledge of the city’s decision-makers openly considered that an 
alternative, more progressive coalition was poised to seize control – an arguably unthinkable 
proposition when the city’s “old guard” was at the height of its power.  
 At the neighborhood level, the city’s inability (or unwillingness) to equitably address 
the inequity in urban development is evident in the continued dearth of commercial- and 
political capital in the city’s majority-minority southern neighborhoods, and can still be seen 
in the antiregime tendencies of the community organizations and neighborhood leaders within 
North Oak Cliff. The same legacy of northern-sector bias in development that stripped 
southern-sector neighborhoods of their economic vitality and political connectedness 
remains visible today, though the support among northern-sector councilmembers for 
development projects in Downtown Dallas over the objections of actors like 
Councilmember Kingston, even though otherwise, these leaders tend to defer to the wishes 
of individual councilmembers with respect to projects within their districts. As a result, the 
city’s private-sector elites continue to enjoy significant (but waning) informal influence, even 
though this influence is largely limited to Downtown Dallas.  
Finding 2: Structure still matters in urban decision-making. In his analysis of 




their decision-making structures face difficulties in pursuing policies designed to attract 
capital investment to the community” 604. In Dallas, these difficulties are baked directly into 
its system of district-based political leadership. Recall that the “go along to get along” 
practices of councilmembers effectively splits the city into 14 mini-cities, each headed by a 
mini-mayor, or perhaps more cynically, 14 loosely-united fiefdoms headed by would-be 
feudal lords. This structure is self-reinforcing, because councilmembers are elected only by 
voters living within their districts, and as such, seek primarily seek benefits and resources for 
their own constituents, even at the cost of a more equitable distribution of resources, 
especially in districts or communities that have declined under decades of disinvestment. 
Thus, while individual council districts may gain short-term advantages or increases in 
prosperity, the city as a whole suffers (à la the “tragedy of the commons”).  
As a result, this study finds it highly unlikely that Dallas will ever see a 
comprehensive development strategy, because such a strategy necessarily benefits some areas 
at the cost of others. Further, each councilmember is able to pursue a unique set of 
priorities, which challenges private- and third-sector actors to adapt their plans to suit each 
councilmember in whose district they seek to develop. In North Oak Cliff, for example, 
developers seeking the approval of Councilmember Griggs or his appointees often must 
hold neighborhood meetings, to ensure that the community is aware of (and broadly 
supports) new development projects, although there are some exceptions to this, based on 
zoning changes that were enacted prior to Griggs’ involvement in city politics. By 
comparison, in Downtown Dallas, it is only necessary for a developer to gain the support of 
the first- and second tier influentials who are regularly willing to use their deep connections to 
the city’s eight pro-development councilmembers (including the mayor) and to high-level city 
                                                          




officials, in order to circumvent the disapproval of Councilmember Kingston. 
Finding 3: CDCs and anchor institutions have a long way left to go. A critical 
finding in this study is that neither CDCs nor anchor institutions are particularly involved in 
the politics of decision-making in Dallas, and when they are involved, they tend to favor pro-
development agenda items and self-serving policies. This is unfortunate, given that these 
organizations could be transformative in economically-marginalized communities, but also 
unsurprising, given that Dallas’ public- and private-sector leaders are still able to combine 
political and economic capital in service of individual development projects, even when these 
projects fail to develop into enduring partnerships. Dallas is not unique in the non-
involvement of CDCs and anchor institutions in the decision-making process; certainly, 
while inclusive, community-based, cross-sectoral governing coalitions have been speculated 
about in the past605, like most progressive governing coalition typologies, they have only seen 
limited, short-lived instances in the real world (e.g. Chicago under Harold Washington, 
Philadelphia at the beginning of the 21st century, San Francisco at the end of the 20th 
century)606.  
The Philadelphia case noted above is highly relevant to Dallas, because it features 
neighborhood-level mobilization combining the resources of anchor institutions with the 
involvement of hundreds of citizens and over a dozen community groups, which helped 
pave the way for the 2007 election of a progressive-minded mayor, causing speculation that 
the city’s governing coalition could transition away from its elite-dominated, entrepreneurial 
governing coalition past607. Dallas, at a similar crossroads of its neoliberal past and an 
uncertain future, could benefit from the lessons found in Philadelphia – chiefly, that issue-
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based alliances can lead to enduring coalitions, and can change how a city is governed. In 
this chapter’s final substantive section, this study will revisit the Philadelphia case as a basis 
for discussing how Dallas’ decision-making structure could become more progressive, even 
if the unstable nonregime persists.  
Finding 4: Under the right pressures, governing coalitions can transition. 
Following the dissolution of its business community, and a forced-restructure of its political 
leadership, Dallas’ entrepreneurial governing coalition has been replaced by competing agendas 
and discord, found both among political leaders primarily interested in their own districts 
(over the city as a whole), and among private-sector leaders who are cautious about 
becoming too political, lest they be on the “wrong side” when the battle over Dallas’ future 
as either a pro-development or a progressive development city is finally resolved. This study finds 
that, much like the San Francisco of the late 1980s, Dallas’ has (at least, in substantive part) 
cast off its entrepreneurial governing coalition past, but has failed to supplant it with a unified 
alternative, resulting instead in the present unstable nonregime that is unable to pursue long-
term development strategies, and is instead limited to reactionary policies and one-off, short-
term development plans.  
Key to the return of a unified agenda is a necessary divorce of public-sector leaders 
from private-sector interests. While this has occurred in part, this study finds a continued 
series of deep connections between a subset formal authorities and various highly influential 
actors from the private- and third sectors. This in mind, encouraging news for progressive 
development advocates came in May 2016, when pro-development city manager A.C. Gonzalez 
announced his resignation, which became effective in early 2017 after only three years on the 
job, and amid suggestions of weakening support from city councilmembers608. Among the 
                                                          




five candidates under consideration to replace Gonzalez were four from other cities as well 
as one internal candidate, widely assumed to be the “favorite” for the position, especially 
among pro-development advocates609, yet after a closed session in early December 2016, only 
one finalist was announced for a final city council vote. After three decades of city managers 
who made their careers within Dallas’ city hall610, the city’s incoming top bureaucrat – T.C. 
Broadnax – is a true “outsider,” currently unaffiliated with the first tier and second tier 
influentials who, for so much of Dallas’ history, have enjoyed preferred access to the levers 
of decision-making. This decision, confirmed by a majority council vote in mid-December, 
was lauded by progressive development councilmembers Kingston and Griggs611. With another 
key formal authority unencumbered by informal commitments to highly influential private 
actors, a progressive-minded future for economic development in Dallas becomes more 
plausible.  
While this news is encouraging for advocates of a new, more progressive Dallas, it 
remains true that city-level decisions are still made by the “eight vote majority,” which is 
currently tilted in favor of the pro-development agenda. While all councilmembers (excepting 
the mayor) will come up for re-election in May of 2017, for the first time in Dallas’ history, 
no district-based councilmember is currently term-limited, so all 14 will benefit from 
incumbency. Because of the tremendous advantages this confers, this study finds it unlikely 
that a councilmember running for reelection would lose; however, as the recent presidential 
elections have reminded scholars and talking heads alike, there may not be such a thing as a 
“sure bet” in politics. Notably, and for the first time in recent memory, a sitting 
councilmember is actively campaigning against one of his colleagues; in early December 
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2016, Councilmember Kingston endorsed a progressive development challenger running for the 
seat of incumbent (and increasingly unpopular), pro-development councilmember (and Mayor 
Pro Tempore) Monica Alonzo612. Additionally, in northern Dallas, long-time realtor, real 
estate journalist, and “Dallas Way” critic Candy Evans is challenging pro-development advocate 
Lee Kleinman for his council seat, and she appears to have the support of several area real 
estate bodies613. As the election draws closer, it is likely that additional challengers will 
emerge across the city, with some being supported by pro-development organizations and 
influential actors, and others being supported by progressive development advocates; thus, while it 
is possible that in this election, the “Dallas Way” may become functionally irrelevant, it is 
too early to tell whether this is likely to occur. Even with such unprecedented potential for 
upsets, however, this study argues that relying on upset votes in some districts, while hoping 
for progressive incumbents to retain their seats in others is, at best, a tenuous proposition 
for progressive development advocates. 
A Vision of Future Governance in the Commercial Republic 
With the aforementioned Philadelphia case in mind, this study argues that when 
community members (e.g. residents, business owners, leaders of community organizations 
and anchor institutions) are willing to assume key roles in designing their neighborhoods’ 
revitalization, they gain the opportunity reclaim power that has historically been denied, and 
thus, develop a sense of ownership over their communities. From this, it follows that 
community-based governance can extend beyond simply involving community members in 
formal decision-making, and can also guide efforts to build the kinds of community capacity 
needed to address (a subset of) problems without the direct involvement of formal authorities. 
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To be successful in Dallas, community-based governance requires councilmembers to be 
willing to share decision-making with community stakeholders, but at the same time, it is 
incumbent upon those stakeholders to find common ground, and to demonstrate a 
willingness and ability to make decisions together, cultivate leadership from within the 
communities themselves, and share knowledge and resources across sectoral boundaries, in 
spite of the presence of real (or perceived) slights614. Once organized behind a common, 
enduring agenda, this study suggests that community members will be able to demand a 
greater role in the formal decision-making process, either from incumbent political 
leadership, or by supporting challengers who are more open to shared governance. In the 
process of preparing community members to successfully assert roles in organized district-
level decision-making, this study considers the roles of actors like David Spence (for 
business organization) and Jason Roberts (for community engagement).  
In first speculating about Spence’s role in the development of district-level, 
community-based governing coalitions, recall that – beyond repurposing and renovating 
existing structures, Spence’s firm also works with local entrepreneurs to fill these buildings 
with locally-owned businesses, which are then interconnected with other firms in Spence-
leased properties. Beyond the economic benefits that a network of interdependent, import-
substituting local firms provides for a community, Spence’s network also allows business 
owners within a relatively compact commercial corridor to communicate with one another, 
share ideas, and potentially identify common concerns and develop a common agenda. 
Although Spence himself operates primarily in North Oak Cliff, this study argues that the 
model is both sustainable and transferable to other parts of the city, particularly in southern-
sector districts where Dallas’ multinational real estate development firms have shown little 
                                                          




interest in investing. As tools for building a more inclusive decision-making structure, such 
networks could be mobilized in support of city councilmembers who value the protection 
and growth of locally-owned firms, and the kinds of development projects that allow more 
local businesses to form. In a progressive future for Dallas, these networks would aggregate 
their resources – both financial and social – to support progressive candidates and civic 
projects, and by connecting them financially, it becomes more reasonable for these actors to 
connect in support of political leaders as well. 
While private-sector resources can help fund a candidate’s campaign, as well as 
various projects throughout their term in office, councilmembers are (at least, ostensibly) 
responsible to the voters in their districts. This study argues that organized, engaged 
constituents are better able to hold a councilmember accountable than the disorganized 
collection of needs and demands found in, for example, North Oak Cliff. Thus, Dallas’ 
progressive future relies on disparate interest groups coming together around a common 
vision for their development, which is where Jason Roberts enter the equation. Recall that 
Roberts’ organization produces temporary urban revitalization projects in areas of deep 
disinvestment, engaging community members (e.g. residents, local business owners, and local 
community organizations) throughout the design- and implementation processes. Through 
this prolonged engagement, Roberts provides communities with best practices, training in 
community organization, and (non-financial) resources615. If these leaders and organizations 
can successfully work together after individual projects are completed, and are willing to 
move beyond past disagreements, then this study posits that they are likely to be well-
positioned to take ownership over neighborhood issues, and will have many of the necessary 
resources to be attractive partners for political leaders who are actively involved in the 
                                                          




problem-solving process. In addition, this study argues that these coalitions will be better 
able to elucidate a cohesive set of demands for political leaders, as well as proposed solutions 
and resources that can be devoted toward these, all while representing significant numbers of 
voters who can alternatively reward or punish councilmembers during elections. In a 
progressive future Dallas, these neighborhood coalitions, working in concert with coalitions 
of locally-owned businesses, form the alternative support structures that councilmembers 
will need in order to fully divorce themselves from corporatist interests.  
Although a Dallas run by progressive-minded political leaders who themselves are 
supported by (and accountable to) a series of district-level, community-based governing 
coalitions is an intriguing thought exercise, that it has not yet come to fruition is suggestive 
of the real-world challenges that this model faces – primarily, a lack of resources needed to 
scale up the initiatives of actors like Spence and Roberts. To begin, it is important to note 
that David Spence is not the primary (or arguably, even a significant) driver of the economic 
revitalization of North Oak Cliff, and even without his firm, North Oak Cliff would likely 
continue to be a focus for development. Spence’s success is, to some extent, catalyzed by the 
unique confluence of factors that is bringing new life to North Oak Cliff (e.g. proximity to 
Downtown Dallas, TIF support, infrastructure investment), as well as the presence of larger, 
successful development projects. For his part, Roberts also shares a similar problem – 
insufficient resources to increase scale. Because his organization relies on external funding 
and contracts with various cities to “reimagine” derelict spaces, Roberts is unable to focus 
on enduring projects, or on any single community. Thus, while his organization has found 
limited success in Dallas, as well as in other cities, it remains unclear whether small successes 




Without sufficient capacity to grow their existing projects, it seems unlikely that 
change-agents in southern Dallas will be able to convert these into a foundation for a more 
progressive future citywide. In other cities (e.g. Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia), funding for 
change-making initiatives came (at least, in part) from anchor institutions, but in Dallas, 
many of these institutions are often funded and lead by first tier and second tier influentials 
whose pro-development agenda built Dallas into the city it is today, and who would stand to 
benefit from continued pro-development policies. It stands to reason that, if these organizations 
had the desire (or ability) to involve themselves in programs like those being implemented by 
Spence and Roberts, they would have done so already.  
Much like Dallas’ new city manager, whose “outsider” status leaves him largely free 
of the tethers to Dallas’ most highly-influential actors, there is one new anchor institution 
that has established itself in southern Dallas, and is also largely free of these tethers. As such, 
it is possible that this new institution – the first (and presently, only) public university within 
Dallas’ city limits – can become the supporting organization that actors like Spence and 
Roberts need in order to “scale up” their efforts. The University of North Texas at Dallas, a 
“daughter” campus of the University of North Texas (located to the far northwest of 
Dallas), has taken up residence on over 250 acres of undeveloped land in the southern part 
of the city, and is rapidly expanding. While it remains small, this institution is already 
leveraging public- and private-sector support to improve its surrounding communities, both 
through capacity-building initiatives within disenfranchised neighborhoods and through 
involvement in economic development projects in derelict commercial centers616. Although 
these efforts are still relatively new, they could portend greater support for a more 
progressive Dallas in the future, regardless of the results of the next citywide election.  
                                                          




Limitations, Re-Revisited and Expanded 
As Chapter 3 notes, every study, no matter how well constructed, has limitations that 
shape the conclusions that can be drawn617. Understanding these limitations is critical for 
these findings to be properly evaluated, so in the paragraphs that follow, this study will 
revisit- and expand upon limitations first introduced in Chapter 3.  
Looking first at this study’s use of secondary-source data, any problems in the source 
data are inherited by this study, and this study is forced to rely on definitions and 
conceptualizations present in the source material. For example, participation rates for people 
identifying as Hispanic or Latino are questionable, presumably because people worry that 
census records will be used to identify them as undocumented immigrants, and they fear 
deportation618. As a result, recall that this study examined changes in poverty rates and 
median household income (MHI), as well as changes in demographics with respect to race 
and Hispanic or Latino status, which was complicated because MHI is available by race and 
Hispanic or Latino status at the tract level, but poverty rates by race and Hispanic or Latino 
status are not, therefore this study could only make broad inferences about the face of 
poverty in these two neighborhoods.  
Additionally, in at least one case, data are unavailable because definitions used by the 
census bureau changed. One key example of this is that census definitions regarding 
employment industries changed dramatically between 1990 and 2000, so data comparing blue 
collar and creative class employment from 1980 and 1990 could not be reconciled with data 
from 2000 and 2010. Finally, recall that economic data span the decades from 1980 to 2010, 
inclusively, but during that time, Dallas experienced two large economic slowdowns – the 
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Savings & Loan Crisis, and the Great Recession – both of which likely affected the 
economic data, further weakening this study’s quantitative findings. This particular limitation 
is not unique to this study; indeed, any case study would have similar complications.  
In considering the collection of survey and interview data, additional limitations 
emerge. First, because surveys and interviews were collected in a natural (rather than 
laboratory) setting, it is extremely difficult for future scholars to replicate the study in other 
settings; moreover, the settings themselves may also have impacted the kinds of responses 
that participants were comfortable with giving. However, this may also be a benefit, as 
participants were allowed to select their interview and survey settings, and may have 
strategically selected locations where they could speak more freely. Even in these participant-
selected interview settings, however, there were occasions wherein participants were not 
comfortable addressing all aspects of each interview question.  
In any case, responses were limited by the time constraint on the meetings; 
participants may have truncated responses in order to fit within the time allotted, reducing 
their overall quality. Related to this, because a number of survey items restricted the range of 
possible responses, the results are narrower than they may have been, were the questions 
written to be open-ended. A further limitation is that the nonrandom nature of snowball 
sampling introduces the possibility that the study sample is not actually representative of the 
(arguably unknowable) population; at best, it merely approximates the breadth of leaders 
involved in decision-making. This sampling was further limited because the researcher lacked 
the time or funds to interview every possible individual with knowledge of various decision-
making structure, which denies this study the perspectives of un-interviewed individuals. 
Related to the topic of participant perspectives, survey and interview results were 




unknowable amount of error – participants could, for example, be misleading with their 
answers (intentionally or otherwise), be simply uninformed, may be biased in their responses 
and perceptions, or may be attempting to give the answers that they perceived to be 
desirable. This study’s findings, then, may be skewed by the presence of actors whose 
positions in the leadership structure are artificially higher than they would normally be (a 
“man of the hour” effect), or artificially lower as a result of, for example, a local scandal. 
Some participants seemed, as a rule, to be reluctant to give low scores, but broadly speaking, 
this was not an issue in the vast majority of cases.  
In addition, it must be noted that all data regarding the decision-makers described in 
Chapter 4, as well as the resulting analyses in this chapter, are temporally-locked in the 
summer and early fall of 2015, and may be less accurate as time passes, and circumstances 
change (e.g. death or retirement of a highly-nominated actor). The information gained from 
this study is, by its very nature, not as reliable as direct observation of the decision-making 
process, taken over several years, but such a study would be infeasible, given the lack of time 
or resources to perform it.  
A final set of limitations come from the nature of this study’s use of Dallas as a 
single-shot crucial case, rather than as part of a comparative study. To begin, Dallas was 
assumed to be an extreme outlier, with respect to the presence of anchor institutions and 
CDCs in governing coalitions; that no particular evidence was found to support their 
involvement is unsurprising, and while (as noted in Chapter 3) it does not preclude the 
possibility of anchor institutions and CDCs being deeply involved in the governing 
coalitions of other cities, it does limit the contributions that this study can make to the 
greater field. In addition, because of the lack of cross-case, comparative data, this study is 




extreme an outlier, when compared to other cities. It should also be noted that both of this 
study’s focus neighborhoods – North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas – represent areas 
undergoing various levels of gentrification. Dallas has as many as 355 neighborhoods619, 
spread over an area (approximately) eight times the size of San Francisco620, and it is 
unrealistic to assume that the results taken from these two are representative of those for 
other neighborhoods within Dallas. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Because this study was conducted with a limited pool of resources, over an equally-
limited amount of time, a number of concerns could not be addressed, and a number of new 
questions arose - questions that simply could not be answered in the interest of completing 
the work. Additionally, some of this study’s limitations, especially those that resulted from a 
reliance on secondary-source data, are infeasible to eliminate without unrealistic budgets, but 
other limitations, such as those related to case studies more broadly, can be addressed by 
future scholars, especially those working in teams. With this study’s unanswered questions 
and “addressable” limitations in mind, this section now offers avenues for future research.  
 To begin, recall this study was a single-shot case analysis, and as such, lacks a strong 
comparative element, both among Dallas’ neighborhoods, and among Dallas and other, 
similar cities. Within the Dallas case, future scholarship should include additional 
neighborhoods from across the city’s 14 districts, to determine whether Downtown Dallas 
and North Oak Cliff happen to be outliers, or whether, for example there are regional effects 
on leadership inside the city. Expanding to Dallas as one city among many, consider that it is 
yet-unknown whether (or to what extent) the city’s contemporary decision-making structure 
                                                          
619 Wilonsky, 2012 




(i.e. the unstable nonregime) is unique to Dallas. If several cities can be found to have a nonregime 
structure, even if this number is far-from a majority, then it may be time for scholarship to 
reconsider what the de facto urban governance model should be, even if the analysis of 
governing coalitions (or urban regimes) remains the preferred method for conceptualizing 
these structures. Additionally, by understanding the connections (to the extent that they 
exist) between neighborhood-level civic leadership and civic leadership citywide, new 
avenues may open for would-be progressive leaders to either forge new paths to equitable 
urban governance, or gain new insight into why efforts to-date have seen only limited 
success.  
 Returning to Dallas specifically, recall that this study’s data collection and analysis 
concludes as Dallas enters a critical and highly uncertain election season. Whether or not the 
city’s progressive development agenda manages to carry the day, a follow-up study in the weeks 
and months that follow could chronicle the transition of Dallas’ decision-making structure as 
it marches toward one of three possibilities: first, a progressive-minded nonregime (unstable or 
otherwise), second, as a reformulated entrepreneurial governing coalition that must nonetheless 
reconcile its agenda with the visible success of progressive development initiatives, or as a 
continuation of the existing unstable nonregime. In each of these cases, the lessons learned are 
of immediate consequence to other cities facing what amount to “identity crises” with 
respect to how they will be run. Remember that a significant critique of contemporary urban 
theory is that it fails to identify the precursors of governing coalition transformation; in the 
Dallas case, this study argues that the restructuring of its city council and rise of progressive 
leaders from district-based elections, and the decline of its long-standing civic leaders with 
no apparent successors are two likely precursors of governing coalition shift, but the extent 




Further, in considering the New Orleans case, some results may take years to materialize. 
Regardless of the outcome of this critical period, this study argues the lessons learned from a 
follow-up study of Dallas will be helpful for would-be progressive leaders in other cities, as 
well as for comparing the decision-making structures of “pre-crisis” and “post-crisis” Dallas.  
 Finally, in considering why Dallas’ decision-making structure lacked the hypothesized 
involvement of CDCs and anchor institutions, this study considered that the city’s relatively 
strong economy allowed decision-makers to pursue capital without the constraints of 
mission requirements (or put another way, capital without the constraints of conscience). 
This study now considers whether the willingness of governing coalitions to entertain 
alternative sources of capital for development projects exists on a spectrum, with 
“development-hungry” cities (e.g. Detroit, Cleveland) at one end, and “development-full” 
cities like Dallas on another. As an alternative to seeking out cities similar to the Dallas case, 
this path of future scholarship focuses on the relationship between the presence and 
outcomes of third-sector involvement in governing coalitions and the amount of urban 
development being undertaken through more traditional methods (inter alia public-private 
partnerships). Such a line of research could discover, for example, whether there is some 
kind of a “tipping point” or indicator that signals when (or whether) alternative development 
projects become acceptable within the traditional division of labor, and whether these 
projects indicate that third sector institutions have become equal (or at least “more equal”) 
to public- and private sector institutions in governing coalitions.  
Chapter Summary 
As cities redefine themselves after decades of commercial abandonment, “urban 
renaissance” movements, white flight, and the gentrification of central urban neighborhoods, 




coalitions conceptualized by urban regime theorists, or whether (or to what extent) new 
players had emerged. It suggested that, in the forty years since the dawn of the political 
economy paradigm, many cities looked nothing like they did when growth machine theory 
and urban regime analysis were first conceptualized, and that contemporary observations of 
central cities may, once again, yield new insight into their decision-making structures.  
This study found that, at least in the Dallas case, the hypothesized “new players,” 
that is, CDCs and anchor institutions, have failed to claim meaningful roles in the decision-
making process, either at the citywide level, or within particular communities. However, and 
of (arguably) greater note, this study found that a city whose decision-making structure once 
epitomized the entrepreneurial governing coalition was now void of the unified agenda and 
resource-sharing that defines governing coalitions, and further, that the wounds were self-
inflicted. As Dallas inches closer to deciding whether it will double-down on the pro-
development agenda of its past, or whether a more progressive future is in order, individual 
progressive actors have found ways to operate successfully at the neighborhood level by 
working (for the most part) independently of Dallas’ dysfunctional decision-makers, and as 
new institutions develop significant resource pools, the connections made between mission-
driven capital and mission-driven actors may prove to be the final nail in the coffin for the 
“Dallas Way.” In many ways, Dallas represents what many cities, especially those in the Rust 
Belt, might aspire to become; therefore, as the city’s decision-making structure grapples with 
which future it wants to bring about, it remains poised to become either a shining example 
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Quantitative Data Source Tables, 1980 
Variable Description 
Source Table 
(City of Dallas) 
Source Table 
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts) 
Population (all) Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (white) Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (black or African 
American) 
Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (American Indian or 
Alaskan native) 
Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (Asian American, 
Pacific Islander, or native 
Hawaiian) 
Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (other / mixed) Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (nonwhite) Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons Table P1: General Characteristics of Persons 
Population (Hispanic) Table P7: Race & Spanish Origin Table P7: Race & Spanish Origin 
Median Household Income 
Table 3: Summary of Occupation, Income, 
and Poverty Characteristics 
Table P10: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Poverty Rate Table P11: Income & Poverty Status in 1979 Table P11: Income & Poverty Status in 1979 
Unemployment Rate 
Table P10: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Table P10: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Employment: Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting, and mining 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Construction N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Manufacturing 
Table 2: Summary of Labor Force and 
Commuting Characteristics 
Table 2: Summary of Labor Force and 
Commuting Characteristics 
Employment: Wholesale trade N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Retail trade N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Information N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Finance and 
insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Professional, 
scientific, and management, and 




services, and health care and social 
assistance 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Arts, entertainment, 
and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Other services, 










Quantitative Data Source Tables, 1990 
Variable Description 
Source Table 
(City of Dallas) 
Source Table 
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts) 
Population (all) Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (white) Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (black or African 
American) 
Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (American Indian or 
Alaskan native) 
Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (Asian American, 
Pacific Islander, or native 
Hawaiian) 
Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (other / mixed) Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (nonwhite) Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Population (Hispanic) Table 1: General Characteristics of Persons Table 8: Race & Hispanic Origin 
Median Household Income Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989 Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989 
Poverty Rate Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989 Table 19: Income and Poverty Status in 1989 
Unemployment Rate 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Employment: Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting, and mining 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Construction N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Manufacturing 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Employment: Wholesale trade N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Retail trade N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Information N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Finance and 
insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Table 18: Labor Force and Disability 
Characteristics of Persons 
Employment: Professional, 
scientific, and management, and 




services, and health care and social 
assistance 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Arts, entertainment, 
and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
N.D. N.D. 
Employment: Other services, 










Quantitative Data Source Tables, 2000 
Variable Description 
Source Table 
(City of Dallas) 
Source Table 
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts) 
Population (all) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (white) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (black or African 
American) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (American Indian or 
Alaskan native) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (Asian American, 
Pacific Islander, or native 
Hawaiian) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (other / mixed) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (nonwhite) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Population (Hispanic) 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-1: Profile of General Demographic 
Characteristics 
Median Household Income 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Poverty Rate 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Unemployment Rate 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting, and mining 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Construction 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Manufacturing 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Wholesale trade 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Retail trade 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Information 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Finance and 
insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Professional, 
scientific, and management, and 
administrative and waste 
management services 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Educational 
services, and health care and social 
assistance 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Arts, entertainment, 
and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Other services, 
except public administration 
Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 




Table DP-3: Profile of Selected Economic 
Characteristics 






 Appendix 4 
Quantitative Data Source Tables, 2010 
Variable Description 
Source Table 
(City of Dallas) 
Source Table 
(CBD & Oak Cliff Tracts) 
Population (all) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (white) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (black or African 
American) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (American Indian or 
Alaskan native) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (Asian American, 
Pacific Islander, or native 
Hawaiian) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (other / mixed) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (nonwhite) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Population (Hispanic) 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Table QT-P3: Race and Hispanic or Latino 
Origin:  2010 
Median Household Income 
ACS Table B19013: Median Household 
Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2010 
Inflation-Adjusted Dollars) 
ACS Table B19013: Median Household 
Income in the Past 12 Months (in 2010 
Inflation-Adjusted Dollars) 
Poverty Rate 
ACS Table S1701: Poverty Status in the Past 
12 Months 
ACS Table S1701: Poverty Status in the Past 
12 Months 
Unemployment Rate 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting, and mining 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Construction 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Manufacturing 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Wholesale trade 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Retail trade 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Transportation and 
warehousing, and utilities 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Information 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Finance and 
insurance, and real estate and 
rental and leasing 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Professional, 
scientific, and management, and 
administrative and waste 
management services 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Educational 
services, and health care and social 
assistance 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Arts, entertainment, 
and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 
Employment: Other services, 
except public administration 
ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 




ACS Table DP03: Selected Economic 
Characteristics 







Dear [Participant Name]:  
 
My name is Benjamin Leamon, and I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Louisville. 
As part of my dissertation, I am conducting research on the general decision-making process in 
Dallas. Because of your involvement in [Name of Organization], I would like to request your 
participation in a brief survey and interview to help me better understand how projects that affect 
large parts of the city are implemented. Your answers will be completely confidential. In addition, 
the results of the survey will be reported in summary format, so your particular responses cannot be 
linked back to you.  
 
To participate in the study, please contact me by email at benjamin.leamon@louisville.edu, 
or by phone at 502-554-6126.  
 
Thank you for your time and consideration. If you have any questions about the survey, 




Sincerely, Benjamin Leamon  














Census Tract 32.01 Census Tract 32.01 Census Tract 32.01 Merged into 204 
Census Tract 42 Census Tract 42 Split into 42.01 & 42.02   

























All Census Tracts Used in this Study 
Tracts Used to Approximate Downtown Dallas 
Census Tract 17.01 Census Tract 31.01 Census Tract 204 
Census Tract 21 Census Tract 32.01  
Tracts Used to Approximate North Oak Cliff 
Census Tract 20 Census Tract 42.01 Census Tract 42.02 






































Informed Consent Agreement 
 
PLEASE READ THIS DOCUMENT CAREFULLY. YOUR SIGNATURE IS 
REQUIRED FOR PARTICPATION. YOU MUST BE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OF AGE 
TO GIVE YOUR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH. IF YOU DESIRE A 
COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM, YOU MAY REQUEST ONE AND WE WILL 
PROVIDE IT. 
 
Description of the Study: 
This is a one-session study of the nature of Dallas’ decision-making process.  
 
Nature of Participation: 
If you consent to participate, you will be asked to participate in one session, during which you will be asked to 
complete the attached survey.  
 
Purpose of the Study: 
The goal of the survey is to understand how community-wide decisions are made in Dallas, as well as 
understanding the relationships among the people who are most active in this process. We are primarily 




When filling out the survey, you may feel uncomfortable rating the influence of particular individuals. In 
addition, you may feel that you do not have enough information to answer each question.  
 
Possible Benefits: 
When your participation is complete, you will be given an opportunity to learn about this research.  
 
Confidentiality: 
All of your answers will be anonymous, and no identifying markers will be used. In addition, completed surveys 
will be stored within a controlled-access office, inside of a locked cabinet only accessible to the researcher. The 
results of the survey will only be reported in aggregate, and no direct quotations will be used. Finally, please 
remember that no particular person’s responses interest us; we are interested in the general decision-making 
process in Dallas.   
 
Opportunities to Question: 
Please direct questions about this research to: Benjamin Leamon, at (502) 554-6126, or 
benjamin.leamon@louisville.edu.  
 
Statement of Voluntary Participation: 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate, there will not be any 
negative consequences. In addition, if you decide to participate, you may stop participating at any time, also 
with no negative consequences. By signing the supplied form, you are attesting that you understand this 











Signature of Person        









































Thank you for participating in this survey of Dallas’ decision-making process. This 
survey is part of a research project that will help fulfill the requirements for a doctoral 
dissertation at the University of Louisville. The goal of the survey is to understand how 
community-wide decisions are made in Dallas, as well as understanding the relationships 
among the people who are most active in this process. For each question, please answer based 
on your experience and opinions, even if doing so may mean that you cannot answer a 
question in its entirety. While a more complete survey will be more helpful for the project than 
a less-complete one, all answers and responses will benefit the research, and even a partially-




















Section 1: City-Wide Leadership 
Many people would suggest that there is a group of leaders within the city, whose 
members are highly active in making most of the important decisions, especially regarding 
public policy or urban development.  
On the following pages are a series of lists of influential people in Dallas. For each 
person on the list, please complete the table that follows to the best of your knowledge and 
ability, using the following information as a guide: 
1. Rating of Influence– 1 (low) to 4 (high): 
a. In this blank, please indicate how influential this person is with respect to 
policy decisions or development in Dallas, ranging from 1 (not very influential) 
to 4 (highly influential). 
2. Reasoning for Rating:  
a. In this blank, please discuss why you gave this person the rating you did. Again, 
please be aware that these answers will be kept strictly confidential, and will 
not be reproduced in any way.  
3. Committee or Project in the Past 5 Years (circle yes or no): 
a. In this blank, please indicate (yes/no) whether you have worked on a 
committee with this person in the past five years. 
4. Relationship (circle one): 
a. In this blank, please circle the item which best describes your relationship to 
the person 
 
At the bottom of the list are several blank spaces. In those spaces, please list any names you 
feel should be on the list, but who are not currently listed.  
 
 
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be 









1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 






1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Ralph W. Babb 
Jr. 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 
Your Relationship to  
This Person 
Brock K. Bailey 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Gene H. Bishop 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Kim R. Cocklin 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 
Your Relationship to  
This Person 
David E. Daniel 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 





1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
David B. Miller 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 
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Yes                                         
No 
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Yes                                         
No 
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Yes                                         
No 
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Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 





1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Jack C.  
Vaughn, Jr. 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Linda W. Hart 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
David B. Holl 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 















1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 





1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Hunter L. Hunt 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Ray L. Hunt 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 











1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 






Personal friend or 
relative 
Lee F. Jackson 
 
1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 


























1 (low) to 
4 (high) 
Reasoning for Rating 
Committee 
or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 










1             2             




   
Yes                                         
No 












































Section 2: City-Wide Project Committee 
For this section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are responsible for 
a project that will have an impact felt throughout the city, and that this project will require a 
decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly everyone would accept. 
Using the lists from the previous section, as well as your own knowledge of Dallas’ leaders, 
which ten leaders would you choose, and why?  
 
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be 





Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 







Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 








Section 3: Development in Downtown Dallas 
 
In recent years, there has been a tremendous revitalization effort within downtown 
Dallas, with construction of new properties, as well as revitalization of existing ones. For this 
section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are responsible for a new project in 
downtown Dallas, which (like in the previous section) will require a decision to be made by a 
group of leaders, whose opinions nearly everyone would accept.  Using the lists from the 
previous section, as well as your own knowledge of neighborhood leaders, which ten leaders would you 
choose to help with this project, and why?  
 
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be 


























Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 








Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 




Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
































Section 4: Development in North Oak Cliff 
 
In recent years, there has been significant interest in the redevelopment of North Oak 
Cliff, with many organizations and leaders involved in a number of projects throughout the 
neighborhood. For this section, which begins on the next page, imagine that you are 
responsible for a project in North Oak Cliff. Similar to the previous sections, this project will 
require a decision made by a group of leaders – leaders whose opinions nearly everyone would 
accept. Using the lists from the first section, as well as your own knowledge of neighborhood leaders, 
which ten leaders would you choose, and why?  
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations 
will be used without your permission. 
Name 
(Write-In) 
Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 
Your Relationship to  
This Person 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 







Reasoning for Adding to Your Team 
Committee or Project in  
Past 5 Years 
Your Relationship to  
This Person 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 
Personal friend or 
relative 
  Yes                         No 
Never  heard of 
Know slightly 
Know well 







Section 5: Free Response on Leadership in Dallas 
 
In this final section, please record any concluding thoughts on the nature of decision-
making in Dallas, such as your thoughts on how decisions are made, who makes them, or the 
types of people who get most heavily involved in Dallas’ decision-making body, either for the 
city as a whole, or for projects in particular neighborhoods. Please also list any other names of 
people who might be willing to provide additional information that may be helpful for this 
study. 
 
As a reminder: all of your responses are confidential, and no direct quotations will be 





















1. What can you tell me about projects and development in Dallas; specifically – who 
gets involved? 
2. Thinking about how development can differ based on the area, how does 
development in South Dallas and Oak Cliff – like what’s going on with the Bishop 
Arts District and Oak Cliff Gateway -  differ from projects in Downtown, like 
Downtown Dallas 360? 
3. You mentioned that <Organization(s) or Person(s)> was involved in <Development 
Plan> – could you tell me more about that? 















Benjamin C. Leamon 
Urban & Public Affairs, The University of Louisville, Louisville KY 40292 | (502) 554-6126 | benjamin.leamon@louisville.edu 
Education 
Doctor of Philosophy, Urban & Public Affairs - The University of Louisville, 
Louisville KY 
Dissertation Title: Urban governance reconsidered: Assessing the roles of public- 
private- and third-sector leaders in governing the modern city. Anticipated 
graduation: May 2017 
 
2012 - 2017 
Master of Science, Social Work - The University of Louisville, Louisville KY 
 
2010 - 2012 
Bachelor of Science, Psychology — The University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson 
TX 
2005 - 2010 
Courses Taught 
Urban Political Economy — The University of Louisville 
 
This introductory course enables and encourages students to interrogate the nature of 
contemporary urban governance, examining urban problems, solutions, and their 
implications from a variety of perspectives. Students collaborate in diverse teams to 
understand what it means to govern a city in a time of tremendous global changes. 
Spring, 2016 
University Service 
Director of Finance — University of Louisville Student Activities Board, Louisville KY 
 
Chief financial officer, project manager, and administrative coordinator of a seven-committee 
board comprised of students, faculty, staff, and community members dedicated to student 
enrichment and programming at a campus of over 22,500 students. Primarily responsible for 
monthly financial auditing and reporting, management of an approximately $500,000 annual 
operating- and payroll budget, purchasing and vendor relations, contract management in 
conjunction with university legal- and financial staff, and post-event evaluation. Also responsible 
for collaborating with marketing director and university marketing team to develop- and 










Recent Publications & Presentations 
Graduate Research Assistant — University of Louisville, Louisville KY 
 
Data analyst and assistant for sustainability initiatives, responsible for collaborating with 
community partners, university faculty and staff, and public-sector leaders on various projects to 
reduce the University of Louisville’s carbon footprint and encourage behavior change among 
students, faculty, and staff. Also worked with students, faculty, and staff to develop innovating 
programming and leadership opportunities for students and sustainability initiatives. 
 
2012 - 2016 
Appropriations Chair — University of Louisville Student Government Association, Louisville 
KY 
 
Committee director responsible for drafting- and managing the $1.195 million operating budget 
for the university's SGA. Chief activities include managing a team of student leaders in the 
evaluation of funding requests for student programming, student organizations, and student travel 
for both undergraduate and graduate students, ensuring best practices with respect to financial 
record-keeping on behalf of student leaders for 12 colleges and schools, with budgets ranging 
from $1,000 to approximately $45,000, and assisting university staff with training on university 
financial accountability practices and policies. 
 
2014 - 2015 
Director of Green Initiatives — University of Louisville Engage Lead Serve Board, Louisville 
KY 
 
Project manager for sustainability-related student programming and service opportunities. 
Primarily responsible for monthly financial audits, management of a $15,000 project budget, 
stakeholder surveys, supervising student- and community-member volunteers on project sites, and 
regular project evaluations. Also assisted senior leadership to update and streamline governing 
documents, policies, and board procedures. 
 
2014 - 2015 
Liaison to Student Activities Board — University of Louisville Student Government 
Association, Louisville KY 
 
Chief liaison between student programming leaders and student government leaders, responsible 
for facilitating open communication among these stakeholders, and partnering with university staff 
to ensure that that programming volunteers operated within SGA guidelines and university 
policies and procedures, assisting students with event programming and volunteer coordination, 
and assisted programming staff with streamlining and updating policies and procedures. 
2013 - 2015 
Governing Dallas: the nature of governance in the post-industrial commercial republic 
An analysis of the economic- and demographic changes in Dallas, Texas since the 1980s, including 
an assessment of the city’s formal- and informal governance structures, based on interviews with 80 
of the city’s public-, private-, and third-sector leaders, as well as community leadership structures 
based on interviews with community leaders in North Oak Cliff and Downtown Dallas. (UAA 
National Conference, 2016) 
April, 2016 
Weaving sustainability into curricula across disciplines: Challenges and successes from the 
Green Threads faculty workshop 
An evaluation of the effectiveness of a multi-year, multidisciplinary faculty workshop, designed to 











Dallas GrowSouth AmeriCorps VISTA— Office of Mayor Michael S. Rawlings, Dallas, TX 
Facilitated development of neighborhood goals and objectives, and completion of grant-funded 
community improvement projects using public-, private-, and third-sector resources. Engaged 
university students in neighborhood-identified community service projects throughout southern 
Dallas, and developed these “one-off” projects into a recurring service day, coupled with 
ongoing lines of communication between University of North Texas at Dallas staff and local 
community leaders, so that student volunteers can be connected with community projects. 
Developed a research agenda and implementation strategy for Community Court Advisory 
Boards with all Dallas Community Courts. Partnered with City Staff, community leaders, 
student leaders, and area stakeholders to develop- and pilot community-driven solutions to the 
notable problem of stray animals in southern Dallas. 
2016 - Present 
Data Analyst Intern, Community Impact — Metro United Way, Louisville KY 
Assisted with constructing needs assessments for communities of people with low incomes, and 
partnered with marketing team to develop “neighborhood snapshot” reports for partner 
organizations and public access. Assisted with financial audits and organizational vitality studies 
of partner organizations as part of a comprehensive funding restructure. Completed a 
comprehensive analysis of public elementary- middle- and high school feeder patterns to 
maximize the effectiveness of out-of-school time (OST) programs to support federal grant 
applications in partnership with city officials.  
2011 - 2012 
  
Awards & Certificates 
Collaboration of the Year, The University of Louisville Office of Student Involvement 2015 
Graduate Teaching Certificate, The University of Louisville Delphi Center for Teaching and 
Learning 
2015 
Profiles in Leadership, The University of Louisville Student Involvement 2014 
Order of Kentucky Colonels, Kentucky Governor Steve Beshear 2013 
 
 
The medicine doesn’t heal: Differential effects of economic revitalization on social equity 
within low-income communities 
A study of the connections between social equity and economic revitalization in low-income 
majority-white and low-income majority-nonwhite neighborhoods in Louisville, KY, using publicly-
available quantitative indices. (UAA National Conference, 2015). 
April, 2014 
 
